Here is a review of the legal acts described:
Commission Delegated Regulation updating trade agreement safeguard clauses
Main Purpose: This Regulation updates the list of specific rules found in EU trade agreements concerning bilateral safeguard clauses and the temporary withdrawal of trade preferences. It incorporates provisions from the Interim Trade Agreement between the EU and Chile into Regulation (EU) 2019/287.
Structure and Changes: The act contains two articles and an Annex. Article 1 adds the text of the Annex to the Annex of Regulation (EU) 2019/287. Article 2 governs its entry into force. The Annex reproduces relevant articles from the EU-Chile Interim Trade Agreement. The main change is the expansion of the Annex of Regulation (EU) 2019/287 to include these specific rules applicable to trade with Chile.
Key Provisions: The most important provisions are those listed in the Annex, which stem directly from the EU-Chile agreement and take precedence over general EU rules where they differ. These include: the definition of the “transition period” for applying safeguards (Articles 5.9(b), 5.11.1(c)), special rules for the EU’s outermost regions based on “serious deterioration” (Article 5.15), requirements for domestic industry support in investigations (Article 5.17.2), criteria for establishing a causal link between imports and injury (Article 5.18.3(a)), a 12-month deadline for investigations (Article 5.18.5), and the allowance for submitting documents in English during procedures (Article 5.22).
Commission Delegated Regulation amending banking capital requirements for market risk (internal models)
Main Purpose: This Regulation updates technical standards for banks using internal models to calculate market risk capital requirements. It amends three existing delegated regulations to align them with recent changes to the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) by Regulation (EU) 2024/1623, aiming for consistency with international standards and clarifying existing rules.
Structure and Changes: The Regulation has four articles. Articles 1, 2, and 3 amend Delegated Regulations (EU) 2022/2059, (EU) 2022/2060, and (EU) 2023/1577, respectively. Article 4 specifies the entry into force. The changes are necessary due to amendments introduced in Regulation (EU) 2024/1623.
Key Provisions: Key changes include: clarifying the meaning of trading desk zones (‘green’, ‘yellow’, etc.) in back-testing and P&L attribution and updating the formula for the additional own funds requirement under the internal model approach. For risk factor modellability, it adds a requirement for banks to document the use of third-party vendor data. Regarding foreign exchange and commodity risk in the non-trading book, it requires identifying positions related to translation risk and mandates that banks’ policies clearly document the assignment of these positions to trading desks, including the rationale.
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/881 concerning 1-methylcyclopropene
Main Purpose: This Regulation updates the rules for the active substance 1-methylcyclopropene in plant protection products. It removes a previous restriction, allowing its use before harvest in the field, and requires the applicant to submit further data on potential breakdown products and residues.
Structure and Changes: The Regulation consists of three articles and an Annex. Articles 1 and 2 amend Implementing Regulations (EU) 2019/1085 and (EU) No 540/2011. Article 3 governs the entry into force. The Annex contains the updated “Specific provisions” for the substance in the lists of approved substances. The main change is the removal of the restriction limiting use to “post-harvest storage in sealable warehouses only”.
Key Provisions: The most significant provision is the lifting of the restriction on use, which allows plant protection products containing 1-methylcyclopropene to potentially be authorised for pre-harvest applications in the field (e.g., via orchard spray direct injection). Another key provision is the requirement for the applicant to provide confirmatory data by 27 May 2027 regarding the presence and risks of methallyl alcohol in soil and water, and the impact of water treatment on residues in drinking water.
Commission Implementing Regulation establishing the EU pesticide residue control programme for 2026-2028
Main Purpose: This Regulation sets up the European Union’s coordinated programme for monitoring pesticide residues in food for the years 2026, 2027, and 2028. Its aim is to ensure compliance with maximum residue levels (MRLs) and gather data for consumer exposure assessment by specifying which food products and pesticides Member States must sample and analyse.
Structure and Changes: The Regulation has four articles and two Annexes. Article 1 mandates Member States to sample and analyse according to Annexes I and II. Article 2 specifies how results must be submitted to EFSA. Article 3 repeals the previous Regulation (EU) 2024/989, while confirming its application for 2025 samples. Article 4 sets entry into force. Annex I lists the products and pesticide/product combinations for each year. Annex II sets minimum sample numbers per Member State/product and specifies analytical requirements, including for organic and infant foods. The regulation continues the multiannual programme system, updating the specific lists from the previous cycle.
Key Provisions: Article 1 in conjunction with Annex I is crucial as it dictates the specific list of products and pesticides to be monitored in each of the years 2026, 2027, and 2028. Annex II Part A is vital as it sets the minimum number of samples each Member State is required to collect annually for the listed products, specifically including sampling for organic products and foods for infants and young children. Annex II Part B provides essential details on analytical methods and reporting, including reporting complex residue definitions separately. Article 2 sets the deadline and format for Member States to submit results to EFSA.
Commission Implementing Regulation laying down rules for EU Digital Identity Wallet security breach response
Main Purpose: This Regulation establishes specific rules for EU Member States on how to react to security breaches or compromises affecting European Digital Identity Wallets, validation mechanisms, or electronic identification schemes. It aims to ensure a swift, coordinated, and secure response across the Union to protect users and maintain trust.
Structure and Changes: The Regulation contains eleven articles and one Annex. It implements specific aspects of the amended eIDAS Regulation (Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 as amended by Regulation (EU) 2024/1183), providing detailed operational rules for reacting to security incidents concerning the new Wallets.
Key Provisions: Article 3 and Annex I are crucial as they provide the specific criteria for Member States to assess the severity of a breach (e.g., impact, data compromised, duration of unavailability, financial loss). Articles 4 and 8 mandate the suspension or withdrawal of affected wallet solutions under specific conditions. Key timelines are imposed: suspension and initial notification without undue delay and no later than 24 hours after suspension (Articles 4, 5). If a breach leading to suspension is not fixed within three months, withdrawal must occur without undue delay and within 72 hours after that period expires (Article 8), with information shared within 24 hours (Article 9). Articles 5(2) and 9(2) list the comprehensive information required for suspension and withdrawal notifications. Article 10 mandates the use of the CIRAS system or equivalent for official communication.
Commission Implementing Regulation laying down rules for EU Digital Identity Wallet relying party registration
Main Purpose: This Regulation sets out the specific practical rules for how organisations and companies (wallet-relying parties) must register to use the European Digital Identity Wallets. It mandates Member States to establish national registers to ensure transparency and trust.
Structure and Changes: The Regulation has 11 articles and five Annexes. It implements new provisions from the amended eIDAS Regulation establishing the European Digital Identity Framework, providing the first detailed EU-level rules for relying party registration. Articles cover establishing and maintaining registers (Article 3), registration policies (Article 4), the registration process (Article 6), and relying party information obligations (Article 5). It introduces requirements for ‘wallet-relying party access certificates’ (Article 7) and optional ‘wallet-relying party registration certificates’ (Article 8), rules for suspension/cancellation (Article 9), and record-keeping (Article 10). Annexes provide details on required information, technical specifications, verification, and certificate requirements.
