The judgment in *Dönmez and Others v. Türkiye* (2026) addresses a series of applications concerning convictions for membership in the “FETÖ/PDY” organization following the 2016 coup attempt in Türkiye. The core issue before the Court was the domestic judicial practice of relying decisively on the use of the encrypted messaging application “ByLock” as sufficient, automatic proof of criminal membership in an armed terrorist organization. The Court found that this approach, which effectively imposed objective liability on users, violated the principle of legality under Article 7 of the Convention. By treating the mere use of the application as conclusive evidence of all constituent elements of the crime, the domestic courts failed to conduct an individualized assessment of the applicants’ specific criminal conduct. Consequently, the Court ruled that there has been a violation of Article 7, while finding it unnecessary to examine other complaints separately. This decision reinforces the precedent set in *Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye* and confirms that the systemic issues identified in that Grand Chamber ruling remain a point of contention in Turkish jurisprudence. ****
### Structure and Provisions
The decision is structured as a Committee judgment, reflecting the Court’s established practice for repetitive cases. It follows a standard format:
* **Subject Matter:** Outlines the legal context, specifically the reliance on ByLock and other circumstantial evidence (e.g., Bank Asya accounts, association memberships).
* **Assessment:** The Court joins the 34 applications due to their identical legal nature. It addresses the Article 7 complaint by reaffirming the principles established in *Yüksel Yalçınkaya* and *Demirhan and Others*.
* **Article 41 (Just Satisfaction):** The Court determines that the finding of a violation constitutes sufficient just satisfaction, emphasizing that the applicants have a domestic remedy available: the reopening of their criminal proceedings under Article 311 § 1 (f) of the Turkish Code of Criminal Procedure.
* **Changes:** Unlike earlier individual cases, this judgment serves as a consolidation of repetitive applications, confirming that the Court will not deviate from its established stance on the “ByLock” evidence issue, regardless of whether additional circumstantial evidence was present in specific files.
### Key Provisions for Legal Use
For legal practitioners and observers, the most critical aspects of this decision are:
1. **Reaffirmation of the “ByLock” Standard:** The Court explicitly states that it sees no reason to depart from its findings in *Yüksel Yalçınkaya*. It clarifies that while other evidence (e.g., witness statements, financial records) may exist, the domestic courts’ reliance on ByLock as *conclusive* proof of membership violates Article 7.
2. **Procedural Redress:** The judgment highlights that the primary remedy for these applicants is the reopening of their domestic trials. The Court explicitly links its finding of a violation to the applicants’ right to seek such a reopening, which is the most significant practical consequence of this ruling.
3. **Judicial Economy:** By finding a violation of Article 7, the Court exercises judicial economy, declining to examine Article 6 § 1 (fair trial) and other complaints separately. This signals that the Article 7 violation is the “main legal question” that effectively covers the core of the applicants’ grievances regarding their convictions.
4. **Individualization Requirement:** The judgment underscores that even if an applicant has an “organic link” to an organization, the domestic courts must still prove the “continuity, diversity, and intensity” of their activities rather than relying on a blanket presumption of guilt derived from the use of a specific communication tool.
