Review of the EU legislation for 04/09/2025

Commission Regulation (EU) 2025/1783 (Bigeye Tuna Closure for Portugal):
This regulation effectively closes the Atlantic Ocean to Portuguese vessels targeting bigeye tuna. It states that Portugal has exhausted its 2025 quota for this species as of August 7, 2025. Portuguese-flagged vessels are prohibited from any further bigeye tuna fishing activities in the Atlantic, including catching, retaining, relocating, transshipping, or landing any bigeye tuna caught after this date.
Commission Regulation (EU) 2025/1781 (Herring Closure for Ireland):
This regulation restricts Irish herring fishing in specific areas of the Atlantic. Specifically, it prohibits vessels flying the flag of Ireland from fishing for herring in areas 6b and 6aN, as well as United Kingdom and international waters of 5b, as of August 1, 2025. This action is taken because Ireland’s 2025 herring quota for this stock has been exhausted. The key exception is that herring caught *before* the closure date can still be transshipped, retained, processed, transferred, caged, fattened, and landed. Accidental catches of herring after the closure date must be kept on board, recorded, landed, and counted against the existing quota.
General Court Judgment on “TUNA” Trademark:
The General Court upheld the EUIPO decision. The court agreed that a trademark for “TUNA” is deceptive when used for goods or services unrelated to tuna fish. The case centered on whether the mark was misleading to consumers. The court found that the mark ‘TUNA’ would be deceptive to the average consumer in Ireland and Malta, given their understanding and perception of the goods in question. Deceptive nature of a mark must be assessed “per se,” and external factors such as the use made of it, should not be considered. The Court stated that there is no need for an intention to deceive the consumer for the refusal to apply.
General Court Judgment on Hallux Valgus Orthosis Design:
The General Court has dismissed the action that challenged the validity of a registered Community design for an orthosis used for hallux valgus (bunion). The court agreed with the EUIPO’s decision to reject the request to invalidate the design owned by Hallufix AG. The judgment states that party seeking invalidation must prove that all the appearance features of the orthosis were exclusively dictated by technical functions.
General Court Judgment on Termination of Recruitment due to Unfitness:
The General Court rejected a claim by an applicant. Applicant was not hired by the European Commission. The decision was made due to her medical report stating that she was physically unfit for the job. The Court found that the Commission’s decision was lawful, and that Applicant was not entitled to damages. The Court examined medical reports and found that it was not flawed and that the Commission had not violated the principles of good administration or duty of care.
General Court Judgment on “W&B TV” Trademark:
The General Court dismissed an appeal by W&B Television GmbH, upholding the EUIPO’s decision to send the case back to the Opposition Division for further examination. The dispute involved an opposition to the registration of the “W&B TV” mark, based on the earlier “WB” mark. The court rejected the arguments by W&B TV concerning the likelihood of confusion and the admissibility of new evidence.
General Court Judgment on “Princesse de Paris” Trademark:
The General Court upheld the EUIPO’s decision, rejecting Princesse de Paris SARL’s claim that there was no likelihood of confusion between the trademarks. It involved a dispute where Printsesa Sheih Khaled i s-ie OOD opposed the registration of “Princesse de Paris” based on their earlier Bulgarian figurative trademark “Princess P Gold.” The court found similarities between the marks in the perception of the relevant public.
General Court Judgment on Zalando’s VLOP Designation:
The General Court has dismissed Zalando’s action challenging its designation as a Very Large Online Platform (VLOP) under the Digital Services Act (DSA). The court agreed with the Commission that Zalando met the criteria for VLOP status and rejected Zalando’s arguments that the Commission incorrectly calculated its average monthly active recipients and that the DSA’s provisions violated legal certainty, equal treatment, and proportionality. This decision confirms that Zalando is subject to the stricter obligations imposed on VLOPs under the DSA.
General Court Judgment on Sanctions Against Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich Boguslayev:
The General Court has annulled the Council’s decisions to maintain Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich Boguslayev on the EU’s sanctions list. The court found that the Council did not provide sufficient evidence to justify maintaining Mr. Boguslayev on the list, especially given his changed circumstances, including his detention by Ukrainian authorities and removal from his position at Motor Sich. However, the court rejected Mr. Boguslayev’s claim for damages, finding insufficient evidence of actual harm to his reputation. The Council must now reassess its position regarding Mr. Boguslayev.
General Court Judgment on Access to State Aid Documents (Huhtamaki):
The General Court rejected Huhtamaki’s challenge to the European Commission’s decision to deny access to documents related to State aid procedures (specifically, advance tax agreements granted by Luxembourg). The court confirmed the existing general presumption of confidentiality for documents in State aid review procedures and held that Huhtamaki failed to demonstrate an overriding public interest that would justify overriding this confidentiality. It’s a confirmation of current legal thought on the issue.
General Court Judgment on CO2 Emission Standards and Wheelchair-Accessible Vehicles (London EV Co.):
The General Court dismissed London EV Co.’s challenge to the Commission’s decision regarding CO2 emission performance standards. The core issue was whether the Commission correctly excluded London EV Co.’s wheelchair-accessible vehicles from the scope of Regulation (EU) 2019/631. The court upheld the Commission’s interpretation, finding that the regulation does not apply to special purpose vehicles, including wheelchair-accessible vehicles. As a result, London EV Co. could not fully participate in the carbon pooling mechanism.
General Court Judgment on “OMV!” Trademark (Invalidity):
The General Court annulled a decision by the EUIPO Board of Appeal regarding the trademark “OMV!” (owned by Combe International LLC) and the earlier “OMV” trademarks (owned by OMV AG). The court found that the Board of Appeal made an error in assessing whether a link existed between the marks, particularly given the similarity of the signs, the reputation of the earlier trade marks, and the proximity of the goods and services. The case will now be sent back to the EUIPO for further assessment.
General Court Judgment on Sanctions Against Alisher Usmanov:
The General Court upheld the EU’s sanctions against Alisher Usmanov. Court confirms that the restrictive measures were imposed due to Usmanov’s ties to the Russian government and involvement in actions undermining Ukraine’s territorial integrity. The court rejected his claims of distorted evidence, errors of assessment, and breaches of his fundamental rights, finding that the Council provided sufficient justification for maintaining Usmanov on the sanctions list.
General Court Judgment on “Discovery” Trademark and Hookahs:
The General Court has overturned an EUIPO decision revoking the “Discovery” trademark for “hookahs.” The court held that the Board of Appeal incorrectly treated “stems for hookahs” as a separate subcategory from “hookahs,” and found that evidence of genuine use for “stems for hookahs” could be considered genuine use for “hookahs” themselves.
General Court Judgment on “SANDOKAN” Trademark (Bad Faith):
The General Court upheld the EUIPO’s decision to declare the “SANDOKAN” trademark invalid. The court confirmed that Kartroi LLC acted in bad faith when applying for the trademark, with the aim of circumventing non-use revocation of a prior trademark and obstructing the activities of Luxvide, which was planning a “Sandokan” TV series. The judgment states that this kind of action implies a dishonest state of mind or intent.
General Court Judgment on State Aid to Česká pošta (Czech Post):
The General Court dismissed a challenge by Zásilkovna, a parcel delivery company, against the European Commission’s decision to approve State aid granted by the Czech Republic to Česká pošta (Czech Post). Zásilkovna claimed the compensation for universal service obligations was incompatible with EU law. The court upheld the Commission’s decision, finding no manifest errors in its assessment of the compatibility of the compensation with the internal market.
General Court Judgment on “OMV! BY VAGISIL” Trademark (Invalidity – 2nd time):
The General Court (for a second time) annulled an EUIPO Board of Appeal decision regarding the “OMV! BY VAGISIL” trademark, owned by Combe International LLC. This action was brought by OMV AG, based on their earlier “OMV” marks. The court again found that the Board of Appeal underestimated the reputation of the earlier OMV marks and failed to properly assess the link between the marks in the eyes of the public. The case is remanded back to the EUIPO for another evaluation.
General Court Judgment on “SANDOKAN” Trademark (Non-Use):
The General Court upheld the EUIPO’s decision to revoke the “SANDOKAN” trademark due to lack of genuine use. The trademark holder, Kartroi LLC, failed to provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the mark had been genuinely used in the EU for a continuous period of five years. The court found that the evidence presented, such as sales figures and website impressions, was insufficient to prove genuine use and rejected the arguments related to social media engagement.
General Court Judgment on EU-U.S. Data Privacy Framework:
The General Court upheld the European Commission’s decision that the EU-U.S. Data Privacy Framework provides an adequate level of data protection. This allows personal data to continue flowing from the EU to participating US companies. The court addressed concerns about the independence of the Data Protection Review Court (DPRC), bulk data collection by US intelligence, and protections against automated decision-making, and concluded that the framework ensures a level of protection substantially equivalent to EU law.
General Court Judgment on Eti Gıda vs. Star Foods (Packaging Design):
The General Court dismissed Eti Gıda’s action. The court upholds the EUIPO Board of Appeal’s decision invalidating Eti Gıda’s design for decoration on bags of packaging. The Board had determined it was similar to existing trademarks owned by Star Foods E.M. SRL. The key question was whether there was a likelihood of confusion between the contested design and the earlier mark.
General Court Judgment on “VENERE” Trademark (Rice):
The General Court has upheld the EUIPO’s decision to declare the “VENERE” trademark invalid for rice products. The court agreed that the term “VENERE” is descriptive of a type of black rice and therefore lacks the distinctiveness required for trademark protection.
General Court Judgment on Motorcycle Speed Variator Design:
The General Court upheld the EUIPO’s decision regarding the design of a motorcycle speed variator. The Court agreed with the EUIPO decision. It confirmed the EUIPO did not err in its assessment. The design when applied to a speed variator mounted externally on a competition motorcycle, does not match normal use.
General Court Judgment on “VENERE” Trademark (Rice – Repeat):
The General Court has again confirmed the EUIPO’s decision that the trademark “VENERE” is invalid for goods including rice. This is on the basis that the mark is descriptive and lacks distinctiveness, because it relates to a known variety of black rice. The decision supports the need for a trademark to be inherently distinctive to be protected.
General Court Judgment on Eti Gıda vs. Star Foods (Packaging Design – Repeat):
The General Court dismissed Eti Gıda’s action, upholding the EUIPO Board of Appeal’s decision. It also confirmed that there was likelihood of confusion between Eti Gıda’s packaging and Star Foods earlier Trademarks, leading to the invalidity of the design. The decision emphasized the right of trademark holders to prevent the use of similar marks that could cause confusion among consumers.
General Court Judgment on Eti Gıda vs. Star Foods (Packaging Design – Repeat):
The General Court again addressed the Eti Gıda vs. Star Foods case, upholding the EUIPO’s decision. It ruled to confirm that that Eti Gıda’s packaging design was similar to the registered Trademark owned by Star Foods. It was likely to cause confusion among consumers, which is a reason for invalidity.

