Review of the EU legislation for 05/09/2025

Here’s a breakdown of the provided legal acts:

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1706

This regulation specifies how vehicles are approved to meet Euro 7 emission standards. It details the tests manufacturers must perform to ensure compliance with emission limits throughout a vehicle’s life. Critically, it aims to prevent the use of manipulation devices that could skew emission results. The regulation also mandates the use of on-board fuel and electric energy consumption monitoring devices and specifies the information to be included in applications for type-approval. Annexes to the regulation outline detailed procedures for testing, prevention of manipulation devices, and specifications for on-board diagnostic systems.

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1707

This regulation implements the Euro 7 standards by detailing rules for on-board monitoring systems and fuel consumption monitoring. It introduces the concept of an Environmental Vehicle Passport (EVP), providing consumers with data on a vehicle’s environmental performance, accessible via QR codes. The regulation also establishes procedures to prevent the manipulation of emission control systems, requiring manufacturers to provide comprehensive documentation. This regulation focuses on real-world emissions and transparency for consumers.

Commission Regulation (EU) 2025/1783

This regulation closes the Atlantic Ocean to bigeye tuna fishing for Portuguese vessels, effective August 7, 2025. It’s a direct consequence of Portugal’s 2025 fishing quota for bigeye tuna being exhausted. Portuguese vessels are prohibited from catching, keeping, or landing any bigeye tuna after that date.

Commission Regulation (EU) 2025/1781

This regulation bans Irish vessels from fishing for herring in certain areas (6b, 6aN, and UK/international waters of 5b) as of August 1, 2025. This action follows the exhaustion of Ireland’s herring quota for those specific fishing zones. While fishing is prohibited, vessels are allowed to land, process, and transfer fish caught before the deadline, with specific rules for recording and counting any accidental catches against existing quotas.

Judgment in Case C-531/22, LEGO A/S v Pozitív Energiaforrás Kft.

This case clarifies the scope of protection for Community designs, particularly concerning modular toy building sets. It defines the “informed user” not as a technical expert but as someone familiar with existing designs in the field. The judgment emphasizes that while modular systems are protected, the designer’s freedom to create variations influences the level of protection. Minor design differences can be enough to avoid infringement if the designer’s freedom was limited. The Court also narrowly defines “special reasons” that would allow a court to avoid standard penalties for infringement, stating that the small number of infringing components is insufficient grounds for non-enforcement.

Judgment in Case C-741/21 P, EDPS v SRB

This judgment centers on data protection and clarifies what constitutes “personal data” and “pseudonymization” under EU Regulation 2018/1725. The Single Resolution Board (SRB) transmitted pseudonymized data to Deloitte and EDPS claimed that SRB should provide data subjects with information about it. The Court of Justice clarifies that pseudonymized data isn’t automatically anonymous and must be considered personal data if a data subject can still be identified using it. The judgment clarifies that the identifiable nature of the data subject must be assessed at the time of collection of the data and from the point of view of the controller.

Judgment in Case C-276/22, OO v Ministero dell’Istruzione

The court ruled that existing prior teaching experience in non-state schools should not affect the salary of teachers who are later hired permanently in state schools. The main reason for that is because the nature of the school where the experience was gained, not on whether the employment was fixed-term or permanent.

Judgment in Case C-455/22, AOK Rheinland/Hamburg

The judgment clarifies how to determine which country’s social security legislation applies when a worker resides in one Member State but works in several, with a focus on the concept of “substantial part of the activity.” The court rules that when assessing whether a “substantial part” of a worker’s activity is carried out in their Member State of residence, the competent institution must primarily consider whether at least 25% of their working time or remuneration is accrued in that state.

Judgment in Joined Cases C-585/21 and C-623/21, Prokuratura Rejonowa w Mińsku Mazowieckim and Prokuratura Okręgowa w Siedlcach

This case addresses the interpretation of EU law regarding the independence of judges in Poland. The CJEU is asked to clarify whether EU law allows national courts to disregard decisions of constitutional courts or national rules that prevent them from assessing the lawfulness of judicial appointments, especially when those appointments may compromise the independence and impartiality of the judiciary. The Court concludes that EU law precludes national legislation and constitutional court case-law that would force a national court to comply with a decision from a higher court if the national court finds that the judges in that higher court do not meet the standards of independence and impartiality required by EU law.

Judgment in Case C-407/22, Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Bremen

This judgment clarifies the interplay between the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision and the Framework Decision on the enforcement of criminal judgments. The Court specifies the conditions under which an executing state can refuse to execute an EAW based on Article 4(6) of Framework Decision 2002/584, emphasizing the need to follow the procedures outlined in Framework Decision 2008/909, including obtaining the issuing state’s consent for the transfer of enforcement. The key takeaway is that the executing state’s decision to enforce a sentence instead of surrendering a person under an EAW is conditional on the issuing state’s consent.

Judgment in Case C-34/22, UI v Österreichische Post AG

This judgment clarifies several key aspects of the GDPR, including what constitutes “non-material damage” and how it should be compensated. It emphasizes that negative feelings, such as fear or annoyance, resulting from unauthorized data disclosure can qualify as non-material damage. The judgment clarifies the responsibilities of data controllers. The CJEU clarifies the scope of “non-material damage” and the assessment of compensation under Article 82 of the GDPR.

Judgment in Case C-423/22, Fédération CFTC Santé Sociaux

This judgment states that the definition of “redundancies” includes cases where employees are dismissed for refusing to accept changes to their employment contracts based on collective mobility agreements. This means that employers must follow the procedures for informing and consulting with workers’ representatives as outlined in Directive 98/59/EC when implementing such agreements, especially if they anticipate dismissals due to employees refusing the new terms.

Judgment in Case C-776/22 P, Studio Legale Ughi e Nunziante v EUIPO

The core issue is whether a law firm can be represented before the EU Courts by its own partners. The Court clarifies that while parties must be represented by a lawyer, and that lawyer must be authorized to practice in a Member State, the requirement of independence does not automatically exclude partners of a law firm from representing that firm. The Court establishes a presumption of independence for lawyers, which can only be rebutted by specific evidence of a manifestly detrimental effect on their capacity to represent their client or non-compliance with professional rules.

Judgment in Case C-728/22, UX v Corte d’appello di L’Aquila

This judgment addresses the rights of honorary members of the judiciary in Italy who were on fixed-term contracts and then underwent an assessment for permanent confirmation. It was clarified that EU law precludes national legislation that forces honorary judges to waive their right to paid annual leave as a condition of being confirmed to a permanent position.

Judgment in Case C-537/22, CP v Nissan Iberia SA

This judgment clarifies when the limitation period for bringing such actions begins, specifically when the injured party is considered to have the necessary knowledge to start the legal proceedings. The CJEU ruled that Article 101 TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) and Article 10(2) of Directive 2014/104/EU preclude national legislation that allows the limitation period for damages actions to begin before the decision of the national competition authority finding the infringement becomes final.

Judgment in Case C-379/22, AF v Casa Națională de Asigurări de Sănătate

This judgment addresses the interpretation of EU law on cross-border healthcare. The case concerns a Romanian citizen, AF, who sought reimbursement from Romanian authorities for medical treatment received in Germany. The Court ruled that Article 7(7) of Directive 2011/24/EU, read in light of Article 56 TFEU, *does* preclude national legislation that makes reimbursement of cross-border healthcare costs conditional on a prior medical assessment carried out exclusively by a health professional within the public health insurance system of the Member State of affiliation.

