Case No. 991/5014/24 dated 18/06/2026
Greetings. As a lawyer with many years of experience, I have analyzed the court decision provided by you. Here is a detailed analysis:
1. The subject of the dispute is the legality of the court of first instance’s refusal to lift the interim measures imposed on assets seized as state revenue pursuant to a decision on the application of sanctions.
2. The court of appeal proceeded from the premise that the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine is the proper entity to file such a motion, as it is the plaintiff in the case and is responsible for implementing sanctions policy. The appellate court found the first instance court’s conclusion regarding the lack of authority for the Ministry of Justice to act in the interests of the State Property Fund of Ukraine (SPFU) on this procedural issue to be erroneous. A key argument was that the existence of a court injunction on registration actions effectively blocks the execution of the final court decision on the seizure of assets, as the SPFU cannot register the state’s ownership rights. The court established that with respect to one of the objects (a service station), the SPFU had already initiated the registration procedure, which was suspended precisely due to the effect of the interim measures. At the same time, regarding other property (land plots and vehicles), no evidence of registration actions being undertaken was provided; therefore, the court left the injunction in force to avoid the risk of asset alienation. Thus, the court applied the principle of balance between the necessity of executing the court decision and protecting assets from unlawful disposition.
3. The appellate court partially satisfied the appeal, lifting the interim measures only with respect to the non-residential building (service station), while leaving the ruling of the court of first instance unchanged regarding the remainder of the property.
Case No. 991/3983/26 dated 23/06/2026
Here is a detailed analysis of the court decision in Case No. 991/3983/26:
1. **Subject of the dispute:** Consideration by the High Anti-Corruption Court of a plea agreement concluded between the SAPO prosecutor and the former director of SE “Ukrecoresursy”, accused of misappropriation of state funds through abuse of office (Part 5 of Article 191 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine).
2. **Court’s arguments:**
– The court established that the agreement meets the requirements of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, as the accused was not the organizer of a criminal group, fully admitted guilt, and undertook to cooperate with the investigation to expose other accomplices.
– The court emphasized that the conclusion of the agreement serves the interests of society, as it allows for accelerating the judicial review in a complex proceeding where there is a risk of expiration of the statute of limitations for criminal liability.
– An important argument was the voluntary undertaking of the accused to transfer 1,000,000 UAH for the needs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and to partially compensate for damages invictim enterprise.
– The Court emphasized that the right to enter into a plea agreement is an element of the dispositive nature of criminal proceedings, and the verdict itself does not have a prejudicial effect on other accomplices whose cases are being heard separately.
– Regarding the confiscation of property, the court clarified that when releasing a person from serving a sentence on probation (Article 75 of the Criminal Code), confiscation is not applied unless the parties have agreed to its application as a special additional penalty for a corruption-related crime.
– The court also took into account the positive character references of the accused, as well as the fact that he has a minor child and a person with a disability under his care.
3. **Court Decision:** The court approved the plea agreement, imposed a sentence of 7 years of imprisonment, released the defendant from serving the sentence with a probation period of 3 years, and ordered the transfer of the defendant’s bail to the needs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Case No. 991/1824/25 dated 06/23/2026
The subject of the dispute is a civil case regarding the recognition of the defendants’ assets as unjustified and their compulsory recovery into state revenue within the framework of civil confiscation proceedings.
In rendering its decision, the appellate court was guided by the fact that the evidence collected by the prosecution (the prosecutor) was sufficient to confirm that the value of the defendants’ assets did not correspond to their legal income. The panel of judges carefully examined the arguments of the appeals regarding violations of substantive and procedural law by the court of first instance, but found no grounds for granting them. The court confirmed that the burden of proof procedure in civil confiscation cases was observed and that the legal status of the assets as having been acquired without legal grounds was proven. An important aspect was that the defendants were unable to provide convincing refutations regarding the legality of the sources of funds used to acquire the disputed property. Thus, the appellate court concluded that the decision of the court of first instance on the confiscation of assets is lawful, well-founded, and consistent with the objectives of anti-corruption legislation.
The Appeals Chamber of the High Anti-Corruption Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the decision of the court of first instance regarding the recovery of assets into state revenue.