Key Provisions: Article 3 and Annexes I/II are key, mandating Member States to establish public, online registers accessible in human and machine-readable formats. Article 5 and Annex I oblige relying parties to provide detailed registration information, including the exact data or attributes they intend to request for each purpose. Article 7 and Annex IV mandate the use of ‘wallet-relying party access certificates’ for authentication. Article 8 and Annex V detail the content of optional ‘wallet-relying party registration certificates’, including the relying party’s intended use and data requests. Article 9 outlines provisions for suspending or cancelling registrations, acting as a safeguard against non-compliance or excessive data requests.
Commission Implementing Regulation on providing information about certified EU Digital Identity Wallets
Main Purpose: This Regulation sets out specific rules for how EU Member States must provide information about their certified European Digital Identity Wallets to the European Commission and the relevant expert group. Its goal is to enable the Commission to create and maintain a reliable, public list of these certified wallets.
Structure and Changes: The Regulation defines its subject matter and provides definitions. It implements specific provisions of the main eIDAS Regulation, particularly Article 5d(7), which set up the framework for the Wallets. The core operational requirement is detailed in Article 3 and the specific information required is listed in the Annex.
Key Provisions: Article 3 is key, dictating that Member States must submit the required information using a secure electronic channel provided by the Commission, and that the submission must be at least in English. It also imposes the obligation to keep the information up-to-date. The Annex is equally vital, listing the exhaustive information required. This includes detailed descriptions of the wallet solution, the underlying electronic identification scheme (covering authorities, regimes, enrolment), and necessary certification documentation. This information forms the basis of the public list of certified wallets.
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/846 on EU Digital Identity Wallet identity matching
Main Purpose: This Regulation lays down the technical rules for how public sector bodies in the EU must perform identity matching when individuals use their European Digital Identity Wallet or a cross-border national electronic identification means to access online services. It aims to ensure reliable and consistent cross-border identity matching.
Structure and Changes: The Regulation contains six articles. It is based on the updated eIDAS Regulation (Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 as amended by Regulation (EU) 2024/1183) and provides necessary technical detail for the cross-border identity matching process introduced by the amendment.
Key Provisions: Article 2(1) is important as it mandates that public sector bodies offering online cross-border services *must* use this identity matching process. Article 2(3) and (4) specify exactly which data points from the European Digital Identity Wallet (based on IR 2024/2977) or a notified eID means (based on IR 2015/1501) must be used for the matching. Article 2(7) provides a clear definition of what constitutes a successful or unsuccessful match. Articles 3 and 4 are vital for user experience, requiring relying parties to inform users about the outcome, provide reasons for failure, and offer options for reusing successful matches. Article 5 imposes logging requirements, detailing what information must be logged and for how long. The Regulation will apply from 24 December 2026 (Article 6).
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/842 correcting linguistic errors in ETS reporting rules
Main Purpose: This Regulation corrects specific linguistic errors found in the French and Swedish language versions of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/2066, which lays down rules for monitoring and reporting greenhouse gas emissions under the EU’s Emissions Trading System (ETS). The errors were introduced by a previous amendment, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2493.
Structure and Changes: The Regulation consists of a preamble and two articles. Article 1 contains the specific corrections (it notes this article does not concern the English version). Article 2 sets the entry into force. This Regulation does not introduce new substantive rules but rectifies unintended linguistic inaccuracies in a previous amending regulation.
Key Provisions: For users of the French or Swedish versions of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/2066 (as amended by 2024/2493), the key provisions are the corrections themselves. These ensure accuracy in technical requirements related to aviation reporting (correct definition of flight plan in Annex IIIa French version), industrial emissions monitoring (correct minimum frequency of flue gas analyses in Annex VII Swedish version), and general reporting standards (correct measurement units in Annex X Swedish version).
Regarding the other items you provided:
Based on your description, items 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 are judgments of the General Court. Item 16 describes amendments to the TIR Convention, which is an international convention, not an EU legislative act itself. My task is to provide analysis of legislation. As judgments and international convention amendments are not EU legislative acts in the sense of Regulations, Directives, or Decisions, I cannot provide the requested analysis for these items based on my instructions.
Review of each of legal acts published today:
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/880 of 25 February 2025 amending Regulation (EU) 2019/287 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards specific provisions contained in the Interim Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Chile
This Commission Delegated Regulation serves to update the list of specific rules found in the European Union’s trade agreements that relate to bilateral safeguard clauses and the temporary withdrawal of trade preferences. It specifically incorporates provisions from the recently concluded Interim Trade Agreement between the EU and the Republic of Chile into the existing framework established by Regulation (EU) 2019/287. The aim is to ensure that the specific safeguard mechanisms agreed upon with Chile are clearly identified and applied where they differ from the general EU rules.
The structure of this Delegated Regulation is straightforward and concise. It consists of only two articles. Article 1 is the core operative provision, stating that the detailed text contained in the Annex of *this* Regulation is to be added to the Annex of the parent Regulation (EU) 2019/287. Article 2 simply governs the entry into force of the Delegated Regulation. The substance of the act lies entirely within its Annex, which directly reproduces several specific articles from Chapter Five, Section C of the EU-Chile Interim Trade Agreement. These articles cover various aspects of bilateral safeguard measures, such as the definition of the “transition period” during which safeguards can be applied, rules on their duration and re-application, criteria for initiating investigations, handling of confidential information, and special provisions for the EU’s outermost regions. The main change compared to the previous version of Regulation (EU) 2019/287 is the expansion of its Annex to include these specific provisions applicable to trade with Chile.
For anyone involved in trade with Chile under the new Interim Agreement, the most important provisions are those listed in the Annex of this Delegated Regulation. These specific rules from the EU-Chile agreement take precedence over the general rules in Regulation (EU) 2019/287 where they differ. Key provisions include the precise definition of the “transition period” for applying safeguards (Articles 5.9(b), 5.11.1(c)), the unique criteria for applying safeguards to the EU’s outermost regions based on “serious deterioration” rather than “serious injury” (Article 5.15), the detailed requirements for domestic industry support when initiating a safeguard investigation (Article 5.17.2), the need to demonstrate a clear causal link between increased imports and injury while examining other factors (Article 5.18.3(a)), the strict 12-month deadline for completing investigations (Article 5.18.5), and the practical allowance for submitting documents in English during procedures, with a later translation requirement (Article 5.22). Understanding these specific rules is essential for economic operators and authorities to navigate potential safeguard actions under the EU-Chile Interim Trade Agreement.
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/878 of 3 February 2025 amending the regulatory technical standards laid down in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/2059, Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/2060 and Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/1577 as regards the technical details of back-testing and profit and loss attribution requirements, the criteria for assessing the modellability of risk factors, and the treatment of foreign-exchange risk and commodity risk in the non-trading book
This Commission Delegated Regulation updates specific technical rules that banks must follow when calculating their capital requirements for market risk using internal models. It amends three existing delegated regulations related to back-testing and profit and loss attribution tests, assessing which risk factors can be modelled, and how foreign exchange and commodity risks in a bank’s non-trading book are treated. These changes are necessary to align the technical standards with recent amendments made to the main EU banking regulation, the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR), by Regulation (EU) 2024/1623. The aim is to ensure consistency with international standards and clarify existing requirements for banks using the advanced internal model approach for market risk.