Review of each of legal acts published today:

Commission Regulation (EU) 2025/1783 of 29 August 2025 establishing a fisheries closure for bigeye tuna in the Atlantic Ocean for vessels flying the flag of or registered in Portugal

This Commission Regulation (EU) 2025/1783 establishes a fisheries closure for bigeye tuna in the Atlantic Ocean specifically for vessels flying the flag of or registered in Portugal. It declares that Portugal’s fishing quota for bigeye tuna in the Atlantic Ocean for 2025 has been exhausted. As a result, it prohibits fishing activities for bigeye tuna in the Atlantic Ocean by Portuguese vessels from a specified date. The regulation also prohibits retaining, relocating, transhipping, or landing bigeye tuna caught by these vessels after that date.

The Regulation consists of three articles and an annex. Article 1 states that the fishing quota allocated to Portugal for bigeye tuna in the Atlantic Ocean for 2025 is deemed exhausted from the date set out in the Annex. Article 2 prohibits fishing activities for bigeye tuna by vessels flying the flag of or registered in Portugal from the date set out in the Annex, including retaining, relocating, transhipping or landing fish from that stock caught after that date. Article 3 specifies that the Regulation enters into force on the day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. The Annex specifies the Member State (Portugal), the stock (BET/ATLANT), the species (Bigeye tuna – Thunnus obesus), the zone (Atlantic Ocean), and the closing date (7 August 2025).

The most important provision is Article 2, which explicitly prohibits fishing activities for bigeye tuna by Portuguese vessels in the Atlantic Ocean after the specified closing date. This includes a ban on retaining, relocating, transhipping, or landing any bigeye tuna caught after that date, ensuring compliance with the quota limits.

Commission Regulation (EU) 2025/1781 of 29 August 2025 establishing a fisheries closure for herring in areas 6b and 6aN; United Kingdom and international waters of 5b for vessels flying the flag of Ireland

This Commission Regulation (EU) 2025/1781 establishes a fisheries closure for herring in specific areas, namely 6b and 6aN, as well as United Kingdom and international waters of 5b, for vessels flying the flag of Ireland. This action is prompted by the fact that the allocated fishing quota for this herring stock for Ireland in 2025 has been exhausted. As a result, the regulation prohibits fishing activities targeting this stock by Irish vessels in the specified areas.

The regulation consists of three articles and an annex. Article 1 declares the quota exhaustion for the specified herring stock allocated to Ireland for 2025. Article 2 outlines the prohibitions, including fishing, searching for fish, and deploying fishing gear for the purpose of catching the stock. However, it allows for transshipping, retaining, processing, transferring, caging, fattening, and landing of fish caught before the closure date. It also addresses unintended catches, requiring them to be retained on board, recorded, landed, and counted against quotas. Article 3 states that the Regulation enters into force on the day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. The annex specifies the Member State (Ireland), the stock (HER/5B6ANB), the species (Herring), the zone (6b and 6aN; United Kingdom and international waters of 5b) and the closing date (1 August 2025).

The most important provision is Article 2, which directly prohibits fishing activities for the specified herring stock by Irish vessels after the closing date. However, the allowance for continued handling of catches taken before the closure date and the protocol for unintended catches are also significant for ensuring compliance and minimizing disruption to fishing operations.

Judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) of 3 September 2025.Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren eV v European Union Intellectual Property Office.EU trade mark – Invalidity proceedings – EU word mark TUNA – Absolute ground for refusal – Mark of such a nature as to deceive the public – Article 7(1)(g) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 – Article 63(3) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 – Authority of a final decision.Case T-377/24.

This judgment concerns the annulment of the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) regarding the invalidity of the EU trade mark “TUNA.” The Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren eV, the applicant, sought to annul the decision that declared their “TUNA” mark invalid due to its potential to deceive the public. The core issue revolves around whether the “TUNA” mark, used for goods and services not related to tuna fish, could mislead consumers.

The structure of the judgment is as follows:
– It begins by outlining the background of the dispute, including the application for and registration of the “TUNA” mark, the subsequent application for a declaration of invalidity by Inaba Shokuhin, and the decisions of the Cancellation Division and the Board of Appeal.
– It identifies the applicable law, noting that while the substantive law is based on Regulation No 207/2009, procedural rules are governed by Regulation 2017/1001.
– It addresses the subject matter of the proceedings, particularly a request for limitation of the goods and services covered by the contested mark, which the Court decides cannot be taken into account.
– It then examines the applicant’s two pleas in law: (1) infringement of Article 52(1)(a) of Regulation No 207/2009, read in conjunction with Article 7(1)(g) thereof (the mark is deceptive), and (2) infringement of Article 63(3) of Regulation 2017/1001 (authority of a final decision).

The main provisions and changes compared to previous versions are not explicitly detailed, as the judgment focuses on the specific case and the application of existing regulations. The judgment does not introduce new legislation but interprets and applies existing EU trade mark regulations.

The most important provisions for its use are:
– The interpretation and application of Article 7(1)(g) of Regulation No 207/2009, which prohibits the registration of trade marks that are deceptive.
– The criteria for assessing the likelihood of deception, including the relevant public’s perception and the potential for consumers to be misled about the nature or quality of goods and services.
– The ruling that the Board of Appeal did not err in finding that the public by reference to which the registrability of the contested mark had to be assessed was the general public in Ireland and Malta, with an average level of attention for the goods in Classes 29 to 31 and the services in Class 35, with the exception of wholesale services in respect of which a high level of attention had been established.
– The emphasis on the importance of assessing the deceptive nature of a mark “per se,” without considering external factors such as the use made of it.
– The clarification that the application of the ground for refusal in Article 7(1)(g) of Regulation 2017/1001 does not require an intention to deceive the consumer.

Arrêt du Tribunal (septième chambre) du 3 septembre 2025.#DJO LLC contre Office de l’Union européenne pour la propriété intellectuelle.#Dessin ou modèle de l’Union européenne – Procédure de nullité – Dessin ou modèle de l’Union européenne enregistré représentant une orthèse pour hallux valgus – Motif de nullité – Non-respect des conditions de protection – Article 25, paragraphe 1, sous b), du règlement (CE) no 6/2002 – Caractéristiques de l’apparence d’un produit exclusivement imposées par la fonction technique de celui-ci – Article 8, paragraphe 1, du règlement no 6/2002.#Affaire T-1102/23.

This document is a judgment from the General Court of the European Union regarding the validity of a registered Community design for an orthosis used for hallux valgus (a bunion). The court dismisses the action brought by DJO LLC against the decision of the EUIPO (European Union Intellectual Property Office), which had previously rejected DJO LLC’s request to invalidate the design owned by Hallufix AG and Vitus Maria Huber.

The judgment is structured as follows:
1. **Background:** Describes the initial application for the design, the product it relates to (“Gouttières [bandages chirurgicaux]”), and the grounds for the invalidity request (Article 25(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 in conjunction with Article 8(1) of the same regulation). DJO LLC argued that the design’s features are solely dictated by the product’s technical function.
2. **EUIPO Decision:** Outlines that the EUIPO’s Cancellation Division initially rejected the invalidity request, and the Board of Appeal upheld this decision, finding that DJO LLC had not demonstrated that the design’s features were exclusively dictated by technical considerations.
3. **Arguments of the Parties:** Summarizes the arguments of DJO LLC (the applicant), EUIPO (the defendant), and Hallufix AG and Vitus Maria Huber (the interveners). DJO LLC seeks annulment or reformation of the EUIPO decision, while the EUIPO and the interveners seek dismissal of the action.
4. **Legal Assessment:** This is the core of the judgment, where the court analyzes the legal arguments. It refers to Article 25(1)(b) and Article 8(1) of Regulation No 6/2002, which state that a design can be invalidated if it does not meet the requirements of Articles 4 to 9, and that a design does not confer rights on features solely dictated by technical function. The court outlines a three-step test for assessing this:
* Determine the technical function of the product.
* Analyze the appearance features of the product.
* Examine whether these features are exclusively dictated by the technical function, considering all relevant objective circumstances.
5. **Court’s Reasoning:** The court upholds the EUIPO’s decision, finding that DJO LLC failed to prove that all the appearance features of the orthosis were exclusively dictated by technical functions. The court examines the evidence presented by DJO LLC, including a patent, a declaration from a technician, and advertising materials, and finds them insufficient to demonstrate that the specific shape of the orthosis and bandages was solely determined by technical requirements. The court emphasizes that the burden of proof lies with the party seeking invalidation.
6. **Conclusion:** The court dismisses DJO LLC’s action and orders DJO LLC to bear the costs of the proceedings.

