Review of US courts opinions for 10/11/2024

US, et al v. American Airlines Group Inc. / 23-01802 (2024-11-08)

This is a significant antitrust decision regarding the Northeast Alliance (NEA) between American Airlines and JetBlue Airways. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling that the NEA violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act as an unreasonable restraint on competition.The key elements of the decision include:

• The NEA was an agreement between American Airlines and JetBlue to operate as a single airline for most routes in/out of Boston and New York City, including coordinating schedules, sharing revenues, and allocating markets
• The court found the NEA had direct anticompetitive effects by reducing output and consumer choice in multiple markets through market allocation and elimination of competition between the carriers
• The court rejected American Airlines’ arguments that the NEA had procompetitive benefits that outweighed its anticompetitive effects, finding most claimed benefits were either not legally cognizable or lacked evidentiary support

The main provisions of the decision focused on:

• Applying the three-step rule of reason analysis to find the NEA violated antitrust law
• Rejecting American Airlines’ arguments that the NEA should be viewed more favorably as a joint venture rather than an anticompetitive agreement
• Upholding the district court’s factual findings about the NEA’s anticompetitive effects and lack of offsetting procompetitive benefits
• Affirming that any limited procompetitive benefits could have been achieved through less restrictive means

The most important aspects for application include:

• The decision reinforces that agreements between competitors to allocate markets and share revenues will face strict antitrust scrutiny even if labeled as a joint venture
• Courts will closely examine claimed procompetitive benefits and require strong evidentiary support rather than accepting theoretical justifications
• The availability of less restrictive alternatives to achieve legitimate business objectives will weigh heavily in the antitrust analysis

Admiral Insurance Company, et al v. Tocci Building Corporation, et al / 22-01462 (2024-11-08)

This opinion addresses a dispute between a general contractor (Tocci) and its insurers over coverage under a commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policy. The key question was whether the policy covers damage to non-defective parts of a construction project resulting from a subcontractor’s defective work on other parts of the project.The court focused on the policy’s exclusion (j)(6), which excludes coverage for property damage to “that particular part of any property that must be restored, repaired or replaced because ‘your work’ was incorrectly performed on it.” Applying Massachusetts law, the court interpreted this exclusion broadly to apply to the entire construction project where Tocci served as general contractor, not just the specific defective components.The court determined that since Tocci was retained as general contractor for the entire project, the exclusion applied to all resulting damage from defective work, including:

• Damage to sheetrock from faulty roof work
• Mold formation from inadequate sheathing
• Damage to concrete, framing and pipes from improper soil compaction

While the exclusion has an exception for completed work under the “products-completed operations hazard,” this did not apply since Tocci was terminated before completing the project. Therefore, the court affirmed that the insurer had no duty to defend Tocci in the underlying lawsuit.

United States v. Dewayne Baker / 24-02586 (2024-11-08)

This opinion addresses an appeal of a criminal sentence in a federal firearms case. The defendant, Dewayne Baker, appealed his above-Guidelines sentence after pleading guilty to possession of a firearm in furtherance of a federal drug trafficking crime.The Court of Appeals addressed two main aspects of the case. First, it determined that the appeal was outside the scope of the appeal waiver contained in the written plea agreement. Second, the Court analyzed the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, finding that the district court properly considered the statutory factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and made an appropriate individualized assessment.The key provisions of the opinion are:

• The Court affirmed that the district court’s upward variance in sentencing was reasonable, as it was based on an individualized assessment of the facts
• The Court found that the district court properly considered all relevant factors and made no clear errors in judgment when weighing these factors
• The Court determined that there were no non-frivolous issues for appeal after an independent review of the record
• The Court granted defense counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirmed the original judgment

United States v. Keith Clevenger / 24-02311 (2024-11-08)

This opinion addresses a criminal appeal case where Keith Clevenger challenged his sentence after pleading guilty to conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance. The court dismissed the appeal based on the existence of an appeal waiver in the plea agreement. The opinion is structured around three main elements: (1) the validity of the appeal waiver, (2) counsel’s motion to withdraw under Anders v. California, and (3) the court’s independent review under Penson v. Ohio. The court determined that the appeal waiver was enforceable, entered into knowingly and voluntarily, and that enforcing it would not result in a miscarriage of justice. The key provisions of the opinion are:

• The appeal waiver was found to be enforceable under the three-part test from United States v. Andis
• The court conducted a de novo review of the appeal waiver’s validity
• Despite counsel’s challenge to the sentence as substantively unreasonable, the court found this issue fell within the scope of the appeal waiver
• The court’s independent review found no non-frivolous issues outside the scope of the appeal waiver
• The court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismissed the appeal

United States v. Leonard Jones / 23-03506 (2024-11-08)

This is a procedural notice from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit informing counsel about the issuance of an opinion in the cases United States v. Leonard Jones (Case Nos. 23-3487 and 23-3506).The notice outlines the post-submission procedures, specifically emphasizing that petitions for rehearing and petitions for rehearing en banc must be filed within 14 days of the judgment entry date. All counsel-filed petitions must be submitted electronically through the CM/ECF system, with no paper copies required.Key procedural requirements include:

• No grace period for mailing is allowed except as provided by FRAP 25(a)(2)(iii)
• Petitions must be received within the 14-day deadline to be considered timely
• Late submissions may be denied as untimely
• Electronic filing is mandatory for counsel-submitted petitions

United States v. Leonard Jones / 23-03487 (2024-11-08)

This is a procedural notice from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit informing counsel about the issuance of an opinion in the cases United States v. Leonard Jones (23-3487 and 23-3506). The notice serves as a formal communication about the entry of judgment in accordance with the issued opinion.The document outlines the post-submission procedures, specifically emphasizing the strict 14-day deadline for filing petitions for rehearing and petitions for rehearing en banc. It details that counsel-filed petitions must be submitted electronically through CM/ECF system, and no paper copies are required.Key procedural requirements highlighted in the notice include:

• Petitions must be received within 14 days of the judgment entry date
• Electronic filing is mandatory for counsel-filed petitions
• No grace period for mailing is allowed (except as provided by FRAP 25(a)(2)(iii))
• Late petitions may be denied as untimely

Major Brands, Inc. v. Mast-Jagermeister US, Inc., et al / 22-03067 (2024-11-08)

This appears to be a notice of opinion issuance from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in the case Major Brands, Inc. v. Mast-Jagermeister US, Inc., et al (Case Nos. 22-2979 and 22-3067).The document serves as a formal notification that the court has issued its opinion and entered judgment in the case. It outlines the post-submission procedures, particularly emphasizing the strict 14-day deadline for filing petitions for rehearing and petitions for rehearing en banc.Key procedural requirements specified in the notice include:

• Petitions must be received within 14 days of the judgment entry date
• Counsel-filed petitions must be submitted electronically through CM/ECF
• No grace period for mailing is allowed (except as provided by FRAP 25(a)(2)(iii))
• Late petitions may be denied as untimely

The notice is primarily administrative in nature, providing instructions to counsel regarding post-judgment procedures rather than containing substantive legal holdings or analysis. It serves as a procedural guide for attorneys involved in the case regarding their options following the court’s decision.

Major Brands, Inc. v. Mast-Jagermeister US, Inc., et al / 22-02979 (2024-11-08)

This appears to be a notice of opinion issuance from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in the case of Major Brands, Inc. v. Mast-Jagermeister US, Inc. The document informs the parties that the court has issued its opinion and entered judgment in consolidated cases 22-2979 and 22-3067.The notice outlines the post-submission procedures, specifically emphasizing the 14-day deadline for filing petitions for rehearing and petitions for rehearing en banc. It clarifies that counsel-filed petitions must be submitted electronically through CM/ECF, and no paper copies are required. The notice explicitly states that petitions received after the 14-day period may be denied as untimely.The document includes important procedural details:

• Petitions must be received within 14 days of judgment entry
• Electronic filing is mandatory for counsel-filed petitions
• No grace period for mailing is allowed (except as provided by FRAP 25(a)(2)(iii))
• The case originated from the U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Missouri (Case No. 4:18-cv-00423-HEA)

United States v. Kenneth Everett / 24-02400 (2024-11-08)

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld a district court’s decision to revoke Kenneth Everett’s supervised release and sentence him to 21 months in prison without additional supervised release. The case involved an appeal challenging the revocation sentence as substantively unreasonable.The Court’s opinion is structured around two main elements: (1) the review of the district court’s sentencing decision and (2) the analysis of whether the court properly considered the statutory factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The Court found that the district court acted within its discretion and followed proper procedures in determining the sentence.The key provisions of the opinion are:

• The 21-month prison sentence was below the statutory maximum of 2 years for a Class C felony
• The district court properly considered all relevant factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
• There was no indication that the district court overlooked relevant factors or made clear errors in judgment
• The review was conducted under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard

Tracy Sanders, et al v. Reid Forrester, et al / 24-01699 (2024-11-08)

This is a procedural notice from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, informing the parties that the court has issued an opinion and entered judgment in case No. 24-1699 (Tracy Sanders, et al v. Reid Forrester, et al).The notice outlines the post-submission procedures, specifically focusing on the requirements for filing petitions for rehearing and petitions for rehearing en banc. Key provisions include:

• A strict 14-day deadline for filing petitions for rehearing and petitions for rehearing en banc from the date of judgment entry
• Requirement for counsel to file petitions electronically through CM/ECF system
• No paper copies are required for petition submissions
• No grace period for mailing is allowed (except as provided by FRAP 25(a)(2)(iii))

The notice emphasizes that any petition received after the 14-day filing period may be denied as untimely. This document serves as an administrative notification rather than a substantive court opinion, providing procedural guidance to the parties involved in the case.