Judgment in Case C-469/22, Arcomet Romania SRL v Direcţia Generală Regională a Finanţelor Publice Bucureşti

This judgment concerns the interpretation of the VAT Directive, specifically regarding supplies of services within a group of companies and the right to deduct VAT. The court clarified that: Remuneration for intra-group services, calculated according to OECD guidelines to adjust a subsidiary’s operating profit margin, can be considered consideration for a supply of services subject to VAT. Tax authorities are not precluded from requiring documents other than the invoice to prove the existence and use of services for taxable transactions, as long as such requests are necessary and proportionate.

Judgment in Case C-603/22, European Commission v Republic of Poland

This is a judgment by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) regarding a failure by Poland to transpose Directive (EU) 2019/790 on copyright and related rights in the digital single market into its national law by the deadline. The Court found Poland in breach of its obligations and ordered it to pay a lump sum of EUR 8,300,000 to the Commission.

Judgment in Case C-577/22, Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid v GB

This is a judgment from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) regarding the interpretation of the Return Directive (2008/115/EC) in the context of immigration law. The judgment clarifies the obligations of national courts when reviewing the legality of detention for removal purposes, emphasizing the need to consider fundamental rights.

Judgment in Case C-148/23, WB v Kärntner Landesregierung

This is a judgment from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) regarding the interpretation of Directive 2001/83/EC on medicinal products for human use, specifically Article 2(2) concerning the classification of products that could be considered both medicinal products and products covered by other EU legislation. The judgment clarifies the scope of Article 2(2) of Directive 2001/83/EC, stating that the rule of precedence for medicinal product legislation applies when a product undoubtedly qualifies as a medicinal product but there’s uncertainty whether it might also fall under other EU regulatory frameworks.

Review of each of legal acts published today:

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1706 of 25 July 2025 laying down rules, procedures and testing methodologies for the application of Regulation (EU) 2024/1257 as regards exhaust and evaporative emission type-approval of vehicles of categories M1 and N1 and amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/683

Here is a detailed description of the provisions of the act you provided:

**1. Essence of the Act:**

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1706 lays down the rules, procedures, and testing methodologies for the type-approval of M1 and N1 vehicles concerning exhaust and evaporative emissions, as mandated by Regulation (EU) 2024/1257 (Euro 7). It also amends Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/683 to adapt it to the new Euro 7 requirements. The regulation aims to simplify the type-approval process by referring to UN Regulations where applicable, eliminating redundant tests, and ensuring a consistent set of procedures. It focuses on ensuring that vehicles meet emission limits throughout their expected lifetime and preventing the use of manipulation devices and strategies.

**2. Structure and Main Provisions:**

* **Scope (Article 1):** Defines the vehicle categories to which the regulation applies (M1, N1, and certain N2 vehicles designated as ‘Euro 7ext’ and ‘Euro 7Gext’).
* **Definitions (Article 2):** Provides definitions for key terms used in the regulation, such as ‘vehicle type with regard to emissions,’ ‘periodically regenerating system,’ and various fuel types (mono-fuel, bi-fuel, flex-fuel).
* **Requirements for Emission Type-Approval (Article 3):** Specifies the tests (Annexes III to VIII, X, XI, XIV, XVI, XX, XXI and XXII) that manufacturers must perform to demonstrate compliance with emission limits. It also covers reference fuels (Annex IX), fuel consumption, CO2 emissions, and specific requirements for different fuel types (e.g., mono-fuel gas vehicles).
* **OBD System (Article 4):** States that the On-Board Diagnostics (OBD) system must meet the requirements outlined in Annex XI.
* **On-Board Fuel and Electric Energy Consumption Monitoring Devices (Article 5):** Mandates the installation of on-board fuel and electric energy consumption monitoring devices on specific vehicle categories and specifies that these devices must comply with Annex XXII.
* **Application for Emission Type-Approval (Article 6):** Details the information and documentation that manufacturers must submit when applying for emission type-approval, including information documents, declarations of compliance, and measures to prevent tampering.
* **Administrative Provisions (Article 7):** Specifies the templates and models (Annexes I, V, VII, XI, XIV, XVI, XXI) to be used for demonstrating compliance and outlines the procedure for granting type-approval, including the issuance of type-approval numbers and certificates.
* **Amendments to Emission Type-Approvals (Article 8):** States that Articles 27, 33 and 34 of Regulation 2018/858 apply to any extensions to the emission type-approvals granted under Regulation (EU) 2024/1257.
* **Conformity of Production (Article 9):** Ensures that vehicles produced under a type-approval conform to the type-approval requirements.
* **In-Service Conformity (Article 10):** Requires manufacturers and approval authorities to perform in-service conformity checks to verify that emissions are effectively limited throughout the vehicle’s lifetime.
* **Pollution Control Devices (Article 11):** Sets requirements for replacement pollution control devices, including type-approval as separate technical units and identification markings.
* **Application for Emission Type-Approval of Replacement Control Device (Article 12):** Details the information and documentation that manufacturers must submit when applying for emission type-approval of a replacement pollution control device.
* **Administrative Provisions for Emission Type-Approval of Replacement Pollution Control Device (Article 13):** Specifies the procedure for granting emission type-approval for replacement pollution control devices.
* **Manipulation Devices and Manipulation Strategies (Article 14):** Requires manufacturers to comply with Annex IV, which outlines tests, methods, and procedures to establish the absence of manipulation devices and strategies.
* **Gear Shift Indicator (Article 15):** Ensures that vehicles comply with specific requirements related to emission type-approval in accordance with Annex X.
* **Anti-Tampering, Security and Cybersecurity (Article 16):** Ensures that vehicles comply with specific requirements related to emission type-approval in accordance with Annex XIV.
* **Specific Administrative Provisions (Article 17):** Specifies that emission type-approval is granted only if the requirements of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1707 are also complied with.
* **Amendments to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/683 (Article 18):** Amends Annexes I, IV and VIII to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/683 in accordance with Annex XVIII to this Regulation.
* **Entry into Force (Article 19):** States that the regulation enters into force on the twentieth day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union, with Annex XVIII applying from 29 November 2026.

**Main Changes Compared to Previous Versions:**

The regulation introduces new testing methodologies and procedures to align with the Euro 7 emission standards set by Regulation (EU) 2024/1257. It places a strong emphasis on preventing manipulation devices and strategies and ensuring that vehicles meet emission limits throughout their lifetime. The regulation also incorporates references to UN Regulations to harmonize technical rules and simplifies the type-approval process by eliminating redundant tests.

**3. Most Important Provisions:**

* **Article 3:** This article is crucial as it defines the core requirements for obtaining emission type-approval, including the specific tests that must be passed and the emission limits that must be met.
* **Article 14:** This article is vital for preventing the use of manipulation devices and strategies, ensuring that vehicles comply with emission standards in real-world driving conditions.
* **Annex IV:** This annex provides the tests, methods and procedures for establishing the absence of manipulation devices and manipulation strategies.
* **Annex XI:** This annex defines the functional aspects of on-board diagnostic (OBD) systems for the control of emissions from motor vehicles.
* **Annex II:** This annex sets out the in-service conformity (ISC) methodology for checking compliance against the emission limits for tailpipe (including low temperature) and evaporative emissions throughout the additional lifetime of the vehicle.
* **Annex III:** This annex describes the procedure for determining Real Driving Emission.
* **Annex XXII:** This annex defines the requirements applicable to the devices for monitoring on board the vehicle the consumption of fuel and/or electric energy.
* **Appendix 6 to Annex I:** This appendix defines the Emission level and Emission Type-Approval Certification Numbering System and Certificate of Conformity.

I hope this detailed description is helpful!