Case No. 752/25834/18 dated 06/19/2026
Greetings. As a lawyer with many years of experience, I have analyzed the verdict of the High Anti-Corruption Court provided by you. Here is a detailed analysis:
1. **Subject of the dispute:**
Criminal proceedings concerning charges against an individual for aiding and abetting an official in receiving an improper benefit (Part 5, Article 27, Part 4, Article 368 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine), which was reclassified by the court during the trial to abuse of influence (Part 2, Article 369-2 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine).
2. **Court arguments:**
* The court concluded that sThe prosecution did not prove the fact of aiding and abetting, as no initiative was established on the part of the official (the head of an SBU sector) to involve the accused in the criminal scheme, nor was coordination of actions between them proven.
* The accused maintained a passive position, did not participate in discussing the details of the crime, and was absent during key stages of the transfer of the undue benefit, which excludes the elements of aiding and abetting.
* The court established that the actions of the accused consisted of introducing an interested party to the official and exerting influence on the latter in order to resolve the issue, which corresponds to the constituent elements of the crime of “abuse of influence.”
* The court rejected the defense’s arguments regarding entrapment, as law enforcement agencies merely joined in the documentation of unlawful activity that had already commenced, rather than creating artificial conditions for its commission.
* The court found the prosecution’s evidence (records of covert investigative (search) actions, witness testimony, expert reports) to be relevant and admissible, as they were obtained in compliance with procedural norms.
* Given that the crime was committed in 2018, and by the time of the verdict, the statute of limitations for criminal liability for a non-grave crime (5 years) had expired, the court applied the provisions of Article 49 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
3. **Court Decision:**
The court found the accused guilty of committing the criminal offense provided for by Part 2 of Article 369-2 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, imposed a sentence of 3 years of imprisonment, but released her from serving the sentence due to the expiration of the statute of limitations for criminal liability.
Case No. 204/2164/20 dated 06/22/2026
Here is a detailed analysis of the court decision prepared for your interview:
1. **Subject matter of the dispute:** The bank attempted to recover inflation losses from the borrower for the period of delay in executing a court judgment on the recovery of loan debt, which was originally issued in foreign currency.
2. **Court arguments:** The Supreme Court proceeded from the premise that inflation losses provided for by Article 625 of the Civil Code of Ukraine apply exclusively to obligations denominated in the national currency, the hryvnia. The court emphasized that the loan agreement was a currency agreement (US dollars), and determining the debt amount in hryvnia equivalent in a previous court decision does not change the essence of the obligation itself. Since the monetary obligation is a currency obligation, losses from the devaluation of money are not compensated by inflation accruals, but by the equivalent of the foreign currency. The court also emphasized that previous conclusions of the Supreme Court in cases between the same parties confirm the impossibility of applying inflation indices to such legal relations. Thus, the bank’s accrual of inflation losses on a sum that is effectively a currency debt was deemed legally groundless. The court also noted that the bank’s arguments regarding the change ofnature of the obligation after the court decision has been rendered are erroneous and contradict established judicial practice.
3. **Court Decision:** The Supreme Court dismissed the bank’s cassation appeal and upheld the decisions of the lower courts.
Case No. 725/5895/25 of 06/23/2026
Here is a detailed analysis of the court decision, prepared from a professional perspective:
1. **Subject of the Dispute:** The plaintiff attempted to establish a legal fact of him solely raising and maintaining two minor children after the dissolution of marriage.
2. **Court Arguments:**
– The court established that applying to the court with such a claim under martial law conditions bears signs of artificially creating grounds for obtaining a deferral from mobilization, which affects the interests of the state.
– The appellate court had the full authority to review the case upon the appeal of the Territorial Recruitment and Social Support Center (TCC), as the decision of the court of first instance directly affected the state’s public duties regarding mobilization.
– The Supreme Court emphasized that family rights and duties are inalienable; therefore, the fact of sole upbringing cannot be established solely on the basis of an agreement between parents or the fact of the children residing with one of them.
– The existence of a notarized agreement between parents is not proof of the mother’s evasion of child-rearing; to establish such a fact, evidence of deprivation of parental rights or other legal facts terminating parental legal personality is required.
– The court emphasized that private-law instruments cannot be used for the abuse of rights for the purpose of avoiding the performance of the constitutional duty to defend the Fatherland.
