Review of US courts opinions for 16/11/2024

Urias-Orellana, et al v. Garland / 24-01042 (2024-11-14)

This case involves a petition for review of a final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying asylum and Convention Against Torture (CAT) protection to a family from El Salvador.The key points of the opinion are:

• The petitioners (Urias-Orellana family) sought asylum based on threats and harassment from a hitman named Wilfredo who had previously shot the main petitioner’s half-brothers.
• The court upheld the BIA’s finding that the threats and one assault experienced by the petitioner did not rise to the level of past persecution required for asylum.
• The court also agreed that internal relocation within El Salvador was reasonable, given that the petitioners had successfully lived in other parts of the country without incident and family members remained there unharmed.

The main provisions of the opinion focus on:

• The standards for establishing past persecution and well-founded fear of future persecution for asylum purposes
• The requirements for demonstrating that internal relocation is not reasonable
• The burden of proof required for CAT protection, including showing government acquiescence to torture

The key legal determinations were:

• Unfulfilled death threats rarely constitute persecution unless they cause significant actual suffering or harm
• Successful prior internal relocation and safety of family members strongly indicates relocation is reasonable
• CAT protection requires specific evidence of likely torture with government acquiescence, not just general country conditions

Medina-Suguilanda, et al v. Garland / 23-02031 (2024-11-14)

The case involves a petition for review of an asylum application denial by Diana Fernanda Medina-Suguilanda, an Ecuadorian woman who suffered domestic abuse in her home country. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the immigration judge’s finding that she failed to show past persecution or well-founded fear of future persecution.The court’s opinion focuses on three main aspects:

• The determination that unwillingness and inability of government to protect are questions of fact, not mixed questions of law and fact, and thus subject to clear error review by the BIA
• The finding that petitioner failed to demonstrate government nexus for past persecution since she never reported abuse to authorities and evidence showed police were willing to help when called
• The conclusion that petitioner did not establish well-founded fear of future persecution either from her former partner or based on general conditions for women in Ecuador

Key provisions of the opinion include:

• To establish persecution by private actors, asylum seekers must generally report abuse to authorities unless they can prove reporting would be futile
• The one time police were called about abuse, they were willing to arrest the perpetrator
• Evidence showed Ecuador has laws punishing domestic violence and protecting victims, which authorities generally enforce
• While violence against women is a serious problem in Ecuador, evidence did not show systematic or pervasive persecution acquiesced to by the government

The court denied the petition, finding substantial evidence supported the agency’s determinations that petitioner failed to establish past persecution or well-founded fear of future persecution required for asylum.

United States v. Paul Castillo / 24-02439 (2024-11-14)

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld a district court’s decision to deny a sentence reduction to federal prisoner Paul Castillo, who sought relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) based on Guidelines Amendment 821. The Court found that the district court properly exercised its discretion in considering both the amended Guidelines range and the relevant factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The opinion addresses two main aspects: (1) the court’s consideration of the amended Guidelines range and statutory factors, and (2) the weighing of the defendant’s post-incarceration conduct against the seriousness of the original offense. The Court affirmed the lower court’s decision to prioritize the seriousness of the offense over the prisoner’s positive conduct while incarcerated. Key provisions of the opinion include:

• The district court’s discretion in weighing § 3553(a) factors is presumed proper
• Positive post-incarceration conduct, while considered, may be outweighed by the seriousness of the original offense
• The court is not required to give greater weight to rehabilitation evidence than to other sentencing factors

United States v. Vicente Young / 24-02016 (2024-11-14)

This opinion addresses an appeal by Vicente Young challenging his sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court affirmed the district court’s within-Guidelines sentence and granted defense counsel’s motion to withdraw.The opinion addresses two main challenges to the sentence. First, it rejects Young’s constitutional challenge based on N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, citing circuit precedent that has already determined 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) remains constitutional both facially and as applied. Second, it finds the sentence substantively reasonable, noting the district court properly considered statutory factors and made an individualized assessment.Key provisions include:

• Reaffirmation that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (felon in possession statute) remains constitutional post-Bruen
• Confirmation that the district court has wide latitude in weighing sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
• Application of the presumption that within-Guidelines sentences are reasonable
• Finding that the district court’s upward variance was properly based on individualized assessment

United States v. Avery Edwards / 23-03618 (2024-11-14)

This is a procedural notice from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, informing counsel that the court has issued an opinion in the case of United States v. Avery Edwards (Case No. 23-3618) and that judgment has been entered accordingly.The notice outlines the post-submission procedures, specifically emphasizing that:

• Petitions for rehearing and petitions for rehearing en banc must be received within 14 days of the judgment entry date
• Counsel-filed petitions must be submitted electronically through CM/ECF
• No grace period for mailing is allowed except as provided by FRAP 25(a)(2)(iii)
• Late petitions may be denied as untimely

The notice serves as a formal communication regarding the completion of the appellate process and provides clear instructions for any potential post-judgment filings. It’s a standard procedural document that ensures all parties are aware of their rights and obligations following the court’s decision.

United States v. Kierre Balark / 24-02399 (2024-11-14)

This opinion addresses an appeal of an above-Guidelines-range sentence imposed after the revocation of supervised release. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision and granted defense counsel’s motion to withdraw.The opinion is structured simply, addressing a single issue: whether the sentence imposed was substantively unreasonable. The Court applied the standard of review from United States v. Miller and the factors analysis framework from United States v. Larison.The key provisions of this opinion are:

• The Court found no indication that the district court failed to consider relevant factors
• There was no evidence that the district court gave significant weight to improper or irrelevant factors
• The district court did not commit a clear error of judgment in weighing the relevant factors
• The Court relied on United States v. Michels to support that an above-Guidelines sentence was not an abuse of discretion

Prisbrey v. State Auto Insurance Companies, et al / 24-04037 (2024-11-14)

This opinion concerns a case between Kent Terry Prisbrey and State Auto Insurance Companies/Milbank Insurance Company regarding a homeowner’s insurance claim for water damage.The case revolves around a dispute that began when the plaintiff filed a $9,955.41 insurance claim for water damage in May 2020, later demanding an additional $154,986.86 for subsequently discovered damages. The key issue was the plaintiff’s persistent refusal to allow the insurance companies to inspect his property to verify the claimed damages, despite multiple court orders.The main provisions of the opinion include:

• The district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims with prejudice due to his failure to prosecute the case and comply with court orders regarding property inspection
• The court’s order for the plaintiff to pay $4,779.50 in attorney fees for non-compliance with inspection orders
• An additional attorney fees award of $7,676.00 for continued non-compliance
• A further $462.50 in attorney fees after the plaintiff attempted to pay his obligations with Zimbabwean currency worth approximately 40 U.S. dollars

The Appeals Court affirmed all lower court decisions, noting that while pro se litigants receive liberal construction of their filings, they must still follow basic procedural rules. The Court found the plaintiff’s appeals inadequate due to their lack of proper legal citations, coherent arguments, or explanations of why the district court’s decisions were wrong.

United States v. Armenta / 23-07035 (2024-11-14)

This opinion addresses a criminal appeal where defendant Anthony Armenta challenged his convictions related to a shooting and physical altercation, arguing that the district court’s refusal to sever his trial from his codefendant Kevin Ward’s trial violated his rights to due process and a fair trial.The key aspects of the opinion include:

• The court analyzed whether the defendants had mutually antagonistic defenses, finding they were fully antagonistic regarding assaults on two victims (Chappell and Short) but only partially antagonistic regarding the third victim (Rich)
• The court examined whether joint trial created prejudice that would compromise specific trial rights or prevent reliable judgment, finding Armenta failed to demonstrate such prejudice
• The court weighed any potential prejudice against judicial economy considerations, determining that even if prejudice existed, the district court appropriately used limiting instructions rather than severance

The main provisions of the opinion are:

• Mutually antagonistic defenses alone are not sufficient for severance – defendant must show actual prejudice outweighing judicial economy benefits
• To demonstrate prejudice requiring severance, defendant must show compromise of specific trial rights or prevention of reliable judgment
• District courts have discretion to use limiting instructions rather than severance to address potential prejudice

The court ultimately affirmed the district court’s denial of severance, finding no abuse of discretion since Armenta failed to demonstrate prejudice outweighing the benefits of a joint trial.