The structure of this Regulation is straightforward. Following introductory recitals explaining the background and necessity, it contains four articles. Articles 1, 2, and 3 detail the specific amendments made to three separate existing delegated regulations: Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/2059 (on back-testing and P&L attribution), Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/2060 (on risk factor modellability), and Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/1577 (on non-trading book FX/commodity risk). Article 4 specifies the entry into force.
Key changes introduced by this Regulation include:
* For back-testing and profit and loss attribution, it explicitly defines what the classification of a trading desk into ‘green’, ‘yellow’, ‘orange’, or ‘red’ zones means in terms of how “close” or “sufficiently close” the theoretical changes in a portfolio’s value are to the hypothetical changes. It also updates the formula for calculating the additional own funds requirement for desks under the internal model approach, referencing the location of the main formula in the CRR itself and providing the formula for a specific coefficient used in this calculation. An outdated aggregation formula is removed as it is now in the CRR.
* Regarding the modellability of risk factors, the Regulation adds a new documentation requirement for banks. If banks use market data from third-party vendors to assess whether risk factors are modellable, they must now document the number and materiality of risk factors classified as modellable based on each vendor’s data.
* For foreign exchange and commodity risk in the non-trading book, the Regulation requires banks to be able to identify positions included in foreign exchange risk exposure specifically due to *translation risk* when consolidating group positions into a single reporting currency. It also mandates that banks’ internal policies must clearly document how non-trading book positions subject to foreign exchange risk, commodity risk, or both, are assigned to trading desks (whether dedicated non-trading book desks or mixed desks), including the criteria and rationale for this assignment.
The main provisions likely to be most important for banks using the internal model approach are the clarified definitions related to the profit and loss attribution zone classifications and the updated calculation method for the additional own funds requirement. The new documentation requirement for using third-party vendor data for risk factor modellability is also significant for banks relying on such data. Furthermore, the requirements for identifying translation risk and documenting the assignment of non-trading book FX and commodity positions to trading desks will necessitate updates to banks’ internal systems and policies.
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/881 of 7 May 2025 amending Implementing Regulations (EU) 2019/1085 and (EU) No 540/2011 as regards the conditions of approval of the active substance 1-methylcyclopropene
Okay, let’s look at this new piece of EU legislation.
This is Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/881. Its main purpose is to update the rules for the use of the active substance 1-methylcyclopropene, which is used in plant protection products. Specifically, it removes a previous restriction on its use, allowing it to be applied before harvest in the field, in addition to its existing use in post-harvest storage. The regulation also imposes a requirement for further data to be submitted by the applicant regarding potential breakdown products and residues.
The structure of this regulation is quite straightforward. It consists of three articles and an Annex. Article 1 and Article 2 are the operative parts that make the actual legal changes; they state that the Annex amends two previous implementing regulations: Regulation (EU) 2019/1085 (which renewed the substance’s approval) and Regulation (EU) No 540/2011 (the main list of approved substances). Article 3 simply sets the date for the regulation to enter into force. The crucial part is the Annex, which contains the new text for the “Specific provisions” column related to 1-methylcyclopropene in the lists of approved substances. Compared to the previous rules, the main change is the removal of the explicit restriction limiting use to “post-harvest storage in sealable warehouses only”.
For anyone dealing with plant protection products containing 1-methylcyclopropene, the most significant provision is undoubtedly the lifting of the restriction on its use. This means that plant protection products containing this substance can now potentially be authorised by Member States for pre-harvest applications in the field, specifically mentioned as via orchard spray fed by direct injection system, whereas previously they were limited to post-harvest storage. Another key provision is the requirement placed on the applicant (the company that sought the change) to provide confirmatory information by 27 May 2027. This data concerns the presence and potential risks of methallyl alcohol, a possible breakdown product, in soil and water, and how water treatment processes affect residues in drinking water. This indicates that while the use is expanded, there is ongoing monitoring and a need for further data to confirm safety aspects.
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/854 of 7 May 2025 concerning a coordinated multiannual control programme of the Union for 2026, 2027 and 2028 to ensure compliance with maximum residue levels of pesticides and to assess the consumer exposure to pesticide residues in and on food of plant and animal origin and repealing Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/989
Okay, let’s look at this Commission Implementing Regulation.
This regulation establishes the European Union’s coordinated control programme for monitoring pesticide residues in food for the years 2026, 2027, and 2028. Its main goal is to ensure that maximum residue levels (MRLs) set for pesticides in food are being complied with across the Union and to gather data to assess consumer exposure to these residues. It sets out which specific food products and pesticides Member States must sample and analyse over this three-year period.
The structure of the regulation is straightforward. It begins with several ‘Whereas’ clauses that explain the background and necessity for the programme, referencing the basic MRL Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 and previous control programmes. The core obligations are laid out in four Articles. Article 1 mandates Member States to take and analyse samples according to the lists in Annex I and the requirements in Annex II. Article 2 specifies how and when Member States must submit their analytical results to the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). Article 3 formally repeals the previous implementing regulation (EU) 2024/989, while clarifying its continued application for samples from 2025. Article 4 sets the entry into force date. The detailed lists of products and pesticide/product combinations to be monitored each year are contained in Annex I (Parts A, B, C, and D), while Annex II (Parts A and B) specifies the minimum number of samples per Member State and per product, including requirements for organic products and foods for infants and young children, and outlines analytical requirements. This regulation continues the established system of multiannual control programmes, updating the specific lists of products and pesticides based on previous monitoring results and consumption patterns, and replacing the previous regulation which covered a different three-year cycle.
For practical use, the most important provisions are found in Article 1 and the Annexes. Article 1, combined with Annex I, is crucial as it dictates *what* products and *which* pesticides must be sampled and analysed in each of the years 2026, 2027, and 2028. Annex II Part A is vital as it sets the minimum number of samples each Member State is required to collect annually for the listed products, ensuring a sufficient volume of data for a robust assessment. It also specifically requires sampling of organic products and foods intended for infants and young children. Annex II Part B provides essential details on analytical methods and reporting requirements, including the need to report components of complex residue definitions separately, which is key for ensuring the comparability and quality of the data collected across the EU. Finally, Article 2 is important for Member States as it sets the deadline and format for submitting their results to EFSA.
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/847 of 6 May 2025 laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards reactions to security breaches of European Digital Identity Wallets
This Commission Implementing Regulation lays down specific rules for how EU Member States must react to security breaches or compromises affecting European Digital Identity Wallets, the related validation mechanisms, or the underlying electronic identification schemes. Its core purpose is to ensure a fast, coordinated, and secure response across the Union to protect users and maintain trust in the digital identity ecosystem. It sets out criteria for assessing the severity of breaches and mandates specific actions, including suspension or withdrawal of affected wallet solutions, and detailed information requirements for users, relying parties, and other Member States.