– The Supreme Court confirmed that the plaintiff’s evidence only confirms joint residence but does not prove the absence of the mother’s participation in upbringing, which renders the claim for establishing the fact groundless.
3. **Court Decision:** The Supreme Court dismissed the cassation appeal and upheld the ruling of the appellate court, which had denied the establishment of the fact of sole child upbringing.
Case No. 369/10819/25 of 06/17/2026
Greetings. As a lawyer with many years of experience, I have analyzed the court decision provided to you. Here is a detailed analysis for your material:
1. **Subject of the Dispute:** A father’s challenge to the decision of the guardianship and custody authority regarding granting permission to change a minor child’s surname without his consent.
2. **Court Arguments:**
* The court emphasized that when resolving the issue of changing a child’s surname, the priority is to ensure the child’s best interests, which requires a thorough investigation of the relationship between the child and both parents.
* The Supreme Court highlighted that the guardianship and custody authority, when making a decision, is obliged not merely to formally consider the application, but to provide justification as to why the change of surnamewhich corresponds to the best interests of the child, taking into account the performance by the parents of their duties.
* In this case, it was established that the decision of the executive committee did not contain sufficient evidence that the child’s father intentionally failed to care for the child, or that a change of surname was necessary to protect the child’s interests.
* The court took a critical view of the assertions regarding the conducting of an interview with the child, as the case files did not contain sufficient evidence of such a procedure being conducted, and new evidence is not admitted at the cassation stage.
* The court of appeal correctly applied the substantive law by establishing that the decision of the guardianship authority was adopted in violation of the procedure and in the absence of proper justification, which constitutes grounds for its revocation.
* The Supreme Court noted that the revocation of the decision of the guardianship authority is an independent ground for restoring the birth record of the child to its original state.
* The court also pointed out that the parties are not deprived of the right to re-apply to the court regarding this matter, by providing proper evidence and justification.
3. **Court decision:** The Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the court of appeal, by which the decision of the guardianship authority to change the child’s surname was declared illegal and revoked.
Case No. 509/1087/24 dated 17/06/2026
Greetings. As a lawyer with many years of experience, I have analyzed the court decision provided by you. Here is a detailed analysis:
1. The subject of the dispute is the issue of legal succession in enforcement proceedings, namely, whether a debtor (surety) is subject to replacement by their heir in a case concerning the collection of debt under a loan agreement, for which a court decision has already been rendered.
2. The Supreme Court pointed out that the lower courts mistakenly focused exclusively on the nature of the suretyship agreement, without taking into account that a court decision on debt collection, which is subject to enforcement, had already been rendered during the debtor’s lifetime. The Court emphasized that the death of a debtor does not terminate an obligation if it has already been transformed into a court decision, and procedural legal succession in enforcement proceedings is entirely possible. The Court also emphasized that a creditor’s application to the court for the replacement of a party to enforcement proceedings constitutes a form of presenting claims against an heir within the meaning of Article 1281 of the Civil Code of Ukraine. The lower courts did not establish the key circumstances: whether the creditor knew about the death of the debtor and whether they complied with the preclusive time limits for presenting claims against the heir. Therefore, the findings of the courts regarding the impossibility of replacing a party were deemed premature due to insufficient examination of evidence and incorrect application of the rules of procedural law.
3. The Supreme Court revoked the ruling of the court of first instance and the resolution of the court of appeal, remanding the case for a new trial to the court of first instance to establish all the necessary circumstances.
Case No. 205/3280/14-c dated 10/06/2026
Here is a detailed analysis of the court decision, prepared in an interview format for a journalist:
**1. Subject of the Dispute**
The subject of the dispute is a review of the 2017 judgment of the Supreme Court of Ukraine regarding the unlawful dismissal of an employee from PJSC GAC “Chornomornaftogaz” based on exceptional circumstances, initiated after the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) found that the previous review of this case constituted a violation of the right to a fair trial.
