CASE OF BRUN v. SWITZERLAND
### 1. Essence of the Decision
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled unanimously in the case of *Brun v. Switzerland* that Switzerland’s military-service exemption tax, levied on Swiss men unfit for service but not on Swiss women or foreign residents, does not violate the prohibition of discrimination (Article 14 of the Convention) in conjunction with the prohibition of forced labour (Article 4). The applicant, a Swiss national declared medically unfit for military service, argued that being forced to pay this compensatory tax constituted discrimination based on sex and nationality. The Court established that because the exemption tax is intrinsically linked to the obligation to serve, it constitutes a solidarity obligation in national defence rather than a standard fiscal tax, bringing it within the scope of Article 4. However, the Court found that Swiss women and foreign nationals are not in a comparable situation to the applicant because they are not legally obligated to perform military service in the first place. Ultimately, the Court concluded that the underlying differences in the obligation to perform military service itself are objectively and reasonably justified, falling well within Switzerland’s wide margin of appreciation in organizing its national defence.
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### 2. Structure of the Decision, Main Provisions, and Evolution from Previous Case Law
#### Structure of the Decision
* **The Facts:** Details the applicant’s drafting in 2000, his subsequent medical discharge in 2001, the tax assessments for the years 2005 and 2010, and his unsuccessful appeals through the Swiss cantonal and Federal Supreme Courts.
* **Relevant Legal Framework:** Cites the Swiss Federal Constitution (Articles 8, 58, and 59), the Federal Military-Service Exemption Tax Act, and the Federal Army and Military Administration Act.
* **The Law:**
* *Admissibility:* Analyzes whether Article 14 is applicable in tandem with Article 4, concluding that the tax falls within the ambit of “service of a military character” (Article 4 § 3 (b)).
* *Merits:* Evaluates the existence of a “comparable situation” and whether the difference in treatment on the grounds of sex and nationality has an objective and reasonable justification.
* **Holding:** Unanimously declares the application admissible but finds no violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 4.
#### Main Provisions
* **Article 4 Applicability:** The Court confirmed that while Article 4 § 3 (b) excludes military service from the definition of “forced or compulsory labour,” it serves to delimit the right. The exemption tax, as a financial substitute for service, is a national defence solidarity obligation and thus falls within the ambit of Article 4.
* **The Comparator Test:** To establish discrimination under Article 14, there must be a difference in treatment of persons in analogous or relevantly similar situations.
* **Justification of Distinctions:** The Court accepted that excluding foreign nationals from military service (and the tax) is justified by their lack of citizenship rights and the need to avoid bilateral conflicts over dual-service obligations. For women, the distinction is justified by national traditions in military defence and the lack of a European consensus on female conscription.
#### Changes and Distinctions Compared to Previous Case Law
* **Distinction from *Glor v. Switzerland* and *Ryser v. Switzerland*:** In those previous cases, the ECtHR found a violation of Article 14 because the comparator groups (men with severe disabilities versus men with minor disabilities) both had the underlying legal obligation to serve but were taxed differently. In *Brun*, the comparator groups (women and foreigners) have no underlying obligation to serve, meaning they are not in a comparable situation regarding the substitute tax.
* **Distinction from *Karlheinz Schmidt v. Germany*:** In *Schmidt*, the Court found a fire service levy imposed only on men to be discriminatory because the obligation to serve in the fire brigade was purely theoretical (as there were enough volunteers). In *Brun*, the Court highlighted that Swiss military service is a practical reality (with 80% of the army consisting of militia servicemen), meaning the exemption tax retains its genuine compensatory, rather than purely fiscal, character.
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### 3. Main Provisions of the Decision Most Important for Legal Application
For legal practitioners, academic researchers, and policy-makers, the most critical takeaways from this judgment are:
* **The “Underlying Obligation” Principle for Substitute Taxes:** The judgment establishes that a taxpayer cannot successfully claim discrimination regarding a compensatory or substitute tax unless the chosen comparator group shares the same primary underlying legal obligation. Because Swiss women and foreign nationals are not obligated to perform military service, they cannot serve as valid comparators for the tax designed to replace that service.
* **Broad Discretion in National Security:** The Court strongly reaffirms that member states enjoy a “wide margin of appreciation” in organizing their national defence and armed forces. This includes deciding who is conscripted.
* **Strict Standard for Gender-Based Distinctions Maintained but Satisfied:** While the Court reiterated that sex-based differences require “particularly serious reasons” to be justified, it ruled that the protection of national security and the maintenance of an effective militia-based defence system constitute such reasons.
* **The Role of European Consensus:** The Court heavily relied on the fact that, at the material time, there was no European consensus regarding the conscription of women (with Norway being the sole exception since 2013). This lack of consensus directly widened Switzerland’s margin of appreciation.
