Review of the EU legislation for 01/05/2025

Review of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/636

This regulation updates the animal health certificates needed for importing certain animals and goods into the EU. It amends Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/2235, replacing key annexes with updated models for certificates and attestations. These changes cover various products, including fresh meat, eggs, dairy, honey, and seafood. Key updates address antimicrobial resistance, transit rules, and specific requirements for different product types. A transitional period is in place, allowing use of old certificates until 19 February 2026, but only if issued before 19 November 2025.

Review of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/826

This regulation corrects a previous regulation, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/261, which dealt with anti-dumping duties on biodiesel from China. The correction adds more TARIC codes to track imports of sustainable aviation fuels (SAF) from China. The aim is to better monitor these fuel flows into the EU market. This ensures fairer trade and data gathering for policy and enforcement related to anti-dumping measures.

Review of Banco Cooperativo Español, S.A. v. Single Resolution Board (SRB) Judgment

The General Court dismissed Banco Cooperativo Español’s challenge against the SRB’s calculation of its 2016 contributions to the Single Resolution Fund. The bank claimed certain liabilities were wrongly included in the calculation. The Court upheld the SRB’s methodology. The judgment clarifies the interpretation of Delegated Regulation 2015/63 regarding which liabilities can be excluded and reinforces the importance of legal certainty and the Commission’s discretion in financial matters.

Review of Case C-745/23 Judgment – Declaring Cash at EU Borders

This judgment clarifies how to value cash in non-euro currencies, like Ukrainian hryvnia, when deciding if it needs to be declared entering or leaving the EU. Member States can use exchange rates from websites if they are transparent and easily accessible. The chosen rate must reflect actual transactions, be clearly designated, and allow individuals to reliably determine the applicable rate.

Review of Court’s judgment – Health claims about “botanical substances” in food supplements

This judgment clarifies the rules for health claims about botanical substances in food supplements. You cannot advertise health claims for botanical substances unless those claims are authorized and on the EU’s approved lists. Transitional measures are possible if the claim was in use before the regulation came into force and an application for authorization was submitted by January 19, 2008. Food business operators must justify the use of any health claim.

Review of the General Court’s judgment in the case between Real Pharm Group and the EUIPO regarding the “REAL PHARM” trade mark application

The General Court upheld the EUIPO’s decision to reject Real Pharm Group’s application for the “REAL PHARM” figurative mark due to the likelihood of confusion with an earlier “real,-” figurative mark owned by real GmbH.
The court found similarities between the marks, particularly the shared element “real,” combined with the identical or similar goods and services covered, created a risk that consumers would be confused about the origin of the products.

Review of the General Court’s judgment in the case between Serana Europe GmbH and Cytogen Produkte für Medizin + Forschung GmbH regarding the “Amniogrow” trademark

This judgment concerns an EU trademark dispute. The court ultimately rejects Serana Europe GmbH’s appeal, supporting the EUIPO’s decision to allow further examination of the opposition. The court clarifies the criteria for establishing that an unregistered sign has been used in the course of trade and has more than local significance. It emphasizes that the use must be in a commercial context aimed at economic advantage and that the geographical scope of the use must not be purely local.

Review of the Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 30 April 2025 in Joined Cases C-554/23 P and C-568/23 P, concerning appeals by Fertilizers Europe and the European Commission

The Court of Justice overturned the General Court’s judgment regarding anti-dumping duties on ammonium nitrate from Russia. The Court clarified that the Commission can consider evidence from EU producers even close to the expiry of anti-dumping measures when deciding on a review. This confirms the Commission’s authority in these matters and is crucial for EU industries seeking anti-dumping protection.

Review of the General Court’s judgment in the case of Symrise AG v. European Commission

The General Court dismissed Symrise AG’s action against the Commission’s decision to conduct an inspection of its premises. The court upheld the Commission’s right to conduct the inspection, emphasizing the balance between the Commission’s powers to investigate potential competition infringements and the rights of companies to be protected from arbitrary or disproportionate intrusions. The Commission needs to have concrete indications of potential wrongdoing before launching an inspection.

Review of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) judgment on stolen vehicles accidents

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled on motor vehicle insurance, concerning accidents involving stolen vehicles. The CJEU ruled that in cases involving accidents with stolen vehicles, the compensation body must prove that the injured party knew the vehicle was stolen to avoid paying compensation. This is a key protection for accident victims and ensures they are not unfairly burdened with proving their lack of knowledge about the vehicle’s status.

Review of the General Court’s judgment in the case between DoDo Services s.r.o. and doqo regarding the registration of the EU trade mark “doqo”

The General Court sided with doqo, finding that there was no likelihood of confusion between the two marks “Do Do” and “doqo” trademarks. The court considered the relevant public and territory, the similarity of the goods and services, and the visual, phonetic, and conceptual similarity of the signs.
The court found that the differences between the signs were significant enough to prevent consumer confusion, despite the identity or similarity of the goods and services involved.

Review of the General Court’s judgment in the case between Serana Europe GmbH and Cytogen Produkte für Medizin + Forschung GmbH regarding the “Marrowgrow” trademark

The court rejects Serana’s appeal, supporting the EUIPO’s decision to allow further examination of Cytogen’s opposition.
The court clarifies that “use in the course of trade” means commercial use aimed at an economic advantage, not necessarily “serious use”. It also clarifies that “more than local significance” requires significant use in the relevant business sector and a geographical reach that is not limited to a small area.

Review of the General Court’s judgment in the “hey car select” trade mark case

The General Court dismissed Mobility Trader Holding GmbH’s action for registration of the “hey car select” trade mark, finding that there was indeed a likelihood of confusion and dismissing Mobility Trader Holding GmbH’s action.
The case highlights the importance of phonetic similarity in trade mark disputes, especially for services that are often advertised or recommended orally and reinforces the principle that the likelihood of confusion must be assessed globally, considering all relevant factors and the overall impression created by the marks.

