Analysis of Legal Acts
1. Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1882
This regulation updates the restricted zones related to African Swine Fever (ASF) in several EU Member States – Estonia, Latvia, and Poland. Annex I to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/594 is amended to reflect recent ASF outbreaks. These changes aim to control the spread of ASF by redefining restricted zones based on the latest epidemiological data. Farmers, operators, and competent authorities need to pay close attention to the updated Annex I for specific geographic areas affected by the restrictions.
2. Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1846
The EU has cancelled the authorisation for the biocidal product ‘Nordkalk QL 0-0,1’ following a request from the manufacturer, Nordkalk AB, due to the product’s discontinuation. Consequently, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1478, which originally authorised the product, is repealed. The product can no longer be sold after March 31, 2026, and existing stocks must be used by September 27, 2026. Businesses need to manage their inventories accordingly.
3. Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1803
The EU has cancelled the authorisation for the biocidal product ‘Nordkalk QL 90’ following a request from the manufacturer, Nordkalk Oy Ab, due to the product’s discontinuation. Consequently, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1672, which originally authorised the product, is repealed. The product can no longer be sold after March 31, 2026, and existing stocks must be used by September 27, 2026. Businesses need to manage their inventories accordingly.
4. Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1845
The EU officially recognises ‘Κρήτη / Kriti’ as a Protected Geographical Indication (PGI) for products originating from Crete. This recognition, based on Regulation (EU) 2024/1143, grants legal protection against misuse, imitation, or evocation of the name for products not conforming to the required standards.
5. Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Case C-447/22)
This CJEU judgment clarifies that when a Member State refuses to execute a European Arrest Warrant (EAW) due to the convicted person’s residency and undertakes to enforce the sentence, it cannot subsequently suspend that sentence. The power to suspend a sentence remains with the issuing state.
6. Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Joined Cases C-764/23 to C-766/23)
The CJEU addressed the legality of Italian regulations regarding the allocation of digital terrestrial broadcasting radio frequencies during the transition from DVB-T to DVB-T2 technology. The judgment clarifies the scope of judicial protection for operators affected by frequency allocation decisions, the independence of national regulatory authorities, and the criteria for converting existing rights of use. It permits national legislation that limits the effects of appeals to financial compensation, provided that such compensation fully covers the damages suffered.
7. Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Case C-567/22)
The CJEU clarifies the “ne bis in idem” principle, stating that a person already convicted in one Member State for involvement in a terrorist association cannot be prosecuted again in another Member State for the same terrorist acts. The key factor is whether the underlying conduct is identical, regardless of the legal classification of the offenses.
8. Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Case C-59/23 P)
The CJEU annulled the Commission’s decision approving Hungarian State aid for the Paks II nuclear power plant. The Court found that the General Court had erred in assessing whether the absence of a public procurement procedure for the construction of the reactors rendered the Commission’s decision unlawful. The Commission failed to adequately state the reasons for its conclusion that EU public procurement rules were not infringed.
9. Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Case C-301/22)
The CJEU ruled that investors who had ongoing legal actions against a bank *before* it underwent resolution measures are entitled to maintain those claims. Such claims are considered “accrued” and thus still enforceable against the bank or its successor, even after resolution measures have been applied.
10. Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Case C-168/23)
The CJEU clarified the legal framework applicable to conflicts between Protected Designations of Origin (PDOs) for wine and earlier trademarks. In a case involving the wine name “Salaparuta,” the Court ruled that the conflict must be resolved based on older regulations (Regulation No. 1493/1999), where the protected wine name generally takes precedence, but allows for the continued use of earlier well-known trademarks under certain conditions.
11. Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Case C-138/23)
The CJEU ruled that entities subject to EU sanctions (specifically, the freezing of funds under Regulation No. 269/2014) can be authorized to use frozen funds to pay court fees necessary to challenge the sanctions in national courts. This is based on the interpretation of Article 4(1)(a) regarding “basic needs” and the right to an effective remedy. This judgment underscores the importance of respecting fundamental rights, particularly the right to access justice, when applying EU sanctions.
12. Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Case C-667/22)
This CJEU judgment clarifies the definition of “telemedicine” under EU law and its implications for cross-border healthcare services. The Court specified that telemedicine applies only to healthcare services provided exclusively via ICT at a distance, where the patient and healthcare provider are not simultaneously physically present in the same location. The laws of the Member State where the healthcare provider offering the telemedicine service is established will generally govern telemedicine.
13. Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Case C-492/22)
The CJEU addressed the interpretation of Directive 2000/78/EC (equal treatment in employment and occupation) concerning discrimination based on disability. The Court emphasized that seemingly neutral sick leave policies can constitute indirect discrimination if they disproportionately disadvantage people with disabilities. Employers have a duty to provide reasonable accommodation unless it imposes a disproportionate burden. The offer of unpaid leave does not constitute such accommodation.
14. Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Case C-350/22)
The CJEU extended the scope of protection against discrimination in employment to include caregivers of disabled children. The Court confirmed that the prohibition of indirect discrimination on grounds of disability applies to employees who face discrimination because they provide care to a disabled child. Employers must provide reasonable accommodation to caregivers of disabled children, balancing the needs of the employee with the operational requirements of the business.
15. EFTA Court Advisory Opinion Request (Case E-7/25)
The EFTA Court will provide an Advisory Opinion on the interpretation of the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC). The Reykjavik District Court is seeking clarification on whether authorization for a project that could potentially impact a groundwater body can be granted before a status assessment of that body has been conducted and the results included in a river basin management plan.
16. EFTA Court Advisory Opinion Request (Case E-9/24)
The EFTA Court will provide an Advisory Opinion regarding the interpretation of Article 38(3) of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in the context of the dismissal of a data protection officer (DPO). The Liechtenstein court seeks clarification on whether national laws governing the dismissal of DPOs are compatible with the GDPR, particularly when the DPO is not performing their duties correctly.