The main provisions of the act that may be the most important for its use are:
* **Article 25(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 6/2002:** This article is the basis for invalidating a Community design. It states that a design can be declared invalid if it does not meet the conditions set out in Articles 4 to 9 of the same regulation.
* **Article 8(1) of Regulation (EC) No 6/2002:** This article specifies that a Community design does not grant rights to features of appearance that are exclusively dictated by the technical function of the product. This is a key limitation on the scope of design protection.
* **The three-step test:** The court’s articulation of the three-step test for assessing whether a design feature is exclusively dictated by technical function provides a framework for analyzing design validity in similar cases.

Arrêt du Tribunal (dixième chambre) du 3 septembre 2025.#DF contre Commission européenne.#Fonction publique – Agents contractuels – Recrutement – Refus d’engagement pour inaptitude physique à l’exercice des fonctions – Avis de la commission médicale – Étendue de la compétence de la commission médicale – Lien compréhensible entre les constatations médicales et la conclusion d’inaptitude – Devoir de sollicitude – Principe de bonne administration – Responsabilité – Préjudices matériel et moral.#Affaire T-153/24.

This is a judgment of the General Court of the European Union regarding a dispute between DF (the applicant) and the European Commission (the defendant) concerning the Commission’s decision to terminate DF’s recruitment process due to a finding of physical unfitness for the job. DF sought the annulment of the Commission’s decision and compensation for the material and moral damages she allegedly suffered as a result.

**Structure and Main Provisions:**

The judgment is structured as follows:

* **Background:** It outlines the factual background of the case, including DF’s prior work history, her diagnosis with burnout, her application for a position at the Commission, the medical examinations she underwent, and the negative medical opinions that led to the termination of her recruitment process.
* **Procedure:** It describes the administrative procedure, including DF’s request for access to her medical file, her appeal to a medical committee, and her subsequent complaint against the Commission’s decision.
* **Claims of the Parties:** It summarizes the arguments made by DF and the Commission. DF argued that the Commission’s decision was based on an flawed report from the medical committee and violated the principles of good administration and duty of care.
* **Decision of the Court:** The Court rejects all of DF’s claims. It finds that the Commission’s decision was lawful and that DF was not entitled to compensation for the damages she allegedly suffered.

**Main Provisions and Changes:**

* The Court examines whether the medical committee’s report was flawed, specifically addressing DF’s arguments that the committee failed to consider her medical certificate, that there was no comprehensible link between the medical findings and the conclusion of unfitness, and that the committee misinterpreted the concept of “future disorders.”
* The Court upholds the Commission’s decision, finding that the medical committee’s report was not flawed and that the Commission had not violated the principles of good administration or duty of care.
* The Court rejects DF’s claim for compensation, finding that she had not established a causal link between the Commission’s actions and the damages she allegedly suffered.

**Most Important Provisions:**

* The Court’s analysis of the medical committee’s report and its conclusion that the report was not flawed.
* The Court’s finding that the Commission had not violated the principles of good administration or duty of care.
* The Court’s rejection of DF’s claim for compensation.

Urteil des Gerichts (Achte Kammer) vom 3. September 2025.#W&B Television GmbH gegen Amt der Europäischen Union für geistiges Eigentum.#Unionsmarke – Widerspruchsverfahren – Internationale Registrierung mit Benennung der Europäischen Union – Bildmarke W&B TV – Ältere Unionsbildmarke WB – Relatives Eintragungshindernis – Verwechslungsgefahr – Art. 8 Abs. 1 Buchst. b der Verordnung (EU) 2017/1001 – Zurückverweisung der Sache an die Widerspruchsabteilung.#Rechtssache T-466/24.

This document is a judgment by the General Court of the European Union (Eighth Chamber) regarding a trademark dispute between W&B Television GmbH and the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), with Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. as an intervening party. The case concerns an opposition to the registration of the figurative mark “W&B TV” as a European Union trademark, based on the earlier figurative EU trademark “WB”. The court ultimately dismisses W&B Television GmbH’s appeal, supporting the EUIPO’s decision to send the case back to the Opposition Division for further examination.

The structure of the judgment includes an introduction outlining the request for annulment of the EUIPO’s decision, followed by a summary of the factual background, including the details of the contested and earlier trademarks, the opposition proceedings, and the decision of the Board of Appeal. The judgment then presents the arguments of the parties, followed by the legal reasoning of the General Court. This reasoning addresses two pleas raised by W&B Television GmbH: violation of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 (likelihood of confusion) and violation of Article 95(2) of the same regulation (admissibility of new evidence before the Board of Appeal). The court rejects both pleas and dismisses the action.

The most important provisions of the act for its use are those concerning the assessment of the likelihood of confusion between trademarks. The court reiterates established principles, such as the need for a global assessment taking into account all relevant factors, including the similarity of the signs and the goods or services, and the perception of the relevant public. The judgment also clarifies the criteria for assessing the similarity of signs, emphasizing the importance of the dominant and distinctive elements. Additionally, the judgment provides guidance on the level of attention of the relevant public and the admissibility of new evidence in appeal proceedings.

Arrêt du Tribunal (première chambre) du 3 septembre 2025.#Princesse de Paris contre Office de l’Union européenne pour la propriété intellectuelle.#Marque de l’Union européenne – Procédure d’opposition – Demande de marque de l’Union européenne verbale Princesse de Paris – Marque nationale figurative antérieure Princess P Gold – Motif relatif de refus – Risque de confusion – Article 8, paragraphe 1, sous b), du règlement (UE) 2017/1001 – Preuve de l’usage sérieux – Article 47, paragraphes 2 et 3, du règlement 2017/1001.#Affaire T-525/24.

This is a judgment from the General Court of the European Union regarding a trademark dispute. Princesse de Paris SARL applied for a European Union trademark for the word mark “Princesse de Paris”. Printsesa Sheih Khaled i s-ie OOD opposed the registration based on their earlier Bulgarian figurative trademark “Princess P Gold”. The EUIPO’s Board of Appeal rejected Princesse de Paris SARL’s appeal, finding a likelihood of confusion. The General Court upheld the Board of Appeal’s decision, rejecting Princesse de Paris SARL’s claim that there was no likelihood of confusion between the trademarks.

The judgment is structured as follows: It begins with the background of the dispute, detailing the trademark application, the opposition, and the decision of the Board of Appeal. It then outlines the arguments presented by both parties (Princesse de Paris SARL and EUIPO). The Court then addresses the competence of the Tribunal, and then proceeds to the legal analysis, which is divided into preliminary observations and then a structured analysis of the single plea raised by the applicant, which is further divided into three grievances. Finally, the Court rules on the costs of the proceedings.

The most important provisions of the judgment relate to the assessment of the likelihood of confusion between trademarks. The Court reiterates the established principles for assessing the likelihood of confusion, including the need for a global assessment, taking into account all relevant factors, such as the similarity of the marks, the similarity of the goods/services, and the perception of the relevant public. The Court also emphasizes that the earlier mark benefits from a presumption of validity and cannot be considered as devoid of any distinctive character in the context of an opposition proceeding.

Judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber, Extended Composition) of 3 September 2025.Zalando SE v European Commission.Digital services – Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 – Designation of a very large online platform – Plea of illegality – Article 33(1) and (4) of Regulation 2022/2065 – Legal certainty – Equal treatment – Proportionality – Obligation to state reasons.Case T-348/23.

This is a judgment from the General Court of the European Union regarding the designation of Zalando SE as a very large online platform (VLOP) under the Digital Services Act (DSA), Regulation (EU) 2022/2065. Zalando sought annulment of the Commission’s decision to designate it as a VLOP, arguing that it did not meet the criteria. The court ultimately dismissed Zalando’s action, upholding the Commission’s decision.

The judgment is structured as follows:
* **Background:** It describes Zalando’s business model, which includes both direct sales (Zalando Retail) and sales by third-party sellers (Partner Programm). It also outlines the process leading to the Commission’s decision, including Zalando’s reporting of its average monthly active recipients (AMAR) and the Commission’s preliminary conclusions.
* **Forms of order sought:** It lists the requests made by Zalando and the supporting parties (annulment of the Commission’s decision) and the responses from the Commission and the intervening parties (dismissal of the action).
* **Law:** It presents the three pleas in law raised by Zalando:
1. Infringement of specific articles of Regulation 2022/2065 regarding the definition of online platforms and the AMAR threshold.
2. Illegality of Article 33(1) and (4) of Regulation 2022/2065, read in conjunction with Article 24(2), due to violations of legal certainty, equal treatment, and proportionality.
3. Infringement of Article 296 TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) regarding the obligation to state reasons.
* **Court’s reasoning:** The court systematically addresses each of Zalando’s pleas, rejecting them all. It clarifies the definitions of “online platform,” “intermediary service,” and “active recipient,” emphasizing that the DSA applies to platforms that host and disseminate information from third parties, even if they also sell their own products. The court also upholds the Commission’s calculation of Zalando’s AMAR, finding that it was based on a correct interpretation of the DSA.
* **Costs:** The court orders Zalando to pay the costs of the Commission, while the other intervening parties bear their own costs.