Review of mortgage loan agreements

The CJEU provides guidance to the national court on how to assess the fairness and transparency of these fees, particularly concerning the level of detail required in disclosing the services covered by the fee and the method of expressing the fee amount.
The Court clarifies that Article 5 of Directive 93/13 does not require a detailed breakdown of all services covered by a loan arrangement fee. However, the consumer must be able to understand the nature of the services, assess the economic consequences, and ensure there is no overlap between costs. The key is that the consumer is in a position to understand what they are paying for.

Review of Judgment in Case C-278/24 [Genzyński] – Directors’ VAT Liability

This judgment clarifies how national laws can hold company directors liable for a company’s VAT debts. The CJEU determined that such liability is permissible under certain conditions, but it cannot be applied in an arbitrary or disproportionate manner. National law can presume that a company director is responsible for VAT debts incurred during their tenure, but this presumption must be rebuttable. The director must have a real opportunity to prove they acted diligently and that the company’s failure to pay VAT was not due to their fault.

Review of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) judgment regarding the interpretation of Article 116(7) of the Union Customs Code

The CJEU interprets the term “in error” broadly, concluding that it covers not only unintentional errors by customs authorities but also situations where the authorities deliberately made a tariff classification that later proved to be incorrect.

Review of General Court of the European Union’s judgment about official of the Council of the European Union

The court annuls the Council’s decision not to promote the officials, finding that the Council incorrectly applied the Staff Regulations when determining the number of available promotions to grade AST 8. The court clarifies that while the principle of promotion based on merit remains paramount, it cannot be used to circumvent the application of the promotion rates when determining the number of vacant posts.

Review of judgment – unfair terms in consumer leasing agreements

The judgment emphasizes that unfair terms in consumer contracts should not be binding on the consumer, and national courts must ensure that consumers are placed in the situation they would have been in had the unfair term never existed.

Review of Court of Justice of the European Union’s judgment about Consumer Rights Directive

The CJEU ruled that a parent who concludes an enrolment contract with a private school for their child’s compulsory education is considered a “consumer” under the Directive.

Review of Deutsche Lufthansa AG and the European Commission

The court dismisses Lufthansa’s action for annulment of the Commission’s decision, which had approved the aid. The court found that Lufthansa did not sufficiently demonstrate that its procedural rights were violated or that its market position was substantially affected by the aid.

Review of the judgment to help you understand its implications:

This judgment clarifies the scope of an exception to the EU’s ban on exporting euro-denominated banknotes to Russia. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled that exporting euros to pay for medical treatment in Russia does not fall under the exemption for “personal use” as defined in Article 5i(2)(a) of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014.

Review of consumer contract regarding loan arrangement fees

The Court clarifies that while a detailed breakdown of services covered by the arrangement fee is not mandatory, the consumer must be able to understand the economic consequences of the fee, the nature of the services provided in exchange for it, and that there is no overlap between different costs in the contract. The national court must assess whether the consumer was given sufficient information to understand the fee’s content and function within the loan agreement, considering the perspective of an average, reasonably informed consumer.

Review of the judgement regarding refuge status to people who have commited a serious crime before

The Court concludes that national authorities must consider a served sentence when assessing whether to exclude someone from refugee status under Article 12(2)(b). However, this fact alone does not prevent exclusion. Authorities must conduct a comprehensive assessment of all relevant circumstances, including the nature of the crime, the length of the sentence, the time elapsed since the crime, the person’s conduct since then, and any expressions of remorse.

Review of the General Court’s judgment in the SBK Art OOO v Council case

The Court dismissed SBK Art OOO’s action, upholding the EU’s sanctions regime. The Court rejects the applicant’s request under Article 45 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union. clarifies the scope and legality of using “association” with a sanctioned entity as a basis for imposing sanctions.

Review of Protocol implementing the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Cabo Verde

The Protocol, covering the period from 2024 to 2029, establishes the terms and conditions for EU vessels to fish in the waters of Cabo Verde. Stakeholders, including EU fishing vessels and relevant authorities, need to be aware of this date to ensure compliance with the Protocol’s provisions.

Review of each of legal acts published today:

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/636 of 25 March 2025 amending Annexes III and V to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/2235 as regards model animal health certificates, model official certificates, model animal health/official certificates and private attestation, for the entry into the Union or transit through the Union to a third country of consignments of certain categories of animals and goods intended for human consumption

Thank you for your request. Here is a breakdown of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/636.

**1. Essence of the Act:**

This regulation amends Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/2235, updating the model animal health certificates, official certificates, and private attestations required for bringing certain animals and goods intended for human consumption into or through the EU. These updates are essential to align with the latest EU legislation on antimicrobial resistance, animal health standards, and food safety, ensuring clarity and consistency in trade practices.

**2. Structure and Main Provisions:**

The regulation is concise, comprising just 3 articles and 2 annexes.

* **Article 1:** This is the core, replacing Annexes III and V of the original Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/2235 with the updated versions found in Annex I and II of this new regulation. Annex III contains the model certificates, while Annex V includes the model attestation.
* **Article 2:** It introduces a transitional period, allowing the use of certificates compliant with the pre-amended Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/2235 until 19 February 2026, provided they were issued by 19 November 2025. This is designed to prevent trade disruptions.
* **Article 3:** It states that the regulation will take effect 20 days after its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

The significant changes are in Annex I and II, which replace the older annexes in the original regulation. These changes impact numerous model certificates, including those for:

* Fresh meat from various animals (beef, sheep, pork, poultry, etc.)
* Mechanically separated meat
* Eggs and egg products
* Meat preparations and products
* Casings
* Live fish and crustaceans
* Live bivalve molluscs
* Raw milk and dairy products
* Honey and apiculture products
* Composite products

The amendments to the certificates include:

* **Antimicrobial Attestation:** Updates to include references to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2598, which lists third countries authorized regarding antimicrobial use.
* **Transit Option:** An added alternative certification option for products transiting through the EU to a non-EU destination, aligning with Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/404.
* **Meat Preparation Establishments:** Clarification of the types of establishments from which fresh meat can be sourced for meat preparations, reflecting changes in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/2292.
* **Fishery Products:** Deletion of certain alternatives in the certificate for fishery products caught by EU-flagged vessels, recognizing that the third country where the transfer occurs has limited responsibility for monitoring contaminants.
* **Honey and Apiculture Products:** Updates to reflect that honey must come from establishments listed in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2017/625.
* **Composite Products:** Amendments to reflect exclusions for gelatine, collagen and wild catch fishery products from certain requirements, and updates related to honey and apiculture product content.
* **Private Attestation:** Modifications to the model private attestation in Annex V, including limiting the gelatine/collagen exemption to non-ruminant sources and clarifying the origin of dairy products in shelf-stable composite products.