17. Decision of the Standing Committee of the EFTA States (No. 1/2025/SC)
This decision establishes the rules for internal cost sharing among Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway for the EEA Financial Mechanism for the period 2021-2028. It defines how the contributions of these EFTA states will be determined and divided into annual tranches, based on their Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
18. Decision of the Standing Committee of the EFTA States (No. 2/2025/SC)
This decision extends the mandate of the designated Performance Review Body (PRB) of the single European sky for the EFTA States until 2 June 2025. Liechtenstein is excluded from the application of this decision.
Review of each of legal acts published today:
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1882 of 11 September 2025 amending Annex I to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/594 laying down special disease control measures for African swine fever
Okay, I will help you to understand this legal act.
Here’s a breakdown of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1882:
**1. Essence of the Act:**
This regulation amends Annex I to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/594, which lays down special disease control measures for African swine fever (ASF). The amendment involves updating the lists of restricted zones (I, II, and III) in certain Member States (Estonia, Latvia, and Poland) due to recent outbreaks of ASF in both kept and wild porcine animals. These changes aim to combat the risks associated with the spread of the disease by establishing new restricted zones of sufficient size based on the evolving epidemiological situation.
**2. Structure and Main Provisions:**
* **Title:** Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1882 of 11 September 2025 amending Annex I to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/594 laying down special disease control measures for African swine fever.
* **Legal Basis:** The regulation is based on the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Regulation (EU) 2016/429 (“Animal Health Law”), specifically Article 71(3).
* **Recitals:** These provide the background and justification for the regulation, including:
* The impact of African swine fever on animal populations and farming profitability.
* Reference to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/594, which establishes special disease control measures.
* The need to amend Annex I due to new ASF outbreaks in Estonia, Latvia, and Poland.
* The principles for defining restricted zones based on epidemiological situation, risk level, scientific criteria, and international standards.
* Specific details of the outbreaks in each country and the rationale for redefining zone boundaries.
* **Article 1:** Amends Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/594 by replacing Annex I with the new text provided in the Annex to this regulation.
* **Article 2:** Specifies that the regulation enters into force on the day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.
* **Annex:** Contains the updated Annex I, listing the restricted zones I, II, and III for Germany, Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Italy, Czechia, Greece and Croatia. These lists detail specific geographic areas (e.g., regions, counties, municipalities) within each Member State that are subject to restrictions.
**3. Main Provisions Important for Use:**
* **Updated Restricted Zones:** The key element is the updated list of restricted zones in Annex I. This is crucial for:
* **Member States:** To implement the appropriate disease control measures within the defined zones.
* **Farmers and Operators:** To understand the restrictions and requirements applicable to their activities (e.g., movement of animals, products).
* **Competent Authorities:** For monitoring and enforcement of the control measures.
* **Geographic Specificity:** The annex provides detailed geographic descriptions of the restricted zones, which is essential for accurate implementation.
* **Entry into Force:** The immediate entry into force emphasizes the urgency of addressing the ASF situation.
**** This act has implications for Ukraine, as African Swine Fever is a threat to Ukrainian pig farming and trade. The measures implemented by the EU to control the disease can affect trade relations and the movement of animals and products between Ukraine and the EU. Ukrainians involved in pig farming or trade with the EU should pay close attention to the updated restricted zones and any related restrictions.
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1846 of 11 September 2025 cancelling the Union authorisation for the single biocidal product Nordkalk QL 0-0,1 in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 528/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1478
This Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1846 cancels the Union authorisation for the single biocidal product ‘Nordkalk QL 0-0,1’. The cancellation was requested by the authorisation holder, Nordkalk AB, due to commercial considerations related to the discontinuation of the product’s production. The Regulation also repeals the previous Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1478, which had granted the Union authorisation for the product.
The structure of the act is straightforward, containing a preamble outlining the reasons for the cancellation, followed by four articles. Article 1 cancels the Union authorisation for ‘Nordkalk QL 0-0,1’. Article 2 repeals Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1478. Article 3 sets deadlines for the withdrawal of the product from the market and the cessation of its use. Article 4 specifies the date of entry into force of the Regulation. The main change compared to the previous regulation (EU) 2024/1478 is the cancellation of the authorisation it had granted.
The most important provisions for practical use are found in Article 3, which stipulates that ‘Nordkalk QL 0-0,1’ can no longer be made available on the market after 31 March 2026, and existing stocks must not be used after 27 September 2026. This provides a grace period for stakeholders to manage existing supplies of the biocidal product.
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1803 of 11 September 2025 cancelling the Union authorisation for the single biocidal product Nordkalk QL 90 in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 528/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1672
This Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1803 cancels the Union authorisation for the single biocidal product ‘Nordkalk QL 90’ and repeals the previous Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1672 which had granted the authorisation. The cancellation was requested by the authorisation holder, Nordkalk Oy Ab, due to commercial reasons related to the discontinuation of the product’s production. The Regulation also provides a period of grace for the making available on the market and use of existing stocks of ‘Nordkalk QL 90’.
The structure of the act is straightforward. It consists of a preamble outlining the reasons for the cancellation, followed by four articles. Article 1 cancels the Union authorisation for ‘Nordkalk QL 90’. Article 2 repeals the previous Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1672. Article 3 sets deadlines for the withdrawal of the product from the market and the cessation of its use. Article 4 specifies the date of entry into force of the Regulation.
The most important provisions for practical use are in Article 3, which stipulates that ‘Nordkalk QL 90’ can no longer be made available on the market after 31 March 2026, and existing stocks must not be used after 27 September 2026. This provides a grace period for businesses and users to adjust to the cancellation and deplete their existing stocks.