**2. Arguments of the Court**
The Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court was guided by the fact that the ECHR judgment in the case of “Vashchenko and Tretyak v. Ukraine” clearly pointed to a violation of the principle of legal certainty due to the Supreme Court of Ukraine’s overturning of final court decisions on the basis of case law that had formed only after those decisions were rendered. The Court emphasized that the State has an obligation to restore the previous legal status of a person (*restitutio in integrum*), if possible, as just satisfaction from the ECHR is not always a sufficient remedy for the protection of non-pecuniary rights. At the same time, the Court took into account the principle of prohibition of double recovery; therefore, it decided not to set aside the 2017 judgment regarding monetary awards, as these sums had already been awarded to the applicant by the ECHR. Regarding reinstatement in office, the Court recognized this as a non-pecuniary right that had not been restored, and therefore, the decisions of the lower courts in this part must remain in force. The Court also rejected the respondent’s arguments regarding the alleged de facto reinstatement of the employee, as no evidence was provided that the person had been made familiar with the order or granted access to work. Thus, the Grand Chamber found a balance between executing the ECHR judgment and preventing the unjust enrichment of the applicant.
**3. Court Decision**
The Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court partially granted the application of Person_1, setting aside the 2017 judgment of the Supreme Court of Ukraine in the part concerning the refusal to reinstate the employee and upholding the decisions of the trial, appellate, and cassation courts regarding the plaintiff’s reinstatement in office, while maintaining the 2017 judgment in effect regarding the monetary claims.
Case No. 990/150/26 dated 18/06/2026
Here is a detailed analysis of the court decision in case No. 990/150/26:
1. **Subject of the Dispute:** The plaintiff sought to challenge the inaction of the High Council of Justice (HCJ) regarding the prolonged failure to consider his disciplinary complaints against a judge’s actions and to compel the HCJ to consider these complaints on their merits.
2. **Arguments of the Court:**
* The Court proceeded from the premise that a person’s right to file a disciplinary complaint does not transform into a right to control the course of disciplinary proceedings or to influence the timeframes for decision-making by the disciplinary body.
* The Grand Chamber emphasized that disciplinary proceedings against a judge constitute a specific procedure where the complainant is not a direct participant in the legal relationship, and their rights or obligations are not altered.depending on the results or duration of the complaint review.
* The Court noted that the current legislation clearly defines the list of HCJ decisions that are not subject to appeal and does not provide for judicial oversight of the preliminary complaint review stage or the timeframes for their consideration.
* It was emphasized that the assessment of a judge’s actions during the performance of their duties falls exclusively within the competence of the HCJ, rather than the administrative court.
* The Court rejected the plaintiff’s reference to the ECHR case law, noting that the limitation of access to the court in this case is legitimate, as the claims are not aimed at protecting the plaintiff’s actual violated rights.
* The Grand Chamber confirmed that, according to established practice formed in a number of recent decisions, such disputes are not subject to judicial review at all, as they do not arise from public-law relations in which the rights of a specific person are violated.
* The Court also indicated that when resolving identical disputes, one should be guided specifically by the latest legal position of the Grand Chamber, which remains unchanged on this issue.
3. **Court Decision:** The Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the first-instance court’s ruling on the refusal to initiate proceedings, confirming that such a dispute is not subject to judicial review.
Case No. 380/1253/24 of 22/06/2026
Below is a detailed analysis of the court decision, prepared from a professional perspective:
1. **Subject of the Dispute:** The dispute concerns the lawfulness of the refusal by the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine to pay the family of a deceased serviceman a one-time monetary allowance (OMA) in the amount of UAH 15 million in accordance with CMU Resolution No. 168, instead of the paid allowance in the amount of 750 times the subsistence minimum.
2. **Court’s Arguments:**
– The Court departed from the previous legal position of the Supreme Court (in particular, set forth in cases No. 600/548/23-а and No. 380/9868/23), noting that the previous conclusions regarding the possibility of paying UAH 15 million in case of death from any disease related to the defense of the Motherland were not based on correct legal application.
– The Court emphasized that Resolution No. 168 is an exceptional social guarantee of wartime, and therefore its provisions cannot be interpreted broadly.
– It was established that for the receipt of the increased payment (UAH 15 million), the death of the serviceman must be a direct consequence of a wound, contusion, trauma, or mutilation received during combat operations.
– The mere fact that death resulted from a disease related to the defense of the Motherland is not an automatic basis for the application of Clause 2 of Resolution No. 168.
– In this case, the courts did not establish a direct causal link between the death from the disease and the sustained wound or trauma; therefore, there are no grounds for the payment of UAH 15 million.