**3. Main Provisions Important for Use:**

* **Updated Certificates:** The most critical point is that the model certificates in Annex III of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/2235 have been replaced. Anyone involved in importing or exporting animals and goods for human consumption must use the new certificate models in Annex I of this regulation.
* **Transitional Period:** Pay close attention to the transitional period in Article 2. Old certificates are valid only until 19 February 2026, and only if issued before 19 November 2025. After these dates, only the new certificates will be accepted.
* **Antimicrobial Requirements:** The updated attestation on antimicrobial use is essential. Exporters must ensure their products come from countries or regions that meet the EU’s standards on antimicrobial substances.
* **Specific Product Requirements:** Depending on the product (meat, dairy, honey, etc.), there are specific changes to the certificate requirements. Carefully review the relevant model certificate to ensure compliance.
* **Transit Rules:** If goods are only transiting through the EU, the new transit options in the certificates should be considered.

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/826 of 29 April 2025 correcting Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/261 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of biodiesel originating in the People’s Republic of China

This Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/826 serves to correct a previous regulation, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/261, which imposed a definitive anti-dumping duty on biodiesel imports originating from the People’s Republic of China. The correction involves modifying the list of TARIC codes used to monitor imports of sustainable aviation fuels (SAF) from China, in addition to biodiesel. The aim is to enhance the monitoring of SAF flows into the EU market.

The regulation consists of two articles. Article 1 amends Article 1(1) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/261 by adding additional TARIC codes to CN codes 2710 19 11, 2710 19 15, 2710 19 21, 2710 19 25 and 2710 19 29 for monitoring imports of sustainable aviation fuels. It replaces the original text of Article 1(1) of Regulation 2025/261 with an updated list of CN and TARIC codes subject to the anti-dumping duty, while also specifying codes for sustainable aviation fuels that are excluded from the duty but subject to monitoring. Article 2 stipulates that the regulation will come into force the day after its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union and confirms that the regulation is binding and directly applicable in all Member States.

The most important provision of this regulation is the amendment to Article 1(1) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/261. This change ensures that the EU can more effectively monitor the import of sustainable aviation fuels from China by including additional TARIC codes. This is crucial for ensuring fair trade practices and for gathering data on the flow of these fuels into the European market, which is essential for policy and enforcement related to anti-dumping measures.

Judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber, Extended Composition) of 30 April 2025.Banco Cooperativo Español, SA v Single Resolution Board.Economic and monetary union – Banking union – Single Resolution Mechanism for credit institutions and certain investment firms (SRM) – Single Resolution Fund (SRF) – Decision of the SRB on the calculation of the 2016 ex ante contributions – Exclusion of certain liabilities from the calculation of the ex ante contributions – Article 5(1)(a), (b) and (f) of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/63 – Plea of illegality – Principle of non-retroactivity – Non-contractual liability – Sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals – Unjust enrichment.Case T-499/20.

Here’s a breakdown of the General Court’s judgment in the case of Banco Cooperativo Español, S.A. v. Single Resolution Board (SRB):

**1. Essence of the Act**

This judgment concerns a challenge by Banco Cooperativo Español against a decision by the Single Resolution Board (SRB) regarding the calculation of its 2016 ex-ante contributions to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF). The bank argued that certain liabilities should have been excluded from the calculation and sought annulment of the SRB’s decision, as well as compensation for damages allegedly suffered as a result of the decision. The General Court ultimately dismissed the bank’s action, upholding the SRB’s decision.

**2. Structure and Main Provisions**

The judgment addresses the following key aspects:

* **Background:** The judgment outlines the context of the dispute, including the role of Banco Cooperativo Español within a network of rural savings banks, its activities, and the relevant EU regulations concerning the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and the Single Resolution Fund (SRF).
* **Contested Decision:** It describes the SRB’s decision-making process for calculating ex-ante contributions, including the methodology used, the setting of the annual target level, and the adjustment of contributions based on risk profiles.
* **Claims for Annulment:** The bank raised three pleas in law:
* Illegality of Article 5(1) of Delegated Regulation 2015/63 (which specifies which liabilities can be excluded from the calculation). The bank argued this provision was unlawful because it didn’t allow for the exclusion of certain liabilities related to its activities on behalf of rural savings banks.
* Infringement of Directive 2014/59 and Regulation 806/2014 (raised only if the first plea was successful).
* Breach of the principle of legal certainty due to the retroactive effect of the SRB’s decision.
* **Claims for Compensation:** The bank sought compensation for damages, including default interest, arguing unjust enrichment on the part of the SRB.
* **Court’s Reasoning:** The General Court addressed each of the bank’s arguments, ultimately rejecting them. It found that:
* Article 5(1) of Delegated Regulation 2015/63 was not unlawful. The Commission has broad discretion in determining the criteria for adjusting ex-ante contributions based on risk profiles. The bank failed to demonstrate a manifest error or misuse of power by the Commission.
* The SRB’s decision did not infringe Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (freedom to conduct a business) or the principle of proportionality.
* The retroactive effect of the SRB’s decision did not breach the principle of legal certainty, as it was necessary to maintain the legal basis for the contributions and respected legitimate expectations.
* The bank’s claims for compensation were unfounded, as there was no unlawful conduct by the SRB and no unjust enrichment.