Davis v. FBP, et al / 24-01342 (2024-11-14)

The opinion addresses the appeal of prisoner Jamar Davis against the dismissal of his case by the district court. The case was dismissed without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to prosecute after Davis did not comply with court requirements to submit proper documentation.The structure of the opinion consists of three main parts:1. Background – describing Davis’s initial 94-page complaint about prison conditions and his failure to comply with court orders to submit proper forms2. Discussion of the failure to prosecute dismissal – affirming the district court’s decision as not an abuse of discretion3. Analysis of in forma pauperis (IFP) status and Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) implications – denying IFP status and imposing a ‘strike’ against Davis for bringing a frivolous appealKey provisions of the opinion include:- Confirmation that district courts have authority to dismiss cases sua sponte when plaintiffs fail to prosecute- Clarification that while dismissal for failure to prosecute doesn’t count as a PLRA strike, bringing a frivolous appeal of such dismissal does warrant a strike- Requirement that Davis must still pay the full appellate filing fee despite the dismissal- Standard for IFP status requiring both financial need and a non-frivolous legal argument

Prisbrey v. State Auto Insurance Companies, et al / 24-04068 (2024-11-14)

The case concerns a dispute between Kent Terry Prisbrey and State Auto Insurance Companies/Milbank Insurance Company regarding a homeowner’s insurance claim for water damage. Here are the key aspects of the court’s opinion:The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Prisbrey’s claims and the award of attorney fees to the insurance companies. The case originated from a $9,955.41 initial damage claim that escalated to an additional claim of $154,986.86 for water damage.The court’s opinion is structured around three main elements:

• The background of the insurance claim dispute and initial court proceedings
• The plaintiff’s repeated refusal to comply with court orders to allow property inspection
• The court’s decision to dismiss the case and award attorney fees to defendants

The key provisions of the opinion are:

• The court’s affirmation of dismissal with prejudice due to plaintiff’s failure to prosecute the case and willful refusal to comply with court orders
• The confirmation of multiple attorney fee awards totaling $12,918 against the plaintiff
• The court’s finding that plaintiff’s attempt to pay the attorney fees with Zimbabwean currency (worth approximately $40 USD) was another example of flouting court orders
• The rejection of plaintiff’s appeal due to inadequate briefing that failed to meet basic requirements of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)

United States v. Devincentis / 24-02114 (2024-11-14)

This is a brief order from the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit dismissing an appeal based on an appeal waiver. The case involves defendant Jasmine Devincentis who had previously agreed to waive her right to appeal as part of her case.The structure of this order is straightforward and consists of two main elements: (1) the government’s motion to enforce the defendant’s appeal waiver, and (2) the court’s decision to grant this motion based on both parties’ positions and the court’s independent review.The key provisions of this order are:

• The government moved to enforce Devincentis’s appeal waiver under the precedent of United States v. Hahn
• Devincentis acknowledged that her waiver was enforceable
• The Court granted the government’s motion and dismissed the appeal
• The order is not binding precedent except under specific legal doctrines (law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel)

United States v. Sutton / 23-05135 (2024-11-14)

The opinion addresses a criminal case where Jeffrey David Sutton was convicted of assault with a dangerous weapon and discharge of a firearm during a crime of violence in Indian country. The defendant appealed his conviction, challenging the sufficiency of evidence, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions.The Court’s analysis focuses on two main aspects:

• The standard of review, which is de novo, requiring viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the government
• The assessment of evidence supporting the defendant’s intent to inflict bodily harm, which is a key element of both charged offenses

The Court found sufficient evidence to support the conviction based on several key elements:

• The girlfriend’s testimony about multiple shooting incidents, including shots fired at a television, at her, and through a bathroom door
• Corroborating testimony from a neighbor who heard arguments and multiple bursts of gunfire
• The defendant’s own admission of firing shots through the storm door
• A law enforcement officer’s testimony about the defendant’s incriminating statement

General Motors v. Hampton / 24-00604 (2024-11-14)

The opinion represents a decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denying General Motors LLC’s petition to appeal a district court’s class certification order in a case involving Oklahoma state law claims.The Court’s decision is structured around the analysis of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), which allows courts of appeals to permit appeals from class-action certification orders. The Court relies on the precedent set in Vallario v. Vandehey, which established three situations where interlocutory review might be appropriate: (1) ‘death knell cases’, (2) cases involving unresolved class action law issues likely to evade end-of-case review, and (3) cases with manifestly erroneous class certification orders.The key provisions of the opinion are:

• The Court’s discretion in granting such appeals is ‘unfettered and akin to the discretion exercised by the Supreme Court in acting on a petition for certiorari’
• Interlocutory review is considered an exception rather than the rule
• The Court found that General Motors failed to demonstrate that their case fit any of the Vallario categories for permissible interlocutory appeal
• As a procedural matter, the Court granted General Motors’ motion to file a reply brief

United States v. Webb / 24-03124 (2024-11-14)

This is a brief dismissal order from the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in the case of United States v. Virok D. Webb. The Court dismissed the appeal due to lack of prosecution under Tenth Circuit Rule 42.1.The order consists of a single operative paragraph that dismisses the appeal. It is a straightforward procedural dismissal that occurs when a party fails to actively pursue their appeal according to court rules and deadlines.The key provision in this order is the dismissal for lack of prosecution, which effectively terminates the appellate proceedings. The order specifies that it shall serve as the mandate of the court, meaning it is the official notification to the lower court that the appeal has been concluded.

United States v. Martinez / 24-02131 (2024-11-14)

The opinion addresses the enforcement of an appellate waiver in a criminal case where Michael Andrew Martinez, a former sheriff’s deputy, pled guilty to deprivation of rights under color of law and destruction of records in federal investigations. The defendant received a 108-month prison sentence and sought to appeal despite having signed a plea agreement waiving his appellate rights.The Court’s analysis follows the three-part test from United States v. Hahn: (1) whether the appeal falls within the waiver’s scope, (2) whether the waiver was knowing and voluntary, and (3) whether enforcement would result in a miscarriage of justice. The Court focused primarily on the third element, as Martinez conceded the first two points.The Court rejected Martinez’s argument that enforcing the waiver would constitute a miscarriage of justice. Two key reasons were provided: First, the sentence fell within the range contemplated by the plea agreement (2-10 years). Second, Martinez’s challenge to the sentence calculation did not affect the lawfulness of the waiver itself, which is the proper focus of the analysis. The Court emphasized that a waiver is not unlawful merely because the claimed error would be appealable in the absence of a waiver.The Court’s ruling reinforces that appellate waivers will be enforced when they are knowing and voluntary, even if the defendant later disagrees with the sentence imposed, as long as that sentence falls within the agreed-upon range. The opinion maintains that challenges to sentence computation cannot overcome a valid appellate waiver unless they demonstrate the waiver itself was unlawful.

United States v. Wilford / 24-05059 (2024-11-14)

The opinion addresses an appeal case where Maurice Wilford challenged his sentence for violating supervised release conditions. The court dismissed the appeal and granted counsel’s motion to withdraw, finding no non-frivolous grounds for reversal.The opinion is structured around three main aspects of potential appeal:

• Procedural reasonableness of the sentence – The court found no error in the district court’s calculation of Guidelines range and consideration of relevant factors.
• Substantive reasonableness of the sentence – The court confirmed the within-Guidelines sentence of 24 months was presumptively reasonable given multiple violations.
• Constitutionality of the original conviction – The court ruled that challenging the underlying conviction was not permissible in this proceeding.