The most important provisions of the act for its use are:

* **Definition of “online platform” (Article 3(i) of Regulation 2022/2065):** The court clarifies that a marketplace like Zalando, which hosts and disseminates information from third-party sellers, qualifies as an online platform under the DSA, even if it also sells its own products.
* **Definition of “active recipient” (Article 3(p) of Regulation 2022/2065):** The court confirms that an active recipient is someone who has been exposed to information on the platform, not just those who have made a purchase. This is a broad definition that includes anyone who views or interacts with content on the platform.
* **AMAR threshold (Article 33(1) and (4) of Regulation 2022/2065):** The court upholds the Commission’s authority to designate platforms with 45 million or more active recipients as VLOPs, subjecting them to stricter obligations under the DSA.
* **Obligations of VLOPs (Articles 34-43 of Regulation 2022/2065):** Although not directly addressed in the judgment, the court’s decision confirms that Zalando is subject to these obligations, which include risk assessment, mitigation measures, and independent auditing.

Arrêt du Tribunal (cinquième chambre) du 3 septembre 2025.#Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich Boguslayev contre Conseil de l’Union européenne.#Politique étrangère et de sécurité commune – Mesures restrictives prises eu égard aux actions compromettant ou menaçant l’intégrité territoriale, la souveraineté et l’indépendance de l’Ukraine – Gel des fonds – Liste des personnes, des entités et des organismes auxquels s’appliquent le gel des fonds et des ressources économiques – Maintien du nom du requérant sur la liste – Erreur d’appréciation – Responsabilité non contractuelle – Atteinte à la réputation et à la présomption d’innocence – Préjudice moral – Réalité du dommage.#Affaire T-604/24.

This is a judgment of the General Court of the European Union regarding restrictive measures (sanctions) against Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich Boguslayev, an Ukrainian national. The court rules on the legality of the Council of the European Union’s decisions to maintain Mr. Boguslayev’s name on the list of individuals subject to asset freezes and other restrictions due to actions undermining Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence. Mr. Boguslayev contests these decisions and seeks compensation for damages allegedly suffered as a result of his inclusion on the sanctions list.

The structure of the judgment is as follows:
– It starts with an introduction outlining the purpose of the legal action and the specific Council decisions being challenged.
– It then presents the background to the dispute, including the initial imposition of sanctions in 2014, subsequent amendments, and the specific reasons for including Mr. Boguslayev on the list.
– It outlines the arguments of both parties (Mr. Boguslayev and the Council of the EU).
– It provides the legal reasoning of the Court, including an assessment of the evidence and arguments presented by both sides.
– Finally, it states the Court’s decision, which includes the annulment of the Council’s decisions insofar as they concern Mr. Boguslayev, the rejection of his claim for damages, and the allocation of costs.

The main provisions and changes compared to previous versions are:
– The judgment focuses on the Council’s decisions from 2024 and 2025 to maintain Mr. Boguslayev on the sanctions list.
– The reasons for his initial listing involved his role as a former member of the Ukrainian parliament and a major shareholder in Motor Sich, a Ukrainian aircraft engine manufacturer. He was accused of supplying engines to the Russian military, supporting actions undermining Ukraine’s integrity, and conducting transactions with separatists in the Donbass region.
– The Court assesses whether the Council provided sufficient evidence to justify maintaining Mr. Boguslayev on the list, considering his changed circumstances, including his detention by Ukrainian authorities and his removal from his position at Motor Sich.
– The Court concludes that the Council did not provide sufficient evidence to support the reasons for maintaining Mr. Boguslayev on the list, particularly in light of his changed circumstances.

The main provisions of the act that may be the most important for its use are:
– The Court annuls the Council’s decisions to maintain Mr. Boguslayev on the sanctions list, finding that the Council failed to provide sufficient evidence to justify his continued inclusion.
– The Court rejects Mr. Boguslayev’s claim for damages, finding that he did not provide sufficient evidence of actual harm to his reputation.
– The Court orders the Council to pay its own costs and those of Mr. Boguslayev.
– The Court maintains the effects of one of the decisions until the time limit for appeal expires.

: This judgment is highly relevant to Ukraine and Ukrainians as it concerns sanctions imposed in response to actions undermining Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence. The judgment highlights the importance of providing sufficient evidence to justify the imposition and maintenance of sanctions, particularly in light of changing circumstances.

Judgment of the General Court (Tenth Chamber) of 3 September 2025.Huhtamaki Holding Sàrl v European Commission.Access to documents – Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 – Documents relating to State aid procedures – Advance tax agreements – Refusal of access – Exception relating to the protection of the commercial interests of a third party – Exception relating to the protection of the purpose of inspections, investigations and audits – General presumption of confidentiality – Not irrebuttable – Overriding public interest – Principle of sound administration – Obligation to state reasons.Case T-225/24.

This is a judgment of the General Court of the European Union regarding a case (T-225/24) between Huhtamaki Holding Sàrl and the European Commission. The case concerns the Commission’s decision to refuse Huhtamaki access to certain documents related to State aid procedures, specifically advance tax agreements (ATAs) granted by Luxembourg to various companies. Huhtamaki sought annulment of the Commission’s decision, arguing that the refusal was unlawful.

**Structure and Main Provisions:**

The judgment is structured as follows:

* **Background:** It outlines the context of the dispute, including Huhtamaki’s tax arrangements in Luxembourg, the Commission’s investigation into Luxembourg’s ATA practices, and Huhtamaki’s request for access to documents.
* **Forms of order sought:** It summarizes the applicant’s (Huhtamaki’s) requests to the Court and the defendant’s (Commission’s) responses.
* **Law:** This section contains the legal reasoning and analysis of the General Court. It is divided into three pleas raised by Huhtamaki:
* **First Plea:** Error of law in applying a general presumption of confidentiality to the requested documents.
* **Second Plea (Alternative):** Error of law in not finding that the general presumption was rebutted due to lack of harm to protected interests or the existence of an overriding public interest.
* **Third Plea (Alternative):** Breach of the right to sound administration and the duty to state reasons.
* **Costs:** It determines which party is responsible for covering the legal costs of the proceedings.

**Main Provisions and Changes:**

The judgment revolves around the interpretation and application of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 regarding public access to EU institution documents, particularly Article 4, which provides for exceptions to access. The key legal issues are:

* **General Presumption of Confidentiality:** The Court confirms the existence of a general presumption that disclosing documents in State aid review procedures undermines the protection of investigations.
* **Rebuttal of Presumption:** The Court clarifies that this presumption is not irrebuttable but places the burden on the applicant to demonstrate that specific documents are not covered or that an overriding public interest justifies disclosure.
* **Overriding Public Interest:** The Court finds that Huhtamaki did not demonstrate an overriding public interest that would outweigh the need to protect the confidentiality of the documents.
* **Sound Administration and Duty to State Reasons:** The Court rejects Huhtamaki’s arguments that the Commission breached the principle of sound administration or failed to adequately state the reasons for its decision.

**Most Important Provisions for Use:**

The most important aspects of this judgment are:

* **Confirmation of General Presumption:** It reinforces the established case law that a general presumption of confidentiality applies to documents within the Commission’s administrative file in State aid procedures.
* **Burden of Proof:** It emphasizes that the burden is on the party seeking access to rebut this presumption by demonstrating either that the documents do not fall within the scope of the exception or that an overriding public interest exists.
* **Limited Scope of Public Interest:** It clarifies that general arguments about transparency or the rights of the defense are often insufficient to outweigh the need to protect the confidentiality of ongoing investigations.
* **Ongoing Cases:** It confirms that the presumption of confidentiality applies even if the State aid case is not closed, because the Commission may resume its activities with a view to the possible adoption of a new decision.

In conclusion, the General Court dismissed Huhtamaki’s action, upholding the Commission’s decision to refuse access to the requested documents. The judgment provides valuable guidance on the application of Regulation No 1049/2001 in the context of State aid investigations and the circumstances in which access to documents may be restricted.

Judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) of 3 September 2025.London EV Co. Ltd v European Commission.Environment – Regulation (EU) 2019/631 – Carbon dioxide emission performance standards – New passenger cars – Commission Decision specifying the values relating to the performance of manufacturers and pools of manufacturers of new passenger cars and new light commercial vehicles for 2021 – Scope – Special purpose vehicle – Wheelchair accessible vehicle – Equal treatment – Proportionality – Legitimate expectations – Obligation to state reasons – Plea of illegality).Case T-1024/23.

This is a judgment of the General Court regarding the application of Regulation (EU) 2019/631, which sets CO2 emission performance standards for new passenger cars and light commercial vehicles. The applicant, London EV Co. Ltd, challenged a Commission decision that specified the values relating to the performance of manufacturers for 2021, arguing that the Commission incorrectly excluded its wheelchair-accessible vehicles from the scope of the regulation, thereby preventing it from fully participating in the carbon pooling mechanism. The General Court dismissed the action, upholding the Commission’s interpretation of the regulation.