The Regulation is structured into eleven articles and one Annex. Article 1 defines the subject matter. Article 2 provides essential definitions for terms like ‘wallet solution’, ‘wallet user’, and ‘wallet-relying party’. Article 3 outlines how Member States must assess security breaches using the criteria detailed in Annex I and initiate appropriate measures. Articles 4 and 5 specify the procedures for suspending affected wallets and the mandatory information that must be provided about such suspensions. Articles 6 and 7 cover the process and information requirements for re-establishing wallet services once a breach is remedied. Articles 8 and 9 detail the conditions and procedures for the withdrawal of wallet solutions, particularly if a breach is not fixed within three months, and the information to be shared about withdrawals. Article 10 mandates the use of specific information systems like CIRAS for communication between Member States and the Commission. Article 11 sets the entry into force date. This Regulation implements specific aspects of the amended eIDAS Regulation (Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 as amended by Regulation (EU) 2024/1183), providing detailed operational rules for reacting to security incidents concerning the new European Digital Identity Wallets.
For practical use, some of the most important provisions concern the obligations and timelines imposed on Member States and, indirectly, on wallet providers. Article 3 and Annex I are crucial as they provide the specific criteria (such as impact on users/relying parties, data compromised, duration of unavailability, financial loss, certification status) that Member States must consider when determining if a security breach affects the reliability of a wallet solution and requires action. Articles 4 and 8 are key as they mandate the suspension or withdrawal of affected wallet solutions, respectively, under specific conditions. The strict timelines in Articles 4, 5, 8, and 9 are particularly important: suspension and initial notification must happen without undue delay and no later than 24 hours after the suspension; if a breach leading to suspension is not remedied within three months, withdrawal must occur without undue delay and within 72 hours after that period expires; and information about withdrawal must be provided within 24 hours. The comprehensive list of information required in Articles 5(2) and 9(2) for notifications about suspensions and withdrawals is also vital for ensuring transparency and enabling affected parties to take necessary steps. Finally, Article 10 specifies the mandatory use of the CIRAS system or equivalent for official communication between Member States and the Commission regarding these incidents.
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/848 of 6 May 2025 laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the registration of wallet-relying parties
Okay, here is the description of the legal act you provided, presented as if explaining it to a journalist.
This Implementing Regulation lays down the specific, practical rules for how organisations and companies – known as ‘wallet-relying parties’ – that wish to use the new European Digital Identity Wallets must register. It mandates Member States to set up national registers for these entities, ensuring transparency and trust in the ecosystem. The regulation details the information required for registration, the processes involved, and the technical specifications for the registers and associated certificates.
The structure of this regulation is straightforward, comprising 11 articles and five detailed annexes. It serves to implement new provisions introduced by the recent amendment to the eIDAS Regulation, which established the European Digital Identity Framework. Therefore, it provides the first set of detailed EU-level rules for the registration of these wallet-relying parties, a concept central to the new digital identity framework. The articles cover the core requirements: Member States must establish and maintain national registers (Article 3), define clear registration policies (Article 4), and manage the registration process itself (Article 6). Wallet-relying parties are obliged to provide specific, accurate, and up-to-date information for registration (Article 5). The regulation also introduces requirements for ‘wallet-relying party access certificates’ for authentication purposes (Article 7) and allows for the issuance of ‘wallet-relying party registration certificates’ to inform users (Article 8). Crucially, it includes rules for the suspension or cancellation of registrations (Article 9) and mandates record-keeping for 10 years (Article 10). The annexes provide the essential details: Annex I lists the precise information required from relying parties, Annex II sets out technical requirements for the registers and their interfaces, Annex III specifies how the entitlements of relying parties are to be verified, and Annexes IV and V detail the requirements for the access and registration certificates, respectively.
For anyone involved with or planning to use the European Digital Identity Wallet, several provisions in this regulation are particularly significant. A key element is the requirement for Member States to establish public, online registers of all registered wallet-relying parties, accessible both in human-readable form and via a machine-readable API (Article 3, Annexes I and II). This ensures transparency and allows users and other parties to verify the identity and status of the service provider they are interacting with. Another crucial aspect is the obligation for wallet-relying parties to provide detailed information during registration, specifically including a list of the exact data or attributes they intend to request from users for each distinct purpose they use the wallet for (Article 5, Annex I). This is fundamental for enabling data minimisation and empowering users with control over their data. Furthermore, the regulation mandates the use of ‘wallet-relying party access certificates’ (Article 7, Annex IV) for relying parties to authenticate themselves to the wallet, adding a layer of security and trust to the interaction. While the issuance of ‘wallet-relying party registration certificates’ is optional for Member States (Article 8), if issued, these certificates must clearly state the relying party’s intended use and the data they are registered to request, potentially allowing the wallet to warn users if a request exceeds this scope (Annex V). Finally, the provisions for suspending or cancelling registrations (Article 9) are vital safeguards, allowing registrars to act against relying parties providing inaccurate information, failing to comply with policies, requesting excessive data, or otherwise breaching the law.
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/849 of 6 May 2025 laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the submission of information to the Commission and to the Cooperation Group for the list of certified European Digital Identity Wallets
Okay, let’s look at this Commission Implementing Regulation.
This Implementing Regulation sets out the specific rules for how EU Member States must provide information about their certified European Digital Identity Wallets to the European Commission and the relevant expert group. Its main purpose is to ensure that the Commission can create and maintain a reliable, public list of these certified wallets. This is a crucial step for transparency and trust in the new EU digital identity system, making it clear which wallets are officially recognised and certified.
The structure of the Regulation is straightforward. It begins by stating its subject matter – defining the formats and procedures for submitting wallet information. It then provides clear definitions for key terms used in the context of the digital wallet, such as ‘wallet solution’, ‘wallet provider’, and ‘critical assets’. The core operational requirement is found in Article 3, which mandates Member States to submit the information using a secure electronic channel provided by the Commission and requires the submission to be at least in English. It also obliges Member States to update this information whenever changes occur. The detailed list of *what* information needs to be submitted is contained in the Annex. This Regulation implements specific provisions of the main eIDAS Regulation (Regulation (EU) No 910/2014), particularly Article 5d(7), which established the framework for the European Digital Identity Wallets.
For practical use, the most important provisions are Article 3 and the Annex. Article 3 is key because it dictates *how* and *where* Member States must submit the required data – via a secure electronic channel designated by the Commission and importantly, at least in English, to ensure accessibility. It also imposes the obligation to keep the information up-to-date. The Annex is equally vital as it provides the exhaustive list of *what* information must be submitted. This includes detailed descriptions of the wallet solution itself, the electronic identification scheme under which it operates (covering aspects like responsible authorities, supervisory and liability regimes, and enrolment processes), and the necessary certification documentation. This detailed information is what will populate the public list, allowing users and relying parties to verify the status and details of certified wallets.
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/846 of 6 May 2025 laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards cross-border identity matching of natural persons
This Regulation, Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/846, lays down the technical rules for how public sector bodies across the European Union must handle the process of matching a person’s identity when they use their European Digital Identity Wallet or a national electronic identification means from another Member State to access online services. The goal is to ensure that this cross-border identity matching works reliably and consistently, making it easier for citizens and businesses to use their digital identities seamlessly across borders. It provides detailed procedures for how this matching should be performed and what information should be used.