Key provisions of the opinion include:

• Confirmation that supervised release violation appeals cannot be used to challenge the original conviction’s validity
• Affirmation that sentences within Guidelines range are presumptively reasonable
• Clarification that procedural reasonableness requires proper Guidelines calculation and consideration of § 3553(a) factors
• Recognition that challenges to original convictions must be made through direct appeal or § 2255 proceedings

Zachary Spada v. Richard Houghton, et al / 22-02816 (2024-11-14)

The opinion addresses an appeal by Zachary Spada, a state inmate, regarding excessive force claims against prison officers who used oleoresin capsicum (OC) spray against him on six occasions while he was a pretrial detainee at Erie County Prison.The Court’s analysis focuses on whether the use of OC spray was objectively unreasonable under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, applying the Kingsley factors which include: the relationship between need and amount of force used, extent of injury, efforts to limit force, severity of security problem, perceived threat, and active resistance.The Court’s key determinations are:

• Summary judgment was appropriate for two incidents (second October 29, 2018 incident and November 2, 2018 incident) where the use of OC spray was found objectively reasonable due to clear security threats.
• Summary judgment was not warranted for four other incidents (September 4, October 3, October 8, and first October 29, 2018 incident) where factual disputes existed about whether Spada posed an active threat when sprayed.
• The Court rejected qualified immunity defense due to disputed facts about whether force was used after threats had ended or for punitive purposes.

The Court vacated in part and affirmed in part the District Court’s judgment, remanding the case for further proceedings on the four incidents where summary judgment was found inappropriate.

Scotto v. McDonough / 24-01187 (2024-11-14)

This is a case where the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit dismissed an appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims due to lack of jurisdiction. The case involves a pro se appellant, Livia M. Scotto, who attempted to appeal a Veterans Court decision that had dismissed her original appeal for lack of jurisdiction.The key elements of the opinion are:

• The Veterans Court initially dismissed Ms. Scotto’s appeal because she failed to identify any actual Board of Veterans’ Appeals decision that she was attempting to appeal. She provided two different dates (February 19, 2019, and January 17, 2023) for alleged Board decisions, but no decisions existed on either date.
• Despite multiple opportunities provided by the Veterans Court to identify a specific Board decision she wished to challenge, Ms. Scotto failed to do so.
• The Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal because Ms. Scotto did not raise any legal arguments or constitutional challenges that would fall within the court’s limited jurisdiction to review Veterans Court decisions.

The most significant provisions of this opinion relate to the jurisdictional requirements for appeals:

• The Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction to review Veterans Court decisions is limited to questions of law or constitutional issues
• The court cannot review factual determinations or challenges to how laws were applied to specific facts
• For the Veterans Court to have jurisdiction over an appeal, there must be a final Board decision at issue

Crandall v. MSPB / 24-01373 (2024-11-14)

This opinion addresses a jurisdictional dispute regarding the Merit Systems Protection Board’s (MSPB) authority to hear an appeal from Patricia Ann Crandall, a former employee of the Army & Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES).The Court affirmed the MSPB’s decision that it lacked jurisdiction over Crandall’s appeal of her termination. The key finding was that as an employee of a nonappropriated fund instrumentality (NAFI), Crandall was statutorily excluded from appealing to the MSPB under 5 U.S.C. § 2105(c), which deems NAFI employees ‘not an employee’ for purposes of laws administered by the Office of Personnel Management.The opinion contains several important provisions:

• It confirms that NAFI employees have no right to appeal adverse employment actions to the MSPB under 5 U.S.C. § 7513(d)
• It reaffirms that NAFI employees cannot bring whistleblower protection claims to the MSPB under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)
• It emphasizes that the MSPB’s jurisdiction is limited only to matters specifically granted by law, rule, or regulation
• It places the burden of establishing MSPB jurisdiction on the petitioner by a preponderance of the evidence

The Court’s decision reinforces the established precedent that NAFI employees, despite their length of service or the merits of their claims, cannot seek review of employment actions through the MSPB due to their statutory exclusion from its jurisdiction.

USA v. Joseph Gray / 22-01828 (2024-11-14)

This case involves a criminal appeal regarding fraud against the Department of Veterans Affairs. The key points are:1. Joseph Scott Gray, a decorated Gulf War veteran, was convicted of several fraud-related offenses for lying about his health conditions to obtain VA benefits he wasn’t entitled to. He was sentenced to 5 years in prison and ordered to pay $264,631 in restitution.2. The court’s opinion addresses three main issues:

• The exclusion of expert witness testimony about Gray’s mental health
• The reasonableness of Gray’s 60-month prison sentence
• The scope of the restitution order covering benefits received since 2004

3. The key ruling is that while the conviction and prison sentence are affirmed, the restitution order is vacated because it improperly included benefits from before 2015, when the charged conspiracy began according to the indictment. The court held that restitution must be limited to losses that occurred during the time period specified in the indictment.The most significant legal principle established is that when determining restitution in conspiracy cases that go to trial, courts must look to the temporal scope defined in the indictment rather than including losses from outside that timeframe. This aligns with precedent from other circuits that restitution orders are limited by the temporal boundaries set forth in the charging documents.

USA v. Eric Rogers / 23-01663 (2024-11-14)

This opinion concerns a criminal case involving a series of armed carjackings in Detroit in 2018. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence of Eric Rogers, who was found guilty of conspiracy to commit carjacking and multiple counts of aiding and abetting carjackings and brandishing firearms.The Court’s opinion addresses four main issues:

• The denial of Rogers’s motions for mistrial and new trial based on an in-court identification by a witness
• The sufficiency of evidence supporting the verdict
• The admissibility of 911 call reports
• The classification of Rogers as a career offender under Sentencing Guidelines

Key provisions of the opinion include:

• The Court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the mistrial motion, as any prejudice from the witness identification was mitigated by clear jury instructions
• The evidence against Rogers was deemed sufficient, including DNA evidence, cell phone location data, fingerprints, and witness testimony
• The admission of 911 call reports, even if erroneous, was considered harmless error
• The Court upheld Rogers’s classification as a career offender, confirming that state-law controlled substance offenses need not align exactly with federal definitions to count as predicate offenses

VFS Leasing Co. v. Markel Insurance Company / 22-13338 (2024-10-30)

The case addresses whether an insurance company (Markel American) remains liable when it issues joint checks to two co-payees (VFS Leasing and TDL), but one co-payee (TDL) cashes the checks without the other’s knowledge or endorsement.The key provisions at issue are Florida Statute § 673.4141(3), which states that a drawer is discharged when a bank accepts a draft, and § 673.1101(4), which requires joint payees to act together for negotiation or discharge of an instrument.The Court of Appeals ruled that § 673.4141(3) controls, meaning Markel American’s obligation was discharged when the bank accepted the checks, even though TDL improperly cashed them without VFS’s endorsement. The proper remedy for VFS is to pursue a conversion claim against the bank that improperly accepted the checks, not against Markel American.The main provisions of the opinion include:

• Analysis of the tension between two Florida UCC provisions regarding discharge of payment obligations
• Explanation that § 673.4141(3) insulates drawers from bank errors in recognizing proper holders
• Clarification that while the drawer’s obligation is discharged, the underlying obligation on the checks is suspended and can be enforced against the bank
• Discussion of available remedies through conversion claims against banks rather than breach of contract claims against drawers

This opinion represents a significant interpretation of Florida’s UCC provisions regarding joint payee situations and establishes that drawers are protected when banks improperly accept checks, with remedies directed at the banks rather than the original drawers.

USA v. Matthew Choy / 24-10056 (2024-11-13)

This opinion addresses an appeal by Matthew James Choy regarding his 40-month sentence for criminal contempt. The appellant’s sole argument focused on the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ failure to place him in a medical facility and their decision to keep him in solitary confinement.The Court’s opinion is structured around two main elements: (1) the criteria for summary disposition and (2) the jurisdictional scope of the Court’s review on direct appeal in criminal cases. The Court emphasizes that it can only review the district court’s judgment of conviction and sentence, while the Bureau of Prisons has exclusive statutory authority over prisoner placement decisions.The key provisions of the opinion are:

• Summary disposition is appropriate when one party’s position is clearly correct as a matter of law
• The Court’s jurisdiction in direct criminal appeals is limited to reviewing conviction and sentence
• The Bureau of Prisons, not the district court, has statutory authority over prisoner placement under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b)
• The Court granted the government’s motion for summary affirmance as Choy did not challenge his actual conviction or sentence

Radiant Images, Inc., et al v. Ryan K. Stumphauzer / 24-12350 (2024-11-14)

The opinion addresses a jurisdictional matter in an appeal related to a receivership case in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The Court determined it lacked jurisdiction over an appeal from a district court order that approved a receiver’s motion regarding the treatment of claims.The Court analyzed the appeal under several potential bases for jurisdiction:

• 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(2), which allows appeals from certain receivership-related orders. The Court found this provision inapplicable as the order did not appoint a receiver, refuse to wind up a receivership, or refuse to take steps to accomplish winding up.
• 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), concerning injunction-related orders. The Court determined this provision did not apply as the order neither granted injunctive relief nor addressed any request for such relief.
• The collateral order doctrine, which the Court found inapplicable as the appellants failed to demonstrate that the order might have serious or irreparable consequences that could only be challenged through immediate appeal.