* **Legitimacy of Citizenship-Based Duties:** The ruling solidifies the principle that states can legitimately tie military service and its financial substitutes to citizenship, validating the exclusion of foreign residents from national defence obligations.
CASE OF SEKSIMP GROUP SRL v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
This judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the case of *Seksimp Group SRL v. the Republic of Moldova* (Just Satisfaction) represents a crucial determination of financial redress following a complex property dispute. The case stems from a domestic litigation where Moldovan courts, without adequate reasoning, ordered the applicant company to pay a private entity compensation, which led to the covert auction of the applicant’s valuable real estate. While the applicant company sought an astronomical sum of nearly one billion euros—primarily claiming lost profits from highly speculative business ventures like an ostrich farm and a water park—the Court rejected this valuation. Instead, the Court focused on the State’s failure to provide a proper forum to protect the applicant’s property rights, characterizing the damage as a compensable “loss of opportunity.” Recognizing that pending reopened domestic proceedings could not fully remedy the loss caused by the undervalued 2011 auction, the Court ruled on the basis of equity. Consequently, the ECtHR unanimously ordered the Republic of Moldova to pay the applicant company EUR 560,000 in respect of pecuniary damage.
### Structure of the Decision and Changes Compared to the Principal Judgment
The structure of this judgment is divided into three main parts:
1. **Procedure (paragraphs 1–6):** This section recaps the procedural history, noting that the principal judgment of 15 May 2025 established violations of Article 6 § 1 (lack of adequate reasoning) and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (failure to provide an effective forum). It details the post-judgment developments, including the Moldovan Supreme Court’s refusal to resolve the compensation issue domestically, and the parties’ failure to reach a friendly settlement, which forced the ECtHR to rule on Article 41.
2. **The Law (paragraphs 7–32):** This core section outlines the parties’ arguments and the Court’s legal assessment. It contrasts the applicant’s massive claim of EUR 997,677,050 (based on 2022 valuation reports and speculative business plans) with the Government’s defense that the claims were speculative, excessive, and should be resolved by domestic courts.
3. **Operative Provisions:** The final, binding clauses where the Court unanimously awards the applicant EUR 560,000 plus interest, and dismisses the remainder of the claims.
**Changes compared to previous versions:**
The principal judgment of May 2025 only established the liability of the Moldovan State but reserved the question of just satisfaction. This current judgment finalizes the proceedings by translating those abstract treaty violations into a concrete monetary award. It also addresses a critical post-judgment shift: the domestic courts attempted to deflect the task of calculating damages back to the state’s executive or the ECtHR itself, prompting the Court to step in and make an independent assessment rather than deferring to the reopened domestic proceedings.
### Main Provisions of the Decision and Their Practical Importance
For legal professionals and journalists tracking international human rights law, several key provisions in this text are highly significant:
* **The “Loss of Opportunity” Principle in Positive Obligations (Paragraph 20):** The Court clarifies that when a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is based on a State’s failure to meet its *positive obligations* (failing to protect a citizen’s rights in a private dispute) rather than direct state expropriation, the compensation does not have to reflect a total elimination of all consequences. Instead, the applicant is compensated for a “real loss of opportunity.”
* **Limits of Domestic Reopening as a Remedy (Paragraphs 23–25):** While the ECtHR often prefers that domestic courts reopen proceedings to fix violations, this text establishes that reopening is insufficient if the primary damage flowed from an irreversible enforcement action (such as an undervalued auction of assets to a third party) and where the domestic framework cannot guarantee recovery from a private debtor. In such cases, the ECtHR will directly award pecuniary damages.
* **Rejection of Speculative Lost Profits (Paragraph 30):** The Court reiterates that running a business inherently involves risks and uncertainties. Hypothetical business plans (like the applicant’s proposed housing developments or ostrich farms) are deemed too speculative to quantify, meaning the Court will not award damages for projected future profits that were never realized.
* **Equitable Assessment of Damages (Paragraph 31):** Where precise calculation of pecuniary loss is impossible due to the inherently uncertain nature of the damage, the Court will exercise its discretion to decide the award on the basis of equity.
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### **** Implications for Ukraine and Ukrainians
This decision holds **** systemic relevance for Ukraine, Ukrainian citizens, and legal practitioners.
Ukraine has historically faced a high volume of cases before the ECtHR concerning the non-enforcement or improper enforcement of domestic judicial decisions, as well as corporate raiding and unlawful asset transfers facilitated by poorly reasoned court orders.
The principles applied in this judgment are highly instructive for Ukrainian litigants:
1. **State Liability for Enforcement Failures:** It reinforces that the Ukrainian State can be held financially liable under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 if its judicial and enforcement systems allow a debtor’s property to be auctioned off covertly or at a gross undervaluation, even if the dispute is purely between private parties.