**3. Main Provisions Important for Use**

* **Article 5(1) of Delegated Regulation 2015/63:** This provision is central to the case, as it defines the types of liabilities that can be excluded from the calculation of ex-ante contributions to the SRF. The judgment clarifies the interpretation and application of this article, particularly in the context of intragroup liabilities, institutional protection schemes, and promotional loans.
* **Principle of Legal Certainty:** The judgment provides important guidance on the application of this principle in the context of decisions that have retroactive effect. It confirms that retroactive effect is permissible in certain circumstances, such as when it is necessary to achieve the purpose of the decision and when legitimate expectations are duly respected.
* **Non-Contractual Liability:** The judgment reiterates the conditions for establishing the non-contractual liability of the EU, including the requirement for a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals.
* **Discretion of the Commission:** The judgment emphasizes the broad discretion afforded to the Commission in the exercise of its delegated powers, particularly in areas involving complex assessments and evaluations.

Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 30 April 2025.Maksu- ja Tolliamet v UT.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Regulation (EU) 2018/1672 – Article 3(1) – Sum of cash not declared – Determining the value of a sum of cash denominated in foreign currencies – Exchange rate of a currency not published by the European Central Bank – Ukrainian hryvnia.Case C-745/23.

Here’s a breakdown of the Court of Justice’s judgment in Case C-745/23, focusing on its implications for declaring cash when entering or leaving the EU:

This judgment clarifies how to determine the value of cash in non-euro currencies, specifically the Ukrainian hryvnia, when assessing the obligation to declare cash entering or leaving the EU under Regulation 2018/1672. The Court specifies that Member States can use exchange rates from websites, even if other rates exist, as long as certain conditions are met to ensure fairness, transparency, and predictability for individuals. The ruling arises from a case in Estonia involving a Ukrainian citizen who failed to declare a sum of Ukrainian hryvnias when entering the country.

The judgment addresses a request for a preliminary ruling from the Estonian Supreme Court concerning the interpretation of Article 3(1) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1672. The core issue is how to determine the exchange rate for a currency not published by the European Central Bank (ECB) when assessing whether a person is carrying €10,000 or more in cash, triggering the declaration obligation. The Court clarifies that while Member States can determine the exchange rate, they must do so in a way that respects the effectiveness of Regulation 2018/1672 and the rights of individuals under EU law. It explicitly states that Article 53 of the Union Customs Code (UCC) does not apply in this context, as cash is not considered “goods” under the UCC.

The most important provisions of the judgment are those outlining the conditions under which a Member State can use an exchange rate from a website for determining the value of cash in a non-euro currency. These conditions are:
* The rate must reflect actual and frequent exchange transactions.
* The Member State must clearly designate the chosen rate as the applicable one.
* The rate information must be freely and easily accessible to individuals.
* Individuals must be able to determine the applicable rate with certainty when entering or leaving the EU.

The Court also notes that if the exchange rate fluctuates continuously, individuals should have the right to rely on the most advantageous rate published for a short period around the time they decided not to declare the cash.

Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 30 April 2025.Novel Nutriology GmbH v Verband Sozialer Wettbewerb eV.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Consumer protection – Regulation (EC) No 1924/2006 – Nutrition and health claims made on foods – Article 10(1) and (3) – Specific conditions applicable to health claims – Articles 13 and 14 – Lists of authorised health claims – Article 28(5) and (6) – Transitional measures – Advertising promoting a food supplement using health claims relating to botanical substances contained in that supplement – Health claims the evaluation of which has been suspended by the European Commission – Applicability of Regulation No 1924/2006.Case C-386/23.

Here’s a breakdown of the judgment to help you understand its implications:

**Essence of the Act**

This judgment clarifies how Regulation (EC) No 1924/2006 applies to health claims made about “botanical substances” in food supplements. It addresses a situation where the European Commission has not yet finalized its evaluation of these claims for inclusion in authorized lists. The Court of Justice rules that, in general, health claims about botanical substances cannot be used in advertising until the Commission completes its assessment and includes them in the authorized lists. However, there are transitional measures that might allow some claims to continue being used under specific conditions.

**Structure and Main Provisions**

The judgment revolves around interpreting Articles 10(1), 10(3), and 28(5) and (6) of Regulation No 1924/2006.

* **Regulation No 1924/2006:** This regulation harmonizes rules for nutrition and health claims made on foods to protect consumers and ensure fair competition. It requires that health claims be scientifically substantiated and authorized before they can be used.
* **Article 10:** This article generally prohibits health claims unless they comply with the regulation and are included in authorized lists (Articles 13 & 14). It also states that general references to health benefits must be accompanied by a specific, authorized health claim.
* **Articles 13 & 14:** These articles concern the establishment of lists of authorized health claims.
* **Article 28:** This article provides transitional measures, allowing some claims used before the regulation’s entry into force to continue being used under certain conditions.

The judgment considers the interplay of these articles in the context of botanical substances, where the Commission’s evaluation is still pending. It also references Regulations (EU) No 432/2012 and No 536/2013, which acknowledge the ongoing evaluation of botanical claims.

**Key Provisions for Practical Use**

The most important takeaway is that companies marketing food supplements with botanical substances need to be very careful about the health claims they make.

* **General Prohibition:** As a rule, you cannot advertise health claims for botanical substances unless those claims are authorized and on the EU’s approved lists.
* **Transitional Measures are Key:** The possibility of using claims under Article 28(6) is crucial. This depends on whether the claim was in use before the regulation came into force and whether an application for authorization was submitted by January 19, 2008.
* **Burden of Proof:** Food business operators must justify the use of any health claim.
* **Ongoing Evaluation:** The judgment acknowledges that the Commission’s evaluation of botanical claims is ongoing. Companies should monitor developments and be prepared to adapt their marketing practices accordingly.

Judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) of 30 April 2025.Real Pharm Group sp. z o.o. v European Union Intellectual Property Office.EU trade mark – Opposition proceedings – Application for the EU figurative mark REAL PHARM – Earlier EU figurative mark real,- – Relative ground for refusal – Likelihood of confusion – Similarity of the signs – Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001.Case T-312/24.