The Court’s key conclusion was that the June 26 order actually took affirmative steps toward resolving and winding up the receivership by approving the treatment of claims and directing the Receiver to prepare a distribution plan. As no valid basis for jurisdiction existed, the Court dismissed the appeal.

Siddhanth Sharma v. Alan Hirsch / 23-02164 (2024-11-14)

This opinion addresses a challenge to North Carolina’s felony-disclosure requirement for candidates running for federal office. The requirement mandates candidates to indicate if they have felony convictions and provide basic information about such convictions.The Court upheld the felony-disclosure requirement as constitutional, finding it falls within states’ authority to regulate elections under the Elections Clause. The Court determined this requirement is not an additional qualification for office since it does not prevent candidates from appearing on the ballot, but rather serves as a procedural measure to inform voters.Key provisions of the opinion include:

• The felony disclosure requirement is a valid exercise of state power to regulate elections and does not violate the Qualifications Clause since it does not exclude candidates from the ballot
• The requirement imposes only a minimal burden on First Amendment rights since it only requires disclosure of factual public information
• States have broad authority under the Constitution to regulate election procedures when not otherwise restricted by federal law

The Court also addressed a separate challenge to an address-disclosure requirement, remanding that claim as moot since the election had already occurred and future candidates would not face mandatory address disclosure.

USA v. Jimmy Lightsey / 20-13682 (2024-10-31)

This opinion addresses whether Jimmy Ray Lightsey’s prior convictions qualify as predicate offenses under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) for sentencing enhancement purposes. The key provisions analyzed are:1. Two Florida drug convictions (2000 and 2009) for sale/delivery of cocaine – The court held these qualify as “serious drug offenses” under ACCA based on binding precedent that looks at the drug schedules in effect at the time of the prior convictions.2. A 1997 Florida conviction for attempted armed robbery – The majority held this qualifies as a “violent felony” under ACCA’s elements clause, finding that Supreme Court’s Taylor decision did not abrogate prior circuit precedent (Joyner) on this issue. The dissent argued Taylor did abrogate Joyner and this conviction should not qualify.The main provisions of the opinion focus on:

• The categorical approach used to determine if prior convictions qualify as ACCA predicates
• Analysis of whether drug schedules at time of prior conviction or current conviction control
• Detailed discussion of when Supreme Court precedent abrogates circuit precedent
• Comparison of federal and Florida attempt statutes and robbery definitions

The court ultimately affirmed Lightsey’s 240-month sentence, finding all three prior convictions properly qualified as ACCA predicates, though with a dissent on the attempted robbery issue.

James McNeill v. Monica Bond / 23-06181 (2024-11-14)

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to grant judgment as a matter of law in favor of defendant Monica Bond in a civil rights case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by James C. McNeill.The opinion is structured as a brief per curiam decision that addresses an appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina. The court reviewed the record and found no reversible error in the district court’s grant of the defendant’s Rule 50(a) motion.The key provisions of this opinion are:

• The court affirmed the district court’s order granting judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a)
• The court denied McNeill’s motion to file a supplement to his informal opening brief
• The court determined that oral argument was unnecessary as the facts and legal contentions were adequately presented in the existing materials

Jeffery Rieber v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections / 23-13958 (2024-11-14)

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued a decision regarding the interpretation of Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute and its application in federal courts. The case involved a defamation lawsuit between Dr. Joseph Mercola and The New York Times Company, where the court had to determine whether Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute provides immunity from suit or merely a defense against liability.The court’s analysis focused on three main aspects:

• The interpretation of Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute (Fla. Stat. § 768.295) and its procedural implications in federal court
• The distinction between immunity from suit versus immunity from liability
• The application of the collateral order doctrine to anti-SLAPP denials

Key provisions of the opinion include:

• The court determined that Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute does not provide immunity from suit but rather a defense against liability
• The denial of an anti-SLAPP motion is not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine
• The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that it must wait until after final judgment
• The opinion clarifies that Florida’s anti-SLAPP protections are substantive rather than procedural in nature

Howard Schleider, et al v. GVDB Operations, LLC, et al / 21-11765 (2024-10-31)

The opinion addresses a case involving claims against an assisted living facility related to a COVID-19 death. Here are the key points: 1. The case involves state-law claims filed by representatives of a deceased resident against an assisted living facility, alleging negligence in failing to prevent COVID-19 transmission which led to the resident’s death. 2. The main legal question was whether the case could be removed from state to federal court under three potential grounds: (1) the defendants were acting under federal officers, (2) the claims were completely preempted by the federal PREP Act, and (3) the claims raised embedded federal questions. 3. The majority opinion held that:

• The defendants were not ‘acting under’ federal officers merely by complying with federal COVID-19 guidance
• The PREP Act did not completely preempt all state law claims related to COVID-19 countermeasures
• The claims did not raise substantial federal questions that would create federal jurisdiction

The dissenting opinion argued that parts of the claims alleging willful misconduct fell within the scope of the PREP Act’s exclusive federal cause of action, which should have allowed removal to federal court. However, the majority’s view prevailed and the case was remanded back to state court.

Terry Lymon v. United Auto Workers Union, Local 2209 / 24-01584 (2024-11-14)

The case involves a dispute between Terry Lymon, an African American worker, and the United Auto Workers Union, Local 2209, regarding alleged racial discrimination in handling his employment grievance. The case centers around three claims from different time periods: 2004 (failure to process grievance), 2007 (grievance withdrawal), and 2011 (denial of internal appeal).The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the Union based on the following key findings:

• The first two claims (from 2004 and 2007) were time-barred as they occurred more than 300 days before Lymon filed his agency charge in 2012.
• Equitable tolling was not applicable because Lymon failed to show diligence in pursuing his claims, waiting seven years to inquire about his 2004 grievance.
• The continuing-violations doctrine did not apply as Lymon could have learned about the Union’s actions much earlier.
• The 2011 discrimination claim failed because Lymon did not provide sufficient evidence of discrimination, and his comparator evidence was inadequate.

The Court emphasized several important legal principles:

• Title VII requires filing a discrimination charge within 300 days of the alleged wrong.
• Equitable tolling requires the plaintiff to diligently seek information about their claim.
• Title VII has no exhaustion requirement for internal union processes.
• For discrimination claims based on comparators, the comparators must be similar ‘in all material respects,’ including same decision-makers and similar conduct.

Roy Kinard, III v. Florida Department of Corrections, et al / 24-10359 (2024-11-14)

This opinion addresses an appeal in a prisoner’s civil rights case involving medical care and disability discrimination claims. The key points are:1. The case involves a Florida prisoner who fractured his foot and sued prison officials for inadequate medical care under §1983 and disability discrimination under the ADA/Rehabilitation Act.2. The Court’s analysis has two main parts:

• The §1983 deliberate indifference claim against the prison doctor was properly dismissed because the doctor’s actions in treating the foot injury (multiple examinations, x-rays, prescriptions, etc.) did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference, even if potentially negligent.
• The disability discrimination claims against the Department of Corrections should not have been dismissed, as the prisoner adequately alleged he was denied access to prison programs/activities due to his disability. However, the case is remanded to determine if he properly exhausted administrative remedies.