– Consequently, the payment of the OMA on general grounds in accordance with Law No. 2011-XII and Pof Procedure No. 975 is lawful and sufficient under such circumstances.
3. **Court Decision:** The Supreme Court dismissed the cassation appeal and upheld the resolution of the court of appeal, which had denied the claim.
Case No. 205/8540/24 dated 22/06/2026
The subject matter of this dispute is the recognition of ownership of inherited property and the establishment of an additional period for filing an application for the acceptance of inheritance after the expiration of the six-month term.
In its decision, the Supreme Court was guided by the principle that inheritance is a right that requires active measures from the heir, namely the submission of an application to a notary within the six-month period established by law. The Court emphasized that valid reasons for missing this deadline can only be objective, insurmountable, and significant difficulties that made it impossible to apply to a notary during the entire inheritance period. In this case, the plaintiff did not prove the existence of such obstacles, as the legislation provides for the possibility of submitting an application for the acceptance of inheritance by postal service or through consular institutions, even while abroad. The Court stressed that the mere fact of martial law or forced residence outside Ukraine is not an automatic ground for the renewal of the term if the heir had a real opportunity to perform the necessary actions remotely. Therefore, the lower courts correctly concluded that the plaintiff did not exercise her right to accept the inheritance without valid reasons. The Supreme Court confirmed that the reassessment of evidence is not within its jurisdiction and that the application of legal norms by the lower courts was correct.
The Supreme Court dismissed the cassation appeal and left the decisions of the courts of first and appellate instances unchanged.
Case No. 990/479/25 dated 11/06/2026
Greetings. As a specialist with many years of experience, I have analyzed this decision of the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court. Here is a summary of the essence of the case:
**1. Subject matter of the dispute:**
The dispute concerned the lawfulness of the passing score set by the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine (HQCJ) for the third stage of the qualification examination (cognitive abilities testing), which turned out to be higher than the average permissible score, which, in the plaintiff’s opinion, became the basis for her unlawful non-admission to the next stage of selection.
**2. Court arguments:**
* The Court emphasized that the HQCJ is vested with discretionary powers to determine the passing score, taking into account the number of vacant positions, which is a necessary tool in a competitive selection procedure.
* The Grand Chamber distinguished between the concepts of “average permissible score” (which confirms the successful completion of an examination stage) and “passing score” (which is a condition for admission to the next stage).
* Obtaining the average permissible score is only a necessary, but not a sufficient condition.a sufficient condition for further participation in the competition, as the passing score is determined based on the ranking and the vacancy limit.
* Law No. 1402-VIII does not restrict the HQCJ (High Qualification Commission of Judges) in setting a passing score for the cognitive abilities test, unlike other stages where a strict threshold of 75% is established.
* The court noted that the plaintiff was aware of the selection conditions, did not challenge the HQCJ decision regarding the exam procedure in advance, and voluntarily accepted these conditions by commencing participation in the testing.
* The algorithm for determining the passing score established by the HQCJ ensured the transparency and competitiveness of the procedure, as well as the justification for selecting candidates under conditions of a limited number of positions.
* The conclusion of the court of first instance that the HQCJ had no right to set a passing score for individual stages was found to be erroneous and contrary to the nature of the competitive selection process.
**3. Court Decision:**
The Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court overturned the decision of the court of first instance regarding the satisfied claims and adopted a new decision to fully deny the lawsuit of PERSON_1.
**Case No. 320/57616/24 dated 06/22/2026**
1. The subject of the dispute is the lawfulness of taking measures to secure an administrative claim by suspending the effect of a tax authority’s decision to exclude a sole proprietorship from the single tax payer register until the merits of the case are resolved.
2. The court proceeded from the premise that the institution of securing a claim is an important guarantee for the protection of an individual’s rights, which allows for avoiding irreversible consequences before the conclusion of the judicial proceedings. The Supreme Court emphasized that the cancellation of a single tax payer registration fundamentally changes the legal regime of an entrepreneur’s activities, including the procedure for tax accounting, reporting, and relationships with counterparties. The court noted that failure to take such measures could significantly complicate the effective restoration of the plaintiff’s rights, as subsequent adjustment of tax consequences after a long period of operating under a different tax system would require significant effort and expense. At the same time, it was emphasized that the suspension of an act is not a resolution of the dispute on its merits, but merely a temporary measure to preserve the existing state of affairs. The court also rejected the tax authorities’ arguments that a change in the tax burden is not a sufficient ground for securing a claim, pointing to the need to assess the specifics of the legal relations in each particular case. Finally, the Supreme Court confirmed that the courts of lower instances correctly applied the rules of procedural law, ensuring a balance of the parties’ interests.