Here’s a breakdown of the General Court’s judgment in the case between Real Pharm Group and the EUIPO regarding the “REAL PHARM” trade mark application.

This judgment concerns an EU trade mark dispute. The General Court upheld the EUIPO’s decision to reject Real Pharm Group’s application for the “REAL PHARM” figurative mark due to the likelihood of confusion with an earlier “real,-” figurative mark owned by real GmbH. The court agreed that the similarities between the marks, particularly the shared element “real,” combined with the identical or similar goods and services covered, created a risk that consumers would be confused about the origin of the products.

**Structure and Key Provisions:**

* The case revolves around an application by Real Pharm Group for an EU trade mark for a figurative sign including the words “REAL PHARM”.
* real GmbH opposed the application based on its earlier EU figurative mark “real,-“.
* The EUIPO’s Opposition Division upheld the opposition, and the Board of Appeal dismissed Real Pharm Group’s appeal.
* The General Court’s judgment addresses Real Pharm Group’s challenge to the Board of Appeal’s decision.
* The court examines the relevant public and their level of attention, the similarity of the goods and services, and the similarity of the signs.
* The key legal provision is Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001, which prohibits the registration of a trade mark if it is likely to cause confusion with an earlier trade mark.

**Main Provisions and Changes:**

* The court conducts a detailed comparison of the goods and services covered by the two marks, finding them to be identical or similar.
* It analyzes the visual, phonetic, and conceptual similarity of the signs, focusing on the dominant and distinctive elements.
* The court acknowledges some differences between the signs but concludes that the shared element “real” is significant enough to create a likelihood of confusion.
* The court dismisses Real Pharm Group’s arguments regarding the limited scope of the earlier mark and the impact of insolvency proceedings involving real GmbH.
* The court upholds the Board of Appeal’s decision, finding that there is a likelihood of confusion and that the trade mark application should be rejected.

**Most Important Provisions:**

* **Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001:** This article is the core of the case, as it defines the grounds for refusing a trade mark application based on the likelihood of confusion.
* **The assessment of the similarity of the signs:** The court’s detailed analysis of the visual, phonetic, and conceptual similarity of the marks provides valuable guidance for assessing the likelihood of confusion in trade mark disputes.
* **The consideration of the relevant public’s perception:** The court emphasizes the importance of considering how the average consumer would perceive the marks when assessing the likelihood of confusion.

Urteil des Gerichts (Achte Kammer) vom 30. April 2025.#Serana Europe GmbH gegen Amt der Europäischen Union für geistiges Eigentum.#Unionsmarke – Widerspruchsverfahren – Anmeldung der Unionswortmarke Amniogrow – Ältere nicht eingetragene Zeichen Amniogrow und Amniogrow Plus – Relatives Eintragungshindernis – Benutzung eines Kennzeichenrechts im geschäftlichen Verkehr von mehr als lediglich örtlicher Bedeutung – Art. 8 Abs. 4 der Verordnung (EU) 2017/1001.#Rechtssache T-249/24.

This is a judgment by the General Court of the European Union regarding an opposition to the registration of the EU trademark “Amniogrow”. The case revolves around a dispute between Serana Europe GmbH, the applicant for the “Amniogrow” trademark, and Cytogen Produkte für Medizin + Forschung GmbH, which opposed the registration based on its earlier unregistered signs “Amniogrow” and “Amniogrow Plus”. The court ultimately rejects Serana Europe GmbH’s appeal, supporting the EUIPO’s decision to allow further examination of the opposition.

The structure of the judgment includes an introduction outlining the request for annulment and reformation of the EUIPO’s decision, followed by a summary of the background of the dispute, including the trademark application, the opposition, and the decisions of the Opposition Division and the Board of Appeal. It then details the arguments of the parties, followed by the Court’s legal reasoning. The court examines whether the Board of Appeal correctly assessed if Cytogen’s earlier signs were used in the course of trade with more than just local significance, as required by Article 8(4) of Regulation 2017/1001. The court analyzes the evidence provided by Cytogen, including sales figures, invoices, and promotional materials, to determine if the use of the earlier signs was sufficient to prevent the registration of Serana’s “Amniogrow” trademark.

The most important provisions of the act for its use are the interpretation and application of Article 8(4) of Regulation 2017/1001. The court clarifies the criteria for establishing that an unregistered sign has been used in the course of trade and has more than local significance. It emphasizes that the use must be in a commercial context aimed at economic advantage and that the geographical scope of the use must not be purely local. The court also clarifies that the relevant market for assessing the significance of the use should be defined based on the specific characteristics and intended purpose of the products or services in question.

Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 30 April 2025.Fertilizers Europe v European Commission.Appeal – Dumping – Imports of ammonium nitrate originating in Russia – Definitive anti-dumping duties – Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 – Request for an expiry review of anti-dumping measures – Time limit laid down in that provision for making such a request – Sufficiency of the evidence – Information submitted after the expiry of that time limit.Case C-554/23 P.

This is the analysis of the Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 30 April 2025 in Joined Cases C-554/23 P and C-568/23 P, concerning appeals by Fertilizers Europe and the European Commission against a General Court judgment. The core issue revolves around the legality of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/2100, which imposed definitive anti-dumping duties on ammonium nitrate imports from Russia. The General Court had annulled this regulation, leading to the appeals.

The judgment addresses the interpretation of Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036, specifically concerning the time limit for submitting a request for an expiry review of anti-dumping measures and the sufficiency of evidence required for such a request. The General Court had ruled that the Commission erred in initiating the expiry review based on information submitted after the deadline. The Court of Justice, however, disagreed with the General Court’s interpretation.

The Court of Justice overturned the General Court’s judgment, clarifying that the Commission is entitled to consider evidence provided by EU producers even within the three-month period preceding the expiry of anti-dumping measures when deciding whether to conduct a review. The Court found that the General Court’s narrow interpretation of Article 11(2) was incorrect and that the Commission has the power to gather additional evidence to ensure the anti-dumping measures are justified. The case was referred back to the General Court for further examination of the evidence.