The structure of the Regulation is straightforward. It begins with recitals explaining the background and legal basis, which is the updated eIDAS Regulation (Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 as amended by Regulation (EU) 2024/1183). The core rules are then set out in six articles. Article 1 defines the subject matter. Article 2 details the general requirements for the identity matching process, specifying who must perform it (public sector bodies), which data sets to use depending on whether a Wallet or a notified eID means is used, how to determine if a match is successful, and how to handle variations in data. Articles 3 and 4 outline the obligations of the relying party (the service provider) depending on whether the identity matching process is successful or unsuccessful, including informing the user and providing options for future use or remedies. Article 5 mandates logging requirements for the process, specifying what information must be logged and for how long. Article 6 sets the entry into force and application date. This Regulation is a new implementing act under the updated eIDAS framework, providing the necessary technical detail for the cross-border identity matching process, which is a key element introduced by the amending Regulation (EU) 2024/1183. It builds upon previous implementing acts under the original eIDAS, such as those defining data sets, but focuses specifically on the matching procedure itself.
For anyone dealing with cross-border digital identity in the EU, several provisions are particularly important. Firstly, Article 2(1) makes it clear that public sector bodies offering online cross-border services *must* use the identity matching process defined here. Article 2(3) and (4) are crucial as they specify exactly which data points from the European Digital Identity Wallet (based on Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2977) or a notified electronic identification means (based on Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1501) must be used for the matching. Article 2(7) provides a clear definition of what constitutes a successful or unsuccessful match. Articles 3 and 4 are vital for user experience, requiring relying parties to inform users about the outcome, provide reasons for failure, and offer options for reusing successful matches in the future (Article 3(2)(d)). Finally, Article 5 imposes logging obligations, which are important for security, accountability, and handling potential user complaints. The Regulation will apply from 24 December 2026, as specified in Article 6.
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/842 of 6 May 2025 correcting certain language versions of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/2066 on the monitoring and reporting of greenhouse gas emissions pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
This is Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/842. Its essence is to correct specific linguistic errors found in certain language versions of a key piece of EU law concerning the monitoring and reporting of greenhouse gas emissions under the EU’s Emissions Trading System (ETS). Specifically, it addresses errors that were introduced into the French and Swedish versions of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/2066 by a more recent amendment, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2493. These corrections are necessary to ensure the legal text accurately reflects the intended rules.
The structure of this Implementing Regulation is straightforward, consisting of a preamble explaining the necessity for the corrections and two articles. Article 1 contains the actual corrections, although the text notes this article does not concern the English language version. Article 2 sets the entry into force date. The main provisions are detailed in the preamble, identifying the precise errors being corrected: a definition error in the French version regarding flight plans (Annex IIIa), and in the Swedish version, errors concerning the minimum frequency of analyses for flue gas (Annex VII) and the measurement units for reporting (Annex X). This regulation does not introduce new rules but rectifies unintended changes caused by linguistic inaccuracies in a previous amendment.
For those using the French or Swedish language versions of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/2066, particularly as amended by the 2024 regulation, the most important provisions are the corrections themselves. They ensure that technical requirements related to aviation reporting (definition of flight plan), industrial emissions monitoring (flue gas analysis frequency), and general reporting standards (measurement units) are correctly stated in those languages. For users of other language versions, this regulation has no direct practical impact as it only addresses errors specific to the French and Swedish texts.
Judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) of 7 May 2025.RTL Group Markenverwaltungs GmbH v European Union Intellectual Property Office.EU trade mark – Revocation proceedings – EU figurative mark RTL – Lack of genuine use of the mark – Article 58(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 – Submission of facts and evidence for the first time before the Board of Appeal – Article 95(2) of Regulation 2017/1001 – Article 27(4) of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/625 – Misuse of rights.Case T-1088/23.
Here is a description of the provisions of the judgment you provided.
This judgment from the General Court concerns a dispute over the revocation of the EU figurative trade mark RTL for lack of genuine use. The Court examined the decision of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) Board of Appeal, which had partially revoked the mark for certain goods and services. The key issues addressed were whether the mark had been genuinely used for specific categories, the admissibility of evidence submitted late in the administrative procedure, and whether the application for revocation constituted a misuse of rights. The Court ultimately altered the EUIPO decision regarding advertising services (Class 35) but upheld the revocation for other goods and services.
The judgment follows a standard structure for General Court decisions in intellectual property cases. It begins by outlining the background of the dispute, including the trade mark registration, the revocation application based on Article 58(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 (EUTMR) for lack of genuine use, and the decisions of EUIPO’s Cancellation Division and Board of Appeal. It then presents the forms of order sought by the applicant (RTL Group Markenverwaltungs GmbH), EUIPO, and the intervener (Ms. Marcella Örtl). The core of the judgment is the legal analysis, where the Court examines the applicant’s four pleas in law. The first three pleas relate to the assessment of genuine use under Article 58(1)(a) EUTMR and the handling of evidence under Article 95(2) EUTMR and Article 27(4) of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/625. The fourth plea concerns the alleged misuse of rights by the intervener under Article 63(1)(a) EUTMR. The Court first addresses the misuse of rights plea, then the plea regarding Class 35 services and late evidence, and finally the pleas concerning other classes. The judgment concludes with the Court’s decision to alter the Board of Appeal’s ruling regarding Class 35 services and dismiss the action for the remainder, along with the order on costs. Compared to the Board of Appeal decision, the judgment changes the outcome for the Class 35 services, finding that genuine use *was* demonstrated for the full scope of “Advertising, marketing and promotional services,” not just a subcategory.
Several provisions of this judgment are particularly important for understanding its practical implications. Firstly, the Court’s analysis of the “misuse of rights” plea (paragraphs 23-35) clarifies that, generally, any person can apply for revocation of a non-used EU trade mark, and their motive is irrelevant unless there are truly exceptional, abusive circumstances far beyond a simple desire to clear the register or a conflict of interest. This confirms the broad standing for revocation actions. Secondly, and significantly, the judgment provides important guidance on the handling of late-filed evidence by EUIPO Boards of Appeal (paragraphs 38-55). The Court found that the Board of Appeal erred by automatically rejecting evidence submitted after the main deadlines without exercising its discretion under Article 95(2) EUTMR, read in conjunction with Article 27(4) of Delegated Regulation 2018/625. This means EUIPO must *assess* late evidence based on its relevance and whether valid reasons are given for the delay, rather than simply dismissing it based on procedural deadlines alone. Thirdly, the judgment offers a detailed assessment of what constitutes “genuine use” for “Advertising, marketing and promotional services” in Class 35 (paragraphs 56-84). The Court found that the evidence presented, including services provided by related companies like Ad Alliance, demonstrated use beyond mere broadcasting of advertisements, encompassing creative contributions, strategy development, and consultancy services offered to third parties for consideration. This broad interpretation of advertising services use is a key takeaway. Finally, the judgment reiterates (paragraphs 90-102) that the reputation of a trade mark for certain goods/services does not exempt the proprietor from proving genuine use for *all* other goods and services for which it is registered, even if there is a link between them. Genuine use must be shown for each category to maintain registration.
Judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) of 7 May 2025.Schmidt Spiele GmbH v European Union Intellectual Property Office.EU trade mark – Opposition proceedings – Application for EU figurative mark DDG – International registration of the earlier figurative mark DOG – Relative ground for refusal – No likelihood of confusion – Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001.Case T-53/24.
Based on the text provided, I must inform you that this is a Judgment of the General Court, not a legislative act such as a Regulation or Directive. My instructions are to provide a detailed description of the provisions of a legal act. A court judgment interprets and applies existing law to a specific case rather than laying down general provisions. Therefore, I cannot provide the analysis requested for a legislative act based on this text.
Judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) of 7 May 2025.Carl Freudenberg KG v European Union Intellectual Property Office.EU trade mark – Opposition proceedings – Application for EU figurative mark SOUNDLESS – Earlier EU word mark SOUNDTEX – Relative ground for refusal – No likelihood of confusion – Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001.Case T-398/24.
This judgment from the General Court of the European Union concerns a dispute over the registration of an EU trade mark. The case involves an opposition filed against the application for the figurative mark SOUNDLESS, based on the earlier EU word mark SOUNDTEX. Both marks cover identical goods related to acoustic insulation. The core issue examined by the Court was whether there was a likelihood of confusion between these two marks in the minds of the relevant public, as defined by EU trade mark law.
The judgment follows the standard structure for General Court decisions in intellectual property matters. It outlines the background of the dispute before the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), including the initial opposition decision and the subsequent appeal to the Board of Appeal. The legal analysis section focuses entirely on applying Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001, which governs relative grounds for refusal based on earlier rights, specifically the likelihood of confusion. The Court systematically examines the relevant factors: the relevant public, the comparison of the goods (which were found to be identical), and the comparison of the signs themselves, considering their visual, phonetic, and conceptual aspects, as well as the distinctiveness of the earlier mark. The judgment does not introduce changes to the Regulation but interprets and applies its provisions based on established case law.
The most important provisions and findings for understanding this judgment relate to the Court’s application of the likelihood of confusion test. The Court determined that the relevant public for these goods (professionals and DIY enthusiasts) has a high level of attention. When comparing the marks, the Court found the common element ‘sound’ to be weakly distinctive for the goods in question, as it directly relates to acoustic insulation. It emphasised that weakly distinctive elements carry less weight in the overall comparison of signs. The Court assessed the visual similarity as below-average and the phonetic similarity as average, noting the differences in the suffixes (‘less’ versus ‘tex’) and the presence of a figurative element in the applied-for mark. While there was a conceptual link based on ‘sound’, its impact was limited due to the element’s weak distinctiveness. Considering the below-average or low distinctiveness of the earlier mark SOUNDTEX, the high level of attention of the public, and the differences between the signs, the Court concluded that the identity of the goods was not sufficient to create a likelihood of confusion. This confirms that even with identical goods, significant differences in the marks and the public’s attention level can prevent a finding of confusion, particularly when the earlier mark has limited distinctiveness.
Arrêt du Tribunal (cinquième chambre) du 7 mai 2025.#Hashem Anwar Akkad contre Conseil de l’Union européenne.#Politique étrangère et de sécurité commune – Mesures restrictives prises en raison de la situation en Syrie – Gel des fonds – Restrictions en matière d’admission sur le territoire des États membres – Maintien du nom du requérant sur les listes des personnes, des entités et des organismes concernés – Critère de la “femme ou de l’homme d’affaires influents exerçant ses activités en Syrie” – Présomption de lien avec le régime syrien – Erreur d’appréciation – Obligation de motivation – Droits de la défense – Droit à un procès équitable – Droit à une protection juridictionnelle effective – Proportionnalité – Droit de propriété – Droit à la vie privée – Atteinte à la réputation – Moyen nouveau.#Affaire T-502/23.
Voici une description détaillée des dispositions de l’arrêt du Tribunal de l’Union européenne :
1. **Essence de l’acte**
Cet arrêt du Tribunal de l’Union européenne concerne le recours formé par un homme d’affaires syrien contre les décisions du Conseil de l’UE de le maintenir sur les listes de personnes soumises à des mesures restrictives (gel des fonds et restrictions de voyage) en raison de la situation en Syrie. Le requérant contestait la légalité de son inscription, arguant notamment d’erreurs d’appréciation et de violations de ses droits fondamentaux. Le Tribunal a examiné les preuves présentées par le Conseil pour justifier le maintien de son nom sur les listes et a analysé les différents moyens soulevés par le requérant.
2. **Structure de l’acte, ses main provisions et changes comparés aux versions précédentes**
L’arrêt est structuré de manière classique pour une décision du Tribunal. Après avoir présenté les parties et les actes attaqués (les décisions et règlements du Conseil de 2023 et 2024 maintenant les sanctions), il expose les antécédents du litige et les faits pertinents. Il liste ensuite les conclusions des parties. La partie “En droit” constitue le cœur de l’arrêt, où le Tribunal examine successivement les moyens soulevés par le requérant.
Les principales provisions de l’arrêt résident dans l’analyse et le rejet de chacun des sept moyens invoqués par le requérant, ainsi que d’un moyen nouveau présenté à l’audience. Le Tribunal commence par écarter le moyen nouveau relatif à la chute du régime syrien, rappelant que la légalité d’un acte s’apprécie à la date de son adoption. Il examine ensuite les moyens tirés de la légalité externe (motivation, droits de la défense, droit à un recours effectif), concluant que le Conseil a respecté ses obligations. Le Tribunal se penche ensuite sur le moyen principal, l’erreur d’appréciation, en détaillant sa méthode de contrôle juridictionnel des preuves dans ce type d’affaires. Il analyse spécifiquement le critère de l'”homme d’affaires influent exerçant ses activités en Syrie” et le lien avec le régime syrien. Enfin, il rejette les moyens relatifs à la violation des droits fondamentaux (propriété, proportionnalité, vie privée, réputation). L’arrêt ne modifie pas les actes attaqués mais confirme leur légalité au regard des arguments présentés. Il se réfère à de précédents arrêts concernant le même requérant pour contextualiser l’analyse des preuves.
3. **Les main provisions de l’acte qui peuvent être les plus importantes pour son utilisation**
Pour un journaliste ou toute personne intéressée par cet arrêt, les provisions les plus importantes sont les suivantes :
* Le rejet du moyen nouveau basé sur la chute du régime syrien (points 14-18), qui clarifie que les événements postérieurs à l’adoption des actes attaqués ne sont pas pertinents pour juger de leur légalité au moment où ils ont été pris.
* L’analyse détaillée du quatrième moyen (erreur d’appréciation) et les considérations liminaires sur le contrôle juridictionnel des mesures restrictives (points 42-48). Le Tribunal réaffirme le principe selon lequel il incombe au Conseil d’établir le bien-fondé des motifs et que le contrôle porte sur la base factuelle des décisions, en s’appuyant sur un faisceau d’indices concrets, précis et concordants.
* L’évaluation par le Tribunal de la fiabilité et de la pertinence des éléments de preuve produits par le Conseil, y compris ceux provenant de sources publiques comme des articles de presse ou des sites internet (points 54-81). Le Tribunal accepte ces sources, compte tenu de la difficulté d’obtenir des preuves dans le contexte syrien, et évalue leur valeur probante.