3. The Supreme Court dismissed the cassation appeals of the tax authorities and upheld the ruling of the court of first instance and the decision of the appellate court.Case No. 943/201/23 dated 06/17/2026
1. **Subject of the dispute:** Recovery of insurance indemnity from an insurance company, as well as a penalty, 3% per annum, and inflation losses for the delay in its payment resulting from a traffic accident.
2. **Court’s arguments:**
* The Supreme Court proceeded from the premise that an insurer has a legal right to suspend the term for making a payment decision if the circumstances of the traffic accident are being considered within the framework of criminal proceedings.
* Since the insurer officially notified the applicant of the need to provide documents, in particular, a court decision regarding the driver’s fault, it lawfully exercised the mechanism for suspending terms provided for in Clause 36.2 of Article 36 of the Law of Ukraine “On Compulsory Insurance of Civil Liability of Owners of Land Vehicles.”
* The Court noted that under such conditions, there is no fault in the insurer’s actions regarding the delay in the performance of the monetary obligation, which is a mandatory condition for the accrual of a penalty and other sanctions.
* Accordingly, the term for the payment of insurance indemnity begins only from the moment a court decision in a civil case on the recovery of such indemnity enters into legal force.
* The courts of lower instances erroneously applied the provisions on the insurer’s liability, failing to take into account that until the moment of the court decision, the obligation to pay was not unconditional due to the existence of criminal proceedings.
* The Supreme Court emphasized that the legal position regarding the application of Article 625 of the Civil Code of Ukraine in such legal relations must be based on the existence of the debtor’s fault, which has not been established in the insurer’s actions in this case.
3. **Court’s decision:** The Supreme Court set aside the decisions of the courts of lower instances in the part concerning the recovery of the penalty, 3% per annum, and inflation losses and rendered a new decision refusing to satisfy these claims.
Case No. 990/152/26 dated 06/22/2026
**1. Subject of the dispute:**
The subject of the dispute is the lawfulness of the High Council of Justice’s decision on the temporary suspension of a judge from the administration of justice in connection with the judge being held criminally liable for a corruption-related crime.
**2. Court’s arguments:**
* The Court established that the High Council of Justice (HCJ) acted within the scope of its powers, having complied with the procedure for considering the motion, in particular, regarding the notification of the parties and ensuring their participation in the hearing.
* The Supreme Court emphasized that the existence of criminal proceedings against a judge on suspicion of committing a corruption-related crime is an objective basis for the HCJ to assess the risks provided for by the Criminal Procedure Code.of Ukraine, as this directly affects the authority of the judiciary.
* The Court confirmed that the High Council of Justice (HCJ) should not substitute itself for a criminal court and establish guilt, but rather only verify the existence of a reasonable suspicion and risks of influencing witnesses or obstructing the investigation.
* The plaintiff’s arguments regarding the lack of motivation in the HCJ’s decision were rejected, as the Council had analyzed the pre-trial investigation materials in detail, including the transcripts of covert investigative actions, which confirm the reality of the risks.
* The Court acknowledged that the service of a copy of the motion by a NABU detective instead of a prosecutor (given the existence of the relevant authorizations) does not constitute a substantial violation that would affect the plaintiff’s rights or the legality of the decision.
* It was also confirmed that the HCJ decision was signed by all members who participated in the voting, and the technical obscuring of signatures in a copy of the document does not indicate their absence in the original.
* Finally, the Court noted that temporary suspension is a proportionate measure that ensures a balance between the private interests of the judge and the public interest in maintaining society’s trust in the administration of justice.
**3. Court Decision:**
The Supreme Court dismissed the claim of PERSON_1, recognizing the High Council of Justice’s decision on the temporary suspension of the judge from the administration of justice as lawful and well-founded.
Case No. 990/495/25 dated 09/06/2026
1. **Subject of the dispute:** Challenging the lawfulness of the actions taken by the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine (HQCJ) regarding a judicial candidate’s exclusion from the next stage of the qualification examination due to the setting of a passing score that exceeds the average allowable score for the cognitive abilities test.