3. The key legal holdings are:

• Medical care that is potentially negligent but includes actual treatment efforts does not constitute deliberate indifference under §1983
• ADA/Rehabilitation Act claims require showing denial of access to programs/services due to disability, not just inadequate medical care
• Courts must give prisoners notice and opportunity to develop the record on administrative exhaustion before dismissing claims on that basis

US v. Robert Brinson / 24-06693 (2024-11-14)

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to deny Robert Kenneth Brinson’s motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The court found that the district court properly exercised its discretion in evaluating the case.The opinion consists of two main parts: (1) the procedural history and identification of the issue on appeal, and (2) the court’s analysis of the district court’s decision. The court applied the abuse of discretion standard of review as established in United States v. Moody.The key provisions of this opinion are:

• The court confirmed that the district court appropriately weighed the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors in denying the sentence reduction
• The appellate court will affirm discretionary decisions even if they might have decided differently, citing Brodziak v. Runyon
• The court found oral arguments unnecessary as the facts and legal contentions were adequately presented in the existing materials

US v. Russell Laffitte / 23-04566 (2024-11-14)

The opinion addresses the appeal of Russell Lucius Laffitte’s convictions for bank and wire fraud, focusing on the removal of two jurors during deliberations.The key aspects of the opinion are:

• The Court found that Laffitte waived his claims regarding the removal of Juror No. 93 who needed medication, as his counsel agreed to this removal.
• However, the Court held that removing Juror No. 88 violated Laffitte’s Fifth Amendment right to be present and Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.
• The Court adopted the rule that a juror cannot be dismissed during deliberations if there is a reasonable possibility that the dismissal stems from the juror’s views on the merits of the case.

The main provisions of the opinion include:

• The Court joined several other circuits in adopting the ‘Brown rule’ that prohibits dismissing jurors based on their views of the evidence
• The Court clarified that a juror’s emotional distress only justifies removal if it bears no causal link to the juror’s views on the merits
• The Court held that constitutional violations in removing Juror No. 88 were not harmless beyond reasonable doubt
• As a result, the Court vacated Laffitte’s convictions and sentence and remanded for a new trial

The most important provisions for use of this opinion are:

• The adoption of the rule that courts cannot dismiss jurors during deliberations if there is a reasonable possibility the dismissal stems from their views of the evidence
• The clarification that emotional distress only justifies juror removal if unrelated to their views on the merits
• The requirement that defendants have a right to be present when jurors are removed during deliberations

US v. Russell Laffitte / 23-04509 (2024-11-14)

The opinion addresses the appeal of Russell Lucius Laffitte’s convictions for bank and wire fraud, focusing on the removal of two jurors during deliberations.The key aspects of the opinion are:

• The Court found that removing Juror No. 88 during deliberations violated Laffitte’s Fifth Amendment right to be present and Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury, as there was a reasonable possibility her removal was related to her views of the case rather than an independent reason.
• The Court held that Laffitte waived his claims regarding the removal of Juror No. 93 by agreeing to her removal during trial.
• The Court adopted the rule from other circuits that a juror cannot be dismissed during deliberations if there is a reasonable possibility the dismissal stems from the juror’s views on the merits of the case.

The main provisions that may be important for use of this opinion include:

• The Court’s adoption of the rule that juror removal during deliberations requires no reasonable possibility it stems from the juror’s views on the merits
• The Court’s analysis of what constitutes waiver of objections to juror removal
• The requirement that emotional distress or other grounds for removing a juror must bear no causal link to the juror’s views of the case
• The Court’s holding that violations of the right to be present and right to an impartial jury during juror removal are not harmless error when the timing and circumstances suggest the removal affected deliberations

Byungmin Chae v. United States / 1:24-cv-00086 (2024-11-13)

This opinion concerns a case where the U.S. Court of International Trade dismissed a plaintiff’s challenge to the denial of his customs broker’s license. The case revolves around the plaintiff’s second attempt to contest the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s decision to deny him credit for Question No. 27 on the April 2018 Customs Broker License Exam.The court’s decision is structured around three main elements:

• A detailed procedural history of the plaintiff’s previous challenges to his exam results, including appeals through administrative channels and courts
• Analysis of the doctrine of claim preclusion and its applicability to the current case
• The court’s conclusion that the plaintiff’s current claim is barred by claim preclusion as it involves the same parties, same question, and same exam as his previous case that reached final judgment

Key provisions of the opinion include:

• The court’s finding that all three elements of claim preclusion are satisfied: identical parties, final judgment on merits in first suit, and same set of transactional facts
• Rejection of plaintiff’s argument that his new challenge is different because it focuses on a different aspect of the same regulation
• Confirmation that plaintiff cannot relitigate issues that could have been raised in the original action
• The court’s emphasis that plaintiff is not entitled to an ongoing forum after a final judgment has been made

KRUGEL v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:22-vv-00139 (2024-11-14)

This is a decision on attorneys’ fees and costs in a vaccine injury compensation case. The Special Master granted the petitioner’s motion for final attorneys’ fees and costs, awarding a total of $31,407.56.The decision outlines three main components of the award:

• $27,708.00 in attorneys’ fees
• $3,684.76 in attorneys’ costs
• $14.80 in petitioner’s personal costs

The Special Master’s analysis focused on three key aspects:

• The reasonableness of hourly rates for attorneys and paralegals at the Conway, Homer firm, which were found to be consistent with previously awarded rates in Vaccine Program cases
• The documentation and reasonableness of hours billed to the matter
• The appropriateness of costs claimed, including medical records retrieval, filing fees, postage, and expert retention

The decision emphasizes that since the petition for compensation was successful, the petitioner was entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs under §15(e)(1) of the Vaccine Act. The Special Master used the lodestar approach to determine reasonable fees, which involves assessing reasonable hourly rates multiplied by reasonable hours expended.

KRUGEL v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:22-vv-00139 (2023-10-03)

This is a decision on stipulation in a vaccine injury compensation case where petitioner Gary Krugel claimed that an influenza vaccine received on October 29, 2019, caused him to develop transverse myelitis (TM). The parties reached a settlement agreement despite respondent denying that the flu vaccine caused the alleged injury.The decision consists of two main parts: (1) a brief overview of the case background and procedural history, and (2) the terms of the settlement agreement reached between the parties. The decision adopts the parties’ stipulation and orders compensation.The key provision of the decision is the award of a lump sum payment of $65,000.00 to the petitioner, representing all damages available under 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(a). The decision orders the Clerk of Court to enter judgment according to the stipulation terms, with both parties having the option to expedite judgment by renouncing their right to seek review.

AHMED v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:23-vv-00155 (2024-11-14)

This is a decision on attorney’s fees and costs in a vaccine injury compensation case. The Court granted a total award of $23,601.63, consisting of $22,408.50 in attorney’s fees and $1,193.13 in costs, to be paid jointly to the Petitioner (Huda Ahmed) and their counsel, Shannon Law Group, P.C.The case originated from a petition filed on February 3, 2023, under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program. The petitioner claimed a shoulder injury related to an influenza vaccine administered on November 5, 2021. The underlying case was resolved on June 4, 2024, with a compensation award based on the Respondent’s proffer.The Court’s analysis of the attorney’s fees request focused on several key elements:

• The billing records and rates were found to be reasonable with no cause for reduction
• All claimed costs were properly supported with documentation
• The Respondent raised no specific objections to the rates or amounts sought
• The Petitioner incurred no personal out-of-pocket expenses

AHMED v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:23-vv-00155 (2024-07-19)

This is a decision on damages in a vaccine injury compensation case where Huda Ahmed claimed a shoulder injury related to vaccine administration (SIRVA) following a flu vaccine received on November 5, 2021. The case was resolved through the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program.The decision structure is straightforward and includes two main components: (1) the acknowledgment of the respondent’s (Secretary of Health and Human Services) concession that the petitioner is entitled to compensation, and (2) the specific award determination based on the respondent’s proffer.The key provisions of the decision are:

• The total compensation awarded is $45,723.83
• This amount consists of $45,000.00 for pain and suffering
• An additional $723.83 is awarded for past unreimbursable expenses
• The compensation is to be paid in a single lump sum
• The amount represents all damages available under Section 15(a) of the Vaccine Act

AHMED v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:23-vv-00155 (2024-07-09)

This is a ruling on entitlement in a vaccine injury compensation case where Huda Ahmed claimed a shoulder injury related to vaccine administration (SIRVA) following a flu vaccine received on November 5, 2021.The ruling consists of two main parts: (1) the initial claim filing and case background, and (2) the respondent’s concession and final ruling. The key element is that the Secretary of Health and Human Services conceded that the petitioner is entitled to compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program.The main provisions of significance are:

• The respondent confirmed that the petitioner’s injury is consistent with SIRVA as defined by the Vaccine Injury Table
• The respondent acknowledged that the petitioner has satisfied all legal prerequisites for compensation under the Act
• Based on the respondent’s position and evidence, Chief Special Master Corcoran found that the petitioner is entitled to compensation

The ruling represents a straightforward case where the government agreed that the vaccine injury claim meets all the necessary legal criteria for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, leading to a favorable outcome for the petitioner.