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1707 of 25 July 2025 laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) 2024/1257 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards specific methods, requirements and tests, including compliance thresholds, for OBFCM devices and OBM systems, characteristics and performance of driver warning systems and inducement methods and methods to assess their operation, EVP format and data and methods of communication of EVP data of motor vehicles of categories M1 and N1

Here’s a breakdown of the Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1707:

**1. Essence of the Act:**

This regulation sets out detailed rules for implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1257, also known as Euro 7, concerning vehicle emissions and battery durability. It specifies how to apply the Euro 7 regulation regarding on-board monitoring (OBM) systems, fuel consumption monitoring (OBFCM), environmental vehicle passports (EVP), in-vehicle environmental data displays, and methods to prevent manipulation of emission control systems. The regulation aims to ensure that vehicles meet emission standards throughout their lifespan and that consumers have access to reliable environmental performance data.

**2. Structure and Main Provisions:**

The regulation is structured around key areas related to vehicle emissions and data integrity:

* **Scope:** Applies to M1 and N1 vehicle categories, as well as certain N2 vehicles (‘Euro 7ext’ and ‘Euro 7Gext’).
* **On-Board Monitoring (OBM) Systems:**
* Specifies general requirements, including hardware and software functionality, and data requirements (Annex I).
* Details the functions of the excess exhaust emissions driver warning system (EEEDWS), including monitoring NOx and particulate matter (PM), providing driver warnings, and implementing inducement methods (Annex II).
* Sets rules for calculating NOx emissions and other OBM data for each trip.
* Defines the process for calculating hash values and on-board processing of OBM data.
* Outlines requirements for over-the-air (OTA) transmission of OBM data and access to OBM data via the OBD port.
* Mandates submission of anonymous OBM data to authorities.
* Includes provisions for emission type-approval and in-service conformity checks of OBM systems.
* **On-Board Fuel and Electric Energy Consumption Monitoring (OBFCM) Devices:** Ensures OBFCM devices transmit relevant OBM data parameters.
* **Environmental Vehicle Passport (EVP):**
* Requires manufacturers to issue an EVP for each vehicle, containing information on environmental performance.
* Specifies the data and format of the EVP (Annex V) and mandates off-board access to EVP data via digital means, including QR codes.
* **In-Vehicle Display of Environmental Data:** Requires manufacturers to display environmental data about the vehicle type and individual vehicle performance inside the vehicle (Annex VI).
* **Manipulation Devices and Strategies:**
* Establishes methods and procedures to prevent the use of manipulation devices and strategies (Annex VII).
* Requires manufacturers to provide documentation to demonstrate the absence of such devices and strategies.

**3. Main Provisions for Practical Use:**

* **OBM Data Requirements (Annex I):** This section is crucial for manufacturers as it specifies the exact parameters to be monitored, how they should be calculated, and how the data should be processed and transmitted. It also includes the data schemas that must be followed for data integrity and transmission.
* **Driver Warnings and Inducement Methods (Annex II):** This section outlines how manufacturers must warn drivers about excessive emissions and the steps the vehicle will take (inducement methods) if the warnings are ignored. This is important for ensuring compliance and encouraging drivers to address emission-related issues.
* **Environmental Vehicle Passport (Annex V):** This section is important for consumers as it ensures they have access to key environmental performance data for their vehicle. The requirement for a QR code makes this information easily accessible.
* **Manipulation Devices and Strategies (Annex VII):** This section is critical for ensuring data integrity and preventing manufacturers from circumventing emission regulations. It places a strong emphasis on documentation and transparency.
* **In-Service Conformity Checks and Market Surveillance (Annex IV):** This section is important for manufacturers, accredited laboratories and technical services as it sets out the in-service conformity (ISC) methodology for checking the conformity of the NOx and PM emissions monitoring performed by OBM systems, and market surveillance methods for the verification of compliance with the general requirements of OBM systems.

Commission Regulation (EU) 2025/1783 of 29 August 2025 establishing a fisheries closure for bigeye tuna in the Atlantic Ocean for vessels flying the flag of or registered in Portugal

This Commission Regulation (EU) 2025/1783 establishes a fisheries closure for bigeye tuna in the Atlantic Ocean specifically for vessels flying the flag of or registered in Portugal. It declares that Portugal’s fishing quota for bigeye tuna in the Atlantic Ocean for 2025 has been exhausted. As a result, it prohibits fishing activities for bigeye tuna in the Atlantic Ocean by Portuguese vessels from a specified date. This includes prohibitions on retaining, relocating, transhipping, or landing bigeye tuna caught after that date.

The Regulation consists of three articles and an annex. Article 1 states that Portugal’s quota for bigeye tuna in the Atlantic Ocean is deemed exhausted from the date specified in the Annex. Article 2 prohibits fishing activities for bigeye tuna by Portuguese vessels from the date in the Annex, including retaining, relocating, transhipping, or landing the fish. Article 3 specifies that the Regulation comes into force the day after its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. The Annex specifies the closing date for the fishery as 7 August 2025. There are no direct changes to previous versions, as this regulation is specific to the year 2025 and addresses a particular situation of quota exhaustion.

The most important provision is Article 2, which directly prohibits specific fishing activities. This means that Portuguese-flagged or registered vessels must cease fishing for bigeye tuna in the Atlantic Ocean from 7 August 2025, and they are not allowed to keep, move, transfer, or bring ashore any bigeye tuna caught after that date.

Commission Regulation (EU) 2025/1781 of 29 August 2025 establishing a fisheries closure for herring in areas 6b and 6aN; United Kingdom and international waters of 5b for vessels flying the flag of Ireland

This Commission Regulation (EU) 2025/1781 establishes a fisheries closure for herring in specific areas, namely 6b and 6aN, as well as the United Kingdom and international waters of 5b. The closure specifically targets vessels flying the flag of Ireland. The regulation is enacted because the fishing quota allocated to Ireland for this particular herring stock in these areas for 2025 has been exhausted. As a result, the regulation prohibits fishing activities for this stock by Irish vessels in the specified zones.

The regulation consists of three articles and an annex. Article 1 declares the quota exhaustion for Ireland in the specified areas. Article 2 outlines the prohibitions, including searching for fish, shooting, setting, or hauling fishing gear for the purpose of fishing the stock. However, it allows for transshipping, retaining on board, processing, transferring, caging, fattening, and landing of fish caught before the closure date. It also addresses unintended catches, requiring them to be retained on board, recorded, landed, and counted against quotas. Article 3 states that the regulation will enter into force on the day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. The annex specifies the Member State (Ireland), the stock (HER/5B6ANB), the species (Herring), the zone (6b and 6aN; United Kingdom and international waters of 5b) and the closing date (1 August 2025).

The most important provision is Article 2, which explicitly prohibits fishing for the specified herring stock by Irish vessels in the designated areas after the specified closing date. However, it is equally important to note the exceptions, particularly the allowance for handling catches taken before the closure date and the protocol for dealing with unintended catches, which must be recorded and counted against quotas.

Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 4 September 2025.LEGO A/S v Pozitív Energiaforrás Kft.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Community design – Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 – Article 8(3) – Design allowing the multiple assembly or connection of mutually interchangeable products within a modular system – Scope of the protection conferred by such a design – Article 10 – Concept of ‘informed user’ – Article 89(1) – Sanctions in actions for infringement – Special reasons allowing the national court not to make the orders provided for in that provision – Infringement in respect of the pieces of a toy building set, the number of which is small in relation to total number of components of that set.Case C-211/24.

This document is a judgment from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) regarding the interpretation of the Community design regulation, specifically concerning toy building sets. The case revolves around a dispute between LEGO A/S and Pozitív Energiaforrás Kft. regarding alleged infringement of LEGO’s Community designs by the latter’s toy building sets.