The judgment is structured as follows:

* **Background:** It outlines the context of the dispute, referencing Regulation (EU) 2019/631 and the Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2023/1623. It details how the Commission calculates average specific emissions of CO2 and specific emission targets for manufacturers, and how manufacturers can meet these targets individually or through pooling. It also describes London EV Co.’s business, its participation in a pool, and the Commission’s calculation of its emissions for 2021.
* **Forms of order sought:** It summarizes the applicant’s request to annul the contested decision and the Commission’s request to dismiss the action.
* **Law:** This section contains the legal reasoning of the Court. It addresses the four pleas raised by the applicant:
* Incorrect interpretation of Article 2(3) of Regulation 2019/631, arguing it contradicts the regulation’s objectives, the Paris Agreement, and fundamental principles of EU law.
* Unlawfulness of the contested decision for depriving the applicant of full participation in the carbon pooling mechanism.
* Violation of the principle of equal treatment by excluding vehicles with the “wheelchair accessible vehicle” reference.
* Breach of the obligation to state reasons and the right to sound administration.
* **Costs:** It determines which party is responsible for covering the costs of the proceedings.

The main provisions of the act that may be the most important for its use:

* **Article 2(1) and 2(3) of Regulation 2019/631:** These provisions define the scope of the regulation, specifying that it applies to Category M1 and N1 vehicles but not to special purpose vehicles, including wheelchair-accessible vehicles.
* **Article 6 of Regulation 2019/631:** This article allows manufacturers to form pools to meet their emission targets. The judgment clarifies that this provision only applies to manufacturers whose vehicles fall within the scope of the regulation.
* **Directive 2007/46/EC (Annex II):** This directive defines vehicle categories, including “Category M1” and “special purpose vehicles,” which is crucial for determining the scope of Regulation 2019/631.
* **Article 26 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union:** This article concerns the integration of persons with disabilities, which is relevant to the interpretation of Regulation 2019/631 and its impact on manufacturers of wheelchair-accessible vehicles.

The judgment confirms that the exclusion of special purpose vehicles, including wheelchair-accessible vehicles, from the scope of Regulation 2019/631 is consistent with the regulation’s objectives and does not violate fundamental principles of EU law. It clarifies that manufacturers of such vehicles cannot participate in the carbon pooling mechanism under Article 6 of the regulation.

Judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) of 3 September 2025.OMV AG v European Union Intellectual Property Office.EU trade mark – Invalidity proceedings – EU word mark OMV! – Earlier EU figurative marks OMV – Relative ground for refusal – Detriment to repute – Link between the marks at issue – Article 8(5) and Article 60(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001.Case T-302/24.

This judgment concerns a dispute between OMV AG and Combe International LLC regarding the validity of the EU trade mark “OMV!”. OMV AG sought to invalidate Combe International LLC’s “OMV!” mark based on its earlier figurative marks “OMV”, claiming that the use of “OMV!” would take unfair advantage of or be detrimental to the repute of its earlier marks.

The structure of the judgment is as follows: The General Court annuls the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the EUIPO, which had dismissed OMV AG’s appeal against the Cancellation Division’s decision to reject the application for a declaration of invalidity. The court found that the Board of Appeal made an error in assessing whether a link existed between the marks at issue. The court considered the similarity of the signs, the reputation of the earlier trade marks, and the comparison of the goods and services.

The most important provision of this act is that the court found that the Board of Appeal made an error of assessment in ruling out the existence of a link between the marks, given their similarity, the exceptional reputation and enhanced distinctiveness of the earlier marks, and the certain proximity between the goods and services at issue. The court held that the Board of Appeal should have analyzed whether the use of the contested mark was likely to give rise to any of the three types of injury referred to in Article 8(5) of Regulation 2017/1001.

Judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) of 3 September 2025.Alisher Usmanov v Council of the European Union.Common foreign and security policy – Restrictive measures taken in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine – Freezing of funds – List of persons, entities and bodies subject to the freezing of funds and economic resources – Maintenance of the applicant’s name on the list – Concept of ‘businessperson involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation’ – Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145/CFSP – Article 3(1)(g) of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 – Right to effective judicial protection – Obligation to state reasons – Error of assessment – Proportionality – Right to property – Right to private life – Plea of illegality.Case T-1117/23.

This is a judgment by the General Court of the European Union regarding restrictive measures against Alisher Usmanov, specifically the freezing of his funds due to his alleged ties to the Russian government and involvement in actions undermining Ukraine’s territorial integrity. The court reviews the legality of the Council’s decisions to maintain Usmanov’s name on the list of sanctioned individuals and entities.

The judgment is structured as follows:
– It begins with the background to the dispute, outlining the EU’s restrictive measures concerning Ukraine and the initial inclusion of Usmanov on the sanctions list in 2022.
– It details the amendments to the criteria for imposing sanctions, specifically Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145/CFSP and Article 3(1)(g) of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014, which target businesspersons involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Russian government.
– It describes the Council’s decisions to maintain Usmanov’s name on the sanctions list in September 2023, March 2024, and September 2024, along with the reasons provided for each decision.
– The judgment then addresses Usmanov’s legal arguments against the sanctions, which include claims of distorted evidence, errors of assessment, breach of the obligation to state reasons, violation of the principles of equal treatment and proportionality, and infringement of his fundamental rights.
– The court systematically addresses each of Usmanov’s pleas, upholding the legality of the Council’s decisions and dismissing the action.

Several provisions are particularly important for understanding the judgment:
– **Amended Criterion (g):** This is central to the case, as it forms the basis for the sanctions against Usmanov. The court analyzes whether Usmanov fits the criteria of a “leading businessperson operating in Russia” or a “businessperson involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation.”
– **Article 277 TFEU:** This article allows parties to challenge the validity of general acts of the EU institutions that form the legal basis of the contested act.
– **The principle of proportionality:** The court assesses whether the restrictive measures imposed on Usmanov are proportionate to the objectives pursued by the EU’s sanctions regime.
– **Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights:** This article guarantees the right to effective judicial protection, which requires that decisions imposing restrictive measures are based on a sufficiently solid factual basis.
– **The Council’s obligation to state reasons:** The court examines whether the Council provided sufficient reasons for maintaining Usmanov’s name on the sanctions list, enabling him to defend his rights and the court to exercise its power of review.
– **The Council’s review obligation:** The court assesses whether the Council properly reviewed Usmanov’s situation before extending the sanctions against him, taking into account any observations and evidence he submitted.

Judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) of 3 September 2025.Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc. v European Union Intellectual Property Office.EU trade mark – Revocation proceedings – EU word mark Discovery – Genuine use of the trade mark – Article 58(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 – Proof of genuine use – Nature of use – Use in connection with the goods in respect of which the trade mark was registered – Independent subcategory of goods.Case T-404/24.

This judgment concerns a dispute over the EU word mark “Discovery,” specifically regarding its genuine use for “hookahs” in Class 34. The core issue is whether the use of the mark on “stems for hookahs” constitutes genuine use for “hookahs” themselves, which would prevent the revocation of the trademark for those goods. The General Court annulled the decision of the Board of Appeal, which had declared the mark invalid for “hookahs,” finding that the Board erred in considering “stems for hookahs” and “hookahs” as separate subcategories.

The judgment is structured as follows: It begins with the background of the dispute, including the registration of the trademark, the revocation application by Mayflix GmbH, and the decisions of the Cancellation Division and the Board of Appeal. It then outlines the forms of order sought by the parties. The “Law” section contains the legal analysis, addressing the admissibility of evidence, the relevant provisions of Regulation 2017/1001 regarding revocation for non-use, and the concept of genuine use. It examines whether “hookahs” and “stems for hookahs” constitute independent subcategories. Finally, it addresses the claim for alteration and the allocation of costs.

The most important provision is the court’s interpretation of “genuine use” under Article 58(1)(a) of Regulation 2017/1001 and its application to subcategories of goods. The court emphasized that the purpose and intended use of a product are vital in defining a subcategory. It found that the Board of Appeal erred by focusing solely on whether the “stems for hookahs” needed to be combined with other parts before use, rather than considering the overall purpose of smoking and the market perception. The court also considered the evidence showing that “stems for hookahs” are sometimes marketed as “hookahs,” indicating that they are not necessarily viewed as distinct categories by consumers.

Arrêt du Tribunal (sixième chambre) du 3 septembre 2025.#Kartroi LLC contre Office de l’Union européenne pour la propriété intellectuelle.#Marque de l’Union européenne – Procédure de nullité – Marque de l’Union européenne verbale SANDOKAN – Cause de nullité absolue – Mauvaise foi – Article 59, paragraphe 1, sous b), du règlement (UE) 2017/1001.#Affaire T-47/24.

This document is a judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) regarding the case T-47/24 between Kartroi LLC and the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), with Luxvide Finanziaria per Iniziative Audiovisive e Telematiche SpA as an intervening party. The case concerns the validity of the EU trademark SANDOKAN, specifically addressing whether the trademark was filed in bad faith.

The judgment addresses Kartroi LLC’s appeal against the EUIPO’s decision to declare the SANDOKAN trademark invalid due to bad faith at the time of filing. The core issue is whether Kartroi LLC acted in bad faith when it applied for the SANDOKAN trademark, particularly concerning the intent to circumvent non-use revocation of a prior trademark and to obstruct the activities of Luxvide, which was planning a “Sandokan” TV series. The court dismisses Kartroi LLC’s appeal, upholding the EUIPO’s decision that the trademark was indeed filed in bad faith.