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1845 of 4 September 2025 on the registration of the geographical indication Κρήτη / Kriti (PGI) in the Union register of geographical indications pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2024/1143 of the European Parliament and of the Council
This Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1845 officially registers ‘Κρήτη / Kriti’ as a Protected Geographical Indication (PGI) in the Union’s register. This registration is based on an application from Greece and follows the procedures outlined in Regulation (EU) 2024/1143, which governs geographical indications for various products. The absence of any opposition to the registration led to the enactment of this regulation. The act ensures legal protection for the ‘Κρήτη / Kriti’ designation within the EU.
The regulation consists of two articles. Article 1 formally registers the geographical indication ‘Κρήτη / Kriti’ (PGI) in the Union register, referencing Article 22 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1143. Article 2 specifies that the regulation will take effect twenty days after its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union and confirms that the regulation is binding and directly applicable in all Member States. This regulation repeals and replaces the previous Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012.
The most important provision is Article 1, which grants legal recognition and protection to the geographical indication ‘Κρήτη / Kriti’ (PGI) within the EU. This protection prevents misuse, imitation, or evocation of the name for products not conforming to the specified standards and originating from the defined geographical area of Crete.
Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 11 September 2025.Ministério Público v YX.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Area of freedom, security and justice – Judicial cooperation in criminal matters – Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA – European arrest warrant issued for the purpose of executing a custodial sentence – Article 4(6) – Ground for optional non-execution of the European arrest warrant – Objective of social rehabilitation – Residence of the convicted person – Enforcement of that sentence by the executing State in accordance with its domestic law – Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA – Mutual recognition of judgments in criminal matters for the purpose of their enforcement in another Member State – Suspension of the enforcement of a custodial sentence ordered by a court of the executing Member State – Article 8 – Obligation, for the executing State, to recognise the judgment and enforce the sentence – Article 17 – Option, for the executing State, to determine the procedures for enforcement.Case C-215/24.
This judgment concerns the interpretation of Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA on the enforcement of custodial sentences within the EU, specifically regarding the power of an executing state to suspend a sentence imposed by the issuing state. The case arose from a situation where Spain, as the executing state, suspended a prison sentence for tax fraud imposed by a Portuguese court, after having initially refused to surrender the convicted person based on their residency in Spain. The Portuguese court questioned whether Spain had the authority to suspend the sentence under EU law.
The judgment clarifies the relationship between Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European Arrest Warrant and Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA. It specifies that when a Member State refuses to execute a European Arrest Warrant based on the convicted person’s residency and undertakes to enforce the sentence itself, the enforcement is governed by Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA. The Court emphasizes that the issuing state must consent to the transfer of enforcement, typically through the forwarding of a certificate.
The Court ruled that Article 8(1) and Article 17(1) of Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA preclude the executing state from suspending a custodial sentence imposed by the issuing state. The decision to suspend a sentence does not fall within the scope of “procedures for enforcement” that the executing state controls. The power to suspend a sentence remains with the issuing state, ensuring mutual trust and cooperation between Member States in criminal matters.
Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 11 September 2025.Cairo Network Srl and Others v Ministero delle Imprese e del Made in Italy and Others.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Electronic communications networks and services – Directives 2002/20/EC, 2002/21/EC and 2002/77/EC – Rights to use digital terrestrial broadcasting radio frequencies for radio and television – Conversion of rights of use – Granting of rights of use – Judicial protection – Independence of national regulatory authorities.Joined Cases C-764/23 to C-766/23.
This document is a judgment from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) regarding three joined cases (C-764/23 to C-766/23) concerning the interpretation of EU directives related to electronic communications networks and services, specifically focusing on the rights to use digital terrestrial broadcasting radio frequencies in Italy. The cases revolve around the conversion and granting of rights of use for these frequencies, judicial protection, and the independence of national regulatory authorities. The central issue is whether Italian regulations concerning the transition of digital terrestrial television (DTT) from DVB-T to DVB-T2 technology comply with EU law, particularly regarding the allocation of radio frequencies and the protection of existing rights.
The judgment addresses several key aspects of EU law in the context of electronic communications. It examines the scope of judicial protection available to operators affected by decisions regarding the allocation of radio frequencies, the independence of national regulatory authorities (NRAs) in the decision-making process, and the criteria for converting existing rights of use for radio frequencies. The judgment also considers whether national regulations should include structural measures to address past irregularities in the allocation of radio frequencies.
The judgment provides detailed interpretations of several EU directives, including the Authorisation Directive (2002/20/EC), the Framework Directive (2002/21/EC), the Competition Directive (2002/77/EC), and Decision (EU) 2017/899 on the use of the 470-790 MHz frequency band. It clarifies the extent to which national legislation can limit the effects of legal actions against acts related to the allocation of radio frequencies, the degree of discretion NRAs must have in the allocation process, and the conditions under which existing rights of use can be modified or withdrawn. The judgment also addresses the principle of legitimate expectations in the context of technological transitions affecting radio frequencies.
The CJEU ruled that Article 4(1) of the Framework Directive does not preclude national legislation that limits the effects of appeals to financial compensation, provided that such compensation fully covers the damages suffered. It also stated that Articles 3, 8, and 9 of the Framework Directive do not prevent national legislatures from defining certain characteristics of fee-based procedures for allocating additional transmission capacity, as long as the NRA retains substantial discretion. Furthermore, the CJEU clarified that Articles 8 and 9 of the Framework Directive, Articles 5, 7, and 14 of the Authorisation Directive, Article 4 of the Competition Directive, and the principle of legitimate expectations do not preclude national legislation that does not provide for equivalence-based conversion of previous rights, provided that such conversion is not necessary to preserve competition and that operators have not received guarantees regarding the maintenance of their transmission capacity. Finally, the CJEU ruled that Articles 8 and 9 of the Framework Directive, Articles 5, 7, and 14 of the Authorisation Directive, and Article 4 of the Competition Directive do not preclude a system that lacks structural measures to compensate for past illegalities, as long as other measures are sufficient to remedy distortions of competition.
Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 11 September 2025.Ministerio Fiscal v MSIG.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement – Article 54 – Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Principle ne bis in idem – Concept of ‘same acts’ – Member of a terrorist association found guilty, in a Member State, of involvement in that association with a view to preparing an act of terrorism – Prosecution in another Member State for the same terrorist acts.Case C-802/23.
This is a judgment from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) concerning the interpretation of the “ne bis in idem” principle in the context of cross-border criminal proceedings related to terrorism. The case revolves around a Spanish national, MSIG, who was convicted in France for involvement in a terrorist association and is now being prosecuted in Spain for specific terrorist acts. The Spanish court seeks clarification from the CJEU on whether the prosecution in Spain violates the “ne bis in idem” principle, which prevents a person from being tried twice for the same acts.
The judgment is structured as follows:
1. **Introduction:** Sets the context of the preliminary ruling and the relevant articles of the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement (CISA) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
2. **Legal Context:** Outlines the relevant EU law (Article 54 of CISA) and Spanish law (Organic Law 7/2014) concerning the exchange of information on criminal records and the consideration of criminal convictions within the EU.
3. **The Dispute in the Main Proceedings and the Questions Referred for a Preliminary Ruling:** Details the factual background of the case, including MSIG’s prior convictions in France for involvement in a terrorist association, and the subsequent criminal proceedings against her in Spain for specific terrorist acts. It also presents the questions posed by the Spanish court to the CJEU, focusing on whether the prosecution in Spain concerns the “same acts” for which MSIG was already convicted in France.
4. **Procedure before the Court:** Notes that the referring court has withdrawn some of its questions, focusing the judgment on the interpretation of “same acts”.
5. **The First Question (Admissibility and Substance):** Addresses the admissibility of the question and then delves into the substance of whether the concept of “same acts” under Article 54 of CISA and Article 50 of the Charter applies in this case. The Court analyses the “ne bis in idem” principle, emphasizing the requirement of identical material acts. It clarifies that the legal classification of the acts is irrelevant, focusing instead on whether the underlying conduct is the same.
6. **Costs:** States that the decision on costs lies with the referring court.
The most important provision of this act is the interpretation of “same acts” within the meaning of Article 54 of the CISA, read in light of Article 50 of the Charter. The Court clarifies that the concept of “same acts” covers acts of which a person is accused in criminal proceedings brought in a Member State in respect of terrorist acts where that person has already been convicted in another Member State, for the same acts, of involvement in a terrorist association with a view to preparing a terrorist act. This means that if the underlying conduct for which MSIG was convicted in France is the same conduct for which she is being prosecuted in Spain, the “ne bis in idem” principle applies, preventing the Spanish prosecution. The Court emphasizes that the legal classification of the acts (e.g., involvement in a terrorist association versus specific terrorist acts) is not determinative; rather, the focus is on whether the material acts are identical. The judgment provides guidance to the national court on how to assess the identity of the acts, including considering the facts mentioned in the judgments and indictments of the previous proceedings.
Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 11 September 2025.Republic of Austria v European Commission.Appeal – State aid – Article 107(3)(c) and Article 108 TFEU – Aid planned for the development of two new nuclear reactors at the site at Paks (Hungary) – Direct award of the construction contract – Directive 2014/25/EU – Decision declaring the aid compatible with the internal market subject to compliance with certain commitments – Compliance of the aid with EU law other than State aid law – Object of the aid – Aspects that are inextricably linked to the aid – Parallel conduct of infringement proceedings – Obligation to state reasons.Case C-59/23 P.
This is the Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 11 September 2025 in Case C-59/23 P, concerning an appeal by the Republic of Austria against the General Court’s judgment, which had dismissed Austria’s action for annulment of the Commission Decision (EU) 2017/2112 regarding State aid planned by Hungary for the development of two new nuclear reactors at Paks II nuclear power station. The Court of Justice has set aside the General Court’s judgment and annulled the Commission’s decision, finding errors of law in the General Court’s assessment.
The judgment is structured as follows:
1. **Background:** It outlines the legal context, including Directives 2004/17/EC and 2014/25/EU on procurement procedures, and the factual background of the dispute, involving Hungary’s plan to develop two new nuclear reactors at Paks II with financial contributions, including a Russian State loan.
2. **General Court Proceedings:** It summarizes the proceedings before the General Court and the judgment under appeal, where the General Court dismissed Austria’s action seeking annulment of the Commission’s decision.
3. **Appeal:** It details the forms of order sought by the parties to the appeal, including Austria, the Commission, Luxembourg, Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, and the United Kingdom.
4. **Reopening of Oral Procedure:** It addresses Hungary’s request to reopen the oral part of the procedure, which the Court rejects.
5. **Grounds of Appeal:** It presents the four grounds of appeal raised by Austria, alleging errors of law by the General Court, concerning the absence of a public procurement procedure, the proportionality of the aid measure, distortions of competition, and the determination of the aid’s constituent elements.
6. **Court’s Analysis:** The Court analyzes the first ground of appeal in detail, finding that the General Court erred in its assessment of whether the absence of a public procurement procedure for the construction of the reactors rendered the Commission’s decision unlawful. The Court finds that the construction of the reactors is inextricably linked to the object of the aid and that the Commission failed to adequately state the reasons for its conclusion that EU public procurement rules were not infringed.
7. **Final Judgment:** The Court sets aside the General Court’s judgment, annuls the Commission’s decision, and makes a decision on costs.