**Structure and Main Provisions:**

The judgment addresses questions referred by a Hungarian court regarding the scope of protection for Community designs, particularly those related to modular systems like toy building sets. The key articles of Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 under consideration are:

* **Article 8(3):** Deals with designs allowing the multiple assembly or connection of mutually interchangeable products within a modular system.
* **Article 10:** Defines the scope of protection conferred by a Community design, focusing on the “informed user” and the “overall impression” the design makes on them.
* **Article 89(1):** Concerns sanctions in actions for infringement of Community designs, outlining measures a court should order unless there are “special reasons” not to.

The judgment clarifies the interpretation of the “informed user” concept in the context of Article 8(3). It specifies that the informed user is not a technical expert but someone familiar with existing designs in the sector and reasonably attentive. The judgment also addresses what constitutes “special reasons” for a court to deviate from ordering standard sanctions for design infringement.

**Main Provisions for Practical Use:**

1. **Definition of “Informed User”:** The judgment confirms that the “informed user” is not a technical expert but a knowledgeable and observant user within the relevant sector. This is crucial for assessing whether a design infringes on a registered Community design.
2. **Scope of Protection for Modular Systems:** The judgment clarifies that designs for modular systems are protected, but the degree of freedom of the designer is a key factor in determining the scope of that protection. Minor differences in designs may be sufficient to avoid infringement if the designer’s freedom was limited.
3. **”Special Reasons” for Non-Enforcement:** The judgment narrowly defines “special reasons” for a court to avoid standard infringement sanctions. The fact that the infringement relates to only a small number of components in a larger system is not, in itself, a sufficient reason to avoid ordering sanctions.

Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 4 September 2025.European Data Protection Supervisor v Single Resolution Board.Appeal – Protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data – Procedure for granting compensation to shareholders and creditors of a banking institution following the resolution of that institution – Decision of the European Data Protection Supervisor finding that the Single Resolution Board failed to fulfil its obligations relating to the processing of personal data – Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 – Article 15(1)(d) – Obligation to inform the data subject – Transmission of pseudonymised data to a third party – Article 3(1) – Concept of ‘personal data’ – Article 3(6) – Concept of ‘pseudonymisation’.Case C-413/23 P.

This is a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union regarding the interpretation of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 on the protection of personal data by Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies. The case concerns a dispute between the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) and the Single Resolution Board (SRB) about the processing of personal data in the context of compensating shareholders and creditors of a banking institution. The central issue is whether the SRB failed to comply with its obligation to inform data subjects when it transmitted pseudonymized data to a third party (Deloitte).

The judgment addresses the definition of “personal data” and “pseudonymization” under Regulation 2018/1725. It clarifies when pseudonymized data should be considered personal data, particularly in the context of data transfers to third parties. The Court of Justice set aside the General Court’s judgment, finding that the General Court had incorrectly interpreted the provisions of Regulation 2018/1725. The case was referred back to the General Court for further examination of one of the pleas.

The most important provisions clarified by the judgment are:
– **Article 3(1) of Regulation 2018/1725**: Defines “personal data” as any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person. The Court clarifies that personal opinions or views are necessarily closely linked to that person.
– **Article 3(6) of Regulation 2018/1725**: Defines “pseudonymization” as the processing of personal data in such a manner that the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional information. The Court clarifies that pseudonymized data are not automatically considered anonymous and can still be personal data if the data subject is identifiable.
– **Article 15(1)(d) of Regulation 2018/1725**: Requires the controller to provide the data subject with information about the recipients or categories of recipients of the personal data. The Court clarifies that the identifiable nature of the data subject must be assessed at the time of collection of the data and from the point of view of the controller.

Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 4 September 2025.AR v Ministero dell’Istruzione e del Merito.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Social policy – Framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP – Clause 4 – Teachers who have acquired professional experience in certain schools that are not operated or organised by the State – Recruitment on a permanent basis at a State school – Determination of length of service for the purposes of determining salary – National legislation not providing for account to be taken of periods of service completed in certain schools not operated or organised by the State – Difference in treatment based on a criterion other than the permanent or fixed-term nature of the employment relationship – Articles 20 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Applicability – No implementation of EU law.Case C-543/23.

This document is a judgment from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) regarding a preliminary ruling request from Italy. The case concerns the issue of how prior teaching experience in non-state schools should be considered when determining the salary of teachers who are later hired permanently in state schools. The Italian legislation in question does not fully recognize experience gained in certain non-state schools for salary purposes, leading to a potential disadvantage for teachers with such experience.

The judgment is structured as follows: It begins with an introduction outlining the context of the case, including the relevant EU directives and articles of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. It then details the legal background, referencing EU and Italian laws relevant to fixed-term work, non-discrimination, and education. The judgment presents the facts of the main proceedings, the questions referred by the Italian court, and the Court’s analysis and answers to those questions. The CJEU addresses the admissibility and substance of the questions, interpreting Clause 4 of the Framework Agreement on Fixed-Term Work and the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination. The Court concludes by ruling on the interpretation of EU law in relation to the national legislation and the specific circumstances of the case.

The most important provision of the act is that Clause 4 of the framework agreement on fixed-term work does not preclude national legislation that does not account for prior teaching experience in non-state schools when determining the salary of teachers hired permanently by the state. This is because the difference in treatment is based on the nature of the school where the experience was gained, not on whether the employment was fixed-term or permanent. The Court also found that the Charter of Fundamental Rights did not apply in this case, as the national legislation was not implementing EU law.

Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 4 September 2025.KN v Raad van bestuur van de Sociale verzekeringsbank.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Social security – Migrant workers – Legislation applicable – Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 – Article 13(1) – Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 – Article 14(8) and (10) – Worker normally employed in several Member States – Pursuit of less than 25 % of the activity in the Member State of residence – Concept of ‘substantial part of the activity’ – Connecting factors relating to working time and/or remuneration – Consideration of other circumstances – Length of the assessment period – Discretion of the competent institutions.Case C-203/24.

This is a judgment from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) regarding the interpretation of regulations concerning the coordination of social security systems for workers who are employed in multiple Member States. The case specifically addresses how to determine which country’s social security legislation applies when a worker resides in one Member State but works in several, with a focus on the concept of “substantial part of the activity.”

The judgment clarifies the criteria for determining which Member State’s social security legislation should apply to a worker who is active in multiple Member States. It focuses on Article 13(1) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 and Article 14(8) of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009. The court rules that when assessing whether a “substantial part” of a worker’s activity is carried out in their Member State of residence, the competent institution must primarily consider whether at least 25% of their working time or remuneration is accrued in that state. The judgment specifies that other factors should not be considered if the 25% threshold is not met. Furthermore, the assessment should be based on the projected situation for the next 12 calendar months.

The key takeaway from this judgment is the emphasis on the 25% threshold related to working time and/or remuneration in the Member State of residence. If a worker does not meet this threshold, the social security legislation of the Member State where the employer’s registered office is located will apply. This provides a clear and objective criterion for determining applicable legislation, promoting legal certainty for both workers and social security institutions.

Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 4 September 2025.„R” S.A. v AW „T” sp. z o.o.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Rule of law – Independence of judges – Second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU – Effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law – National legislation and case-law prohibiting national courts from calling into question the legitimacy of constitutional courts and bodies or from establishing or assessing the lawfulness of the appointment of judges of those courts or bodies – Verification, by a lower court, of compliance by a higher court with requirements relating to the guarantee of an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law – Izba Kontroli Nadzwyczajnej i Spraw Publicznych (Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs) of the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court, Poland) – Body that does not constitute an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law – Primacy of EU law – Possibility of declaring a judicial decision to be null and void.Case C-225/22.