2. **Reopening of Proceedings is Not a Universal Panacea:** For Ukrainians seeking justice, this case proves that if domestic reopening of civil proceedings cannot realistically restore the lost property (for instance, because it was sold to a bona fide third party), the ECtHR will not force the applicant to exhaust futile domestic civil loops and will instead award direct financial compensation under Article 41.
3. **Standard of Proof for Damages:** Ukrainian businesses claiming damages before the ECtHR must note the Court’s strict rejection of speculative business plans. To claim lost profits successfully, there must be concrete, non-speculative evidence of loss, otherwise, the Court will default to a much lower equitable award.
CASE OF ADDONIZIO AND OTHERS v. ITALY
### 1. Essence of the Decision
The case *Addonizio and Others v. Italy* concerns the environmental and safety hazards arising from the construction and operation of a landfill in the municipality of Sant’Arcangelo Trimonte during Campania’s long-standing waste management crisis. The applicants, local residents, alleged that Italian authorities failed to protect their homes and health from groundwater contamination and landslide risks, thereby violating Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled that Italy violated the substantive aspect of Article 8 because public authorities authorized the landfill on known unstable ground and failed to implement timely safety and clean-up measures. However, the Court rejected the procedural complaint under Article 8, finding that the authorities sufficiently informed the public through official reports and judicial orders. Additionally, the Court dismissed claims from applicants who did not reside directly in the affected municipality, ruling they lacked victim status. Ultimately, the Court held that the finding of a violation itself constituted sufficient just satisfaction for non-pecuniary damage, while awarding EUR 10,000 jointly for legal costs.
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### 2. Structure of the Decision, Main Provisions, and Evolution
The decision is structured systematically into several key sections:
* **Introduction and Procedural History:** Detailing the joinder of applications nos. 67766/11 and 482/13, and the representation of the parties.
* **Subject Matter of the Case:** Outlining the factual background of Campania’s waste crisis (1994–2009), the legislative decrees authorizing the landfill, the geological instability of the site, subsequent criminal proceedings, and environmental reports showing groundwater contamination (mercury, sulphates, manganese).
* **The Court’s Assessment:**
* *Preliminary Objections:* Addressing the government’s objections regarding the applicants’ “victim status” and the exhaustion of domestic remedies.
* *Article 8 (Substantive and Procedural):* Analyzing the merits of the environmental pollution claims and the right to information.
* *Article 13:* Deciding whether a separate examination of domestic remedies is required.
* **Just Satisfaction (Article 41):** Assessing claims for damages and legal costs.
* **Appendix:** Listing the 138 individual applicants, their birth years, and places of residence.
#### Evolution and Comparison with Previous Case-Law
This judgment builds directly upon the principles established in *Di Sarno and Others v. Italy* (2012) and *Locascia and Others v. Italy* (2023), which dealt with the systemic waste crisis in Campania. However, *Addonizio* introduces a stricter application of admissibility criteria regarding geographical proximity. While previous cases allowed broader groups of affected citizens to claim victim status, the Court here strictly separates the applicants: those living in Sant’Arcangelo Trimonte retained victim status due to direct proximity to the landslide-prone site, whereas those living in neighboring Paduli or Benevento were excluded (*ratione personae*) due to a lack of individualized evidence of impact.
Furthermore, regarding the procedural aspect of Article 8 (the duty to inform), the Court aligned with a pragmatic standard, ruling that the publication of parliamentary reports and judicial seizure orders is sufficient to satisfy the state’s duty to inform, thereby narrowing the scope of what constitutes a procedural violation compared to cases where information was entirely withheld.
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### 3. Main Provisions Most Important for Legal and Practical Use
For legal practitioners, environmental advocates, and public authorities, the most critical provisions and findings in this decision include:
* **Strict Geographical Limits on “Victim Status” (Article 35 § 3(a)):** The Court established that in environmental litigation, applicants must prove a direct, individualized link between the environmental hazard and their personal well-being. Living in an adjacent municipality (e.g., Paduli, located near the landfill but not downstream of the landslide path) without specific proof of exposure is insufficient to claim victim status.
* **State Liability for Inadequate Planning and Siting (Substantive Article 8):** The Court confirmed that authorizing a waste disposal facility on land known to be hydrogeologically unstable constitutes a failure to strike a “fair balance” between community interests and individual rights. This provision is highly useful for challenging municipal planning decisions where environmental impact assessments or geological warnings are ignored.
* **Post-Closure and Post-Seizure State Responsibility:** The judgment clarifies that the closure or judicial seizure of a polluting site does not end the state’s positive obligations under Article 8. If a site continues to contaminate groundwater (via leachate leakage) due to delayed or unexecuted remediation plans, the state remains in continuous violation.