United States v. Alan Sanchez / 23-03687 (2024-11-08)

This is a procedural notice from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, informing counsel that the court has issued an opinion in the case United States v. Alan Sanchez (Case No. 23-3687) and that judgment has been entered accordingly.The notice outlines the post-submission procedures, specifically emphasizing that:

• Petitions for rehearing and petitions for rehearing en banc must be received within 14 days of the judgment entry date
• Counsel-filed petitions must be submitted electronically through CM/ECF
• No grace period for mailing is allowed except as provided by FRAP 25(a)(2)(iii)
• Late petitions may be denied as untimely

The document serves as an administrative notification and contains no substantive legal holdings or analysis. It primarily functions as a reminder of procedural requirements for any potential post-judgment filings, particularly regarding the strict 14-day deadline for rehearing petitions.

In re: The Hertz Corporation, et al / 23-01170 (2024-11-06)

This is a procedural order from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit regarding modifications to a previously issued opinion in the Hertz Corporation bankruptcy case. The order concerns appeals filed by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and U.S. Bank National Association as Indenture Trustees against Hertz Corporation and its affiliated entities.The order specifically vacates an amended opinion that was filed on September 25, 2024, and directs the Clerk to file a further amended opinion. The modifications include changes to footnote 20 and the addition of a new paragraph and footnote 25 before the opinion’s conclusion.The Court explicitly states that these amendments do not affect the underlying judgment, and therefore no party is permitted to file a petition for rehearing. The order is signed by Circuit Judge Thomas L. Ambro.Key provisions of the order include:

• Vacation of the September 25, 2024 amended opinion
• Direction to file a further amended opinion with specific modifications
• Clarification that the amendments do not affect the judgment
• Prohibition of further petitions for rehearing

In re: The Hertz Corporation, et al / 23-01170 (2024-11-06)

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals issued a precedential opinion regarding post-petition interest and make-whole premiums in the Hertz bankruptcy case. The key points are:1. The case involved a dispute between Hertz and its noteholders over whether Hertz had to pay over $270 million in post-petition interest and make-whole premiums, while Hertz distributed over $1 billion to shareholders.2. The Court ruled that make-whole premiums must be disallowed under Section 502(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code as they constitute unmatured interest, both under the dictionary definition and as an economic equivalent of interest. However, the Court held that Hertz must pay post-petition interest at the contract rate rather than the lower federal judgment rate because Hertz was solvent.3. The Court’s key reasoning was based on the absolute priority rule – bankruptcy’s fundamental principle that creditors must be paid in full before shareholders receive anything. The Court held that allowing Hertz to cancel over $270 million in interest owed to noteholders while distributing $1.1 billion to shareholders would impermissibly violate this rule. The Court emphasized that the Bankruptcy Code does not allow ‘backdoor means’ to defeat creditor priority.The decision aligns with similar rulings by the Fifth and Ninth Circuits but provides additional reasoning based on the absolute priority rule. The Court’s opinion focused on preventing solvent debtors from using bankruptcy to force creditors to accept less than their full contractual entitlements while making distributions to shareholders.

In re: The Hertz Corporation, et al / 23-01170 (2024-11-06)

This is a procedural order from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit regarding modifications to a previously issued opinion in the Hertz Corporation bankruptcy case. The order concerns appeals filed by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and U.S. Bank National Association as Indenture Trustees against Hertz Corporation and its affiliated entities.The Court has ordered that the amended opinion from September 25, 2024, be vacated and replaced with a further amended opinion. The modifications include changes to footnote 20 and the addition of a new paragraph and footnote 25 before the opinion’s conclusion.The key provisions of this order are:

• The previous amended opinion from September 25, 2024, is vacated
• A new further amended opinion will be filed with specific modifications
• The changes include modifications to footnote 20
• A new paragraph and footnote 25 are added before the conclusion
• The amendments do not affect the judgment
• No party is permitted to file a petition for rehearing based on these amendments

In re: The Hertz Corporation, et al / 23-01170 (2024-09-25)

The opinion addresses a complex bankruptcy case involving Hertz Corporation and its creditors, specifically focusing on the payment of post-petition interest and make-whole premiums.The key points of the decision are:

• The Court ruled that make-whole premiums (called ‘Applicable Premiums’ in this case) must be disallowed under Section 502(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code as they constitute unmatured interest.
• However, the Court held that Hertz, being solvent, must pay post-petition interest at the contract rate rather than the lower federal judgment rate to its unimpaired creditors (the Noteholders).
• The Court determined that the absolute priority rule, which requires creditors to be paid in full before stockholders receive anything, is a fundamental principle of bankruptcy law that must be respected.

The Court’s decision was based on several key provisions:

• The Court found that the Bankruptcy Code incorporates the common law absolute priority rule, which requires solvent debtors to pay contract rate interest before making distributions to equity holders.
• The Court rejected Hertz’s attempt to pay noteholders a lower federal judgment rate while distributing over $1 billion to stockholders.
• The Court emphasized that bankruptcy law’s fundamental goals include protecting creditors’ rights and preventing inequitable distributions to equity holders at creditors’ expense.

The Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the Bankruptcy Court’s decisions, requiring Hertz to pay post-petition interest at the Notes’ applicable contract rate, including the Applicable Premiums on the 2026 and 2028 Notes.

In re: The Hertz Corporation, et al / 23-01169 (2024-11-06)

This is a procedural order from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit regarding modifications to a previously issued opinion in the Hertz Corporation bankruptcy case. The order concerns appeals filed by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and U.S. Bank National Association as Indenture Trustees against Hertz Corporation and its affiliated entities.The Court has ordered that the amended opinion from September 25, 2024, be vacated and replaced with a further amended opinion. The modifications include changes to footnote 20 and the addition of a new paragraph and footnote 25 before the opinion’s conclusion.The Court specifically notes that these amendments do not affect the underlying judgment in the case, and therefore no party is permitted to file a petition for rehearing based on these changes. The order is signed by Circuit Judge Thomas L. Ambro and is directed to be distributed to all counsel of record.The key provisions of this order are:

• Vacation of the September 25, 2024 amended opinion
• Direction to file a further amended opinion with specific modifications
• Clarification that the amendments do not affect the judgment
• Prohibition of new petitions for rehearing based on these amendments

In re: The Hertz Corporation, et al / 23-01169 (2024-11-06)

The opinion addresses a bankruptcy case involving Hertz Corporation and its dispute with noteholders over post-petition interest and make-whole premiums. Here are the key points:1. The case involves Hertz’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization where, despite initially being in financial distress, the company became solvent and paid stockholders $1.1 billion while denying noteholders over $270 million in contractual interest and premiums.2. The court’s decision has three main components:

• It upheld denial of an early redemption fee on 2024 Notes based on contract terms
• It ruled that make-whole premiums (called ‘Applicable Premiums’) must be disallowed as unmatured interest under bankruptcy law
• It held that Hertz must pay post-petition interest at the contract rate rather than the lower federal judgment rate because it was solvent

3. The key provisions that shaped the court’s analysis were:

• The absolute priority rule requiring creditors be paid before stockholders
• Section 502(b)(2) prohibiting claims for unmatured interest
• Requirements for treatment of unimpaired creditors under the bankruptcy plan

The court ultimately concluded that while make-whole premiums must be disallowed as unmatured interest, Hertz’s solvency required it to pay contract rate interest to noteholders before making distributions to stockholders. The decision aligns with similar rulings by the Fifth and Ninth Circuits but provides additional reasoning based on the absolute priority rule.