This is a preliminary ruling by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) concerning the interpretation of EU law related to the rule of law and the independence of judges in Poland. The case originates from a dispute between two companies, where the Supreme Court of Poland (Sąd Najwyższy), specifically its Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs (Izba Kontroli Nadzwyczajnej i Spraw Publicznych), overturned a final judgment of the Court of Appeal in Cracow (Sąd Apelacyjny w Krakowie). The Court of Appeal then questioned the validity of the Supreme Court’s decision, given doubts about the independence and legitimacy of the judges in the Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs.

The judgment addresses four key questions regarding the interpretation of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in the context of national court decisions and legislation that restrict the ability of national courts to assess the legitimacy and independence of other judicial bodies. The CJEU is asked to clarify whether EU law allows national courts to disregard decisions of constitutional courts or national rules that prevent them from assessing the lawfulness of judicial appointments, especially when those appointments may compromise the independence and impartiality of the judiciary. The ruling emphasizes the importance of effective judicial protection and the primacy of EU law, even when national laws or constitutional court decisions conflict with EU principles.

The most important provisions of the act are:
– **The second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU**, which requires Member States to provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective judicial protection in the fields covered by EU law.
– **Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union**, which guarantees the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial.
– **The principle of primacy of EU law**, which means that EU law takes precedence over conflicting national law, including constitutional provisions.
The Court concludes that EU law precludes national legislation and constitutional court case-law that would force a national court to comply with a decision from a higher court if the national court finds that the judges in that higher court do not meet the standards of independence and impartiality required by EU law. Furthermore, EU law requires that a decision by a judicial body that does not meet these standards be considered null and void, especially when it affects the ability of a lower court to ensure effective legal protection.
****

Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 4 September 2025.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Area of freedom, security and justice – Judicial cooperation in criminal matters – Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA – European arrest warrant issued for the purposes of executing a custodial sentence – Article 4(6) – Grounds for optional non-execution of the European arrest warrant – Conditions for an executing Member State’s assumption of responsibility for the execution of that sentence – Article 3(2) – Concept of ‘finally judged … in respect of the same acts’ – Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA – Mutual recognition of judgments in criminal matters for the purpose of their enforcement in another Member State – Article 25 – Compliance with the conditions and procedure laid down by the framework decision in the event that a Member State undertakes to enforce a sentence handed down by a judgment delivered by an issuing State – Requirement of consent on the part of the issuing State as regards another Member State’s assumption of responsibility for the enforcement of such a sentence – Article 4 – Possibility for the issuing State to forward the judgment and certificate referred to in that article to the executing State – Consequences where forwarding does not take place – Principle of sincere cooperation – Article 22 – Right of the issuing State to enforce that sentence – Maintenance of the European arrest warrant – Obligation on the part of the executing judicial authority to enforce a European arrest warrant.Case C-305/22.

This judgment clarifies the interplay between the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision (2002/584/JHA) and the Framework Decision on the enforcement of criminal judgments (2008/909/JHA), particularly when a Member State (the executing state) considers enforcing a sentence instead of surrendering a person under a European Arrest Warrant (EAW). The Court specifies the conditions under which an executing state can refuse to execute an EAW based on Article 4(6) of Framework Decision 2002/584, emphasizing the need to follow the procedures outlined in Framework Decision 2008/909, including obtaining the issuing state’s consent for the transfer of enforcement. The judgment also confirms that the issuing state retains the right to enforce the sentence and maintain the EAW if the executing state fails to comply with these conditions.

The judgment addresses a request for a preliminary ruling from Romania concerning the execution of a European arrest warrant issued against C.J. The structure of the judgment involves an analysis of the relevant articles of Framework Decisions 2002/584 and 2008/909, considering their purpose, scope, and relationship. The Court examines the grounds for optional non-execution of a European arrest warrant, the criteria for forwarding a judgment and certificate to another Member State, and the consequences of transferring a sentenced person. The judgment clarifies that when a Member State undertakes to enforce a sentence under Article 4(6) of Framework Decision 2002/584, it must comply with the conditions and procedures of Framework Decision 2008/909, including obtaining the consent of the issuing state.

The most important provision of this act is that the executing state’s decision to enforce a sentence instead of surrendering a person under an EAW is conditional on the issuing state’s consent. This consent is formalized through the forwarding of the sentencing judgment and a certificate, as per Framework Decision 2008/909. Without this consent, the issuing state retains the right to enforce the sentence and maintain the EAW. This ensures that the decision to transfer the enforcement of a sentence is not unilateral and respects the issuing state’s prerogative to enforce its own judgments.

Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 4 September 2025.IP v Quirin Privatbank AG.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data – Regulation (EU) 2016/679 – Rights of the data subject – Article 17 – Right to erasure of data – Article 18 – Right to restriction of processing – Article 79 – Right to an effective judicial remedy – Unlawful processing of personal data – Action seeking an order requiring the controller to refrain from any further unlawful processing in the future – Basis – Conditions – Article 82(1) – Right to compensation – Concept of ‘non-material damage’ – Assessment of the compensation – Possible consideration of the degree of fault on the part of the controller – Possible impact of the grant of a ‘prohibitory injunction’.Case C-655/23.

This document is a judgment from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) regarding the interpretation of several articles of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) concerning the rights of data subjects when their personal data has been unlawfully processed. The case specifically addresses the right to a prohibitory injunction, the definition of non-material damage, and the criteria for assessing compensation.

The judgment clarifies several key aspects of the GDPR. First, it states that the GDPR does not grant data subjects the right to obtain a preventive injunction against data controllers to prevent future unlawful processing of their data, but it does not prevent member states from providing such a remedy in their national laws. Second, it specifies that “non-material damage” under the GDPR includes negative feelings like fear or annoyance resulting from the unauthorized disclosure of personal data. Third, the degree of fault of the data controller should not be considered when assessing compensation for non-material damage. Finally, the fact that a data subject has obtained an injunction against the controller cannot be used to reduce the financial compensation for non-material damage.

The judgment is structured around six questions referred by the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof). The Court addresses whether the GDPR provides a right to a prohibitory injunction, what constitutes “non-material damage,” whether the controller’s fault should be considered in assessing damages, and whether obtaining an injunction can reduce compensation. The Court systematically answers each question, providing interpretations of the relevant GDPR articles (17, 18, 79, 82, and 84) and referencing relevant recitals.

The most important provisions clarified by this judgment are those concerning the scope of “non-material damage” and the assessment of compensation under Article 82 of the GDPR. The Court’s broad interpretation of “non-material damage” to include feelings like fear and annoyance, and its insistence on full compensation without considering the controller’s fault, strengthen the rights of data subjects and clarify the responsibilities of data controllers.

Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 4 September 2025.RT and ED v Ineo Infracom.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Social policy – Collective redundancies – Directive 98/59/EC – Article 1(1) – Scope – Concept of ‘redundancy’ – Collective internal mobility agreement – Redundancies for economic reasons based on the refusal to apply that agreement – Termination of the employment contract on the employer’s initiative for one or more reasons not related to the individual workers concerned – Article 2 – Procedures for information and consultation with workers’ representatives.Case C-249/24.

This judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union addresses the interpretation of Directive 98/59/EC on collective redundancies, specifically concerning the definition of “redundancy” and the obligations for information and consultation with workers’ representatives. The case originates from France and involves employees who were dismissed after refusing to accept changes to their employment contracts following a collective agreement on internal mobility. The Court clarifies when dismissals related to the refusal of internal mobility agreements should be considered collective redundancies and what consultation obligations employers have in such situations.

The judgment is structured around two main questions referred by the French Court of Cassation. The first concerns the definition of “redundancy” in the context of employees refusing to accept a collective mobility agreement. The Court clarifies that such terminations can fall under the scope of Directive 98/59/EC, either as direct redundancies or as terminations initiated by the employer for reasons unrelated to individual workers. The second question addresses whether informing and consulting workers’ representatives before concluding an internal mobility agreement satisfies the consultation requirements of the Directive. The Court states that such prior consultation can be considered compliant if the information obligations outlined in Article 2(3) of the Directive are met.