The most important provision clarified by the Court is Article 11(2) of Regulation 2016/1036. The Court’s interpretation confirms the Commission’s authority to gather and consider evidence, even close to the expiry of anti-dumping measures, to ensure the measures remain justified. This clarification is crucial for EU industries seeking to maintain anti-dumping protection and for importers subject to such measures.

Judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) of 30 April 2025.Symrise AG v European Commission.Competition – Agreements, decisions and concerted practices – Administrative procedure – Decision ordering an inspection – Article 20(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 – Subject matter and purpose of the inspection – Obligation to state reasons – Sufficiently serious indicia – Protection of privacy.Case T-263/23.

Here’s a breakdown of the General Court’s judgment in the case of Symrise AG v. European Commission:

This judgment concerns an action by Symrise AG, a fragrance manufacturer, against a European Commission decision to conduct an inspection of its premises. Symrise sought to annul the Commission’s decision, arguing that it violated their rights. The General Court ultimately dismissed Symrise’s action, upholding the Commission’s right to conduct the inspection.

**Structure and Key Provisions:**

* The judgment addresses Symrise’s claims that the Commission’s inspection decision was flawed.
* It examines whether the Commission provided sufficient reasoning for the inspection, as required by Article 20(4) of Regulation No 1/2003. This includes assessing the clarity of the subject matter and purpose of the inspection.
* The judgment also considers whether the inspection decision infringed upon Symrise’s right to inviolability of private premises and privacy. This involves evaluating whether the Commission had sufficient grounds for suspecting a competition law infringement and whether the scope and duration of the inspection were proportionate.

**Main Provisions and Changes:**

* The court assesses the Commission’s obligation to state reasons for ordering an inspection, emphasizing that the decision must clearly indicate the presumed facts the Commission intends to investigate.
* It clarifies that the Commission isn’t required to disclose all information or make a precise legal analysis at the inspection decision stage, but must provide enough detail for the company to understand the scope of its duty to cooperate.
* The judgment reinforces the principle that the Commission needs “sufficiently serious indicia” to suspect a competition rules infringement before ordering an inspection. These indicia are assessed as a whole, not individually.
* The court confirms that the absence of a specific end date for an inspection doesn’t make it indefinite, as the Commission must still act within a reasonable time frame.

**Most Important Provisions:**

* The key takeaway is the court’s emphasis on the balance between the Commission’s powers to investigate potential competition infringements and the rights of companies to be protected from arbitrary or disproportionate intrusions.
* The judgment clarifies the level of detail the Commission must provide in an inspection decision, particularly regarding the subject matter, purpose, and the evidence suggesting an infringement.
* It reinforces the need for the Commission to have concrete indications of potential wrongdoing before launching an inspection.

Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 30 April 2025.AT v CT.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles – Directive 2009/103/EC – Article 13(2) – Compensation scheme – Road traffic accident involving a stolen vehicle – Burden of proof in relation to the injured party’s knowledge of the theft of that vehicle – Body responsible for compensation – National legislation interpreted in such a way as to place the burden of proof on the injured party – Obligation to interpret national law in conformity with EU law.Case C-370/24.

This document is a judgment from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) regarding the interpretation of the EU Directive 2009/103/EC on motor vehicle insurance, specifically concerning accidents involving stolen vehicles. The case originates from Italy and involves a dispute over compensation for injuries sustained in an accident where the injured party was a passenger in a stolen car.

The judgment clarifies the burden of proof in cases where an injured party seeks compensation from a national compensation body (instead of an insurer) following an accident in a stolen vehicle. It confirms that it is the responsibility of the compensation body, not the injured party, to prove that the injured party knew the vehicle was stolen at the time of the accident. The CJEU emphasizes that EU law aims to protect victims of road traffic accidents and that placing the burden of proof on the victim would undermine this objective.

The structure of the judgment includes an overview of the case, the questions referred by the Italian court, relevant EU and national (Italian) legal context, the Court’s reasoning, and the final ruling. The Court interprets Article 13(2) of Directive 2009/103/EC in conjunction with Article 10(1) and emphasizes the objective of protecting accident victims. The judgment reinforces the principle that EU law should be effective and that national courts must interpret national law in conformity with EU law, even if it means changing settled national case-law.

The most important provision of this act is that in cases involving accidents with stolen vehicles, the compensation body must prove that the injured party knew the vehicle was stolen to avoid paying compensation. This is a key protection for accident victims and ensures they are not unfairly burdened with proving their lack of knowledge about the vehicle’s status.

Judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) of 30 April 2025.DoDo Services s.r.o. v European Union Intellectual Property Office.EU trade mark – Opposition proceedings – Application for EU figurative mark doqo – Earlier EU figurative mark Do Do – Relative ground for refusal – No likelihood of confusion – Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001.Case T-298/24.

This judgment from the General Court of the European Union concerns a dispute between DoDo Services s.r.o. and doqo regarding the registration of the EU trade mark “doqo”. DoDo Services opposed the registration, arguing that it was too similar to their existing EU trade mark “Do Do” and could cause confusion among consumers. The court ultimately sided with doqo, finding that there was no likelihood of confusion between the two marks.

The structure of the judgment is as follows:
1. **Background:** The judgment outlines the history of the case, including the application for the “doqo” trade mark, the opposition filed by DoDo Services, and the decisions of the EUIPO Opposition Division and Board of Appeal.
2. **Claims:** It summarizes the claims made by DoDo Services (the applicant), EUIPO, and doqo (the intervener) regarding the annulment or alteration of the Board of Appeal’s decision.
3. **Admissibility:** The court addresses the admissibility of certain claims made by the intervener, ultimately rejecting them due to lack of jurisdiction or legal interest.
4. **Substance:** This section forms the core of the judgment. The court examines the single plea raised by DoDo Services, alleging infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, which concerns the likelihood of confusion between trade marks.
5. **Costs:** The judgment concludes by addressing the allocation of costs among the parties.