In re: The Hertz Corporation, et al / 23-01169 (2024-11-06)

This is a procedural order from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit regarding modifications to a previously issued opinion in the Hertz Corporation bankruptcy case. The order concerns appeals filed by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and U.S. Bank National Association as Indenture Trustees against Hertz Corporation and its affiliated entities.The order specifically vacates an amended opinion that was filed on September 25, 2024, and directs the Clerk to file a further amended opinion. The modifications include changes to footnote 20 and the addition of a new paragraph and footnote 25 before the opinion’s conclusion.The Court explicitly states that these amendments do not affect the underlying judgment, and therefore no party is permitted to file a petition for rehearing. The order is signed by Circuit Judge Thomas L. Ambro.Key provisions of the order include:

• Vacation of the September 25, 2024 amended opinion
• Direction to file a further amended opinion with specific modifications
• Clarification that the amendments do not affect the judgment
• Prohibition of further petitions for rehearing

In re: The Hertz Corporation, et al / 23-01169 (2024-09-25)

This is a significant decision of the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit regarding bankruptcy law and creditors’ rights. Here are the key points: 1. The case involves Hertz Corporation’s bankruptcy and a dispute over whether Hertz must pay its noteholders post-petition interest at the contract rate (over $270 million) while distributing $1.1 billion to stockholders. 2. The Court ruled on three main issues:

• The ‘Applicable Premiums’ (make-whole fees) must be disallowed under Bankruptcy Code § 502(b)(2) as they fit both the dictionary definition of interest and are its economic equivalent
• The Noteholders have a right to receive contract rate interest because Hertz was solvent
• The fixed redemption fee on the 2024 Notes was not triggered because those Notes matured when Hertz filed for bankruptcy

3. The Court’s decision was based primarily on the absolute priority rule – bankruptcy’s fundamental principle that stockholders cannot receive anything until creditors are paid in full. The Court determined that allowing Hertz to cancel more than a quarter billion dollars of interest owed to the Noteholders while distributing massive value to stockholders would impermissibly deviate from basic priority rules.

In re: The Hertz Corporation, et al / 23-01169 (2024-09-10)

This is a precedential opinion from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals regarding post-petition interest and make-whole premiums in the Hertz Corporation bankruptcy case.Key aspects of the opinion:1. The Court ruled that make-whole premiums (called “Applicable Premiums” in this case) must be disallowed under Section 502(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code as they constitute unmatured interest, both by definition and as an economic equivalent of interest.2. However, the Court held that Hertz must pay post-petition interest at the contract rate (rather than the lower federal judgment rate) to unimpaired creditors because Hertz was solvent. The Court based this primarily on the absolute priority rule, which requires creditors to be paid in full before equity holders receive distributions.3. The Court rejected Hertz’s attempt to pay noteholders a lower interest rate while distributing over $1 billion to shareholders, finding this would impermissibly violate bankruptcy’s priority rules.The opinion includes a partial dissent arguing that the Bankruptcy Code plainly disallows claims for unmatured interest like the make-whole premiums and post-petition interest at issue. The dissent contends that treatment consistent with the absolute priority rule is not one of the “rights” protected under the relevant Code section regarding impairment of claims.This decision aligns with similar rulings from the Fifth and Ninth Circuits requiring solvent debtors to pay contract rate interest to unimpaired creditors, though it relies more heavily on the absolute priority rule in its reasoning.

USA v. Andrew Suarez / 23-03241 (2024-11-08)

The opinion addresses an appeal by Andrew Suarez who was sentenced for conspiracy to commit money laundering. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s judgment of 60 months’ imprisonment, three years’ supervised release, and restitution of $263,132.96.The opinion is structured around three main arguments raised by Suarez on appeal:

• The application of a sophisticated-laundering enhancement to his sentence
• The rejection of his request for an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction
• The District Court’s mistaken consideration of a pending state court charge as a conviction

Key provisions of the opinion include:

• The Court upheld the sophisticated-laundering enhancement due to the use of offshore accounts, multilayered transactions, and the guise of legitimate business activity
• The denial of acceptance-of-responsibility reduction was affirmed because Suarez routinely shifted blame to a co-conspirator and minimized his role
• While the District Court erred in treating a pending charge as a conviction, this error was not significant enough to warrant vacating the sentence, as the underlying conduct could have been considered regardless of conviction status

In re: Lirong Xu / 24-02851 (2024-11-08)

The opinion addresses a mandamus petition filed by Lirong Xu concerning several civil actions related to a landlord-tenant dispute, her son’s criminal conviction, and related state court litigation.The Court of Appeals denied Xu’s mandamus petition, which primarily sought to establish a verification mechanism for electronic signatures of District Judges and defendants’ counsel. The petitioner also raised concerns about sealed filings related to judicial misconduct, representation issues, and alleged delays in ruling on motions.The Court emphasized three key requirements for granting a writ of mandamus: (1) clear and indisputable abuse of discretion or error of law, (2) lack of alternative avenue for relief, and (3) likelihood of irreparable injury. The Court found that Xu failed to meet these standards, noting that:

• There were no irregularities with electronic signatures requiring a verification mechanism
• No procedural irregularities warranted mandamus relief
• An appeal after final judgment would be an adequate remedy for challenging various rulings
• The relatively short pending time for motions did not justify mandamus relief

The Court expressed confidence that the district courts would continue to rule on Xu’s motions in due course, and ultimately denied the petition as not meeting the extraordinary circumstances required for mandamus relief.

Diana Barreto Constante, et al v. Attorney General United States of America / 23-03263 (2024-11-08)

The opinion addresses a petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision regarding an asylum and withholding of removal case of Diana Isabel Barreto Constante, an Ecuadorian citizen.The case revolves around three main elements:

• Barreto Constante sought asylum based on membership in two particular social groups (PSGs): ‘single Ecuadorian women with school aged children’ and ‘single Ecuadorian women from the countryside that the government has forgotten’
• The Immigration Judge (IJ) found that neither of her PSGs was cognizable and there was no nexus between the alleged harms and her membership in either PSG
• The BIA dismissed her appeal because she failed to challenge the IJ’s no-nexus finding in her appeal

The Court’s key findings include:

• Barreto Constante failed to exhaust administrative remedies regarding the nexus issue in her BIA appeal
• The evidence she presented only addressed general conditions for women in Ecuador, not specific circumstances related to her claimed PSGs
• The IJ’s conclusion that she fears ‘generalized crime and violence that targets everyone in Ecuador’ was supported by the evidence
• The petition for review was denied as she failed to identify evidence that would compel a contrary conclusion

John Doe v. New Castle County, et al / 23-03190 (2024-11-08)

This opinion addresses an employment discrimination case where John Doe sued New Castle County and two co-workers (Herbert Coates and Garrett Kratzer) for hostile work environment, retaliation, and constructive discharge claims under Title VII, as well as constitutional claims.The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of all claims based on the following key findings:

• For the hostile work environment claim, Doe failed to establish respondeat superior liability as he couldn’t show the County knew or should have known about the specific harassment he experienced.
• The retaliation claims failed because:
  • The temporal relationship between Doe’s complaints and his transfer wasn’t sufficiently suggestive of causation
  • The County’s failure to offer an unsolicited transfer while Doe was on leave didn’t constitute an adverse employment action
• The constitutional claims against individual defendants were dismissed because Doe couldn’t establish they acted with supervisory control over him.
• The constructive discharge claim failed because it required a valid hostile work environment claim as a predicate.

The Court emphasized several important legal standards in its analysis:

• For hostile work environment claims involving non-supervisory co-workers, employer liability exists only if the employer failed to provide a reasonable avenue for complaint or knew/should have known about the harassment and failed to take appropriate action
• Prior harassment of others is relevant to determine employer knowledge only if sufficiently similar to the plaintiff’s harassment
• For constitutional claims under § 1983, a defendant must have exercised supervisory power through ability to alter workload or wield considerable control
• A hostile work environment claim is a necessary predicate to a hostile-environment constructive discharge case

United States v. Loera / 24-02112 (2024-11-08)

The opinion addresses a procedural matter regarding the timeliness of an appeal in a criminal case. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit dismissed an appeal filed by Rogelio Loera because it was filed one day after the deadline, and the government properly challenged its timeliness.The opinion’s structure is straightforward and focuses on three key elements:

• The procedural history, including Loera’s admission to violating supervised release terms and subsequent sentencing
• The appointment of attorney Jay K. Nair as counsel of record
• The analysis of the appeal’s timeliness under Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure

The key provisions of the opinion are:

• The 14-day deadline for filing a criminal appeal after entry of judgment (Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1))
• The district court’s authority to extend the appeal time by up to 30 days (Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(4))
• The requirement that courts must dismiss untimely appeals if the government properly raises the time bar
• The determination that Loera’s appeal, filed on August 2, 2024, missed the August 1, 2024 deadline

John Whyde, Jr. v. Paul Sigsworth, et al / 22-03581 (2024-11-08)

This opinion addresses claims by John Whyde, Jr. who was arrested and booked into Erie County Jail while dependent on opioids and Xanax. Instead of continuing these medications, jail staff prescribed an opioid-withdrawal protocol. After his condition worsened and he became a threat to his safety, corrections officers forcibly restrained him.The key provisions of the opinion include:1. The court affirmed summary judgment for jail nurse Burgess on deliberate indifference claims, finding she lacked actual knowledge that Whyde was taking Xanax and reasonably responded to his medical needs by administering prescribed withdrawal medications.2. The court affirmed summary judgment for jail doctor Eldridge, ruling that his decision to prescribe withdrawal protocol instead of continuing opioids reflected reasonable medical judgment rather than deliberate indifference.3. The court affirmed summary judgment for corrections officer Kerr on excessive force claims, finding his takedown of Whyde was reasonable given Whyde’s active resistance and the need to maintain jail security.4. The court affirmed summary judgment for Erie County and its Health District on municipal liability claims, finding no unconstitutional policy regarding medication restrictions.The dissenting opinion argued that summary judgment should be reversed on certain deliberate indifference claims against Burgess, Eldridge and the Health District, as well as the excessive force claim against Kerr, based on disputed factual issues regarding their conduct and policies.