The most important provision of this act is that the definition of “redundancies” includes cases where employees are dismissed for refusing to accept changes to their employment contracts based on collective mobility agreements. This means that employers must follow the procedures for informing and consulting with workers’ representatives as outlined in Directive 98/59/EC when implementing such agreements, especially if they anticipate dismissals due to employees refusing the new terms. The Court emphasizes that the consultation procedure must be initiated when the employer contemplates collective redundancies, even if a collective agreement on internal mobility is being negotiated.

Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 4 September 2025.Studio Legale Ughi e Nunziante v European Union Intellectual Property Office.Appeal – Action for annulment – Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union – Representation of non-privileged parties in direct actions before the Courts of the European Union – Representation of a law firm by a partner of that firm – Lawyer having the status of third party in respect of the applicant – Presumption of independence – Rebuttal of the presumption – Conditions.Case C-776/22 P.

This is the judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) in Case C-776/22 P, *Studio Legale Ughi e Nunziante v EUIPO*. The case concerns an appeal against the General Court’s order dismissing as inadmissible an action for annulment brought by the law firm Studio Legale Ughi e Nunziante against a decision of the EUIPO Board of Appeal. The core issue is whether a law firm can be represented before the EU Courts by its own partners.

The judgment is structured as follows: It begins with an introduction outlining the appeal and the order under appeal. It then presents the legal context, including relevant articles from the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the Rules of Procedure of the General Court. Following this, the background to the dispute and the procedure before the General Court are detailed. The judgment then outlines the procedure before the Court of Justice and the arguments of the parties. Finally, the Court provides its findings, decision, and ruling on costs. The Court of Justice set aside the General Court’s order, finding that the General Court erred in its interpretation of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The Court of Justice referred the case back to the General Court for further proceedings.

The most important provision of the judgment is its interpretation of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, specifically regarding the representation of non-privileged parties before the EU Courts. The Court clarifies that while parties must be represented by a lawyer, and that lawyer must be authorized to practice in a Member State, the requirement of independence does not automatically exclude partners of a law firm from representing that firm. The Court establishes a presumption of independence for lawyers, which can only be rebutted by specific evidence of a manifestly detrimental effect on their capacity to represent their client or non-compliance with professional rules. The Court emphasizes the importance of respecting the rights of the defense and allowing parties to rectify any issues with representation before declaring an action inadmissible.

Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 4 September 2025.Ministero della Giustizia v NZ.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP – Clause 4 – Principle of non-discrimination – Equal treatment in employment and occupation – Honorary and ordinary members of the judiciary – Clause 5 – Measures intended to prevent and penalise misuse of successive fixed-term contracts – Directive 2003/88/EC – Article 7 – Right to paid annual leave – Article 31 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Assessment procedure in order to be permanently confirmed as an honorary member of the judiciary – Waiver, by operation of law, of claims arising from service as an honorary member of the judiciary prior to the assessment procedure – Loss of a right to paid annual leave conferred by EU law.Case C-253/24.

Here’s a breakdown of the Court’s judgment:

**1. Essence of the Act:**

This judgment addresses the rights of honorary members of the judiciary in Italy who were on fixed-term contracts and then underwent an assessment for permanent confirmation. The core issue is whether Italian law can require these honorary judges to waive their right to paid annual leave (accrued during their previous fixed-term contracts) as a condition of being confirmed for a permanent position. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) clarifies how EU law, specifically the Framework Agreement on fixed-term work and the Working Time Directive, applies to this situation.

**2. Structure and Main Provisions:**

The judgment is structured around two main questions raised by an Italian court (Corte d’appello di L’Aquila).

* **Question 1:** Does EU law (specifically the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the Working Time Directive, and the Framework Agreement) prevent national legislation from stripping an honorary judge of their right to paid leave for the period before their confirmation to a permanent position?
* **Question 2:** Does the Framework Agreement preclude national legislation that, as a measure against the misuse of fixed-term contracts, provides for confirmation of an honorary judge (after a non-competitive assessment) or a monetary award (if they fail the assessment), both requiring a waiver of previously accrued rights?

The Court ultimately focuses on the waiver of paid annual leave. It examines the relevant EU directives and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, emphasizing the importance of paid annual leave as a fundamental right for all workers. The Court also considers whether the Italian legislation is a valid measure to prevent abuse of fixed-term contracts.

**3. Main Provisions for Practical Use:**

The most important takeaway is the CJEU’s ruling that EU law *does* preclude national legislation that forces honorary judges to waive their right to paid annual leave as a condition of being confirmed to a permanent position.

* **Paid Annual Leave is a Fundamental Right:** The judgment reinforces that the right to paid annual leave is a fundamental right under EU law (Article 31(2) of the Charter and Article 7 of Directive 2003/88).
* **No Waiver Allowed:** Member States cannot condition measures aimed at preventing the misuse of fixed-term contracts on the waiver of rights granted to workers under EU law.
* **Independent Scopes:** The Framework Agreement’s clauses on preventing abuse of fixed-term contracts and ensuring equal treatment have distinct purposes and cannot be used to undermine each other.
* **Implications for National Law:** National courts must ensure that national law complies with EU law. If national law conflicts, it should be disapplied.

This judgment clarifies that while Member States have some flexibility in addressing the misuse of fixed-term contracts, they cannot do so by infringing on fundamental rights guaranteed by EU law, such as the right to paid annual leave.

Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 4 September 2025.CP v Nissan Iberia SA.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Article 101 TFEU – Principle of effectiveness – Actions for damages for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union – Limitation period – Determination of the dies a quo – Knowledge of the information necessary for bringing an action for damages – Publication on the website of a national competition authority of its decision finding an infringement of the competition rules – Binding effect of a decision of a national competition authority which is not yet final – Suspension or interruption of the limitation period – Stay of the main proceedings before the court hearing an action for damages – Directive 2014/104/EU – Article 10 – Temporal application.Case C-21/24.

This is a judgment from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) regarding actions for damages related to infringements of competition law. The case revolves around determining when the limitation period for bringing such actions begins, specifically when the injured party is considered to have the necessary knowledge to start the legal proceedings. The judgment clarifies the relationship between EU law, national law, and the principle of effectiveness in the context of competition law infringements.

The judgment addresses a request for a preliminary ruling from a Spanish court concerning a case between CP and Nissan Iberia SA. The core issue is whether CP’s action for damages against Nissan, for losses allegedly suffered due to Nissan’s involvement in anti-competitive practices, is time-barred. The Spanish court sought clarification on when the limitation period for such actions begins, particularly when a national competition authority (CNMC) has already found an infringement. The CJEU was asked to interpret Article 101 TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) and Directive 2014/104/EU, which governs actions for damages under national law for infringements of competition law.

The CJEU ruled that Article 101 TFEU and Article 10(2) of Directive 2014/104/EU preclude national legislation that allows the limitation period for damages actions to begin before the decision of the national competition authority finding the infringement becomes final. The Court reasoned that if a national court hearing a damages action is not bound by the competition authority’s decision until it is final, the injured party cannot reasonably be considered to have the necessary information to bring the action until that point. The judgment emphasizes that the injured party must have access to officially published information that is freely accessible to the general public.

Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 4 September 2025.AF v Guvernul României and Others.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Social security – Health insurance – Article 56 TFEU – Freedom to provide services – Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 – Article 20(1) and (2) – Medical treatment received in a Member State other than the insured person’s Member State of residence – Directive 2011/24/EU – Article 7(7) – Assumption of the costs of treatment incurred by the insured person – Reimbursement – National legislation making reimbursement of those costs conditional upon the completion of a medical assessment, carried out exclusively by a health professional belonging to the public health insurance system of the insured person’s Member State of residence, which has given rise to the issuing, by that health professional, of a document authorising the hospitalisation of that insured person – Significant limitation of the reimbursement of the costs of cross-border healthcare.Case C-489/23.