The judgment is structured as follows:
1. **Background**: Details the initial trademark application, the goods and services covered (classes 9, 16, 25, 28, and 41), the nullity request by Luxvide, and the prior international registration of the SANDOKAN trademark held by Kartroi.
2. **Arguments of the Parties**: Summarizes the claims made by Kartroi LLC (the applicant), EUIPO (the defendant), and Luxvide (the intervening party).
3. **Law**: Discusses the admissibility of evidence presented for the first time before the General Court and the substantive issues related to bad faith in trademark applications.
4. **Merits**: Examines the alleged misinterpretation of bad faith, focusing on whether the trademark application aimed to circumvent non-use revocation and obstruct Luxvide’s activities.
5. **Costs**: Allocates the costs of the proceedings.

Key provisions of the judgment include:

* **Bad Faith**: The judgment provides an in-depth analysis of the concept of bad faith in the context of EU trademark law, emphasizing that it implies a dishonest state of mind or intent. It clarifies that bad faith exists when a trademark is filed not to fairly compete but to harm the interests of third parties or to obtain exclusive rights for purposes other than the essential function of a trademark.
* **Burden of Proof**: It reiterates that the burden of proving bad faith lies with the party seeking the declaration of invalidity. However, if the circumstances suggest bad faith, the trademark holder must provide a legitimate explanation for their intentions.
* **Relevant Factors**: The judgment lists several factors to consider when assessing bad faith, including the applicant’s knowledge of third-party use of a similar sign, the intent to prevent such use, the degree of legal protection of the signs, the origin and use of the contested sign, the commercial logic behind the trademark application, and the chronology of events.
* **New Evidence**: The judgment reaffirms that new facts or evidence not presented before the EUIPO cannot be introduced before the General Court.
* **Specific Findings**: The court found that Kartroi LLC’s trademark application was indeed made in bad faith. This conclusion was based on the timing of the application (shortly after Luxvide announced its “Sandokan” TV series), the lack of a legitimate commercial reason for the application, and the intent to hinder Luxvide’s activities.

Judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) of 3 September 2025.Zásilkovna s. r. o. v European Commission.State aid – Postal sector – Compensation for net costs arising from universal service obligations – Decision declaring the aid compatible with the internal market – Article 106(2) TFEU – SGEI Framework – Accounting separation of activities falling within the universal service from other activities – Cross-subsidisation – Counterfactual scenario.Case T-784/22.

This is a judgment by the General Court regarding a challenge to the European Commission’s decision to approve State aid granted by the Czech Republic to Česká pošta (Czech Post), the incumbent postal operator, as compensation for fulfilling its universal service obligations (USO). The applicant, Zásilkovna, a parcel delivery company, argued that the compensation was incompatible with EU law. The General Court ultimately dismissed Zásilkovna’s action, upholding the Commission’s decision.

**Structure and Main Provisions:**

The judgment is structured as follows:

* **Background:** Describes the context of the dispute, including the designation of Česká pošta as the universal service provider, the scope of the USO, and the Commission’s initial decision to investigate the compensation.
* **Forms of order sought:** Lists the requests made by the applicant and the defendant.
* **Law:** This section contains the legal analysis and the court’s reasoning.
* **Admissibility:** Addresses the admissibility of the action.
* **Substance:** Examines the applicant’s pleas, which include:
* Breach of the obligation to state reasons.
* Manifest error of assessment of the compatibility of the compensation with the internal market.
* Manifest error of assessment and a failure to examine whether there was cross-subsidisation prior to the compensation at issue.
* **Costs:** Determines which party is responsible for covering the costs of the proceedings.

**Main Provisions and Changes:**

The core of the judgment revolves around the applicant’s claims that the Commission erred in approving the State aid. The applicant raised several arguments, including:

* **Inadequate Accounting Separation:** The applicant argued that Česká pošta did not properly separate the costs of its USO activities from its commercial activities, leading to cross-subsidisation. The court rejected this, finding that the Commission had adequately examined the accounting separation and that the applicant had not provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate a manifest error.
* **Commercial Viability of USO:** The applicant claimed that the USO could be provided on a commercial basis without State aid. The court found that the Commission had reasonably relied on the Czech authorities’ assessment that a market failure existed, justifying the compensation.
* **Duration of USO Entrustment:** The applicant challenged the five-year duration of the USO entrustment period, arguing that it was not justified by the depreciation of Česká pošta’s assets. The court disagreed, finding that the Commission had adequately considered the depreciation periods of the relevant assets.
* **Counterfactual Scenario:** The applicant argued that the counterfactual scenario used to calculate the net avoided cost (NAC) of the USO was unrealistic, particularly regarding the reduction in the number of post offices and delivery frequency. The court rejected this, finding that the Commission had reasonably assessed the credibility of the scenario.

**Most Important Provisions:**

The most important aspects of this judgment are the court’s findings regarding:

* **The Commission’s assessment of complex economic and accounting issues:** The court reiterated that the Commission has broad discretion in assessing complex economic facts and that judicial review is limited to identifying manifest errors.
* **The burden of proof on the applicant:** The court emphasized that the applicant bears the burden of proving that the Commission made a manifest error of assessment.
* **The scope of the Commission’s inquiry:** The court clarified that the Commission was not required to investigate alleged cross-subsidisation that occurred prior to the period covered by the compensation at issue.
* **The use of the NAC methodology:** The court confirmed that the NAC methodology is the appropriate method for calculating the amount of compensation for USO.

Judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) of 3 September 2025.OMV AG v European Union Intellectual Property Office.EU trade mark – Invalidity proceedings – EU word mark OMV! BY VAGISIL – Earlier EU figurative marks OMV – Relative ground for refusal – Detriment to repute – Link between the marks at issue – Article 8(5) and Article 60(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001.Case T-303/24.

This is a judgment by the General Court of the European Union regarding an application for a declaration of invalidity of the EU trade mark “OMV! BY VAGISIL”. OMV AG, an Austrian company, sought to invalidate the mark, which is owned by Combe International LLC, an American company, based on its earlier EU figurative marks “OMV”. The court annuls the decision of the EUIPO Board of Appeal, which had dismissed OMV AG’s appeal.

The case revolves around whether the “OMV! BY VAGISIL” mark should be invalidated due to its similarity to OMV AG’s earlier marks, potentially taking unfair advantage of or being detrimental to the repute of the earlier marks. The court examines the similarity of the marks, the reputation of the earlier marks, and whether a link exists between the marks in the perception of the relevant public. The court finds that the Board of Appeal made an error in assessing the link between the marks.

The key provisions of the judgment are:
– **Article 8(5) of Regulation 2017/1001**: This article concerns the protection of trademarks with a reputation, even if the goods or services are dissimilar, provided that the use of the later mark would take unfair advantage of, or be detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier trade mark.
– **Article 60(1)(a) of Regulation 2017/1001**: This article states that an EU trade mark is to be declared invalid if it infringes on an earlier trade mark under the conditions of Article 8(5).
– The court emphasizes that for Article 8(5) to apply, there must be a link between the earlier and later marks in the perception of the relevant public. This link is assessed globally, considering factors such as the similarity of the marks, the nature of the goods/services, the reputation of the earlier mark, and the distinctiveness of the earlier mark.
– The court finds that the Board of Appeal underestimated the exceptional reputation of OMV AG’s earlier marks and placed too much emphasis on the dissimilarity of the goods and services.
– The court concludes that, given the visual and phonetic similarity of the marks, the exceptional reputation of the earlier marks, and some overlap in distribution channels and the relevant public, the Board of Appeal erred in ruling out a link between the marks.
– The court annuls the Board of Appeal’s decision and remands the case back to the EUIPO to reassess whether the use of the “OMV! BY VAGISIL” mark would take unfair advantage of or be detrimental to the distinctive character or the repute of OMV AG’s earlier marks.

Arrêt du Tribunal (sixième chambre) du 3 septembre 2025.#Kartroi LLC contre Office de l’Union européenne pour la propriété intellectuelle.#Marque de l’Union européenne – Procédure de déchéance – Enregistrement international désignant l’Union européenne – Marque verbale SANDOKAN – Absence d’usage sérieux de la marque – Article 58, paragraphe 1, sous a), du règlement (UE) 2017/1001.#Affaire T-1/24.

This document is a judgment from the General Court of the European Union regarding a case (T-1/24) between Kartroi LLC and the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), with Luxvide Finanziaria per Iniziative Audiovisive e Telematiche SpA as an intervening party. The case concerns the trademark “SANDOKAN” and its lack of genuine use. The court dismisses Kartroi LLC’s appeal, confirming the EUIPO’s decision to revoke the trademark due to non-use.

The judgment is structured as follows:
* **Background:** It outlines the history of the case, starting with the international registration of the “SANDOKAN” trademark by Kartroi LLC’s predecessor, the goods and services it covered (classes 9, 16, 25, and 28), the challenge to the trademark by Luxvide based on non-use, and the EUIPO’s initial decision to revoke the trademark.
* **Arguments of the Parties:** It summarizes the arguments made by Kartroi LLC (the applicant), the EUIPO (the defendant), and Luxvide (the intervener) before the General Court. Kartroi sought annulment of the EUIPO decision, while the EUIPO and Luxvide sought dismissal of the appeal.
* **Admissibility of Evidence:** The court addresses whether certain documents submitted by Kartroi for the first time before the General Court are admissible. It deems most of the new documents inadmissible, as the court’s review is limited to the information available to the EUIPO at the time of its decision.
* **Merits:** The court examines the substance of Kartroi’s appeal, which is based on the argument that the EUIPO incorrectly assessed the evidence of genuine use of the trademark. The court divides this argument into three parts: an error in assessing the genuine use of the mark, failure to consider the characteristics of the relevant sector, and an incorrect assessment of evidence related to social media engagement.
* **Analysis:** The court analyzes each part of Kartroi’s argument, finding that the EUIPO did not err in its assessment. The court emphasizes that the evidence presented by Kartroi, such as sales figures and website impressions, was insufficient to demonstrate genuine use of the trademark in the EU. The court also notes that Kartroi failed to adequately demonstrate the reach of its social media activities within the EU.
* **Costs:** The court orders Kartroi LLC to pay the costs of the proceedings, as it has lost the case.