The most important provisions of the act are the Court’s findings regarding the assessment of State aid and its relationship with other areas of EU law, particularly public procurement. The Court clarifies that the Commission must consider infringements of EU law other than State aid law when such infringements arise from the economic activity financed, the aid itself, its object, or aspects inextricably linked to the object of the aid. The Court also emphasizes the importance of a proper statement of reasons by the Commission when assessing the compatibility of State aid with EU law, especially when relying on previous infringement proceedings.
Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 11 September 2025.D.E. v Banco Santander, SA.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Directive 2014/59/EU – Resolution of credit institutions and investment firms – General principles – Article 34(1)(a) and (b) – Bail-in – Write-down of capital instruments – Effects – Article 53(1) and (3) – Article 60(2), first subparagraph, points (b) and (c) – Protection of the rights of shareholders and creditors – Purchase of capital instruments – Flawed and incorrect information provided in the prospectus to be published, inter alia, when securities are offered to the public – Action for a declaration of nullity in respect of the agreement for the purchase of capital instruments – Action for damages – Actions brought before the adoption of resolution measures.Case C-687/23.
This judgment clarifies the interpretation of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (2014/59/EU) concerning the rights of investors when a bank is resolved. Specifically, it addresses the situation where investors had ongoing legal actions against a bank *before* it underwent resolution measures, such as the write-down of shares. The case revolves around a Spanish investor, D.E., who sued Banco Santander (as successor to Banco Popular) over flawed information related to convertible bonds he purchased, which were later converted into shares that became worthless during the bank’s resolution.
The judgment focuses on whether claims from lawsuits filed *before* a bank’s resolution are considered “accrued” and thus still enforceable against the bank or its successor, even after resolution measures have been applied. The Court of Justice ruled that such claims *are* considered “accrued” obligations. This means that if an investor had already initiated legal action for damages or contract nullity *before* the bank’s resolution, their claim is not extinguished by the resolution process.
The Court’s reasoning emphasizes that extinguishing pre-resolution claims would undermine the right to an effective remedy, as enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. It also notes that pending lawsuits are typically accounted for in a bank’s financial assessments, so allowing these claims to proceed does not retroactively disrupt the resolution process or unfairly prejudice the acquiring entity. This decision provides greater protection for investors who had already taken legal action before a bank’s resolution, ensuring their claims are not automatically wiped out.
Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 11 September 2025.Duca di Salaparuta SpA v Ministero dell’Agricoltura, della Sovranità Alimentare e delle Foreste and Others.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Agriculture – Common organisation of the market in wine – Community framework for the protection of wine names – Regulation (EC) No 1493/1999 – Article 54 – Quality wines produced in specified regions (quality wines psr) – Regulation (EC) No 479/2008 – Article 43(2) and Article 51 – Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 – Article 118k(2) and Article 118s – Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 – Article 101(2) and Article 107 – Protection, under EU law, of quality wines psr recognised under national law – Conflict between a protected wine name and an earlier well-known mark containing a word identical to that name – Allegedly misleading name – Transitional regime – Automatic extension of protection – Complete nature of the system of protection – Legal certainty.Case C-341/24.
This is a judgment from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) regarding the protection of wine names within the EU’s common market organization. The case revolves around a conflict between a protected designation of origin (PDO) for wine, “Salaparuta,” and an earlier, well-known trademark containing the same name, owned by Duca di Salaparuta SpA. The Italian Supreme Court of Cassation sought clarification on which EU regulations should govern such conflicts.
The judgment clarifies the interplay between different EU regulations concerning the protection of wine names, specifically focusing on the transition from older regulations to newer ones. It addresses whether the more recent regulations, which consider the potential for consumer confusion due to trademark reputation, apply to wine names that were already protected under older regulations.
The CJEU ruled that the conflict between the PDO “Salaparuta” and the earlier trademark must be resolved based on the provisions of Regulation No. 1493/1999, specifically Section F(2) of Annex VII. This section establishes a system where the protected wine name generally takes precedence, but allows for the continued use of earlier well-known trademarks under certain conditions. The Court clarified that the newer regulations (Regulation No. 479/2008, No. 1234/2007, and No. 1308/2013) which consider the potential for consumer confusion due to trademark reputation, do not apply in this specific scenario because the wine name was already protected under the older regime. The Court emphasized that the automatic extension of protection for existing wine names under the newer regulations was intended to maintain legal certainty and not to subject these names to a new examination process.
Judgment of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 11 September 2025.Russisch-Kirgizisch Ontwikkelingsfonds v Belgische Staat.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Common foreign and security policy – Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 – Restrictive measures taken in view of the situation in Ukraine – Article 2 – Freezing of funds and economic resources – Derogations – Article 4(1)(a), (b) and (d) – Release of certain frozen funds for specific expenses – Payment of a roll fee and a flat-rate contribution for the purpose of instituting an action for annulment against a decision implementing that regulation – Included.Case C-384/24.
Here’s a breakdown of the judgment to help you understand its implications:
**1. Essence of the Act:**
This judgment clarifies how EU sanctions, specifically the freezing of funds under Regulation No. 269/2014 (related to the situation in Ukraine), interact with the fundamental right to access justice. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled that entities subject to these sanctions can be authorized to use frozen funds to pay court fees necessary to challenge the sanctions in national courts. This ensures that sanctions do not unduly impede the right to a fair trial.
**2. Structure and Main Provisions:**
* **Subject Matter:** The judgment interprets Article 4(1)(a), (b), and (d) of Regulation No 269/2014, which allows for derogations from the general freezing of funds, in conjunction with Article 2 of that regulation (the freezing provision), Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (right to an effective remedy), and Article 57 TFEU (freedom to provide services).