This is a judgment from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) regarding the interpretation of EU law on cross-border healthcare. The case concerns a Romanian citizen, AF, who sought reimbursement from Romanian authorities for medical treatment received in Germany. The Romanian authorities denied full reimbursement due to national rules requiring prior medical assessment by a health professional within the Romanian public health system and limiting reimbursement amounts.

The judgment is structured as follows:

1. **Introduction:** Sets out the context of the preliminary ruling request and the parties involved.
2. **Legal Context:** Summarizes the relevant EU law (TFEU articles, Regulations, and Directives) and Romanian national law concerning cross-border healthcare reimbursement.
3. **The Dispute in the Main Proceedings and the Questions Referred for a Preliminary Ruling:** Details the factual background of AF’s case, the reasons for the denial of reimbursement, and the questions posed by the Romanian court to the CJEU.
4. **Procedure Before the Court:** Notes the submissions made by the Polish Government and the European Commission.
5. **Consideration of the Questions Referred:**
* **First Question:** Addresses whether national legislation requiring a prior medical assessment by a public health professional for reimbursement of cross-border healthcare costs is compatible with EU law.
* **Second Question:** Examines whether national legislation that significantly limits the reimbursement amount for cross-border healthcare, in the absence of prior authorization, is compatible with EU law.
6. **Costs:** Allocates costs in the proceedings.
7. **Operative Part:** Provides the Court’s answers to the questions referred.

The most important provisions of the judgment are the answers to the two questions referred by the Romanian court:

* The Court ruled that Article 7(7) of Directive 2011/24/EU, read in light of Article 56 TFEU, *does* preclude national legislation that makes reimbursement of cross-border healthcare costs conditional on a prior medical assessment carried out exclusively by a health professional within the public health insurance system of the Member State of affiliation.
* The Court ruled that Article 20(1) and (2) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, read in light of Article 56 TFEU, *does not* preclude national legislation that limits reimbursement to the amount provided for by the national health insurance scheme, even if this significantly limits the reimbursement compared to the actual costs incurred, provided that the calculation method is based on objective, non-discriminatory, and transparent criteria. However, if the insured person was prevented from seeking prior authorization due to their health condition or the need for urgent treatment, they are entitled to reimbursement of an amount equivalent to what would have been assumed had they obtained prior authorization.

Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 4 September 2025.S.C. Arcomet Towercranes S.R.L. v Direcţia Generală Regională a Finanţelor Publice Bucureşti and Administraţia Fiscală pentru Contribuabili Mijlocii Bucureşti.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Taxation – Common system of value added tax (VAT) – Directive 2006/112/EC – Scope of VAT – Article 2(1)(c) – Concept of ‘supplies of services for consideration’ – Commercial services provided within the same group of companies – Transfer price – Articles 168 and 178 – Right to deduct VAT – Supporting documents.Case C-726/23.

This judgment concerns the interpretation of the VAT Directive, specifically regarding supplies of services within a group of companies and the right to deduct VAT. The case revolves around a Romanian company, Arcomet Romania, and its parent company in Belgium, Arcomet Belgium, and whether certain payments between them are subject to VAT and whether the Romanian tax authorities can request documents beyond invoices to justify VAT deductions. The Curtea de Apel Bucureşti (Court of Appeal, Bucharest, Romania) referred questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) for a preliminary ruling.

The judgment is structured as follows:
1. **Introduction**: Sets the stage by outlining the request for a preliminary ruling and the relevant articles of the VAT Directive (Article 2(1)(c), 168, and 178).
2. **Legal Context**: Details the relevant EU law (VAT Directive) and Romanian law (Tax Code, Government Decision No 44/2004, and Government Order No 92).
3. **The Dispute in the Main Proceedings and the Questions Referred for a Preliminary Ruling**: Explains the background of the case, the contractual relationship between Arcomet Romania and Arcomet Belgium, and the specific questions posed by the referring court.
4. **Consideration of the Questions Referred**: This section contains the CJEU’s analysis and answers to the questions.
* **The First Question**: Addresses whether the amount invoiced by the parent company to the subsidiary to align the subsidiary’s profit with OECD guidelines constitutes payment for a service subject to VAT.
* **The Second Question**: Examines whether tax authorities can require documents beyond the invoice to justify the use of purchased services for taxable transactions.
5. **Costs**: States that the decision on costs is a matter for the referring court.
6. **Ruling**: Provides the CJEU’s answers to the questions referred.

The main provisions of the act are the CJEU’s interpretations of Article 2(1)(c), 168, and 178 of the VAT Directive. The court clarified that:

* Remuneration for intra-group services, calculated according to OECD guidelines to adjust a subsidiary’s operating profit margin, can be considered consideration for a supply of services subject to VAT.
* Tax authorities are not precluded from requiring documents other than the invoice to prove the existence and use of services for taxable transactions, as long as such requests are necessary and proportionate.

This judgment clarifies the conditions under which intra-group services are subject to VAT and the extent to which tax authorities can request documentation to support VAT deductions. It confirms that transfer pricing arrangements within groups can fall under the scope of VAT if they represent consideration for actual services provided. It also emphasizes the importance of invoices meeting formal requirements and the right of tax authorities to seek additional evidence when needed, while respecting the principles of necessity and proportionality.

Arrêt de la Cour (dixième chambre) du 4 septembre 2025.#Commission européenne contre République de Pologne.#Manquement d’État – Article 258 TFUE – Directive (UE) 2019/790 – Marché unique numérique – Droits d’auteur et droits voisins – Absence de transposition et de communication des mesures de transposition – Article 260, paragraphe 3, TFUE – Sanctions pécuniaires – Demande de condamnation au paiement d’une somme forfaitaire – Date de la cessation du manquement.#Affaire C-201/23.

This is a judgment by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) regarding a failure by Poland to transpose Directive (EU) 2019/790 on copyright and related rights in the digital single market into its national law by the deadline. The European Commission brought the case against Poland for failing to adopt and communicate the necessary implementing measures. The Court found Poland in breach of its obligations and ordered it to pay a lump sum of EUR 8,300,000 to the Commission.

The judgment is structured as follows:

1. **Background:**
* The Commission initiated proceedings against Poland under Article 258 and Article 260(3) TFEU for failing to transpose Directive 2019/790.
* The Commission requested the Court to declare that Poland had failed to fulfill its obligations under Article 29 of the Directive and to impose financial penalties, including a lump sum and a daily penalty payment.

2. **Legal Framework:**
* Directive 2019/790 aims to harmonize EU law on copyright and related rights in the internal market, considering digital and cross-border uses of protected content.
* Article 29 of the Directive required Member States to implement the necessary laws, regulations, and administrative provisions by June 7, 2021, and to inform the Commission immediately.

3. **Pre-litigation Procedure and Proceedings Before the Court:**
* The Commission sent a letter of formal notice to Poland on July 23, 2021, as it had not received information on the implementation of the Directive.
* Poland responded on September 27, 2021, stating that transposition measures were underway.
* On May 19, 2022, the Commission sent a reasoned opinion to Poland, urging it to take the necessary measures within two months.
* Poland responded on July 11, 2022, claiming partial transposition through existing legislation.
* The Commission brought the case before the Court on February 15, 2023.
* Poland notified the Commission of six legislative acts on August 19, 2024, which the Commission considered to be a complete transposition of Directive 2019/790.