The most important provisions of the act are:
* **Article 58(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001:** This article states that a trademark can be revoked if it has not been put to genuine use in the EU for a continuous period of five years, and there are no valid reasons for non-use. This is the legal basis for the revocation of the “SANDOKAN” trademark.
* **Article 198(2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001:** This article states that a request for invalidity of an international registration designating the European Union shall be treated as a request for revocation under Article 58 of the same regulation.
* **Articles 10(3) and 10(4) of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/625:** These articles specify the type of evidence that can be used to prove the use of a trademark, such as packaging, price lists, catalogs, invoices, and advertisements.

Arrêt du Tribunal (dixième chambre élargie) du 3 septembre 2025.#Philippe Latombe contre Commission européenne.#Transfert de données à caractère personnel vers les États-Unis – Décision d’exécution de la Commission constatant l’adéquation du niveau de protection des données à caractère personnel assuré par les États-Unis – Droit à un recours effectif – Droit à la vie privée et familiale – Décisions fondées exclusivement sur le traitement automatisé des données à caractère personnel – Sécurité du traitement des données à caractère personnel.#Affaire T-553/23.

This is an analysis of a judgment by the General Court of the European Union regarding the transfer of personal data to the United States.

**Essence of the Act:**

This judgment concerns a legal challenge by Philippe Latombe against the European Commission’s decision to recognize the adequacy of the data protection level provided by the EU-U.S. Data Privacy Framework. The court dismisses Latombe’s claims, upholding the Commission’s assessment that the U.S. ensures a level of protection for personal data transferred from the EU that is substantially equivalent to that guaranteed under EU law. The judgment addresses concerns regarding the independence of the Data Protection Review Court (DPRC), bulk data collection by U.S. intelligence agencies, and the protection against automated decision-making.

**Structure and Main Provisions:**

The judgment is structured as follows:

* **Background:** It outlines the history of data transfer agreements between the EU and the U.S., including the previous invalidation of the “Safe Harbor” and “Privacy Shield” frameworks by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the Schrems I and Schrems II cases.
* **Claims:** It summarizes Latombe’s arguments against the Commission’s adequacy decision, which include violations of fundamental rights related to privacy, data protection, and the right to an effective remedy.
* **Court’s Analysis:** The court systematically addresses each of Latombe’s arguments, examining the legal framework established by the U.S. Executive Order 14086 and related regulations. It focuses on the independence and impartiality of the DPRC, the limitations and safeguards surrounding bulk data collection, and the availability of legal remedies for EU citizens.
* **Decision:** The court rejects all of Latombe’s claims and dismisses the action, upholding the Commission’s adequacy decision.

**Main Provisions and Changes:**

* **Data Protection Review Court (DPRC):** The court finds that the DPRC provides an adequate level of judicial protection for EU citizens, despite being established by an executive order rather than a law passed by the U.S. Congress.
* **Bulk Data Collection:** The court acknowledges that U.S. intelligence agencies engage in bulk data collection but finds that this practice is subject to sufficient limitations and safeguards to ensure a level of protection substantially equivalent to that required under EU law.
* **Automated Decision-Making:** The court finds that while the U.S. does not have a general law equivalent to Article 22 of the GDPR, it provides sufficient sector-specific protections in areas where automated decision-making is most likely to occur.

**Most Important Provisions for Use:**

* The judgment confirms the validity of the EU-U.S. Data Privacy Framework, allowing for the continued transfer of personal data from the EU to U.S. companies that participate in the framework.
* It clarifies the requirements for an adequate level of protection in third countries, emphasizing the need for safeguards and remedies that are substantially equivalent to those provided under EU law, even if they are not identical.
* It provides guidance on the interpretation of key concepts such as “independence” of judicial bodies and “necessity and proportionality” of data collection measures.

Judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) of 3 September 2025.Eti Gıda Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ v European Union Intellectual Property Office.European Union design – Invalidity proceedings – Registered European Union design representing decoration for bags of packaging – Earlier national word and figurative marks – Ground for invalidity – Use in the subsequent design of a distinctive sign the holder of which has the right to prohibit such use – Article 25(1)(e) of Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 – Applicable substantive law – Rights of the defence – Scope of the examination carried out by the Board of Appeal.Case T-91/24.

This judgment concerns a dispute over the validity of a registered European Union design representing decoration for bags of packaging. The applicant, Eti Gıda Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ, sought to annul the decision of the EUIPO Board of Appeal, which had upheld the invalidity of their design. The core issue was whether the design infringed an earlier Romanian word and figurative mark, KRAX, owned by Star Foods E.M. SRL.

The General Court dismissed the action, upholding the Board of Appeal’s decision. The court examined three pleas raised by the applicant: infringement of Article 25(1)(e) of Regulation No 6/2002, infringement of Articles 94 and 95 of Regulation 2017/1001 and Article 40(1) of the Romanian law, and breach of the rights of the defence. The court found no merit in any of these pleas.

The court found that the Board of Appeal was correct in determining that there was a likelihood of confusion between the contested design and the earlier mark, thus infringing Article 25(1)(e) of Regulation No 6/2002. The court also rejected the applicant’s arguments regarding the failure to submit proof of use of the earlier mark and the alleged breach of its rights of defence.

The most important provision in this judgment is Article 25(1)(e) of Regulation No 6/2002, which allows a design to be declared invalid if it uses a distinctive sign that the holder of an earlier right can prohibit. The judgment clarifies the application of this provision, particularly in cases involving likelihood of confusion between a design and an earlier trade mark. It emphasizes the importance of assessing the similarity of the signs, the goods or services involved, and the perception of the relevant public.

Arrêt du Tribunal (troisième chambre) du 3 septembre 2025.#Sardo Piemontese Sementi Soc. coop. – Soc. agr. (SA.PI.SE.Coop.agr.) contre Office de l’Union européenne pour la propriété intellectuelle.#Marque de l’Union européenne – Procédure de nullité – Marque de l’Union européenne verbale VENERE – Causes de nullité absolue – Article 52, paragraphe 1, sous a), du règlement (CE) no 207/2009 – Absence de caractère distinctif – Caractère descriptif – Article 7, paragraphe 1, sous b) et c), du règlement no 207/2009.#Affaire T-410/24.

This is a judgment from the General Court of the European Union regarding the nullity of the EU trademark “VENERE.” The court upholds the decision of the EUIPO (European Union Intellectual Property Office) to declare the trademark invalid for certain goods in classes 30, 31, and 33, primarily related to rice products. The core reason for the nullity is that the term “VENERE” is descriptive of a type of black rice and lacks distinctiveness.

The structure of the judgment is as follows:

1. **Background:** Describes the initial trademark application, the goods and services covered, and the nullity proceedings initiated by Riso Gallo SpA.
2. **Decision of the EUIPO:** Details the EUIPO’s initial decision and the subsequent appeal to the Board of Appeal.
3. **Arguments of the Parties:** Summarizes the arguments presented by Sardo Piemontese Sementi (the trademark holder), the EUIPO, and Riso Gallo SpA.
4. **Legal Analysis:**
* **Applicable Law:** Clarifies that the case is governed by Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (the old trademark regulation) for substantive matters and Regulations 2017/1001 and 2018/625 for procedural aspects.
* **Grounds for Appeal:** Addresses the trademark holder’s arguments against the EUIPO’s decision. These arguments include:
* The EUIPO incorrectly admitted new evidence during the appeal.
* The EUIPO wrongly concluded that the trademark was descriptive.
* The EUIPO wrongly concluded that the trademark lacked distinctiveness.
5. **Decision:** The court rejects all arguments of the trademark holder and dismisses the appeal.

The main provisions of the act that may be the most important for its use:

* **Article 95(2) of Regulation 2017/1001 and Article 27(4) of Regulation 2018/625:** These articles concern the admissibility of new facts and evidence before the Board of Appeal. The court confirms that the Board of Appeal has discretion to admit new evidence if it is relevant and there is a valid reason for its late submission.
* **Article 52 of Regulation No 207/2009 (ex Article 7(1)(c)):** This article concerns the descriptive character of a trademark. The court confirms that a trademark can be declared invalid if it is exclusively descriptive of the goods or services for which it is registered. The court considered the term “VENERE” to be descriptive of a type of black rice.
* **Article 52 of Regulation No 207/2009 (ex Article 7(1)(b)):** This article concerns the distinctiveness of a trademark. The court did not rule on this ground, as it had already found the trademark to be descriptive.

Arrêt du Tribunal (huitième chambre) du 3 septembre 2025 (Extraits).#Juan Costa Pujadas contre Office de l’Union européenne pour la propriété intellectuelle.#Dessin ou modèle de l’Union européenne – Procédure de nullité – Dessin ou modèle de l’Union européenne enregistré représentant un variateur de vitesse – Motif de nullité – Absence de caractère individuel – Caractéristiques visibles d’une pièce d’un produit complexe – Notions d’“utilisation normale” et de “visibilité” – Article 4, paragraphes 2 et 3, et article 25, paragraphe 1, sous b), du règlement (CE) no 6/2002 – Charge de la preuve.#Affaire T-331/24.