Jamie Goss v. South Carolina Department of Corrections / 24-06564 (2024-11-08)

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Jamie Goss’s civil rights complaint filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case was dismissed due to the plaintiff’s failure to prosecute.The opinion is structured as a brief per curiam decision, where the Court found no reversible error in the district court’s dismissal order. The Court also addressed a procedural matter by denying Goss’s motion objecting to the court’s order that had granted him leave to proceed in forma pauperis (without paying court fees).Key provisions of the opinion include:

• Confirmation of the district court’s dismissal for failure to prosecute
• Denial of oral arguments as unnecessary given that facts and legal contentions were adequately presented in existing materials
• Specification that this unpublished opinion does not serve as binding precedent in the Fourth Circuit

USA v. Anna Parsons / 23-14097 (2024-11-08)

The case concerns the appeal of Anna Parsons against her 180-month imprisonment sentence for possession with intent to distribute fentanyl and fentanyl distribution, which resulted in the death of Christopher Jackson.The opinion addresses two main issues: (1) whether the district court erred in denying Parsons statutory safety-valve relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), and (2) whether her sentence was substantively unreasonable. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s sentence.Key provisions of the opinion include:

• The Court found that any error in refusing to apply the safety valve was harmless because the mandatory minimum did not affect the district court’s choice of sentence
• The Court upheld the substantive reasonableness of the 180-month sentence, despite it being a major variance from the guideline range of 63-78 months
• The Court confirmed that the district court properly considered both aggravating factors (death resulting from drug distribution, continued drug dealing after the death) and mitigating circumstances (Parsons’ addiction, difficult upbringing)

The most significant aspects of the opinion are:

• Clarification that harmless error analysis applies to safety valve determinations when the error does not affect the final sentence
• Confirmation that substantial upward variances from guidelines can be reasonable when justified by death resulting from drug distribution
• Emphasis on district courts’ broad discretion in weighing sentencing factors, even when imposing sentences significantly above the guidelines range

Virginia Hall v. Chubb European Group Se / 24-10556 (2024-11-08)

The case involves a dispute between Virginia Hall and Chubb European Group regarding insurance coverage for hurricane damage to her home. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to dismiss Hall’s case with prejudice due to repeated failures to comply with court orders.The opinion’s structure follows the procedural history of the case and analyzes two main elements:

• The pattern of willful contempt demonstrated by Hall’s failure to respond to eight inspection requests and two court motions
• The district court’s explicit finding that lesser sanctions would not have been sufficient to motivate compliance

Key provisions of the opinion include:

• Confirmation that dismissal with prejudice is appropriate when a party shows a clear pattern of delay or willful contempt and lesser sanctions would not suffice
• Rejection of the argument that staff negligence can excuse failure to comply with court orders
• Affirmation that attorneys are responsible for meeting deadlines and complying with court orders regardless of internal office issues
• Clarification that notice of court orders through the public docket and CM/ECF system constitutes proper service

Patrick Comack v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration / 23-11115 (2024-11-08)

This opinion addresses an appeal by Patrick Comack against the dismissal of his civil complaint regarding supplemental security income (SSI) proceedings. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the case on two grounds:1. Failure to Properly Serve:– The plaintiff failed to properly serve the Commissioner according to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4- He did not serve the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida or the U.S. Attorney General within the required 90-day period- The court rejected the argument that his pro se status should excuse procedural non-compliance2. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies:– The plaintiff had not received a final decision from the Commissioner as his social security proceedings were still ongoing- The court found no grounds for waiving the exhaustion requirement as: – The issues were not collateral to the benefits claim – Exhaustion would not be futile since continued administrative proceedings could result in a favorable determination- The court rejected alternative jurisdictional arguments under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367The opinion reaffirms established precedent that Social Security claimants must complete the administrative process before seeking judicial review, and that proper service requirements apply even to pro se litigants. The dismissal was without prejudice, allowing the plaintiff to refile after exhausting administrative remedies.

Marcia Stein, et al v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., et al / 22-15862 (2024-09-24)

The opinion addresses whether the False Claims Act’s (FCA) first-to-file rule is jurisdictional in nature. The case involved plaintiffs who sued Kaiser-related entities alleging Medicare fraud, but their case was dismissed as barred by the first-to-file rule because it related to earlier-filed pending actions.The en banc court overruled prior circuit precedent and held that the FCA’s first-to-file rule is not jurisdictional. The court explained that under Supreme Court precedent, a statutory bar is jurisdictional only if Congress clearly states that it is. The first-to-file rule does not use the term ‘jurisdiction’ or include any other textual clue pointing to jurisdiction, unlike other FCA provisions that use explicitly jurisdictional language.The main provisions of the opinion include:

• Analysis of the statutory text showing lack of jurisdictional language in the first-to-file rule
• Comparison to other FCA provisions that explicitly use jurisdictional terms
• Discussion of Supreme Court precedent requiring clear congressional statement for jurisdictional rules
• Review of how other circuits have addressed this issue

The most important aspects for using this opinion are:

• The first-to-file rule is now treated as a non-jurisdictional claim-processing rule rather than a jurisdictional bar
• The court’s emphasis on looking for explicit jurisdictional language in statutory provisions
• The alignment with Supreme Court precedent requiring clear congressional statements for jurisdictional rules
• The court’s willingness to overturn prior precedent when it conflicts with Supreme Court guidance

Nicholas Bullock v. Charlie Paris, et al / 24-10674 (2024-11-08)

This case involves an appeal by Nicholas Bullock against multiple Gilmer County officials regarding various claims and a motion for preliminary injunctive relief. The key aspects of the opinion are:1. The court affirmed dismissal of claims against county officials in their official capacities based on Eleventh Amendment immunity, finding that certain officials like the Sheriff and Superior Court Clerk were acting as arms of the state.2. The court upheld dismissal of individual capacity claims against officials based on qualified immunity, finding Bullock failed to show violations of clearly established constitutional rights.3. The court affirmed dismissal of claims against Tax Assessors under the Tax Injunction Act, which bars federal courts from interfering with state tax assessment and collection.The main provisions include:

• Confirmation that qualified immunity can be considered at motion to dismiss stage
• Analysis of when county officials are considered “arms of the state” for immunity purposes
• Clarification of standards for overcoming qualified immunity
• Discussion of Tax Injunction Act’s broad scope in barring federal court jurisdiction over state tax matters

The court ultimately affirmed the district court’s denial of preliminary injunction and dismissal of claims against all defendants, finding various immunity doctrines and jurisdictional bars applied.

Israel Ruiz v. Wallace Strow, et al / 24-01172 (2024-11-08)

The case concerns a prisoner’s appeal against a summary judgment in a medical deliberate-indifference lawsuit under the Eighth Amendment. The prisoner, Israel Ruiz, sued a prison dentist and dental assistant for allegedly failing to properly treat his gum condition.The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision, finding that:

• The prisoner failed to present evidence that his gingivitis was a serious medical condition requiring more than standard treatment
• Even assuming the condition was serious, there was no evidence of deliberate indifference by the medical staff
• The defendants’ decision to treat the condition with oral hygiene instructions rather than teeth cleaning was within acceptable professional judgment

The key legal provisions established in this opinion include:

• Mild gingivitis symptoms treatable by brushing and flossing do not constitute a serious medical condition under the Eighth Amendment
• A disagreement with medical professionals about the course of treatment does not constitute an Eighth Amendment violation
• The refusal to provide specialized treatment (teeth cleaning) is not ‘blatantly inappropriate’ when there are no emergent dental needs

The court also upheld the district court’s decisions to deny the recruitment of counsel for the prisoner, finding him competent to represent himself based on his litigation experience and the quality of his submissions.