4. **The Claim:**
* The Commission argued that Poland failed to adopt and communicate the necessary provisions to transpose Directive 2019/790 into national law by the deadline specified in the reasoned opinion.
* Poland argued that existing legislation already partially transposed the Directive and cited delays due to extensive public consultations, the COVID-19 pandemic, the late publication of guidelines by the Commission, and a pending court case regarding Article 17 of the Directive.

5. **Court’s Assessment:**
* The Court reiterated that the existence of a breach must be assessed based on the situation at the end of the period specified in the Commission’s reasoned opinion.
* The Court found that Poland had not adopted all the necessary measures to comply with Directive 2019/790 by the deadline.
* The Court rejected Poland’s justifications for the delay, stating that Member States cannot invoke internal legal issues or circumstances to justify non-compliance with EU law.
* The Court also dismissed the arguments related to the COVID-19 pandemic, the late publication of guidelines, and the pending court case.

6. **Request for a Lump Sum Payment under Article 260(3) TFEU:**
* The Commission proposed that Poland be ordered to pay a lump sum based on the gravity and duration of the infringement, as well as the need to ensure deterrence.
* The Court considered the Commission’s arguments and the principles outlined in its communication on financial sanctions.
* The Court determined that a lump sum payment was appropriate in this case to prevent the repetition of similar infringements.
* The Court considered the gravity of the infringement, the duration of the infringement, and Poland’s ability to pay.
* The Court ordered Poland to pay a lump sum of EUR 8,300,000 to the Commission.

7. **Costs:**
* The Court ordered Poland to bear its own costs and those incurred by the Commission.

The main provisions of the act that may be the most important for its use are:

* **Finding of Failure:** Poland failed to transpose Directive 2019/790 by the deadline.
* **Financial Penalty:** Poland must pay a lump sum of EUR 8,300,000 to the Commission.
* **Justifications Rejected:** The Court rejected Poland’s justifications for the delay, including those related to the COVID-19 pandemic and pending court cases.
* **Methodology for Calculating Penalties:** The Court provided insights into how financial penalties are calculated in cases of non-transposition of EU directives, considering the gravity and duration of the infringement, as well as the Member State’s ability to pay.

Arrêt de la Cour (deuxième chambre) du 4 septembre 2025.#GB contre Minister van Asiel en Migratie.#Renvoi préjudiciel – Procédure préjudicielle d’urgence – Politique d’immigration – Retour des ressortissants de pays tiers en séjour irrégulier dans un État membre – Directive 2008/115/CE – Exécution d’une décision de retour devenue définitive – Article 5 – Principe de non-refoulement – Intérêt supérieur de l’enfant – Vie familiale – Article 15 – Placement en rétention à des fins d’éloignement – Contrôle du respect des conditions de légalité – Obligation du juge national de contrôler le respect du principe de non-refoulement et des autres intérêts visés à l’article 5 de la directive 2008/115 – Examen d’office – Articles 6 et 7, article 19, paragraphe 2, article 24, paragraphe 2, ainsi qu’article 47 de la charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne.#Affaire C-313/25 PPU.

This is a judgment from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) regarding the interpretation of the Return Directive (2008/115/EC) in the context of immigration law. The case concerns the detention of a third-country national (GB) pending removal and whether national courts must, when reviewing the legality of detention, assess potential violations of the principle of non-refoulement, the best interests of the child, and family life. The CJEU clarifies the obligations of national courts when reviewing the legality of detention for removal purposes, emphasizing the need to consider fundamental rights.

**Structure and Main Provisions:**

The judgment is structured as follows:

1. **Introduction:** Briefly introduces the request for a preliminary ruling and the relevant national court.
2. **Legal Framework:** Outlines the relevant provisions of international law (Refugee Convention), EU law (Return Directive, Charter of Fundamental Rights), and national law (Dutch law on foreigners).
3. **Facts and Questions:** Summarizes the factual background of the case, the questions referred by the national court, and the request for the urgent procedure.
4. **Urgency Procedure:** Justifies the application of the urgent preliminary ruling procedure.
5. **Preliminary Remarks:** Clarifies the role of the CJEU in providing interpretation of EU law.
6. **First Question:** Addresses whether national courts must examine potential violations of the principle of non-refoulement when reviewing detention legality.
7. **Second Question:** Addresses whether national courts must examine potential violations of the best interests of the child and family life when reviewing detention legality.
8. **Costs:** Determines the allocation of costs in the proceedings.
9. **Ruling:** Provides the answers to the questions referred by the national court.

**Main Provisions and Changes:**

* **Article 5 of the Return Directive:** Clarifies that Article 5 of the Return Directive, concerning non-refoulement, the best interests of the child, family life, and health, is a general rule that applies at all stages of the return procedure.
* **Article 15 of the Return Directive:** Interprets Article 15 of the Return Directive, concerning detention, in conjunction with the Charter of Fundamental Rights. It emphasizes that detention is a severe interference with the right to liberty and can only be ordered or prolonged in compliance with strict conditions.
* **Charter of Fundamental Rights:** Reinforces the importance of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, particularly Articles 6 (right to liberty), 7 (respect for private and family life), 19(2) (non-refoulement), 24 (rights of the child), and 47 (right to an effective remedy).

**Most Important Provisions for Use:**

* **Obligation to Examine Non-Refoulement:** National courts *must* examine, even on their own initiative, whether the principle of non-refoulement would be violated if a third-country national is removed. This is particularly important if new circumstances arise after the return decision was made.
* **Obligation to Examine Best Interests of the Child and Family Life:** National courts *must* also examine, even on their own initiative, whether the removal would violate the best interests of the child or the right to family life.
* **Effective Judicial Protection:** The judgment underscores the right to effective judicial protection under Article 47 of the Charter, requiring national courts to consider all relevant facts and legal arguments when reviewing detention decisions.
* **Priority of EU Law:** National rules or practices that prevent a full examination of non-refoulement, the best interests of the child, or family life are incompatible with the Return Directive and the Charter.

Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 4 September 2025.Kwizda Pharma GmbH v Landeshauptmann von Wien.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Medicinal products – Product which may fall within the definition of ‘medicinal product’ and within the definition of ‘product covered by other Community legislation’ – Applicable legal framework – Directive 2001/83/EC – Article 2(2) – Rule of precedence – Scope – Effectiveness – Procedural autonomy of the Member States – Article 4(3) TEU – Principle of sincere cooperation.Case C-451/24.

This is a judgment from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) regarding the interpretation of Directive 2001/83/EC on medicinal products for human use, specifically Article 2(2) concerning the classification of products that could be considered both medicinal products and products covered by other EU legislation. The case revolves around a dispute in Austria concerning the marketing of certain products as food for special medical purposes, which the national authorities deemed to be medicinal products by presentation. The Austrian court sought clarification from the CJEU on how to interpret the rule of precedence established in Article 2(2) of the Directive.

The judgment clarifies the scope of Article 2(2) of Directive 2001/83/EC, stating that the rule of precedence for medicinal product legislation applies when a product undoubtedly qualifies as a medicinal product but there’s uncertainty whether it might also fall under other EU regulatory frameworks. It emphasizes that if a product clearly falls under another regulatory category (e.g., food), or if it’s definitively a medicinal product and nothing else, the precedence rule doesn’t apply. The judgment also addresses the division of competencies between national authorities responsible for enforcing medicinal product and food legislation, stressing the importance of sincere cooperation to protect public health.

The key takeaway from this judgment is the clarification of when medicinal product legislation takes precedence over other EU legislation for products that could potentially fall under multiple regulatory categories. The Court emphasized that Article 2(2) applies when there is a genuine doubt about the classification of a product. It also highlights the importance of cooperation between different national authorities to ensure that products are appropriately regulated and that public health is protected.