KALAJDZIC et al v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:17-vv-00792 (2024-11-14)

This is a decision of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims regarding the award of attorney’s fees and costs in an unsuccessful vaccine injury case. The court granted the petitioners’ motion for final attorney’s fees and costs totaling $266,564.98, despite their unsuccessful claim that their child developed narcolepsy from a FluMist vaccination.The decision has three main structural components:

• Analysis of whether the unsuccessful claim had a ‘reasonable basis’ to justify fees
• Calculation of appropriate attorney fees based on hourly rates and time spent
• Assessment of litigation costs including expert fees

Key provisions of the decision include:

• The court found the claim had sufficient ‘reasonable basis’ to warrant fees, though it was ultimately unsuccessful
• The court approved hourly rates of $345-479 for the primary attorney and $525 for co-counsel
• Total costs of $20,687.08 were approved, including $12,660 for expert witness fees
• The court warned that similar future claims about non-adjuvanted flu vaccine causing narcolepsy would likely be denied fees entirely

KALAJDZIC et al v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:17-vv-00792 (2024-10-18)

This opinion concerns a case where parents sought compensation under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, claiming that FluMist influenza vaccine caused their son to develop narcolepsy with cataplexy.The key elements of the opinion include:

• The case was classified as an ‘off-table’ injury case since narcolepsy is not listed in the Vaccine Injury Table for seasonal influenza vaccines
• The petitioners had to prove three elements under the Althen test: (1) a medical theory connecting vaccination and injury, (2) a logical sequence of cause and effect, and (3) a proximate temporal relationship
• The Chief Special Master found that petitioners failed to prove the first two Althen prongs by a preponderance of evidence:
  • They did not establish a reliable causal link between FluMist and narcolepsy
  • The medical records lacked evidence of physicians discussing FluMist as a potential cause

The Court upheld the Chief Special Master’s decision, finding that he properly weighed the evidence and expert testimony according to established legal standards. The Court rejected petitioners’ argument that the Special Master improperly applied the Daubert reliability factors.

KALAJDZIC et al v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:17-vv-00792 (2022-07-12)

This is a decision denying compensation in a vaccine injury case where petitioners claimed that their minor son developed narcolepsy after receiving two doses of FluMist influenza vaccine. The key points of the decision are:

• The petitioners alleged that two doses of FluMist vaccine in October and December 2014 caused their son to develop narcolepsy and associated symptoms
• The Chief Special Master denied compensation, finding that petitioners failed to establish that FluMist can cause narcolepsy
• While some versions of flu vaccine (particularly Pandemrix) have been associated with narcolepsy, the evidence does not support that FluMist specifically can cause narcolepsy

The decision’s main provisions include:

• Detailed analysis of the medical theory connecting FluMist to narcolepsy and why it was found insufficient
• Review of prior vaccine program cases involving narcolepsy claims
• Discussion of the medical literature and expert testimony presented
• Analysis under the three-part Althen test for causation in vaccine cases

The most important aspects are:

• The decision found that while some flu vaccines may be associated with narcolepsy, the evidence specifically linking FluMist to narcolepsy was inadequate
• The petitioners’ theory relied too heavily on evidence about different vaccine formulations (particularly Pandemrix) that could not be reliably extended to FluMist
• The timing and circumstances of the child’s narcolepsy onset, while potentially consistent with vaccine causation, could not overcome the lack of evidence that FluMist itself can cause narcolepsy

KALAJDZIC et al v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:17-vv-00792 (2020-08-14)

This is a decision on interim attorneys’ fees and costs in a vaccine injury case. The petitioners filed a claim alleging their minor child developed narcolepsy with cataplexy from a FluMist vaccination. They requested interim attorneys’ fees of $76,297.60 and costs of $14,641.85.The Special Master determined that interim fees were warranted given the 3-year pendency of the case and significant costs incurred. The requested hourly rates for attorneys and paralegals were found reasonable based on prior cases. However, some reductions were made for tasks billed at attorney rates that should have been at paralegal rates, and for overbilling of minor tasks by paralegals.The final award granted was:

• $17,902.00 to current counsel (Wilson Science Law) – $10,302.00 in fees and $7,600.00 in costs
• $69,670.41 to former counsel (Maglio Christopher & Toale) – $62,658.77 in fees and $7,011.64 in costs

Key provisions included:

• Interim fees are appropriate when proceedings are protracted and there are significant costs
• Forum rates apply for DC metro area attorneys
• Reductions made for attorney work billed at attorney rates rather than paralegal rates
• 5% reduction in fees to former firm for paralegal overbilling
• Small reduction in costs for inadequate documentation of shipping/mailing expenses

BRIGGS v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:24-vv-00431 (2024-11-14)

This is a decision of the US Court of Federal Claims dismissing a petition for vaccine compensation filed by Leonora Briggs. The petitioner claimed that childhood vaccinations she received in 1965-1974 caused various health conditions, including hypertension, hearing loss, Type II diabetes, and cognitive disorders.The decision is structured in five main parts: procedural history, factual history, legal standard, analysis, and conclusion. The court explains that the petition was filed on March 20, 2024, and two status conferences were held to discuss the case.The key provisions of the decision are:

• The case falls under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program’s statute of repose (42 U.S.C. § 300aa–16(a)(1)).
• For vaccines administered before October 1, 1988, petitions had to be filed before February 1, 1991.
• The Federal Circuit has ruled that there is no tolling of the statute of limitations based on the discovery rule or ignorance of the law.
• Since the vaccinations were administered between 1965 and 1974, the petition filed in 2024 is time-barred.

The most significant aspects of this opinion are:

• The court’s confirmation that § 300aa–16(a)(1) is a statute of repose, not a statute of limitations.
• The clear deadline established for pre-1988 vaccine claims (February 1, 1991).
• The rejection of arguments for equitable tolling based on delayed discovery of injury or ignorance of the law.

GUZMAN-GUIZAR v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:23-vv-01484 (2024-11-14)

This is a decision on a joint stipulation in a vaccine injury compensation case. Candy Guzman-Guizar filed a petition seeking compensation for a shoulder injury (SIRVA) allegedly related to receiving a Tdap vaccine on January 7, 2021.The key elements of the decision include:

• The petitioner claimed she sustained a shoulder injury within the time period set by the Vaccine Injury Table and experienced effects for more than six months
• While the respondent (Secretary of Health and Human Services) denied the claims, both parties agreed to settle the case
• The settlement awards the petitioner a lump sum payment of $50,000 as compensation for all damages

The stipulation includes several important provisions:

• The payment is solely for the benefit of the petitioner under strict construction of the relevant laws
• The petitioner releases the US government from all related claims
• The settlement is not an admission of liability by the government
• The parties agree this represents a full settlement except for potential attorney fees and costs

PARKINSON v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:22-vv-01270 (2024-11-14)

This is a decision on attorney’s fees and costs in a vaccine injury compensation case. The Court granted a total award of $47,703.66, consisting of $46,368.20 in attorney’s fees and $1,335.46 in costs, to be paid jointly to the Petitioner (William Parkinson) and his legal counsel, Siri & Glimstad, LLP.The case originated from a petition filed on September 9, 2022, where the Petitioner claimed he suffered Guillain-Barré Syndrome following an influenza vaccine administered on September 10, 2021. The underlying case was resolved on April 12, 2024, with a compensation award based on the Respondent’s proffer.The decision contains three main components:

• Review of the attorney’s fee request and confirmation of its reasonableness
• Verification of supporting documentation for all claimed costs
• Determination that the requirements under Section 15(e) of the Vaccine Act for awarding reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to successful claimants were met

Key provisions of the decision include:

• The Court found no cause to reduce the requested hours or rates
• The Respondent raised no specific objections to the rates or amounts sought
• The Petitioner incurred no personal out-of-pocket expenses
• The award is to be paid as a lump sum in the form of a check jointly payable to the Petitioner and his counsel

PARKINSON v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:22-vv-01270 (2024-05-16)

This is a decision awarding damages in a vaccine injury compensation case under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program. William Parkinson filed a petition claiming he suffered from Guillain-Barré Syndrome (GBS) after receiving an influenza vaccine. The court found him entitled to compensation on October 24, 2023.The decision outlines the compensation structure agreed upon by both parties:

• $112,500.00 for pain and suffering
• $33,728.41 for lost wages
• Total compensation: $146,228.41

The key provisions of the decision include:

• The compensation is to be paid as a lump sum
• Payment will be made in the form of a check payable to the petitioner
• The amount represents all damages available under Section 15(a) of the Vaccine Act
• No guardianship is required as the petitioner is a competent adult

The decision is final and directs the Clerk of Court to enter judgment accordingly, with the parties having the right to expedite judgment by jointly filing notice renouncing the right to seek review.

PARKINSON v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:22-vv-01270 (2023-11-30)

This is a ruling on entitlement in a vaccine injury compensation case where William Parkinson claimed he developed Guillain-Barré Syndrome (GBS) after receiving an influenza vaccine on September 10, 2021. The case was filed under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program.The ruling consists of two main parts: (1) the initial claim by the petitioner stating that he suffered a Table Injury (GBS) following flu vaccination and experienced residual effects for more than six months, and (2) the Respondent’s (Secretary of Health and Human Services) concession that the petitioner is entitled to compensation.The key provisions of the ruling are:

• The petitioner met the criteria set forth in the Vaccine Injury Table and the Qualifications and Aids to Interpretation
• The GBS symptoms occurred between three and forty-two days after vaccination
• The weakness did not have a more likely alternative diagnosis
• The condition did not meet any exclusionary criteria
• The petitioner suffered the sequela of his injury for more than six months

Based on these findings, Chief Special Master Corcoran determined that the petitioner is entitled to compensation under the Vaccine Act. The ruling represents a straightforward application of the Vaccine Injury Table criteria to a case where the government conceded liability.

DIAS v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:22-vv-00287 (2024-11-14)

This is a decision on interim attorneys’ fees and costs in a vaccine injury case. The Special Master granted the petitioner’s motion and awarded $59,039.29 in interim attorneys’ fees and costs.The key provisions of the decision include:

• The Special Master found that the petition was filed in good faith and had reasonable basis, which are requirements for awarding attorneys’ fees under the Vaccine Act
• Interim fees were deemed appropriate because:
  • The case had been pending for over 2 years
  • The amount requested exceeded $30,000
  • Petitioner’s counsel was withdrawing from the case
• The awarded amount consisted of:
  • $57,039.00 in attorneys’ fees at hourly rates deemed reasonable
  • $2,000.29 in costs for medical records, shipping, filing fees and other expenses

The decision provides a detailed analysis of the reasonableness of both the hourly rates charged by the attorneys and paralegals, as well as the number of hours billed and costs incurred. The Special Master found all requested fees and costs to be reasonable based on prevailing rates in the Vaccine Program and the work performed in this case.

CHUNG v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:22-vv-00858 (2024-11-14)

This is a dismissal order in a vaccine injury case where Sharon Chung claimed she suffered neuropathy in her left arm following a flu vaccination received on September 30, 2019. The case was filed under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program.The order has a simple structure consisting of two main parts: (1) a brief procedural history of the case, and (2) the dismissal order itself. The case was dismissed without prejudice following a joint stipulation by both parties under Vaccine Rule 21(a).The key provisions of this order are:

• The case is dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Vaccine Rule 21(a)
• The dismissal is based on a Joint Stipulation of Dismissal filed by both parties
• No judgment shall enter in the case pursuant to Vaccine Rule 21(a)
• The dismissal comes after respondent filed a Rule 4(c) report arguing against compensation

YAUNERIDGE et al v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:21-vv-01789 (2024-11-14)

This is a dismissal decision in a vaccine injury compensation case where parents (George and Julia Yauneridge) filed a petition on behalf of their minor son, alleging that he suffered from supraventricular tachycardia (SVT) after receiving multiple vaccines in August 2020.The case was voluntarily dismissed by the petitioners after their investigation revealed they would be unable to prove entitlement to compensation, particularly due to experts’ concerns about causation and the discovery of a more definitive diagnosis of Wolff-Parkinson-White (WPW) syndrome.The decision outlines the legal framework for vaccine injury compensation, noting that petitioners must prove either a ‘Table Injury’ or causation-in-fact through the three-prong Althen test: (1) a medical theory connecting vaccination and injury, (2) a logical sequence of cause and effect, and (3) a proximate temporal relationship between vaccination and injury.Key provisions of the decision include:

• Petitioners must support their claim with either medical records or expert medical opinion
• The medical records were insufficient to establish entitlement
• No expert opinion was presented to support vaccine causation
• Petitioners retain the right to file a civil action after rejecting the Program’s judgment
• Petitioners may apply for costs despite the dismissal

GUY v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:20-vv-00684 (2024-11-14)

This is a decision of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims granting attorney’s fees and costs in a vaccine injury compensation case. The court awarded a total of $178,277.70, consisting of $142,406.50 in attorney’s fees and $35,871.20 in costs, to the petitioner who successfully settled a claim alleging encephalomyelitis caused by a tetanus, diphtheria, pertussis vaccine.The decision outlines the two-part process for determining appropriate fees:

• Application of the lodestar method (multiplying reasonable hours by reasonable rates)
• Adjusting the calculation based on relevant factors

The court analyzed and approved the hourly rates requested for the attorneys and support staff, finding them consistent with the forum rates and previous awards.Regarding costs, the court reviewed and approved:

• Expert fees of $33,750 for Dr. Carlo Tornatore (67.5 hours at $500/hour)
• Standard litigation costs including filing fees, medical record retrieval, medical literature retrieval, and mailing costs

The court found all requested costs to be reasonable and typical for Vaccine Program cases.

GUY v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:20-vv-00684 (2024-04-29)

This is a decision awarding damages in a vaccine injury case where Jamie Guy claimed that a tetanus, diphtheria, pertussis (Tdap) vaccine caused her to develop encephalomyelitis/acute disseminated encephalomyelitis (ADEM). The case was resolved through a stipulation agreement between the parties, with the petitioner being awarded $75,000 in compensation.The decision is structured in three main parts:

• Background of the case, including the initial petition and the parties’ positions
• Recognition of the parties’ stipulation agreement
• Final award determination and terms

Key provisions of the decision include:

• The petitioner claimed the Tdap vaccine received on July 23, 2017, caused ADEM with residual effects lasting more than six months
• While the respondent denied the vaccine caused any injuries, both parties agreed to settle the case
• The compensation amount of $75,000 represents all damages available under Section 15(a) of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program
• The award is to be paid as a lump sum in the form of a check payable to the petitioner

TREPICCIONE v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:21-vv-01902 (2024-11-14)

This is a decision in a vaccine injury compensation case where petitioner Janel Trepiccione sought compensation for a shoulder injury (SIRVA) allegedly caused by a flu vaccine received on September 28, 2018. The case was dismissed due to insufficient proof.The decision outlines three key structural elements:

• The initial claim filing under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program
• The Respondent’s opposition based on failure to meet the six-month severity requirement
• The Petitioner’s ultimate motion to dismiss acknowledging inability to prove entitlement to compensation

The most significant provisions of the decision are:

• To receive compensation, petitioner must prove receipt of a covered vaccine and either a ‘Table Injury’ or an injury actually caused by the vaccine
• Petitioner must establish that injury effects lasted more than six months, resulted in death, or required hospitalization with surgical intervention
• Claims must be supported by either medical records or medical opinion
• In this case, records did not demonstrate symptoms lasting beyond May 2019 (only 4 months post-vaccination)
• The case was dismissed for failure to meet the six-month severity requirement under Section 11(c)(1)(D) of the Vaccine Act