* **Context:** The case arose from a dispute in Belgium where the Russisch-Kirgizisch Ontwikkelingsfonds (RKDF), whose funds were frozen, was denied authorization to transfer funds to pay court fees for challenging the freezing.
* **Key Provisions Interpreted:**
* **Article 2 of Regulation No 269/2014:** Mandates the freezing of funds and economic resources of listed individuals and entities.
* **Article 4(1) of Regulation No 269/2014:** Provides exceptions to the freezing of funds, allowing competent authorities to authorize the release of funds for specific purposes. The court specifically examines:
* **(a)** Basic needs, including payments for taxes.
* **(b)** Payment of reasonable professional fees for legal services.
* **(d)** Necessary for extraordinary expenses.
* **Reasoning:** The Court considered whether court fees (roll fee and flat-rate contribution) could be covered by the exceptions in Article 4(1). It concluded:
* Court fees are not “expenses associated with the provision of legal services” under Article 4(1)(b).
* However, court fees qualify as “taxes” under Article 4(1)(a) and are “necessary to satisfy the basic needs” of the sanctioned entity because they are essential for accessing justice and ensuring the right to an effective remedy.
**3. Main Provisions Important for Use:**
* **Authorization for Court Fees:** The most important takeaway is that competent authorities *can* authorize the release of frozen funds to pay court fees necessary for challenging sanctions. This is based on the interpretation of Article 4(1)(a) regarding “basic needs” and the right to an effective remedy.
* **Focus on Access to Justice:** The judgment emphasizes that EU sanctions must be applied in a way that respects fundamental rights, particularly the right to access justice.
* **Implications for National Courts:** National courts must consider this judgment when dealing with cases involving frozen funds and requests to release funds for legal challenges to sanctions.
**** This judgment has implications for individuals and entities subject to EU sanctions related to Ukraine, as it clarifies their right to challenge these sanctions in court and the possibility of using frozen funds for this purpose.
Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 11 September 2025.UJ v Österreichische Zahnärztekammer.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Public health – Cross-border healthcare – Directive 2011/24/EU – Article 3(d) and (e) – Provision of healthcare through telemedicine – Concept of ‘telemedicine’ – Cross-border healthcare provided through telemedicine – Complex medical treatment that includes healthcare provided in person and through telemedicine – Member State of treatment – Directive 2000/31/EC – Information society service – Directive 2005/36/EC – Professional qualifications – Freedom to provide services – Scope – Article 56 TFEU.Case C-115/24.
This is a judgment from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) regarding the interpretation of several EU directives concerning cross-border healthcare, information society services, and the recognition of professional qualifications, specifically in the context of telemedicine. The case revolves around a dispute in Austria concerning dental services provided by a German company (DZK Deutsche Zahnklinik) through a local Austrian dentist (UJ), using a combination of in-person consultations and remote follow-ups via an application.
**Structure and Main Provisions:**
The judgment addresses questions raised by the Austrian Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof) regarding the application of Directive 2011/24/EU on cross-border healthcare, Directive 2000/31/EC on electronic commerce, and Directive 2005/36/EC on the recognition of professional qualifications, as well as Article 56 TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) concerning the freedom to provide services.
The CJEU clarifies the definition of “telemedicine” within the context of Directive 2011/24/EU, stating that it applies only to healthcare services provided exclusively via ICT (information and communication technologies) at a distance, where the patient and healthcare provider are not simultaneously physically present in the same location. The judgment specifies that if a treatment involves both telemedicine and in-person healthcare services, the telemedicine aspect is governed by the laws of the Member State where the healthcare provider offering the telemedicine service is established. However, the in-person services are subject to the laws of the Member State where those services are provided.
The Court also clarifies that Directive 2005/36/EC on the recognition of professional qualifications does not apply to healthcare providers offering telemedicine services across borders, as this directive applies only when a service provider physically moves to another Member State to provide services.
**Main Provisions for Use:**
1. **Definition of Telemedicine:** The judgment provides a clear definition of telemedicine under EU law, emphasizing the requirement of service provision at a distance using ICT. This is crucial for determining which rules apply to cross-border healthcare services.
2. **Applicable Law:** The judgment confirms that telemedicine services are governed by the laws of the Member State where the healthcare provider is established, in accordance with Directive 2011/24/EU and Directive 2000/31/EC. This clarifies which regulations healthcare providers must comply with when offering telemedicine services across borders.
3. **In-Person Services:** The judgment clarifies that in-person healthcare services provided as part of a broader treatment plan involving telemedicine are subject to the laws of the Member State where those services are delivered. This distinction is important for ensuring compliance with local regulations and standards of care.
4. **Directive 2005/36/EC:** The judgment confirms that Directive 2005/36/EC does not apply to telemedicine services or situations where a healthcare provider uses a local provider in another Member State to deliver in-person services. This clarifies the scope of this directive in the context of cross-border healthcare.
Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 11 September 2025.P.M. v S. Snc.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Directive 2000/78/EC – Equal treatment in employment and occupation – Article 2 – Discrimination based on disability – Dismissal of a worker on sick leave – National legislation laying down the same limit of number of days of sick leave per calendar year for all workers in the same sector of activity – Article 5 – Reasonable accommodation.Case C-5/24.
This is a judgment from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) regarding the interpretation of Directive 2000/78/EC, which establishes a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, specifically focusing on discrimination based on disability. The case revolves around an Italian worker, P.M., who was dismissed after exceeding the maximum sick leave days allowed under Italian national legislation (specifically, a collective agreement). The Italian court seeks clarification on whether this legislation, which applies the same sick leave rules to all workers regardless of disability, is compatible with the EU’s anti-discrimination directive. The CJEU provides guidance on how to interpret the directive in relation to national laws concerning sick leave and disability.
The judgment is structured as follows:
* **Introduction:** Briefly outlines the context of the preliminary ruling and the directive in question.