2. **Court’s arguments:**
– The Court emphasized that the HQCJ is endowed with discretionary powers to independently determine the conditions for candidates’ admission to subsequent stages of selection, including setting the passing score taking into account the number of vacant positions.
– The Grand Chamber clearly distinguished between the concepts of “average allowable score” (which confirms the successful completion of a stage) and “passing score” (which is an instrument for competitive selection under conditions of a limited number of vacancies).
– The Court noted that obtaining the average allowable score is a necessary but not sufficient condition for advancing to the next stage if the number of candidates who have crossed this threshold exceeds the established limit.
– The setting of a passing score higher than the average allowable score was recognized as logically justified and consistent with the purpose of the competitive selection process — to ensure the selection of the most qualified candidates.
– The Court emphasized that the plaintiff voluntarily participated in the competition, having agreed to the conditions determined by the decisionby the HQCJ, which he did not challenge at the time they were adopted.
– The court’s interference with these discretionary powers of the Commission was deemed inadmissible, as it would violate the principle of equality of competition participants and create unjustified privileges for individual persons.
3. **Court Decision:** The Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court granted the appeal of the HQCJ, set aside the court of first instance’s decision in the part concerning the satisfaction of the claim, and rendered a new decision — to fully dismiss the claims of PERSON_1.
Case No. 990/170/26 of 06/22/2026
Greetings. As a lawyer with many years of experience, I have analyzed the court decision provided by you. Here is a brief analysis for your material:
1. **Subject of the dispute:** Challenging by a candidate for the position of judge of the HQCJ decision on the results of the qualification examination and a request to compel the Commission to conduct a re-evaluation of the practical task due to discrepancies in the assessment of individual elements of the work.
2. **Court arguments:**
– The court emphasized that the powers of the HQCJ regarding the assessment of candidates are discretionary, and court interference in this process is possible only in case of a violation of the procedure defined by law and the Regulations.
– The interpretation of the provisions of the Regulations became key: the court confirmed that the grounds for re-evaluation is a discrepancy of 20% specifically in the **total** scores for the practical task, and not in its individual elements.
– The court agreed with the HQCJ’s position that applying the discrepancy algorithm to each individual element of the assessment would lead to absurd results, since even a minimal difference of 1 point for minor tasks would provoke endless re-evaluations.
– It was established that the discrepancy between the plaintiff’s highest and lowest total scores was 14.7%, which does not reach the established threshold of 20%, therefore there were no grounds for a re-evaluation.
– The court noted that the assessment methodology provides for an integrated approach (summation and averaging of scores), which ensures objectivity and an equal approach to all candidates.
– The actions of the HQCJ were recognized as complying with the literal content of the Regulations and the principles of administrative proceedings, as the Commission acted within the scope of its powers and without violating the procedure.
3. **Court Decision:** The Supreme Court dismissed the lawsuit of PERSON_1 in full, recognizing the HQCJ decision as lawful.
Case No. 320/43936/23 of 06/22/2026
The subject of the dispute is the lawfulness of the tax notice-decision issued by the tax authority regarding the Enterprise of Citizens’ Association “Rehabilitation Center ‘Regent'”.
When rendering the decision, the court was guided by the fact that the grounds for cancellation of the tax notice-decision established by the courts of first and appellate instances are well-founded and comply with the norms of substantive and procedural law.procedural law. The Supreme Court analyzed the arguments of the tax authority’s cassation appeal and concluded that they do not refute the correctness of the conclusions reached by the lower courts. The Court confirmed that, during the examination of the case, the circumstances relevant to the correct resolution of the dispute were fully and comprehensively clarified. The legal assessment of evidence provided by the lower courts was recognized as consistent with the requirements of the Code of Administrative Procedure of Ukraine. No violations of substantive or procedural law that could serve as grounds for overturning the contested judicial acts were identified by the cassation instance. Thus, the plaintiff’s position regarding the unlawfulness of the tax authority’s actions received final confirmation in the higher judicial instance.
The Supreme Court dismissed the cassation appeal of the Main Directorate of the State Tax Service in Kyiv Oblast and upheld the decisions of the lower courts without changes.