Brian Morgan v. David Ballard / 24-06306 (2024-11-08)

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision in the case of Brian C. Morgan v. David Ballard, where Morgan appealed the denial of his Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion for reconsideration.The opinion addresses Morgan’s attempt to challenge the district court’s previous dismissal of his Rule 60(b) motions, which were categorized as an unauthorized successive habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Court found no reversible error in the district court’s decision and upheld the denial of Morgan’s motion for reconsideration.Key provisions of the opinion include:

• The Court applied an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the denial of Rule 60(b) relief, citing Justus v. Clarke
• The Court clarified that no certificate of appealability is required to appeal the jurisdictional categorization of a Rule 60(b) motion as an unauthorized successive habeas petition
• The Court denied Morgan’s motion for appointment of counsel and determined that oral arguments were unnecessary as the facts and legal contentions were adequately presented in the existing materials

Grand Canyon University v. Miguel Cardona, et al / 23-15124 (2024-11-08)

Kathy Browne v. Jennifer Waldo, et al / 24-01497 (2024-11-08)

The case involves a settlement agreement dispute between Kathy Browne and attorney Anna Hearn, arising from a lawsuit where Browne alleged unlawful arrest. After signing a settlement agreement, Browne attempted to invalidate it, claiming mistake, duress, and unconscionability, but the district court enforced the agreement.The opinion’s structure addresses three main challenges to the settlement agreement’s validity:1. The mistake defense – rejected because Browne’s signature indicated intent to be bound, and her unilateral misunderstanding didn’t void the contract2. The duress defense – dismissed because it was based on lawful circumstances (debt and attorney withdrawal)3. The unconscionability defense – rejected because Browne had legal representation during negotiationsKey provisions of the opinion include:- Settlement agreements are enforceable when basic contract elements (offer, acceptance, consideration, meeting of minds) are present- A unilateral mistake in understanding contract terms doesn’t void the contract unless induced by misrepresentation- The presence of legal counsel during negotiations generally defeats claims of unconscionability- The settlement agreement’s broad release clause covered all pending matters between the parties- The court denied sanctions against Browne for this appeal but warned about potential future sanctions for frivolous litigation

Miko Thomas v. JBS Green Bay, Inc. / 24-01404 (2024-11-08)

The opinion addresses a Title VII employment discrimination case where Miko Thomas sued JBS Green Bay, Inc., alleging discrimination based on color. The case focuses on three main discriminatory acts: delayed training, denied vacation requests, and problematic shift transfers.The Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s dismissal of the complaint, citing two main errors in the lower court’s decision:

1. The district court incorrectly required the plaintiff to show ‘significant’ injury, which was overturned by Muldrow v. St. Louis (2024) that only requires showing ‘some harm’ to an identifiable term of employment.
2. The court wrongly demanded that the complaint include detailed allegations corresponding to each element of proof, which contradicts the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s notice pleading system and the Supreme Court’s decision in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.

Key provisions of the opinion include:

• Confirmation that employment discrimination complaints need only state a basic grievance, not detailed facts matching legal elements
• Clarification that proof of damages is not required at the complaint stage
• Affirmation that even seemingly minor employment actions (like vacation scheduling or shift changes) can constitute actionable discrimination if based on protected characteristics
• Emphasis that detailed evidence and proof should be demanded at the summary judgment stage, not during initial pleading

Charles Miles v. Caleb Hallet, et al / 23-02314 (2024-11-08)

The case concerns a deliberate indifference claim under the Eighth Amendment filed by former Illinois prisoner Charles Miles against correctional officer Caleb Hallett regarding the treatment of Miles’ broken leg. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the defendant officer.The opinion is structured around two main issues:

• The procedural matter of Miles’ failure to properly object to Hallett’s undisputed material facts according to Local Rule 7.1(D)(2)
• The substantive analysis of Miles’ claim that Hallett showed deliberate indifference by making him walk to retrieve food

Key provisions of the opinion include:

• The court accepted Hallett’s version of facts due to Miles’ procedural failure to properly dispute them under local rules
• Medical records showed that Miles was actually encouraged to move around with crutches after surgery
• The grievance report cited by Miles did not support his claim that Hallett interfered with prescribed medical treatment
• To prove deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must show that the officer ignored or interfered with physician-prescribed treatment, which Miles failed to demonstrate

POMEROY v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:23-vv-00104 (2024-11-08)

This is a decision awarding damages in a vaccine injury compensation case where Duane F. Pomeroy claimed he suffered from Guillain-Barré syndrome (GBS) following a flu vaccination received on October 21, 2020. The Court found the petitioner entitled to compensation on July 1, 2024.The decision outlines the following compensation structure:
– $127,500.00 for pain and suffering
– $841.81 for past unreimbursable expenses
– $11,959.33 for lost wages
The total compensation awarded amounts to $140,301.14The key provisions of the decision include:
1. The compensation is to be paid as a lump sum
2. Payment will be made in the form of a check payable to the petitioner
3. The amount represents all damages available under Section 15(a) of the Vaccine Act
4. No guardianship is required as the petitioner is a competent adultThe decision confirms that both parties agreed to the proffered award amounts, and the judgment was expedited through the parties’ joint filing of notice renouncing the right to seek review.

POMEROY v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:23-vv-00104 (2024-08-05)

This is a ruling on entitlement in a vaccine injury compensation case where Duane F. Pomeroy claimed he developed Guillain-Barré syndrome (GBS) after receiving an influenza vaccine in October 2020. The case was filed under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program.The ruling is structured in a straightforward manner, consisting of two main parts: (1) the initial claim and case background, and (2) the respondent’s concession and final ruling. The key element is the respondent’s (Secretary of Health and Human Services) concession that the petitioner is entitled to compensation based on the criteria set forth in the Vaccine Injury Table and the Qualifications and Aids to Interpretation.The most significant provisions of this ruling are:

• The confirmation that the petitioner’s GBS meets the criteria established in the Vaccine Injury Table
• The respondent’s explicit concession of the petitioner’s entitlement to compensation
• The Chief Special Master’s finding that the petitioner is entitled to compensation based on the evidence and respondent’s position

WILSON v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:21-vv-01655 (2024-11-08)

This is a decision on attorney’s fees and costs in a vaccine injury compensation case. The Court granted a motion for attorney’s fees and costs totaling $68,978.95 ($66,912.50 in fees plus $2,066.45 in costs) in a case where the petitioner successfully claimed compensation for Guillain-Barré syndrome following an influenza vaccine.The decision’s structure is straightforward and includes:

• Background of the original case and compensation award
• Review of the motion for attorney’s fees and costs
• Analysis of the reasonableness of requested rates and hours
• Final determination and payment instructions

Key provisions of the decision include:

• Approval of attorney hourly rate increases for 2024 ($460 for attorney Jessi Huff and $190 for paralegal Chelsea Harris)
• Confirmation that all billed time was reasonably incurred
• Verification that all claimed costs were properly documented
• Direction for payment to be made jointly to Petitioner and counsel, with specific forwarding instructions to Maglio Christopher and Toale Law

WILSON v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:21-vv-01655 (2023-10-27)

This is a decision by the U.S. Court of Federal Claims regarding compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program. The case involves Weldon Wilson who suffered Guillain-Barré syndrome (GBS) after receiving an influenza vaccine on September 2, 2020.The decision awards damages to the petitioner based on a proffer (formal offer) from the respondent (Secretary of Health and Human Services). The total compensation awarded is $154,813.96, which consists of:

• $140,000.00 for pain and suffering
• $2,154.13 for past unreimbursable expenses
• $12,659.83 for past lost wages

The key provisions of the decision include:

• The ruling confirms petitioner’s entitlement to compensation was established on October 18, 2022
• The compensation is awarded as a lump sum payment in the form of a check payable to the petitioner
• The amount represents all elements of compensation available under Section 15(a) of the Vaccine Act
• The petitioner has agreed to the proffered award amounts

WILSON v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:21-vv-01655 (2022-11-18)

This is a ruling on entitlement in a vaccine injury case where Weldon Wilson claimed he developed Guillain-Barré syndrome (GBS) after receiving an influenza vaccine on September 2, 2020. The case was filed under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program.The ruling is straightforward and consists of two main parts: the initial claim presentation and the respondent’s concession. The key element is that the respondent (Secretary of Health and Human Services) conceded that the petitioner is entitled to compensation, acknowledging that Wilson’s case meets the criteria set forth in the Vaccine Injury Table and the Qualifications and Aids to Interpretation.The most significant provisions of this ruling are:

• The petitioner’s claim that he suffered from GBS for more than six months following a flu vaccination
• The respondent’s full concession of the case without the need for further proceedings
• The Chief Special Master’s finding that the petitioner is entitled to compensation based on the respondent’s position and evidence of record