The main provisions and changes compared to previous versions are not applicable in this case, as this is not a legislative act, but a judgment of the General Court.

The most important provisions of the act are related to the assessment of the likelihood of confusion between the two trade marks. The court considered the relevant public and territory, the similarity of the goods and services, and the visual, phonetic, and conceptual similarity of the signs. Ultimately, the court found that the differences between the signs were significant enough to prevent consumer confusion, despite the identity or similarity of the goods and services involved.

Arrêt du Tribunal (huitième chambre) du 30 avril 2025.#Serana Europe GmbH contre Office de l’Union européenne pour la propriété intellectuelle.#Marque de l’Union européenne – Procédure d’opposition – Demande de marque de l’Union européenne verbale Marrowgrow – Signes antérieurs non enregistrés Marrowgrow – Motif relatif de refus – Utilisation dans la vie des affaires d’un signe dont la portée n’est pas seulement locale – Article 8, paragraphe 4, du règlement (UE) 2017/1001.#Affaire T-251/24.

This document is a judgment from the General Court of the European Union regarding a trademark dispute. The court addresses an appeal by Serana Europe GmbH against a decision by the EUIPO (European Union Intellectual Property Office), which had initially rejected an opposition to Serana’s trademark application for “Marrowgrow.” The opposition was filed by Cytogen Produkte für Medizin + Forschung GmbH, based on their prior unregistered use of the “Marrowgrow” sign. The court ultimately rejects Serana’s appeal, supporting the EUIPO’s decision to allow further examination of Cytogen’s opposition.

The judgment is structured as follows:

* **I. Background to the dispute:** This section outlines the timeline and details of the case, including Serana’s trademark application, Cytogen’s opposition based on prior unregistered signs, and the EUIPO’s initial decision.
* **II. Conclusions of the parties:** This section summarizes the requests made by each party to the court (Serana, EUIPO, and Cytogen).
* **III. Law:** This is the core of the judgment, where the court analyzes the legal arguments and evidence. It focuses on Article 8(4) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001, which concerns opposition to a trademark based on a prior unregistered sign. The court examines whether Cytogen’s prior use of “Marrowgrow” met the conditions of this article, specifically whether the sign was used in the course of trade and had more than a local significance.
* **IV. Costs:** This section determines which party is responsible for covering the legal costs of the proceedings.

The key provisions and changes from previous versions (if any) are not explicitly stated, as this is a judgment interpreting existing regulations rather than creating new ones. The judgment refers to and applies Article 8(4) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001, which allows the owner of an unregistered sign to oppose a trademark application if certain conditions are met. The court interprets these conditions based on previous case law.

The most important provisions for practical use are the court’s interpretations of “use in the course of trade” and “more than local significance” in the context of Article 8(4). The court clarifies that “use in the course of trade” means commercial use aimed at an economic advantage, not necessarily “serious use” as defined in other articles of the regulation. It also clarifies that “more than local significance” requires significant use in the relevant business sector and a geographical reach that is not limited to a small area. The court emphasizes that the relevant market should be defined specifically, considering the therapeutic indication or intended purpose of the products.

Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 30 April 2025.Finanzamt für Großbetriebe v Franklin Mutual Series Funds – Franklin Mutual European Fund.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Free movement of capital – Restrictions – Tax on income from capital – Undertaking for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) – Legal personality – National legislation providing that UCITS do not have legal personality – Tax transparency of UCITS – Tax treatment of foreign undertakings that are comparable to UCITS but that have legal personality – Whether a cross-border situation is comparable to a domestic situation.Case C-602/23.

Okay, here’s a breakdown of the Court’s judgment in Case C-602/23, designed to give you a clear understanding of its implications:

This judgment addresses whether Austria’s tax treatment of foreign investment funds (specifically, a US-based fund called Franklin Mutual Series Funds) unfairly restricts the free movement of capital within the EU. The core issue is whether Austria can deny a tax refund to a foreign fund that is similar to an Austrian Undertaking for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS) simply because the foreign fund has a legal personality (which Austrian UCITS do not). The Court clarifies the conditions under which such a denial could be considered a restriction on the free movement of capital, focusing on whether the income is ultimately taxed at the level of the unit-holders (investors) rather than at the fund level.

**Structure and Main Provisions:**

* The judgment revolves around the interpretation of Article 63 TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union), which prohibits restrictions on the movement of capital.
* It examines Austrian tax law, particularly provisions concerning the tax treatment of investment funds (UCITS) and the refund of tax on income from capital for non-resident entities.
* It refers to Directive 2009/65/EC, which harmonizes the regulation of UCITS within the EU.
* The Court assesses whether the Austrian legislation creates a discriminatory situation by treating foreign funds with legal personality differently from domestic UCITS, which lack legal personality and are tax-transparent.
* The key element is the comparison between the cross-border situation (foreign fund) and the domestic situation (Austrian UCITS) to determine if they are objectively comparable.
* The Court emphasizes that the comparability must be assessed considering the objective of the national provisions, which in this case is to ensure tax transparency and avoid tax sheltering.

**Main Provisions and Their Importance:**

* **Article 63 TFEU Interpretation:** The judgment reinforces the broad scope of Article 63 TFEU, prohibiting both direct and indirect restrictions on capital movements.
* **Comparability Analysis:** The Court reiterates the importance of a detailed comparability analysis when assessing potential restrictions on free movement. This analysis must consider the objectives of the national legislation.
* **Tax Transparency Focus:** The judgment highlights that if a foreign fund’s income is ultimately taxed at the level of its unit-holders (investors) in its country of residence, similar to how Austrian UCITS operate, then the fact that the foreign fund has legal personality may not justify denying it a tax refund.
* **Burden of Proof:** The referring court (Austrian Supreme Administrative Court) is tasked with determining whether the income received by the non-resident entity is indeed attributed to its unit-holders and taxed at their level in their state of residence.

In essence, the Court is saying that Austria can’t automatically deny a tax refund to a foreign fund simply because it has a different legal structure than Austrian funds. The key is whether the foreign fund operates in a way that achieves the same level of tax transparency, meaning the income is taxed at the investor level. If it does, then denying the refund could be a restriction on the free movement of capital.