Case No. 990/130/26 dated 09/06/2026
Below is an analysis of this judicial decision:
1. The subject of the dispute is the legality of the first-instance court’s refusal to initiate proceedings regarding a lawsuit filed by a person attempting to appeal a ruling of the Disciplinary Chamber of the High Council of Justice (HCJ) on the return of their disciplinary complaint concerning a judge’s actions.
2. The Court proceeded from the fact that, in accordance with Part 4 of Article 44 of the Law of Ukraine “On the High Council of Justice,” a decision to return a disciplinary complaint is final and not subject to appeal. The Grand Chamber emphasized that the filing of a disciplinary complaint does not create any legal consequences for the applicant that would alter their rights or obligations; therefore, the applicant is not a subject whose rights are directly violated by such an HCJ decision. The Court noted that the legislative prohibition on appealing such rulings is legitimate and does not violate the right to access to justice, as the person has the right to re-submit a complaint to the HCJ after correcting any deficiencies. The Court also emphasized that an administrative court has no authority to substitute itself for the judicial governance body or to review the internal discretion of the HCJ regarding the evaluation of the content of complaints. Since the primary claim for cancellation of the ruling is not subject to judicial review, the derivative claims (including claims for moral damages) cannot be subject to consideration within these proceedings either. All these conclusions are based on the established practice of the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court, which excludes the possibility of judicial control over the stage of preliminary review of disciplinary complaints.
3. The Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the ruling of the first-instance court refusing to initiate proceedings without changes.
Case No. 990SСGС/3/26 dated 18/06/2026
1. The subject of the dispute is a judge’s challenge to a decision of the High Council of Justice, which confirmed the imposition of a disciplinary penalty upon him for the reasthe results of the consideration of the case by the First Disciplinary Chamber of the High Council of Justice.
2. In considering this case, the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court proceeded from the premise that the procedure for bringing a judge to disciplinary liability was complied with within the limits of the powers defined by law. The Court analyzed the materials of the disciplinary proceedings and concluded that the complainant’s arguments did not refute the established facts of the violations that served as the basis for the imposition of the penalty. The Grand Chamber emphasized that the High Council of Justice acted within its discretion and that the decision to impose liability was well-founded and reasoned. The Court also drew attention to the fact that interference with the discretionary powers of the High Council of Justice is possible only in cases of gross procedural violations or the absence of legal grounds for the penalty, which was not established in the present case. Consequently, having verified the legality of the challenged decision, the Court found no grounds for its cancellation or modification.
3. The Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court dismissed the judge’s complaint and upheld the decision of the High Council of Justice on bringing him to disciplinary liability.
Case No. 990/146/26 of 06/17/2026
Here is a detailed analysis of the court decision in case No. 990/146/26:
1. **Subject of the Dispute:** Challenging the decision of the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine (HQCJ) regarding the non-confirmation of a candidate’s ability to administer justice for the position of an appellate court judge due to alleged non-compliance with the criteria of integrity and professional ethics.
2. **Arguments of the Court:**
* The Court emphasized that although the HQCJ has discretionary powers regarding the evaluation of candidates, these powers are not unlimited and must be exercised within the framework of a legal procedure that excludes arbitrariness.
* The Court identified the lack of proper reasoning of the decision as a key violation on the part of the HQCJ, as the Commission ignored the candidate’s explanations and counterarguments regarding each point of the Public Integrity Council’s conclusion.
* The Court noted that the HQCJ merely formally reproduced the conclusion of the Public Integrity Council without providing an analysis of the candidate’s explanations regarding the reasons for increased workload, case processing times, and changes in approaches to the reasoning of decisions.
* The absence of an assessment of the candidate’s arguments in the HQCJ’s decision indicates a violation of the requirements regarding justification provided for in Article 2 of the Code of Administrative Judiciary of Ukraine, which makes it impossible to understand the logic of the decision adopted by the Commission.
* The Court emphasized that a negative decision regarding a candidate must contain not only a reference to the law but also specific motives as to why the candidate’s explanations were rejected, which was not done in this case.
* At the same time, the Court clearly distinguished that it does not substitute the HQCJ in matters of integrity assessment, but only exercises control over compliance with the procedure and the requirements for the reasoned nature of an act of a subject of authority.
3. **Court Decision:** The Supreme [Court]