BOYD v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:21-vv-00850 (2024-11-08)

This decision concerns a damages award in a vaccine injury case where Ivan Boyd claimed a shoulder injury related to vaccine administration (SIRVA) following a flu vaccine received on December 12, 2019. The court awarded $90,000 for pain and suffering but denied the claim for lost wages.The key provisions of the decision include:

• The petitioner underwent significant medical treatment over 4 years including:
  • Manipulation under anesthesia (MUA)
  • 4 steroid injections
  • 18-20 physical therapy sessions
  • MRI, ultrasound and x-rays
• The court found the injury persisted for 4 years but symptoms were generally mild, with questionable evidence regarding range of motion restrictions and pain levels
• The $90,000 award was below typical awards for SIRVA cases requiring surgery due to evidence of symptom magnification and non-compliance with treatment
• The lost wages claim was denied due to insufficient evidence linking work restrictions to the injury

The most significant aspects of this decision are:

• It establishes that even lengthy SIRVA cases may receive more modest awards if the symptoms are mild and there are questions about symptom reporting
• It reinforces that non-compliance with treatment and evidence of symptom magnification can reduce damages awards
• It demonstrates the need for clear evidence linking work restrictions to the vaccine injury to support lost wage claims

BOYD v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:21-vv-00850 (2023-06-23)

This is a ruling on entitlement in a vaccine injury case where Ivan Boyd claimed compensation for a shoulder injury related to vaccine administration (SIRVA) following an influenza vaccination received on December 12, 2019.The ruling is structured in two main parts: first, presenting the petitioner’s claims and eligibility requirements under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, and second, addressing the respondent’s (Secretary of Health and Human Services) concession of the case.The key provisions of the ruling include:

• The petitioner suffered pain onset within 48 hours of vaccine administration
• The pain and reduced range of motion were limited to the vaccinated shoulder
• There was no pre-existing condition or other abnormality that would explain the symptoms
• The case was timely filed and the vaccine was administered in the United States
• The petitioner suffered residual effects for more than six months
• No prior civil action was filed or compensation received for this injury

Based on these findings and the respondent’s concession, the Chief Special Master determined that the petitioner is entitled to compensation under the Vaccine Act.

RIVIERE v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:23-vv-01191 (2024-11-08)

This is a decision awarding damages in a vaccine injury compensation case. The petitioner, Francine Riviere, was awarded $57,367.90 for a shoulder injury related to vaccine administration (SIRVA) following a Tdap vaccination received on December 8, 2022.The decision is structured in two main parts: the initial ruling on entitlement (issued on July 22, 2024) and the subsequent proffer on award of compensation. The proffer, filed by the Respondent on October 8, 2024, details the specific compensation amounts agreed upon by both parties.The compensation award consists of two components:

• $55,000.00 for pain and suffering
• $2,367.90 for past unreimbursable expenses

The award is to be paid as a lump sum in the form of a check payable to the petitioner.The decision specifies that this amount represents all damages available under Section 15(a) of the Vaccine Act, and both parties have agreed to the compensation amounts. The judgment is to be entered in accordance with this decision, and the parties can expedite the entry of judgment by jointly filing a notice renouncing the right to seek review.

RIVIERE v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:23-vv-01191 (2024-08-26)

This is a ruling on entitlement in a vaccine injury compensation case where Francine Riviere claimed she suffered a shoulder injury related to vaccine administration (SIRVA) following a Tdap vaccination received on December 8, 2022. The ruling grants compensation to the petitioner.The case was filed under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, with the petitioner alleging that her vaccine-related symptoms persisted for more than six months. The case was processed through the Special Processing Unit of the Office of Special Masters.The key elements of the ruling include:

• The Respondent (Secretary of Health and Human Services) conceded that the Petitioner is entitled to compensation
• The injury was confirmed to be consistent with SIRVA as defined by the Vaccine Injury Table
• The following criteria were met:
  • No history of pain, inflammation, or dysfunction of the left shoulder prior to vaccination
  • Pain occurred within forty-eight hours after vaccination
  • Pain was limited to the vaccinated shoulder
  • No other condition was identified to explain the shoulder pain

Based on these findings and the Respondent’s position, Chief Special Master Corcoran determined that the Petitioner satisfied all legal prerequisites and is entitled to compensation under the Act.

ACUITY-CHS MIDDLE EAST, LLC v. USA / 1:24-cv-01072 (2024-11-08)

This opinion addresses a bid protest by Acuity-CHS Middle East LLC challenging the Department of State’s determination that Acuity had an organizational conflict of interest (OCI) preventing it from participating as a subcontractor in a medical services task order procurement.The key elements of the opinion are:

• Acuity was the incumbent contractor providing medical services in Iraq under the MSSI contract. State decided to reprocure these services as a task order under the DiPSS contract vehicle.
• State determined Acuity had an OCI because it conducted drug testing of personnel from its affiliated company Janus, which provided security services. State excluded WPS contractors and their affiliates from participating in the new task order.
• The court dismissed Acuity’s protest for lack of standing because:
  • Acuity could not demonstrate Article III standing as its alleged injury was hypothetical – there was no evidence the task order awardee (KBR) would have used Acuity as a subcontractor but for the OCI determination
  • Acuity also lacked statutory standing as an ‘interested party’ since it was neither an actual nor prospective bidder
  • The narrow exception for subcontractor standing created by the Percipient.ai case did not apply

The opinion clarifies the limits on subcontractor standing in bid protests, particularly in light of the Federal Circuit’s recent Percipient.ai decision. It emphasizes that subcontractors generally lack standing unless they can demonstrate concrete injury and fit within narrow exceptions.

GRIGGS v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:21-vv-00492 (2024-11-08)

This is a decision of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims dismissing a vaccine injury compensation case due to the petitioner’s failure to prosecute their claim.The case was initiated in January 2021 by Sydney Griggs, who alleged suffering a Shoulder Injury Related to Vaccine Administration (SIRVA) following a flu vaccine received in October 2020. Despite multiple extensions and orders from the court, the petitioner failed to provide required documentation and information to support the claim over a period of nearly 3 years.The key provisions of the decision include:

• The court’s authority to dismiss cases for failure to prosecute when petitioners do not comply with orders or deadlines
• The requirement under the Vaccine Act that claims must be supported by either medical records or medical opinions, not just petitioner’s claims alone
• The specific procedural history showing multiple missed deadlines and failures to provide required documentation despite numerous extensions

The most important aspects of this opinion are:

• The court’s emphasis that petitioners must actively prosecute their claims and respond to court orders
• The requirement for proper documentation and evidence beyond just the petitioner’s allegations
• The court’s authority to dismiss cases after providing clear warnings and multiple opportunities to comply

FLORES v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:21-vv-01196 (2024-11-08)

This is a decision on attorney’s fees and costs in a vaccine injury compensation case. The case involved Jasmin Flores who filed a petition under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, claiming a shoulder injury related to an influenza vaccine administration. The case was resolved with compensation awarded to the Petitioner based on Respondent’s proffer.The decision addresses Petitioner’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs totaling $33,746.80 ($33,139.60 in fees and $607.20 in costs), plus $87.95 in personal out-of-pocket expenses. The Court reviewed the billing records and found the requested amounts reasonable, with no cause to reduce the requested hours or rates.The Court granted the motion and awarded a total of $33,834.75, split into two payments:

• $33,746.80 as a lump sum for attorney’s fees and costs, payable jointly to Petitioner and Petitioner’s counsel
• $87.95 as a lump sum for Petitioner’s personal costs, payable directly to Petitioner

The decision specifies that this amount is intended to cover all legal expenses in the matter and prevents attorneys from charging additional fees beyond the awarded amount, in accordance with Section 15(e)(3) of the Vaccine Act.

FLORES v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:21-vv-01196 (2024-02-09)

This is a decision on damages in a vaccine injury compensation case where Jasmin Flores was awarded compensation for a Shoulder Injury Related to Vaccine Administration (SIRVA) following a flu vaccine received on September 23, 2020.The decision outlines the compensation award based on a proffer filed by the Respondent (Secretary of Health and Human Services) which includes three main components:

• $102,500.00 for pain and suffering
• $2,374.25 for past unreimbursable expenses
• $6,309.96 for past lost wages

The total compensation awarded is $111,184.21, to be paid as a lump sum to the petitioner. The decision confirms that both parties agreed to the proffered amounts, and the compensation covers all damages available under Section 15(a) of the Vaccine Act. The Chief Special Master directed the entry of judgment in accordance with this decision.