* **Legal Context:** Details the relevant articles from international law (UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities), EU law (Directive 2000/78/EC), and Italian national law (including the CCNL collective agreement and Law No. 300).
* **The Dispute in the Main Proceedings, the Questions Referred and the Procedure before the Court:** Summarizes the facts of the case, the questions posed by the Italian court, and procedural steps.
* **Consideration of the Questions Referred:** This is the core of the judgment, where the CJEU analyzes each question in detail.
* **First and Second Questions (examined together):** Addresses whether the national legislation is discriminatory and, if so, whether it’s justified.
* **Third Question:** Examines whether unpaid leave can be considered “reasonable accommodation.”
* **Fourth and Fifth Questions (examined together):** Addresses whether additional paid leave could be considered “reasonable accommodation.”
* **Costs:** States that the referring court is responsible for the costs of the parties in the main proceedings, and other costs are not recoverable.
* **Operative Part:** The final ruling of the Court.
The main provisions and changes compared to previous versions are not applicable as this is a judgment interpreting existing legislation, not a new legislative act or amendment.
The most important provisions of the act for its use are:
* **Definition of Disability:** The judgment clarifies that “disability” under Directive 2000/78/EC refers to long-term limitations resulting from physical, mental, or psychological impairments that hinder full participation in professional life.
* **Indirect Discrimination:** The judgment emphasizes that seemingly neutral provisions (like a uniform sick leave policy) can constitute indirect discrimination if they disproportionately disadvantage people with disabilities.
* **Justification of Differential Treatment:** If a national law creates indirect discrimination, it must be objectively justified by a legitimate aim, and the means of achieving that aim must be appropriate and necessary.
* **Reasonable Accommodation:** Employers have a duty to provide reasonable accommodation to enable people with disabilities to participate in employment, unless it imposes a disproportionate burden. The judgment clarifies that simply offering unpaid leave does not constitute reasonable accommodation.
* **Individual Assessment:** The judgment underscores the need for an individual assessment of each situation, considering the specific needs of the person with a disability and whether the employer has taken appropriate steps to provide reasonable accommodation.
Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 11 September 2025.G.L. v AB SpA.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Social policy – United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities – Articles 2, 5 and 7 – Articles 21, 24 and 26 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Directive 2000/78/EC – Equal treatment in employment and occupation – Article 1 – Article 2(1) and (2)(b) – Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of disability – Indirect discrimination – Difference of treatment in respect of an employee who does not himself or herself have a disability but cares for his or her child who has a disability – Article 5 – Employer’s obligation to make reasonable accommodation.Case C-38/24.
This judgment from the Court of Justice of the European Union addresses the scope of protection against discrimination in employment, specifically focusing on individuals who care for a disabled child. The case revolves around an Italian employee, G.L., who requested accommodations at work to care for her disabled child, which were denied by her employer, AB SpA. The Italian Supreme Court referred questions to the CJEU regarding whether EU law protects caregivers from indirect discrimination based on their child’s disability and whether employers are obligated to provide reasonable accommodations in such cases.
The judgment is structured as follows: It begins with an introduction outlining the context of the preliminary ruling, followed by a review of the relevant legal framework, including international law (UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities) and EU law (Directives 2000/43/EC and 2000/78/EC). It then details the facts of the main proceedings, the questions referred by the Italian Supreme Court, and the Court’s analysis and answers to these questions. The judgment concludes with a ruling on costs.
The key provisions and changes clarified by this judgment are:
* **Extension of Protection Against Discrimination:** The Court confirms that the prohibition of indirect discrimination on grounds of disability, as outlined in Directive 2000/78/EC, applies not only to individuals with disabilities but also to employees who face discrimination because they provide care to a disabled child.
* **Obligation to Provide Reasonable Accommodation:** Employers are required to provide reasonable accommodation to employees who care for a disabled child to ensure equal treatment, as mandated by Article 5 of Directive 2000/78/EC. This accommodation is required unless it imposes a disproportionate burden on the employer.
* **Interpretation of ‘Reasonable Accommodation’:** The judgment clarifies that reasonable accommodation may include adjustments to working conditions, such as working hours or job assignments, to enable the caregiver to provide necessary care to their child.
The most important aspects of this judgment for practical application are:
* **Broader Interpretation of Discrimination:** The judgment broadens the scope of protection against discrimination in employment to include caregivers of disabled individuals, ensuring they are not disadvantaged due to their caregiving responsibilities.
* **Employer Responsibilities:** Employers must be aware of their obligation to provide reasonable accommodation to caregivers of disabled children, balancing the needs of the employee with the operational requirements of the business.
* **Impact on National Law:** National laws must be interpreted and applied in a manner consistent with this judgment, ensuring that caregivers are protected from discrimination and provided with reasonable accommodation in the workplace.
* **** This judgment may have implications for Ukrainian refugees with disabilities and their caregivers in the EU, as it reinforces the rights of caregivers to reasonable accommodation in the workplace.
Request for an Advisory Opinion from the EFTA Court by Reykjavik District Court dated 15 April 2025 in the case of Ólafur Þór Jónsson and others v The National Energy Authority of Iceland and Benchmark Genetics Iceland hf. (Case E-7/25)
This is a request for an Advisory Opinion from the EFTA Court concerning the interpretation of the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC). The Reykjavik District Court is seeking clarification on whether authorization for a project that could potentially impact a groundwater body can be granted before a status assessment of that body has been conducted and the results included in a river basin management plan. The core question revolves around the timing of project authorization in relation to the assessment and planning requirements of the Water Framework Directive.
