This judgment, **** for the Ukrainian legal system, concerns the 2019 dismissal of Mr. Stanislav Shevchuk from his positions as a judge and President of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (CCU). The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found that the disciplinary proceedings against the applicant were fundamentally flawed, violating both his right to an impartial tribunal and his right to respect for his private life. The Court determined that the CCU acted as a “tribunal” in this context, but failed to provide the necessary procedural safeguards required by the Convention. Specifically, the Court criticized the lack of impartiality of judges who acted as both accusers and adjudicators, as well as the lack of clarity in the domestic legal framework governing such dismissals. This ruling highlights the critical need for transparent and foreseeable disciplinary procedures within high-level judicial institutions.
### Structure and Provisions
The decision is structured into four main legal assessments:
1. **Admissibility:** The Court rejected the Government’s objections regarding the abuse of the right of application and the time-limit for lodging the complaint, confirming that the applicant had exhausted domestic remedies.
2. **Article 6 § 1 (Right to a Fair Trial):** The Court applied the *Eskelinen* test, concluding that Article 6 is applicable because the CCU acted as a “tribunal” in disciplinary matters. It found a violation of the impartiality requirement but declared the complaint regarding “access to court” inadmissible, as the CCU itself served as the tribunal.
3. **Article 8 (Right to Private Life):** The Court found an interference with the applicant’s private life due to the professional and reputational consequences of his dismissal. It ruled that the interference was not “in accordance with the law” due to a lack of foreseeability in the domestic rules.
4. **Article 10 (Freedom of Expression):** This complaint was declared inadmissible as the applicant failed to substantiate that his dismissal was a direct result of his freedom of expression rather than his overall conduct.
Compared to previous case-law (e.g., *Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine*), this decision reinforces the principle that even high-ranking constitutional judges are entitled to basic fair trial guarantees, specifically regarding the separation of roles between those who initiate disciplinary proceedings and those who decide them.
### Key Provisions for Legal Use
* **Objective Impartiality:** The judgment establishes that it is a violation of Article 6 for judges who initiate disciplinary proceedings and publicly formulate accusations to subsequently sit on the panel that decides the merits of the case.
* **Doctrine of Necessity:** The Court clarified that while the “doctrine of necessity” might allow for the participation of biased judges in extreme cases to prevent a total paralysis of the court, it was not applicable here because the CCU had 18 judges, and it was not shown that a panel could not have been formed without the conflicted members.
* **Quality of Law (Article 8):** The Court emphasized that disciplinary grounds must be formulated with sufficient precision. Quoting constitutional provisions verbatim without explaining which specific actions constitute “significant” or “systematic” neglect of duty fails the “foreseeability” test required by the Convention.
* **Procedural Fairness:** The judgment underscores that the absence of domestic rules on the recusal of Constitutional Court judges in disciplinary proceedings is a significant deficiency that undermines the appearance of impartiality and public confidence in the judiciary.