FLORES v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:21-vv-01196 (2023-10-27)

This is a ruling on entitlement in a vaccine injury compensation case where Jasmin Flores claimed she suffered a shoulder injury related to vaccine administration (SIRVA) after receiving a flu vaccine on September 23, 2020.The case was filed under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program and processed through the Special Processing Unit of the Office of Special Masters. The key element of this ruling is that the Respondent (Secretary of Health and Human Services) conceded that the Petitioner is entitled to compensation, agreeing that her injury meets the definition of SIRVA under the Vaccine Injury Table.The ruling contains three main components:

• The initial claim and its basis under the Vaccine Act
• The Respondent’s concession through their Rule 4(c) report
• The Chief Special Master’s finding that the Petitioner is entitled to compensation

The most significant provisions are:

• The Respondent’s explicit agreement that the Petitioner’s injury is consistent with SIRVA as defined by the Vaccine Injury Table (42 C.F.R. §§ 100.3(a), 100.3(c)(10))
• The confirmation that all legal requisites for compensation under the Vaccine Act have been satisfied
• The final determination by Chief Special Master Corcoran that entitlement to compensation is warranted

GONZALEZ v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:21-vv-01003 (2024-11-08)

This opinion concerns a review of a decision dismissing a vaccine injury compensation claim. The key points are:1. The case involves a claim by Evelyn Gonzalez that she suffered a shoulder injury (SIRVA) from a meningitis vaccine administered in July 2019. The Chief Special Master dismissed her petition, finding she had not proven the injury lasted for the required 6+ months.2. The opinion analyzes whether the Chief Special Master’s decision was proper under the applicable standards of review – particularly whether his factual findings were ‘arbitrary and capricious’ and his legal conclusions were ‘in accordance with law.’3. The Court upheld the dismissal, finding that:

• The Chief Special Master appropriately considered the full record in reaching his factual findings about the duration of injury
• His weighing of evidence and credibility determinations were within his discretion as factfinder
• His conclusion that the injury did not persist for 6+ months was rational and supported by evidence
• The severity determination was a factual finding subject to deferential review, not a legal conclusion requiring de novo review

The opinion provides a detailed analysis of the standards for reviewing vaccine injury decisions and the proper deference owed to special masters’ factual determinations. It emphasizes that courts should not reweigh evidence or second-guess reasonable factual findings supported by the record.

GONZALEZ v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:21-vv-01003 (2024-06-07)

This is a decision dismissing a vaccine injury compensation claim under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program. The petitioner alleged she suffered a shoulder injury related to vaccine administration (SIRVA) from a meningococcal conjugate vaccine received on July 30, 2019.The key issue was whether the petitioner’s injury persisted for more than 6 months after vaccination, which is required under the Vaccine Act. The court found that the evidence did not support this requirement because:

• Medical records showed the petitioner’s shoulder pain had largely resolved by August 2019, with minimal treatment through November 2019 when she ceased medical care
• There was a 10-month gap in treatment from November 2019 to September 2020
• During this period, the petitioner was able to participate in Division I college volleyball
• Later shoulder pain starting in September 2020 appeared to be from a new volleyball-related injury rather than the vaccination

The court concluded that the petitioner failed to prove her vaccine injury lasted more than 6 months and therefore dismissed the case for failing to meet this statutory requirement.

WISNIEWSKI v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:21-vv-01052 (2024-11-08)

This is a decision of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims regarding compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program for a shoulder injury related to vaccine administration (SIRVA) caused by a flu vaccine. The Court awarded the petitioner $115,000 for pain and suffering plus $1,253.10 for unreimbursable medical expenses.The key elements of the decision include:

• The petitioner received a flu vaccine in October 2020 and subsequently developed shoulder pain and limited range of motion
• After conservative treatment failed (including physical therapy and steroid injection), he underwent shoulder arthroscopy in March 2021
• By July 2021, after completing post-operative physical therapy, he had achieved 90% improvement but still had some residual limitations

The Court’s analysis focused on several factors in determining the compensation amount:

• The severity and duration of the injury was considered moderate, requiring surgery but achieving good recovery within 9 months
• While the petitioner had some ongoing limitations affecting activities like fishing and playing with grandchildren, he was still able to engage in these activities
• The presence of pre-existing arthritis was noted as potentially contributing to ongoing limitations
• The Court determined this case warranted a six-figure award as typical for SIRVA cases requiring surgery, but on the lower end of the range due to relatively mild severity

WISNIEWSKI v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:21-vv-01052 (2023-09-26)

This is a ruling on entitlement in a vaccine injury case where Philip Wisniewski claimed compensation for a shoulder injury related to vaccine administration (SIRVA) following a flu vaccination received on October 12, 2020. The Respondent (Secretary of Health and Human Services) conceded that the Petitioner is entitled to compensation.The ruling was issued under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, with the case being handled by the Special Processing Unit of the Office of Special Masters. The key elements of the ruling include the confirmation that the Petitioner’s injury meets the definition of SIRVA according to the Vaccine Injury Table, and that he suffered the residual effects for more than six months.The Respondent’s concession was based on several specific findings:

• The Petitioner had no prior history of pain, inflammation, or dysfunction in his left shoulder
• Pain occurred within 48 hours after vaccination
• Pain was limited to the vaccinated shoulder
• No other condition was identified to explain the shoulder pain
• The effects lasted more than six months

ASHCRAFT v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:23-vv-01885 (2024-11-08)

This is a ruling on entitlement in a vaccine injury compensation case where Camille Ashcraft claimed she developed Guillain-Barré Syndrome (GBS) after receiving an influenza vaccine. The Respondent (Secretary of Health and Human Services) conceded that the Petitioner is entitled to compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program.The ruling outlines that the Petitioner received the flu vaccine on October 5, 2022, within the United States, and subsequently developed GBS. She suffered the residual effects for more than six months, and had not filed any other civil action or received compensation for this vaccine-related illness.The key provisions of the ruling include:

• The case was filed under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (42 U.S.C. §300aa-10)
• The Respondent acknowledged that the Petitioner met the criteria set forth in the Vaccine Injury Table and Qualifications and Aids to Interpretation
• Based on the Respondent’s position and evidence, the Chief Special Master found that the Petitioner is entitled to compensation

JOWETT v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:23-vv-00317 (2024-11-08)

This is a decision on a joint stipulation in a vaccine injury case where Heather Jowett claimed she suffered a shoulder injury related to vaccine administration (SIRVA) after receiving a Tdap vaccine on October 30, 2020.The key elements of the decision include:

• The petitioner alleged she suffered SIRVA within the timeframe set by the Vaccine Injury Table and experienced residual effects for more than six months
• The respondent (Secretary of Health and Human Services) denied that petitioner sustained a SIRVA Table injury or that the Tdap vaccine caused her alleged injuries
• Despite their opposing positions, the parties agreed to settle the case with a compensation payment of $25,260.00 to the petitioner

The stipulation contains standard provisions regarding:

• The payment terms and conditions
• Release of claims against the United States and Secretary of Health and Human Services
• Agreement that the settlement is not an admission of liability by the government
• Provisions for attorney’s fees and costs to be determined in subsequent proceedings

DAVIS v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:21-vv-02090 (2024-11-08)

This is a decision awarding damages in a vaccine injury compensation case under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program. The petitioner, Craig Davis, was awarded compensation for a shoulder injury related to vaccine administration (SIRVA) following a flu vaccination received on September 21, 2020.The decision outlines the compensation structure approved by Chief Special Master Corcoran based on a proffer filed by the Respondent (Secretary of Health and Human Services). The award consists of two main components:

• $67,500.00 for pain and suffering
• $1,482.08 for past unreimbursable expenses

The total compensation awarded is $68,982.08, to be paid as a lump sum payment in the form of a check payable to the petitioner. The decision confirms that this amount represents all damages available under Section 15(a) of the Vaccine Act and directs the Clerk of Court to enter judgment accordingly.Key provisions of the decision include:

• The compensation was agreed upon by both parties
• No guardianship evidence was required as petitioner is a competent adult
• The award is final and represents complete compensation under the Vaccine Act
• The judgment can be expedited if parties jointly file notice renouncing right to seek review

DAVIS v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:21-vv-02090 (2024-04-03)

This is a ruling on entitlement in a vaccine injury case where Craig Davis claimed compensation for a shoulder injury related to vaccine administration (SIRVA) following a flu vaccination received on September 21, 2020.The ruling is structured in two main parts: (1) the initial claim and its procedural background, and (2) the respondent’s concession and final determination. The case was filed under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program and assigned to the Special Processing Unit of the Office of Special Masters.The key provisions of the ruling are:

• The petitioner alleged suffering SIRVA from a flu vaccination, with symptoms lasting longer than six months
• The respondent (Secretary of Health and Human Services) conceded that the petitioner is entitled to compensation
• The respondent confirmed that the injury meets the Vaccine Injury Table definition of SIRVA, specifically:
  • No prior history of shoulder problems
  • Pain occurred within 48 hours of vaccination
  • Pain was limited to the vaccinated shoulder
  • No other condition explains the shoulder pain
• Based on the respondent’s position and evidence, the Chief Special Master found the petitioner entitled to compensation

