### Essence of the Decision
This judgment determines the just satisfaction to be awarded to the applicant company, Seksimp Group SRL, following a principal judgment that found violations of Article 6 § 1 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 by the Republic of Moldova. The case originated from domestic court orders requiring the applicant to pay a private company, which led to the rapid, unnotified auction of its valuable assets at a severely undervalued price. While the applicant claimed nearly EUR 1 billion in pecuniary damages, including massive lost profits from projected business developments like an ostrich farm and a waterpark, the Court found these claims highly speculative. The Court emphasized that the State’s failure to provide a proper forum to protect the applicant’s property rights resulted in a real loss of opportunity, which the pending reopened domestic proceedings could not fully remedy. Ultimately, deciding on an equitable basis, the Court ordered Moldova to pay the applicant EUR 560,000 in respect of pecuniary damage, dismissing the remainder of the claims.
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### Structure of the Decision, Main Provisions, and Changes
The judgment is structured systematically to address the unresolved issue of just satisfaction reserved in the principal judgment:
1. **Procedure and Background**: Recalls the principal judgment of 15 May 2025, which established the violations of the right to a fair trial (Article 6 § 1) and the protection of property (Article 1 of Protocol No. 1), and notes the failure of the parties to reach a friendly settlement.
2. **The Parties’ Submissions**: Contrasts the applicant’s extensive claims for pecuniary damage (totaling EUR 997,677,050 for lost property and speculative business profits) with the Government’s arguments that the claims are speculative, excessive, and should be left to the reopened domestic proceedings.
3. **The Court’s Assessment**: Outlines the general principles of Article 41, analyzes the causal link between the violations and the claimed damage, evaluates the impact of the 2011 auction, and explains why the applicant’s lost profit calculations are unacceptable.
4. **Operative Provisions**: Formally holds that the respondent State must pay the applicant EUR 560,000 plus default interest, dismissing all other claims.
#### Changes compared to previous versions:
This judgment is the final resolution of the Article 41 (just satisfaction) question, which was reserved in the principal judgment of 15 May 2025. While the principal judgment established the State’s liability for failing to provide an adequate forum to protect the applicant’s rights, this judgment quantifies the financial redress. It clarifies that the reopened domestic proceedings—initiated after the principal judgment—cannot fully substitute for the Court’s power to award just satisfaction, particularly because those domestic proceedings are incapable of compensating for the losses arising from the undervalued 2011 auction.
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### Main Provisions of the Decision Important for Practical Use
* **Exhaustion of Remedies vs. Article 41**: The Court reaffirms that the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies, including the option of reopening domestic proceedings, does not apply to just satisfaction claims submitted directly to the Court under Article 41.
* **Positive Obligations vs. Deprivation of Property**: The Court clarifies that when a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 stems from a failure of the State’s positive obligations (rather than direct state deprivation), the compensation does not need to reflect a total elimination of all consequences. Instead, it must compensate for a “real loss of opportunity.”
* **Speculative Lost Profits**: The judgment establishes that highly speculative business plans (such as unexecuted development projects on agricultural land) cannot form the basis for precise pecuniary damage calculations due to the inherent risks and uncertainties of business activities.
* **Equitable Assessment**: Where precise calculation of pecuniary loss is prevented by the inherently uncertain nature of the damage, the Court will exercise its discretion to decide the award on the basis of equity.
#### **** (Implications for Ukraine and Ukrainians)
This decision is highly relevant to Ukraine and Ukrainian litigants, as the Court explicitly relies on key Ukrainian precedents—such as *Kryvenkyy v. Ukraine*, *Sovtransavto Holding v. Ukraine*, and *East West Alliance Limited v. Ukraine*—to define the boundaries of state liability, the calculation of lost profits, and the limits of domestic reopening as a remedy.
For Ukrainian legal practitioners and corporate entities, this decision reinforces how the Court assesses “loss of opportunity” and speculative damages in commercial disputes where domestic enforcement proceedings have unlawfully liquidated assets. It underscores that even if domestic civil proceedings are reopened in Ukraine, the ECHR remains competent to award direct just satisfaction if the domestic mechanism cannot fully remedy the enforcement-related losses, particularly regarding undervalued asset auctions.