* **The Standard for Public Information Dissemination (Procedural Article 8):** The Court ruled that the state satisfies its procedural obligation to inform citizens of environmental risks if the relevant data is contained in publicly accessible documents, such as regional environmental compatibility declarations, parliamentary inquiry reports, or judicial seizure orders. Active, direct notification to each resident is not required.
* **Just Satisfaction Threshold (Article 41):** The Court reiterated that a finding of a violation can, in itself, constitute sufficient just satisfaction for non-pecuniary damage in environmental cases, limiting the availability of financial compensation for moral distress unless severe, direct physical harm is proven.
CASE OF RASPOVIĆ v. CROATIA
### Essence of the Decision
The case of *Raspović v. Croatia* concerns a Croatian lawyer, Ivana Raspović, who was fined for contempt of court after criticizing a judge’s perceived inactivity and professional performance in her written appeals. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled unanimously that these financial penalties violated her right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Although her remarks were strongly worded and delivered in a caustic tone, the Court emphasized that they were made within internal judicial communications aimed at defending her client’s interests, rather than in the public domain. The ECHR highlighted that courts are not immune to criticism and that domestic authorities failed to distinguish between sharp professional criticism and mere personal insults. Ultimately, the Court concluded that the financial penalties imposed on the lawyer were disproportionate and constituted an unnecessary restriction on her professional freedom of speech.
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### Structure of the Decision, Main Provisions, and Evolution of Case-Law
The judgment is structured logically to address both the factual background and the legal standards applied by the Court:
1. **Subject Matter of the Case:** This section outlines the facts, detailing how the applicant was fined twice (first HRK 3,000, then HRK 10,000, later reduced to HRK 4,000 on appeal) by the very judge she criticized, and her subsequent unsuccessful appeals to the Osijek County Court, the Supreme Court, and the Constitutional Court of Croatia. It also notes pending disciplinary proceedings by the Croatian Bar Association.
2. **The Court’s Assessment:**
* **Admissibility:** The Court addresses and rejects the Government’s preliminary objections regarding the compatibility of the application and the applicant’s “victim” status (since she had not yet paid the fines).
* **Merits (Article 10):** The Court analyzes whether the interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression was “necessary in a democratic society,” balancing the protection of the authority of the judiciary against the lawyer’s right to robustly represent her client.
3. **Application of Article 41 (Just Satisfaction):** The Court rules on claims for damages and costs, deciding that the finding of a violation itself constitutes sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage.
#### Evolution and Changes Compared to Previous Case-Law
This decision does not depart from, but rather reinforces and refines, the established ECHR jurisprudence regarding the freedom of expression of legal professionals. Relying on precedents such as *Radobuljac v. Croatia* (2016) and *Pisanski v. Croatia* (2024), the Court solidifies the following legal evolutions:
* **Contextual Assessment:** The decision reinforces the shift away from evaluating offensive words in isolation. It obliges domestic courts to assess the *forum* and *context* of the speech.
* **Internal vs. Public Speech:** It solidifies the distinction between a lawyer criticizing a judge in public media versus doing so in written pleadings (internal court communications). The latter enjoys a much higher threshold of protection.
* **Victim Status and Enforceability:** The Court clarifies that a lawyer does not need to have actually paid an administrative fine to claim a violation of their rights; the mere existence of a legally enforceable penalty is sufficient to establish victim status and prove a “chilling effect.”
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### Main Provisions of the Decision Most Important for Practical Use
For journalists, legal practitioners, and civil society, the most critical takeaways and actionable provisions of this judgment include:
* **The Distinction Between Criticism and Insult (Paragraph 20):** The Court establishes that complaining about judicial delays or a judge’s failure to properly review case files constitutes criticism of the administration of justice, not a personal insult. Even if the tone is “caustic” or strongly worded, it is protected under Article 10 if it is tied to genuine procedural grievances (such as filing acceleratory remedies).
* **Protection of Internal Judicial Communications (Paragraph 19):** Written pleadings, appeals, and internal objections filed within the confines of a courtroom or judicial registry enjoy robust protection. Because the general public is unaware of these communications, they pose a minimal threat to public trust in the judiciary, meaning courts must exercise extreme restraint before punishing lawyers for their contents.
* **Judges and Courts are Not Immune to Scrutiny (Paragraph 20):** The judgment reiterates that the judiciary, as a public institution, must tolerate open criticism and scrutiny. Judges cannot use contempt-of-court fines as a shield to silence lawyers who point out systemic or specific administrative failures.
* **Proportionality of Financial Sanctions (Paragraph 21):** The Court notes that fines amounting to approximately EUR 400 and EUR 530 are significant penalties for a practicing lawyer. When domestic courts fail to balance the severity of the fine against the lawyer’s duty to defend their client, they overstep what is “necessary in a democratic society.”