The document itself is a brief announcement in the Official Journal of the European Union, specifically the C series, which contains information and notices. It identifies the case (E-7/25), the parties involved (Ólafur Þór Jónsson and others v The National Energy Authority of Iceland and Benchmark Genetics hf.), and the specific question referred to the EFTA Court. The key provision under scrutiny is Article 4 of Directive 2000/60/EC, which deals with environmental objectives for water bodies. There are no changes compared to previous versions, as this is simply a notification of a new case.
The most important aspect of this request lies in its potential impact on project approvals affecting water resources. If the EFTA Court rules that a status assessment and its inclusion in a river basin management plan are prerequisites for project authorization, it could significantly delay or even prevent projects that might negatively affect groundwater bodies. This interpretation would place a strong emphasis on proactive environmental assessment and planning before any potentially harmful activities are allowed to proceed.
Request for an Advisory Opinion from the EFTA Court by the Princely Supreme Court in the case of Rainer Silbernagl v Universität Liechtenstein (Case E-5/25)
This document is a request from the Princely Supreme Court of Liechtenstein to the EFTA Court for an Advisory Opinion regarding the interpretation of Article 38(3) of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in the context of the dismissal of a data protection officer (DPO). The Liechtenstein court seeks clarification on whether national laws governing the dismissal of DPOs are compatible with the GDPR, particularly when the DPO is not performing their duties correctly. The questions focus on the scope of protection against dismissal afforded to DPOs under the GDPR and whether unlawful dismissal should render the termination void, thus preserving the employment relationship.
The document consists of a single section outlining the three specific questions posed by the Princely Supreme Court to the EFTA Court. These questions revolve around the interpretation of Article 38(3) of the GDPR, which concerns the position of the data protection officer.
The main provisions being examined are:
* **Article 38(3) of the GDPR (second sentence):** This provision protects data protection officers from dismissal or penalty for performing their tasks. The core question is how this protection interacts with national laws regarding employment termination, especially when the DPO is not fulfilling their responsibilities adequately.
* **Article 7(3) and (4) of the Data Protection Act (Liechtenstein):** These articles outline the conditions under which a data protection officer employed by a public body can be dismissed. The Liechtenstein court seeks to understand if these national provisions are in line with the GDPR’s intention to safeguard the DPO’s functional independence.
The most important aspect of this document is the interpretation of the scope of protection granted to data protection officers under the GDPR. The EFTA Court’s advisory opinion will clarify the extent to which national laws can regulate the dismissal of DPOs without undermining their independence, as guaranteed by the GDPR. This has significant implications for the security of data protection officers in Liechtenstein and potentially in other EFTA states bound by similar provisions.
Decision of the Standing Committee of the EFTA States No. 3/2025/SC of 7 May 2025 on internal cost sharing [2025/1873]
This Decision of the Standing Committee of the EFTA States establishes the rules for internal cost sharing among Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway for the EEA Financial Mechanism for the period 2021-2028. It defines how the contributions of these EFTA states will be determined and divided into annual tranches. The decision ensures that the financial obligations of these states are clearly defined and consistently applied. It also addresses the scenario where an EFTA state joins the EU, ensuring their financial commitments to the EEA Financial Mechanism remain unchanged for the specified period.
The Decision consists of 5 articles.
* **Article 1** states that the contributions of Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway to the EEA Financial Mechanism for 2021–2028 will be divided into annual tranches and determined based on Article 2.
* **Article 2** outlines the conditions for these contributions, specifying that they are based on the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of each EFTA state. It details the calculation method, using GDP data from two years prior (t-2) to determine the contribution for a specific year (t). It also requires each EFTA state to provide their GDP data annually and specifies that contributions are to be expressed in Euros. Finally, it allows for a review of the cost-sharing methodology for financial contributions post-2028.
* **Article 3** clarifies that if an EFTA state joins the EU, it must still fulfill its financial obligations to the EEA Financial Mechanism for the period 2021–2028 as per this Decision.
* **Article 4** mandates the publication of this Decision in the EEA Section of the Official Journal of the European Union and its EEA Supplement.
* **Article 5** states that the Decision comes into effect on the day it is adopted.
The most important provisions for practical use are those in Article 2, which detail how the contributions of each EFTA state are calculated based on their GDP. This ensures a clear and consistent method for determining financial obligations. Additionally, Article 3 is significant as it clarifies the financial responsibilities of an EFTA state even if it accedes to the EU, providing certainty and stability to the financial mechanism.
Decision of the Standing Committee of the EFTA States No. 2/2025/SC of 6 February 2025 on the continuation of the designated Performance Review Body of the single European sky for the EFTA States [2025/1872]
This Decision of the Standing Committee of the EFTA States (No. 2/2025/SC) concerns the continuation of the designated Performance Review Body (PRB) of the single European sky for the EFTA States. It extends the mandate of the independent group of experts, initially set up by Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/2296, to continue its functions related to the performance review of air navigation services. The decision ensures the continuity of the PRB’s role until 2 June 2025, aligning with the provisions of Regulation (EU) 2024/2803. Liechtenstein is excluded from the application of this decision.
The Decision consists of five articles. Article 1 stipulates that the Performance Review Body designated in Decision No. 1/2021/SC shall continue its functions until 2 June 2025. Article 2 allows the EFTA Surveillance Authority to consult the PRB on matters related to the performance of air navigation services. Article 3 clarifies that the Decision does not apply to Liechtenstein. Articles 4 and 5 concern the publication of the decision in the Official Journal of the European Union and specify the entry into force and period of application (from 1 January 2025 until 2 June 2025), respectively. This Decision prolongs the application of Decision No. 1/2021/SC.
The most important provision is Article 1, which ensures the uninterrupted operation of the Performance Review Body for EFTA States until 2 June 2025. This is crucial for maintaining oversight and ensuring the performance of air navigation services within the single European sky framework, as it applies to the EFTA countries.