HAMILTON v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:21-vv-00910 (2024-11-14)

This is a ruling on entitlement in a vaccine injury compensation case where Jennifer Hamilton claimed she suffered a shoulder injury related to vaccine administration (SIRVA) following an influenza vaccination received on November 11, 2019. The Department of Health and Human Services has conceded that the petitioner is entitled to compensation.The ruling is structured in three main parts:

• Initial claim details and procedural background
• Respondent’s position acknowledging entitlement
• The court’s final determination of entitlement

Key provisions of the ruling include:

• The petitioner filed under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (42 U.S.C. §300aa-10)
• The injury symptoms persisted for more than six months
• The respondent acknowledged that the petitioner suffered a SIRVA as defined by the Vaccine Injury Table
• The respondent confirmed that all legal prerequisites for compensation were satisfied
• Based on the evidence and respondent’s position, the Chief Special Master found the petitioner is entitled to compensation

HAMILTON v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:21-vv-00910 (2024-09-11)

This is a Findings of Fact ruling in a vaccine injury case where Jennifer Hamilton alleged she suffered a shoulder injury related to vaccine administration (SIRVA) following a flu vaccination received on November 11, 2019.The key issue in this ruling was whether the petitioner’s shoulder pain began within 48 hours of vaccination, as required by the Vaccine Injury Table. The Chief Special Master analyzed various pieces of evidence including medical records, affidavits, and text messages to determine the onset timing.The main provisions of the ruling include:

• A detailed analysis of the evidence timeline from November 2019 to August 2020
• Discussion of the petitioner’s delay in seeking medical treatment and her explanations for this delay
• Evaluation of an intervening medical appointment in March 2020 where shoulder pain was not mentioned
• Assessment of text messages and consistent attribution of the injury to the flu shot in medical records

The Chief Special Master ultimately found there was preponderant evidence that the onset of petitioner’s pain occurred within 48 hours of vaccination, despite the delay in seeking treatment. The ruling ordered the respondent to file a status report by September 18, 2024 indicating how they intend to proceed with the case given this finding.

SMESTAD v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:20-vv-01971 (2024-11-14)

This is a decision on attorney’s fees and costs in a vaccine injury compensation case. The Court granted a total award of $40,912.45, consisting of $39,661.90 in attorney’s fees and $1,250.55 in costs, to be paid jointly to the Petitioner (Eileen Smestad) and her counsel.The case originated from a petition filed on December 23, 2020, where the Petitioner claimed a right shoulder injury related to an influenza vaccine received on October 25, 2019. The underlying case was resolved on March 26, 2024, with a compensation award based on the Respondent’s proffer.The Court’s analysis focused on three main elements:

• Review of the billing records and rates requested by Petitioner’s counsel
• Assessment of the supporting documentation for claimed costs
• Consideration of the Respondent’s position, who did not object to the fees but deferred to the Court’s discretion

The decision emphasizes that the requested fees and costs were found reasonable based on the Court’s experience and the lack of specific objections from the Respondent. The award was ordered to be paid as a lump sum via check, to be forwarded to the law firm’s address in Sarasota, FL.

SMESTAD v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:20-vv-01971 (2024-04-26)

This is a decision awarding damages in a vaccine injury compensation case. The petitioner, Eileen Smestad, was awarded compensation for a right shoulder injury related to vaccine administration (SIRVA) following an influenza vaccine received on October 25, 2019. The case was resolved through the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program.The decision consists of two main parts:

• A ruling on entitlement issued on August 10, 2023, finding the petitioner entitled to compensation
• A proffer on award of compensation filed by the Respondent on March 26, 2024

The key provisions of the decision are:

• Total compensation awarded: $76,570.35
• Breakdown of compensation:
  • $75,000.00 for pain and suffering
  • $1,570.35 for past unreimbursable expenses
• The compensation is to be paid as a lump sum in the form of a check payable to the petitioner
• The amount represents all damages available under Section 15(a) of the Vaccine Act

SMESTAD v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:20-vv-01971 (2023-09-11)

This is a ruling on entitlement in a vaccine injury case where Eileen Smestad claimed compensation for a right shoulder injury related to vaccine administration (SIRVA) following a flu vaccine received on October 25, 2019. The case was filed under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program.The ruling consists of three main parts:

• Initial claim details and procedural background
• March 14, 2023 factual ruling finding that the flu vaccine was administered in Petitioner’s right shoulder and pain onset occurred within 48 hours
• Respondent’s amended Rule 4(c) Report acknowledging that Petitioner suffered SIRVA as defined by the Vaccine Injury Table

Key provisions of the ruling include:

• Petitioner suffered residual effects for more than six months
• No other civil case was filed or compensation received for this injury
• The Respondent (Secretary of Health and Human Services) does not contest that Petitioner satisfied all legal prerequisites for compensation
• The Chief Special Master found the Petitioner is entitled to compensation under the Program

SMESTAD v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:20-vv-01971 (2023-04-18)

This is a Findings of Fact ruling in a vaccine injury case where the petitioner, Eileen Smestad, alleged she suffered a right shoulder injury (SIRVA) after receiving a flu vaccine in October 2019. The key issues were determining the site of vaccination (right vs left arm) and whether pain onset occurred within 48 hours.The ruling analyzes multiple pieces of evidence including:

• Medical records showing Petitioner’s history of shoulder issues
• Vaccine administration records from CVS Pharmacy
• Witness statements from Petitioner, her husband, and a friend
• Post-vaccination medical records documenting complaints of right shoulder pain

The Chief Special Master made two key findings:

1. The flu vaccine was most likely administered in Petitioner’s right shoulder as alleged, despite some conflicting records showing left arm administration. This finding was based on:
   • Detailed CVS records obtained by subpoena showing right arm administration
   • Petitioner’s consistent reports in medical records of right arm injection
   • Evidence that Petitioner routinely requested right arm vaccination due to prior lymph node removal on left side
2. The onset of Petitioner’s shoulder pain occurred within 48 hours of vaccination based on consistent reports of immediate pain upon injection.

The ruling directs the parties to proceed with settlement discussions based on these factual findings establishing the key elements needed to prove a SIRVA claim.

FULLER v. USA / 1:24-cv-01150 (2024-11-13)

This opinion addresses a motion for reconsideration filed by Jerrod Antonio Fuller regarding the court’s previous dismissal of his case. The court denies the motion, reaffirming its lack of jurisdiction over the matter.The opinion’s structure consists of three main parts: (1) the legal standard for reconsideration under Rule 59, (2) analysis of the plaintiff’s arguments, and (3) the final ruling. Under Rule 59, a motion for reconsideration requires showing extraordinary circumstances through either a change in controlling law, newly available evidence, or prevention of manifest injustice.The key provisions of the opinion are:

• The Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction only over claims against the United States, not state courts or other parties
• The court cannot review state court decisions, including those from Maryland state courts
• The plaintiff’s arguments about jurisdiction issues, conflicts of interest, and alleged fraud must be addressed through the Maryland state court system
• The plaintiff’s own statements confirm that his complaints are directed at state court proceedings, which are outside this court’s jurisdiction

FULLER v. USA / 1:24-cv-01150 (2024-10-17)

This is a decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims dismissing a case filed by Jerrod Antonio Fuller against the United States. The plaintiff sought compensation and other remedies related to his divorce proceedings in Maryland state courts.The Court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on several grounds:

• All plaintiff’s allegations were directed at Maryland courts and their officials, not at the United States federal government
• The Court lacks jurisdiction over tort claims (emotional distress, defamation, trespass etc.)
• The Court has no jurisdiction to enforce criminal laws cited by the plaintiff
• The Court cannot review or intervene in state court proceedings

The key provisions of the opinion focus on explaining the limited jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, which can only hear certain monetary claims against the United States federal government. The Court emphasized that it cannot hear claims against state courts or officials, cannot adjudicate tort or criminal matters, and is not an appellate court for state court decisions. The plaintiff’s proper recourse for challenging state court decisions would be through the Maryland state appellate courts.