* La confirmation que le critère de l'”homme d’affaires influent exerçant ses activités en Syrie” est un critère d’inscription objectif et suffisant en soi (point 109). Cela signifie que le Conseil n’a pas besoin de prouver un lien direct entre les activités de l’homme d’affaires et la répression, ni que l’intéressé avait connaissance des conséquences de ses actions sur le régime.
* Le rejet des arguments du requérant visant à renverser la présomption de lien avec le régime syrien (points 110-120), le Tribunal estimant que les éléments présentés par le requérant (résidence à l’étranger, saisie de biens en Syrie, état de santé) n’étaient pas suffisants pour démontrer l’absence de lien ou d’influence.
* Le rejet des moyens relatifs à la violation des droits fondamentaux (propriété, proportionnalité, vie privée, réputation) (points 124-136), le Tribunal jugeant que les restrictions imposées sont justifiées par l’objectif d’intérêt général des sanctions et ne sont pas disproportionnées.
Arrêt du Tribunal (quatrième chambre) du 7 mai 2025.#Helene Hamers contre Centre européen pour le développement de la formation professionnelle.#Fonction publique – Agents temporaires – Enquête de l’OLAF – Procédure pénale nationale – Acquittement – Comportement du Cedefop lié à la procédure pénale nationale – Rejet de la demande d’indemnisation – Exigence d’impartialité – Conflit d’intérêts – Responsabilité – Préjudice moral et de santé.#Affaire T-159/20 RENV.
Here is a description of the provisions of the judgment you provided.
This is a judgment from the General Court of the European Union in a case concerning an EU agency (Cedefop) and one of its former temporary agents. The core issue is whether the agency acted impartially when rejecting the agent’s request for compensation following her acquittal in national criminal proceedings that stemmed from an EU anti-fraud investigation. The Court found that the official who rejected the request was not impartial, leading to the annulment of the rejection decision and an award of damages for the moral harm caused by this lack of impartiality.
The document is a judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) dated 7 May 2025. It details the case T-159/20 RENV, which is a case referred back to the General Court by the Court of Justice after an appeal. The judgment begins by identifying the parties involved (Ms. Hamers as the applicant and Cedefop as the defendant) and the composition of the Court. It then provides a detailed background of the dispute, starting with Ms. Hamers’ employment history, an internal audit, an OLAF investigation, referral to Greek judicial authorities, Cedefop becoming a civil party in the national proceedings, and ultimately Ms. Hamers’ acquittal by a Greek court in 2018. Following her acquittal, Ms. Hamers requested compensation from Cedefop for various damages (moral, health, legal costs), which Cedefop rejected in a decision dated 3 July 2019. The judgment recounts the subsequent internal appeal and the Appeals Committee decision, which partially annulled the rejection regarding legal costs but upheld it for other damages. It then describes the initial court proceedings before the General Court, the appeal to the Court of Justice which partially annulled the initial judgment, and the referral back to the General Court for re-examination of specific points. The structure then moves to the legal analysis (“En droit”), first clarifying the scope of the case after referral, which is limited to examining the claims based on the ground of violation of the impartiality requirement, as directed by the Court of Justice. It then examines the claim for annulment based on this ground, followed by the claim for damages. Finally, it addresses the allocation of legal costs for all stages of the proceedings.
The main provisions of this judgment that are most important for its use are:
* The finding that the right to good administration, specifically the requirement of impartiality under Article 41(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, was violated by Cedefop.
* The specific reasons for this finding: the acting Executive Director who rejected Ms. Hamers’ compensation request had previously testified against her in the OLAF investigation and was identified as a “witness for the prosecution” in the national criminal proceedings, creating legitimate doubt as to his impartiality.
* The consequence of this violation: the annulment of Cedefop’s decision of 3 July 2019 which rejected Ms. Hamers’ request for compensation (except for the part concerning legal costs, which had already been dealt with).
* The finding that the impartiality defect of the contested decision caused Ms. Hamers specific moral damage, including harm to her self-esteem and peace of mind, and a feeling of injustice and insecurity.
* The determination that the annulment of the decision alone was not sufficient to fully compensate this specific moral damage.
* The award of a sum of €5,000 *ex aequo et bono* (fairly and justly) to Ms. Hamers as compensation for this moral damage.
* The rejection of Ms. Hamers’ other claims for damages (related to prior events, health, etc.) due to lack of proof or a direct causal link to the specific illegality found in the contested decision (the impartiality defect).
* The order for Cedefop to bear its own legal costs and pay all of Ms. Hamers’ legal costs for the proceedings before the General Court (initial and after referral) and the Court of Justice appeal, reflecting that Cedefop was ultimately the losing party on the key legal ground.
Urteil des Gerichts (Siebte Kammer) vom 7. Mai 2025.#RTL Group Markenverwaltungs GmbH gegen Amt der Europäischen Union für geistiges Eigentum.#Unionsmarke – Verfallsverfahren – Unionsbildmarke RTL – Keine ernsthafte Benutzung der Marke – Art. 58 Abs. 1 Buchst. a der Verordnung (EU) 2017/1001 – Tatsachen und Beweise, die zum ersten Mal vor der Beschwerdekammer vorgelegt werden – Art. 95 Abs. 2 der Verordnung 2017/1001 – Art. 27 Abs. 4 der Delegierten Verordnung (EU) 2018/625 – Rechtsmissbrauch.#Rechtssache T-1089/23.
Okay, here is a description of the provisions of this General Court judgment, tailored for a journalist.
This document is a judgment from the General Court of the European Union concerning a dispute over the figurative EU trade mark “RTL”. The core issue is whether the mark’s owner, RTL Group Markenverwaltungs GmbH, genuinely used the mark for all the goods and services for which it was registered. The judgment examines the EUIPO’s decision to partially revoke the mark for lack of use and addresses procedural questions regarding the submission of evidence and the concept of abuse of right in revocation proceedings.
The judgment is structured like a typical court ruling, starting with the parties and background, outlining the arguments, presenting the legal analysis, and concluding with the court’s decision. It primarily interprets and applies Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 on the European Union trade mark (EUTMR) and Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/625. Key provisions analysed include Article 58(1)(a) EUTMR concerning the grounds for revocation due to lack of genuine use, Article 95(2) EUTMR and Article 27(4) of the Delegated Regulation 2018/625 regarding the handling of evidence submitted late in appeal proceedings, and Article 63(1)(a) EUTMR concerning standing to file a revocation request. The judgment clarifies the application of these rules, particularly the discretion of the EUIPO Boards of Appeal regarding late evidence and the limited circumstances under which a revocation request might be considered an abuse of right. It also provides specific guidance on what constitutes genuine use for “advertising, marketing and promotion” services (Class 35).
For anyone dealing with EU trade marks, several provisions analysed in this judgment are particularly important:
1. **Genuine Use Requirement:** The judgment reinforces that to avoid revocation, a trade mark must be genuinely used for the specific goods and services for which it is registered (Article 58(1)(a) EUTMR). This means actual use on the market to create or maintain a commercial outlet, not just symbolic use. It confirms that proof of use is generally needed for each distinct product or service category.