VIBE v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:23-vv-01697 (2024-11-08)

This is a ruling on entitlement in a vaccine injury case where Cassidy Vibe claimed compensation for a shoulder injury related to vaccine administration (SIRVA) following flu and/or Tdap vaccinations received on February 11, 2022. The case was filed under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program.The ruling is structured in a straightforward manner, containing the initial claim details, the respondent’s position, and the final determination. The key element is the Respondent’s (Secretary of Health and Human Services) concession that the Petitioner is entitled to compensation, acknowledging that the alleged injury meets the definition of SIRVA as per the Vaccine Injury Table.The main provisions of significance include:

• The Petitioner’s claim that she suffered SIRVA following vaccinations on February 11, 2022
• The Petitioner’s assertion that she experienced residual effects for more than six months
• The Respondent’s concession that the injury is consistent with SIRVA as defined by the Vaccine Injury Table
• The Respondent’s confirmation that all legal prerequisites for compensation have been satisfied
• The Chief Special Master’s finding that the Petitioner is entitled to compensation

BACON v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:22-vv-00599 (2024-11-08)

This is a decision on attorney’s fees and costs in a vaccine injury compensation case. The Court granted a total award of $59,426.10, consisting of $56,417.00 in attorney’s fees and $3,009.10 in costs, to be paid jointly to the Petitioner (Elizabeth Bacon) and her counsel.The case originated from a petition filed on June 1, 2022, where the Petitioner claimed a shoulder injury related to vaccine administration from influenza and tetanus diphtheria acellular pertussis vaccines received on November 11, 2020. The case was resolved through a stipulation-based compensation award on May 30, 2024.The Court’s analysis focused on three main elements:

• Review of billing records and determination that requested hours and rates were reasonable
• Verification of supporting documentation for all claimed costs
• Confirmation that the statutory requirements for an award of attorney’s fees and costs were met

The decision specifies that the payment should be made as a lump sum in the form of a check, to be forwarded to the law firm’s address at 1515 Ringling Blvd., Suite 700, Sarasota, FL 34236. The Court noted that no personal out-of-pocket expenses were claimed by the Petitioner.

BACON v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:22-vv-00599 (2024-07-03)

The decision concerns a vaccine injury compensation case under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program. Elizabeth Bacon filed a petition claiming she suffered a shoulder injury related to vaccine administration (SIRVA) after receiving influenza and Tdap vaccines on November 11, 2020. The case was resolved through a joint stipulation between the parties.The decision’s structure includes:

• Background of the case and petitioner’s claims
• Respondent’s position denying that vaccines caused the alleged injuries
• Terms of the settlement agreement
• Compensation award details

Key provisions of the decision:

• The petitioner was awarded a lump sum of $75,000.00
• An additional $3,500.06 was awarded to satisfy the Optum Medicaid lien from the State of Louisiana
• The total compensation amount is $78,500.06
• The settlement includes provisions for reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs
• The agreement includes standard release clauses and conditions regarding the use of awarded funds

VOGLEMAN v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:21-vv-00226 (2024-11-08)

This is a vaccine injury compensation case where Kimberly K. Vogleman claimed she suffered a shoulder injury related to vaccine administration (SIRVA) after receiving an influenza vaccination on September 20, 2019. Despite the respondent’s denial of the claims, both parties reached a settlement agreement.The decision is structured around a joint stipulation between the parties that includes:

• Details of the vaccination and injury claim
• The respondent’s position denying the claims
• Agreement on compensation despite maintained positions
• Terms of the settlement payment
• Conditions and limitations of the agreement

Key provisions of the decision include:

• A lump sum payment of $30,000.00 to the petitioner
• The payment is for all damages available under 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(a)
• The agreement includes provisions for reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs
• The settlement money must be used solely for the petitioner’s benefit
• The petitioner releases all claims against the United States and the Secretary of Health and Human Services related to this vaccination

FLOWERS v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:20-vv-00285 (2024-11-08)

The opinion addresses a case where Kimberly F. Flowers sought compensation under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, claiming she suffered from Guillain-Barré Syndrome (GBS) following a flu vaccine. The Chief Special Master (CSM) denied her petition, and the Court upheld this decision.The key aspects of the opinion include:

• The CSM determined that Flowers’ GBS symptoms began too soon after vaccination (within 1-2 days) to qualify as either a Table injury (which requires onset 3-42 days after vaccination) or a non-Table injury.
• The Court found that the CSM’s decision was rationally based on medical records showing that Flowers consistently reported experiencing symptoms very shortly after vaccination.
• The CSM rejected Flowers’ expert testimony and family affidavits in favor of contemporaneous medical records, which is within his discretion as the fact-finder.

The main provisions of the opinion establish that:

• For Table injuries, onset must occur within the specified timeframe (3-42 days for GBS after flu vaccine)
• For non-Table injuries, petitioners must demonstrate that their specific case justifies a shorter onset timeframe through medical evidence
• Contemporaneous medical records are generally given more weight than later testimony or recollections
• The special master’s factual determinations will be upheld unless shown to be arbitrary or capricious

The opinion emphasizes that while it’s possible to prove vaccine causation outside the Table timeframes, petitioners must provide specific medical evidence justifying why their case should be an exception to the generally accepted onset periods.

FLOWERS v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:20-vv-00285 (2024-06-03)

This is a decision denying compensation in a vaccine injury case where the petitioner (Kimberly Flowers) claimed that a flu vaccine caused her to develop Guillain-Barré syndrome (GBS).The key aspects of the decision are:

• The petitioner received a flu vaccine on October 26, 2018 and claimed she developed GBS symptoms very shortly after (within 1-2 days)
• To qualify for compensation under the Vaccine Injury Table, GBS symptoms must begin 3-42 days after vaccination
• The medical records showed onset likely occurred less than 3 days after vaccination, which was too soon to meet the Table requirements
• The petitioner’s expert failed to prove that such a short onset period was medically acceptable for a non-Table claim

The decision’s main provisions:

• Detailed analysis of medical records showing symptom onset within 1-2 days of vaccination
• Rejection of expert arguments trying to distinguish between initial symptoms and later diagnosis
• Discussion of why vague timing references in medical records still support finding of early onset
• Explanation of why a short onset period is not medically acceptable without special circumstances

The most important provisions for use are:

• Clarification that onset occurs at first manifestation of symptoms, regardless of when formal diagnosis is made
• Confirmation that Table timeframes represent scientifically-supported onset periods that should not be easily expanded
• Explanation that terms like ‘since’ and ‘shortly after’ in medical records typically indicate very close temporal relationship
• Discussion of the evidentiary weight given to contemporaneous medical records versus later testimony

KASPER v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:24-vv-00124 (2024-11-08)

This is a ruling on entitlement in a vaccine injury compensation case where Adam Kasper claimed he developed Guillain-Barré Syndrome (GBS) after receiving an influenza vaccine on November 7, 2021. The case was filed under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program.The ruling consists of two main parts: (1) the petitioner’s claim and allegations, and (2) the respondent’s concession and the court’s final determination. The petitioner alleged that he suffered GBS as a defined Table injury, received the vaccine in the United States, experienced symptoms for more than six months, and had not received prior compensation for this injury.The key provisions of the ruling are:

• The case was assigned to the Special Processing Unit of the Office of Special Masters
• The Respondent (Secretary of Health and Human Services) conceded that the Petitioner is entitled to compensation
• The Respondent specifically acknowledged that the Petitioner satisfied the criteria set forth in the Vaccine Injury Table and Qualifications and Aids to Interpretation
• Based on the Respondent’s position and evidence, the Chief Special Master found that the Petitioner is entitled to compensation

ROBINSON v. USA / 1:24-cv-00166 (2024-11-07)

This is a court order denying a Motion for Reconsideration in the case of Robinson v. United States. The original case was dismissed on September 17, 2024, for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, and the plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider this decision.The order analyzes the legal standards for reconsideration under Rules 52, 59, and 60 of the United States Court of Federal Claims. These rules allow reconsideration based on three primary grounds: (1) changes in controlling law, (2) new evidence, or (3) need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice.The court rejected all seven arguments presented by the plaintiff because:

• Most arguments were either previously raised or could have been raised before the judgment
• No new evidence or changes in law were presented
• No clear errors or manifest injustice were demonstrated
• Only one argument addressed the jurisdictional issue, which was the basis for the original dismissal

The court emphasized that motions for reconsideration cannot be used to relitigate old matters or raise arguments that could have been presented before judgment. The court noted that the plaintiff had been given ample opportunity to present her case, including six deficient filings and two hearings, before the original dismissal.