This is a judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) from September 3, 2025, regarding an action brought by Juan Costa Pujadas against the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO). The case concerns the validity of a registered EU design representing a speed variator for motorcycles. The court examines whether the design lacks individual character due to the visibility of the variator when fitted in a motorcycle, and considers the concepts of “normal use” and “visibility” as defined in Regulation (EC) No 6/2002.

The structure of the judgment is as follows:
1. **Introduction**: Outlines the purpose of the action, which is to annul the decision of the Third Board of Appeal of the EUIPO.
2. **Background to the Dispute**: Describes the events leading to the action, including the application for a declaration of invalidity by Yasunimotor, SL against Juan Costa Pujadas’ design.
3. **Forms of Order Sought**: Lists the orders sought by each party, with the applicant seeking annulment of the EUIPO decision and the defendant and intervener seeking dismissal of the action.
4. **Law**: Details the legal basis for the action, focusing on Article 25(1)(b) of Regulation No 6/2002, which states that a design can be declared invalid if it does not meet the requirements of Articles 4 to 9 of the same regulation.
5. **The Court’s Analysis**: The court addresses the applicant’s single plea, which is divided into three parts:
* Erroneous assessment of the evidence.
* Imposition of an excessive burden of proof on the applicant.
* Errors of law and assessment regarding the condition of visibility under Article 4(2) of Regulation No 6/2002.
6. **Costs**: Determines that the applicant, having been unsuccessful, must bear the costs of the proceedings.

The most important provisions for the use of this act are:

* **Article 4(2) of Regulation No 6/2002**: This article specifies that a design applied to a component part of a complex product is only considered new and possessing individual character if the component part remains visible during normal use of the complex product, and the visible features of the component part meet the requirements for novelty and individual character.
* **Article 4(3) of Regulation No 6/2002**: Defines “normal use” as use by the end-user, excluding maintenance, servicing, or repair work.
* **Article 25(1)(b) of Regulation No 6/2002**: States that an EU design can be declared invalid if it does not meet the conditions set out in Articles 4 to 9 of the regulation.

The court ultimately rejects the applicant’s arguments, finding that the EUIPO did not err in its assessment. The court holds that the applicant failed to demonstrate that the design, when applied to a speed variator mounted externally on a competition motorcycle, corresponds to normal use. The court also clarifies that while complete visibility of the part is not required, the visible characteristics must be clear enough to assess their novelty and individual character.

Arrêt du Tribunal (troisième chambre) du 3 septembre 2025.#Sardo Piemontese Sementi Soc. coop. – Soc. agr. (SA.PI.SE.Coop.agr.) contre Office de l’Union européenne pour la propriété intellectuelle.#Marque de l’Union européenne – Procédure de nullité – Marque de l’Union européenne verbale VENERE – Causes de nullité absolue – Article 52, paragraphe 1, sous a), du règlement (CE) no 207/2009 – Absence de caractère distinctif – Caractère descriptif – Article 7, paragraphe 1, sous b) et c), du règlement no 207/2009.#Affaire T-410/24.

This is a judgment from the General Court of the European Union regarding the nullity of the EU trademark “VENERE.” The court upholds the decision of the EUIPO (European Union Intellectual Property Office) to declare the trademark invalid for several goods in classes 30, 31 and 33, including rice, rice flour, rice-based snacks, and rice alcohol. The court finds that the term “VENERE” is descriptive of a type of black rice and therefore lacks distinctiveness.

The structure of the judgment is as follows:
* **Introduction:** The judgment begins by outlining the background of the case, including the application for nullity filed by Riso Gallo SpA against the trademark VENERE, which was registered by Sardo Piemontese Sementi Soc. coop. – Soc. agr. (SA.PI.SE.Coop.agr.).
* **Facts:** It describes the goods covered by the trademark and the grounds for the nullity claim, which were based on the lack of distinctiveness and descriptiveness of the mark.
* **Procedural History:** It details the decisions of the Cancellation Division and the Board of Appeal of the EUIPO, which partially upheld the nullity claim.
* **Arguments of the Parties:** It summarizes the arguments presented by the applicant (Sardo Piemontese Sementi), the EUIPO, and the intervener (Riso Gallo SpA).
* **Legal Analysis:** The Court then proceeds with its legal analysis, addressing the applicable law and the various pleas raised by the applicant.
* **Decision:** The Court rejects all the pleas and dismisses the action, upholding the EUIPO’s decision to declare the trademark invalid.
* **Costs:** The Court orders the applicant to bear the costs of the proceedings.

The main provisions and changes compared to previous versions are not applicable in this case, as it is a judgment and not a legislative act.

The most important provisions of the act are:
* **Article 52(1)(a) of Regulation No 207/2009:** This article states that an EU trademark shall be declared invalid if it has been registered contrary to the provisions of Article 7 of the same regulation.
* **Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation No 207/2009:** These articles specify that trademarks which are devoid of any distinctive character or which consist exclusively of signs or indications which may serve to designate the characteristics of the goods or services are not to be registered.

These provisions are crucial because they form the legal basis for the nullity of the trademark VENERE. The court’s interpretation and application of these articles determine the outcome of the case.

Judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) of 3 September 2025.Eti Gıda Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ v European Union Intellectual Property Office.European Union design – Invalidity proceedings – Registered European Union design representing decoration for bags of packaging – Earlier national word and figurative marks – Ground for invalidity – Use in the subsequent design of a distinctive sign the holder of which has the right to prohibit such use – Article 25(1)(e) of Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 – Applicable substantive law – Rights of the defence – Scope of the examination carried out by the Board of Appeal.Case T-83/24.

This judgment of the General Court concerns an action brought by Eti Gıda Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ against the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) regarding a decision of the Third Board of Appeal of EUIPO. The decision relates to the invalidity of a registered European Union design representing decoration for bags of packaging, based on earlier national word and figurative marks owned by Star Foods E.M. SRL. The court dismisses Eti Gıda’s action, upholding the Board of Appeal’s decision that the contested design is invalid due to the likelihood of confusion with the earlier marks.

The judgment is structured as follows:
1. **Background to the dispute:** Describes the application for registration of the Community design, the application for a declaration of invalidity by the intervener, and the decisions of the Invalidity Division and the Board of Appeal.
2. **Forms of order sought:** Outlines the requests made by the applicant, EUIPO, and the intervener.
3. **Law:** Details the legal reasoning and assessment of the pleas raised by the applicant.
* **Third plea:** Alleging breach of the rights of the defence, which the Court rejects.
* **Second plea:** Alleging infringement of Articles 94 and 95 of Regulation 2017/1001, read in conjunction with Article 40(1) of the new Romanian law, which the Court rejects.
* **First plea:** Alleging infringement of Article 25(1)(e) of Regulation No 6/2002 in its earlier version, which the Court rejects after examining the determination of the goods at issue, the relevant territory and public, the comparison of the signs, and the distinctive character of the earlier mark.
4. **Costs:** Determines the allocation of costs between the parties.

The main provisions of the act that may be the most important for its use are:

* **Article 25(1)(e) of Regulation No 6/2002 (earlier version):** This article concerns the ground for invalidity of a design if a distinctive sign is used in a subsequent design, and EU law or the law of the Member State governing that sign confers on the right holder of the sign the right to prohibit such use.
* **Article 36(2)(b) of the Romanian law on trade marks:** This article confers on the proprietor of a mark the right to prohibit the use of any sign in respect of which there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public.
* The Court’s assessment of the likelihood of confusion, including the comparison of the goods, the signs, and the distinctive character of the earlier mark.

Judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) of 3 September 2025.Eti Gıda Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ v European Union Intellectual Property Office.European Union design – Invalidity proceedings – Registered European Union design representing packaging – Earlier national figurative mark – Ground for invalidity – Use in the subsequent design of a distinctive sign the holder of which has the right to prohibit such use – Article 25(1)(e) of Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 – Rights of the defence – Scope of the examination carried out by the Board of Appeal.Case T-92/24.

This is a judgment from the General Court of the European Union regarding a dispute over the validity of a registered EU design. The case revolves around an application for a declaration of invalidity of a Community design representing packaging, filed by Star Foods E.M. SRL against Eti Gıda Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ. Star Foods argued that the design was invalid under Article 25(1)(e) of Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 because it used a distinctive sign (the Romanian figurative mark KRAX) that Star Foods had the right to prohibit.

The structure of the judgment involves the General Court examining three pleas raised by Eti Gıda against the decision of the EUIPO Board of Appeal, which had upheld the invalidity declaration. These pleas concern: (1) infringement of Article 25(1)(e) of Regulation No 6/2002, (2) infringement of Articles 94 and 95 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 and Article 40(1) of the Romanian law on trade marks, and (3) breach of the rights of the defence. The Court dismisses all three pleas and upholds the Board of Appeal’s decision.

The most important provisions of the act relate to the assessment of the likelihood of confusion between the contested design and the earlier mark, the determination of the relevant public and territory, and the protection of the rights of the defence in invalidity proceedings. The judgment clarifies the criteria for assessing the similarity of goods and signs, the distinctive character of marks, and the impact of descriptive or secondary elements on the overall impression conveyed by a design.