2. **Handling of Late Evidence:** Crucially, the Court clarifies the rules for submitting evidence late in EUIPO appeal proceedings. While there are deadlines, the EUIPO Board of Appeal cannot simply reject late evidence outright. It *must* exercise its discretion under Article 95(2) EUTMR, guided by Article 27(4) of the Delegated Regulation 2018/625. This requires the Board to assess whether the evidence is relevant at first sight and if there are valid reasons for its late submission. This is a significant point for parties appealing EUIPO decisions.
3. **Abuse of Right:** The judgment confirms that generally, anyone can file a request to revoke a trade mark for non-use (Article 63(1)(a) EUTMR) without needing to show a specific interest. The Court states that the concept of “abuse of right” applies only in very exceptional circumstances, such as those involving artificially created entities filing numerous, clearly unfounded actions for tactical purposes, distinguishing this case from such scenarios.
4. **Scope of Services (Class 35):** The judgment provides valuable insight into what constitutes genuine use for “advertising, marketing and promotion” services (Class 35) for a media company. It finds that providing services like creative concept development, strategic advice, and production assistance to advertisers, for remuneration, *does* count as genuine use for these services, going beyond merely broadcasting advertisements.
5. **Reputation vs. Genuine Use:** The Court explicitly states that a mark’s reputation in one sector (like media) does not automatically mean it has been genuinely used for unrelated goods or services (like cosmetics or clothing) for which it might also be registered. The requirements for proving genuine use and those for proving reputation (which grants broader protection against dilution) are distinct legal concepts.
Agreement between the European Union and Bosnia and Herzegovina on the cooperation between the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust) and the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina competent for judicial cooperation in criminal matters
This Agreement between the European Union and Bosnia and Herzegovina establishes a framework for enhanced judicial cooperation in criminal matters, primarily through the EU Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation, Eurojust. Its core purpose is to support and strengthen investigations and prosecutions of serious crime, particularly organised crime and terrorism, by facilitating the exchange of information, including personal data, between Eurojust and the competent authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Crucially, the Agreement lays down detailed rules and safeguards for the protection of personal data exchanged, ensuring respect for fundamental rights and freedoms.
The Agreement is structured into five chapters and includes three annexes. Chapter I sets out the objectives, scope, and common provisions, defining key terms, establishing contact points, providing for the secondment of a Liaison Prosecutor from Bosnia and Herzegovina to Eurojust, outlining participation in meetings, referencing support for Joint Investigation Teams (JITs), and allowing for the posting of a Liaison Magistrate from Eurojust to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Chapter II is extensive and focuses entirely on information exchange and data protection, detailing the purposes of processing, general data protection principles, rules for special categories of data, automated processing, strict conditions for onward transfers of data, data subject rights (access, rectification, erasure, restriction), data breach notification procedures, data storage limits, logging requirements, and data security measures, alongside provisions on independent supervisory authorities and the right to judicial remedy. Chapter III briefly addresses the confidentiality of classified and sensitive non-classified information, referring to a separate working arrangement. Chapter IV deals with liability and compensation for damages resulting from erroneous information exchange. Chapter V contains final provisions covering expenses, the working arrangement, the Agreement’s relation to other international instruments, notification procedures, entry into force, amendments, review, evaluation, dispute settlement, suspension, and termination. Annex I lists the forms of serious crime covered, Annex II lists the competent authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Annex III lists the EU bodies with which Eurojust can share personal data. The text of the Agreement does not provide information on changes compared to any previous versions.
For practical use, several provisions are particularly important. Article 1 clearly defines the objective: enhancing judicial cooperation to combat serious crime. Article 3 provides essential definitions, clarifying terms like ‘competent authority’, ‘serious crime’ (with a list in Annex I), and ‘Liaison Prosecutor’. Article 5 is key as it mandates Bosnia and Herzegovina to second a Liaison Prosecutor to Eurojust, who will facilitate cooperation and have direct contact with national authorities and access to relevant registers. Article 7 highlights Eurojust’s role in assisting with Joint Investigation Teams, a vital tool for complex cross-border cases. The entire Chapter II (Articles 9-22) is critically important, as it governs the secure and lawful exchange of personal data, which is fundamental to judicial cooperation. This includes the purposes for which data can be processed (Art 9), the general principles of processing (Art 10), strict rules for handling sensitive data (Art 11), conditions for onward transfers to other authorities or third countries (Art 13), and the rights of individuals regarding their data (Arts 14, 15). Article 21 ensures independent oversight by supervisory authorities, and Article 22 guarantees the right to an effective judicial remedy. Finally, Article 29 sets out the conditions for the Agreement’s entry into force and application, including the requirement for a working arrangement (Art 26) detailing practical cooperation.
Amendments to the Customs Convention on the International Transport of goods under cover of TIR carnets (TIR Convention 1975)
Here is a description of the provided amendments to the TIR Convention 1975:
This document contains amendments to the Customs Convention on the International Transport of Goods under Cover of TIR Carnets, commonly known as the TIR Convention 1975. The TIR system facilitates international road transport by allowing goods to move across borders with minimal customs checks en route, under a sealed vehicle and a single guarantee document (the TIR Carnet). These specific amendments introduce new rules regarding dispute resolution within the guarantee chain, clarify the terms for terminating agreements between the international organization and national associations, and modify the validity period and usage rules for the vehicle approval certificate.
The text presents four distinct amendments to the Convention’s Explanatory Notes and Annexes. The first amendment adds a new Explanatory Note 8.10 (e), establishing a procedure for parties involved in disputes potentially impacting the guarantee chain to inform each other, negotiate, and seek assistance from the TIR Executive Board. The second amendment modifies Explanatory Note 0.6.2 bis-1 to explicitly state that agreements between the international organization and national associations can be terminated with at least six months’ notice, unless authorizations are revoked earlier. The third amendment, split into two parts (a and b), changes the validity period for the certificate of approval of a road vehicle from two years to three years in both Annex 3 and Annex 4. Finally, the fourth amendment adds a new paragraph 6 to Annex 4, stipulating that if a TIR transport begins on or before the certificate’s expiry date, the certificate remains valid until the transport concludes at the final customs office. These points represent direct changes to the existing text of the Convention’s supplementary materials.
For those involved in international road transport under the TIR system, several provisions are particularly important. The introduction of a formal dispute resolution mechanism (Explanatory Note 8.10 (e)) is significant for maintaining the stability and reliability of the guarantee system. The clarification on agreement termination (Explanatory Note 0.6.2 bis-1) provides certainty regarding the operational framework between the international body and national associations. Most notably for transport operators, the extension of the vehicle approval certificate’s validity from two to three years (Amendment 3) reduces administrative burden. Furthermore, the new rule allowing the certificate to remain valid until the end of a transport that started before its expiry (Amendment 4) is a practical change that prevents issues with certificates expiring mid-journey. : As the TIR system is widely used for transport involving Ukraine, these changes directly impact Ukrainian carriers and the movement of goods to and from Ukraine.