Urteil des Gerichts (Achte Kammer) vom 30. April 2025.#Serana Europe GmbH gegen Amt der Europäischen Union für geistiges Eigentum.#Unionsmarke – Widerspruchsverfahren – Anmeldung der Unionswortmarke Lymphogrow – Ältere nicht eingetragene Zeichen Lymphogrow – Relatives Eintragungshindernis – Benutzung eines Kennzeichenrechts im geschäftlichen Verkehr von mehr als lediglich örtlicher Bedeutung – Art. 8 Abs. 4 der Verordnung (EU) 2017/1001.#Rechtssache T-250/24.

This document is a judgment by the General Court of the European Union regarding a trademark dispute. The court addresses the appeal by Serana Europe GmbH against the decision of the EUIPO (European Union Intellectual Property Office) concerning the trademark “Lymphogrow.” The core issue revolves around whether the earlier, unregistered signs “Lymphogrow” used by Cytogen Produkte für Medizin + Forschung GmbH, the opposing party, should prevent Serana Europe from registering its trademark.

The judgment is structured as follows: It begins with the background of the dispute, detailing the trademark application, the opposition filed by Cytogen based on their prior use of the “Lymphogrow” sign, and the EUIPO’s initial rejection of the opposition. It then outlines the arguments made by Serana Europe (the applicant), EUIPO, and Cytogen (the opponent). The court then proceeds with its legal analysis, focusing on Article 8(4) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001, which governs oppositions based on unregistered signs. The court examines whether Cytogen’s use of “Lymphogrow” was “in the course of trade,” had more than a “local significance,” and whether Cytogen had acquired the right to use the sign before Serana Europe’s trademark application. The court ultimately rejects Serana Europe’s appeal, upholding the EUIPO’s decision to send the case back to the Opposition Division for further examination.

The most important provisions of the act are those interpreting Article 8(4) of Regulation 2017/1001. The court clarifies that “use in the course of trade” simply means commercial use aimed at economic advantage. It also emphasizes that the use of the earlier sign must be “sufficiently significant” and have a geographical scope that is “not purely local.” The court also clarifies that the relevant market for assessing the significance of the earlier sign’s use should be defined by the therapeutic indication of the products.

Judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) of 30 April 2025.Mobility Trader Holding GmbH v European Union Intellectual Property Office.EU trade mark – Opposition proceedings – International registration designating the European Union – Figurative mark hey car select – Earlier national figurative mark geicar vehículos seminuevos y de ocasión – Likelihood of confusion – Similarity of the signs – Similarity of the services – Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001.Case T-338/24.

Here’s a breakdown of the General Court’s judgment in the “hey car select” trade mark case:

**Essence of the Act**

This judgment concerns a dispute between Mobility Trader Holding GmbH and Gestión e intermediación Cala and Ruiz SL regarding the registration of the “hey car select” trade mark in the EU. The core issue is whether the “hey car select” mark is likely to be confused with an earlier Spanish trade mark, “geicar vehículos seminuevos y de ocasión.” The General Court ultimately sided with the EUIPO and Gestión e intermediación Cala and Ruiz SL, finding that there was indeed a likelihood of confusion and dismissing Mobility Trader Holding GmbH’s action.

**Structure and Main Provisions**

The judgment is structured as follows:

* It begins by outlining the background to the dispute, including the marks in question, the goods and services they cover, and the opposition proceedings before the EUIPO.
* It then details the forms of order sought by the parties.
* The “Law” section forms the core of the judgment. It addresses the subject matter of the dispute and then delves into the merits of the case, focusing on the alleged infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001.
* The court analyzes the relevant public, compares the services and signs at issue, and assesses the likelihood of confusion.
* Finally, the judgment addresses the issue of costs.

Key provisions and findings include:

* **Relevant Public:** The relevant public consists of the public at large and business customers in Spain, with a rather high level of attention regarding vehicle-related services.
* **Similarity of Services:** The court upheld the Board of Appeal’s finding that several services covered by the marks were either identical or similar to a low or average degree. This included online marketplace services, franchising support, and vehicle rental services.
* **Comparison of Signs:** The court agreed with the Board of Appeal that the signs were visually dissimilar but phonetically highly similar due to the shared “hey car” / “geicar” sounds. It rejected the applicant’s arguments about the conceptual differences and the pronunciation of the letter “h” in Spanish.
* **Likelihood of Confusion:** The court concluded that the phonetic similarity, combined with the similarity of the services, created a likelihood of confusion for at least part of the relevant public, especially considering that the services could be recommended and advertised orally.

**Main Provisions for Practical Use**

The most important takeaways from this judgment are:

* **Phonetic Similarity:** The case highlights the importance of phonetic similarity in trade mark disputes, especially for services that are often advertised or recommended orally.
* **Global Assessment:** The judgment reinforces the principle that the likelihood of confusion must be assessed globally, considering all relevant factors and the overall impression created by the marks.
* **Conceptual Differences:** While conceptual differences can sometimes neutralize visual and phonetic similarities, this requires that at least one of the signs has a clear and specific meaning for the relevant public, which was not the case here.
* **Interdependence of Similarity:** The court reiterates the interdependence between the similarity of the marks and the similarity of the goods or services covered. A high degree of similarity in one area can compensate for a lower degree in the other.

Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 30 April 2025.FG v Caja Rural de Navarra SCC.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Consumer protection – Directive 93/13/EEC – Articles 3 to 5 – Unfair terms in consumer contracts – Mortgage loan agreements – Term concerning loan arrangement fees – Application seeking a declaration of invalidity of that term – Assessment of the unfairness of contractual terms – Plainness and intelligibility of the terms.Case C-699/23.

This is a judgment from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) regarding the interpretation of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive (93/13/EEC) in the context of mortgage loan agreements in Spain. The case specifically addresses the fairness and transparency of loan arrangement fees charged to consumers. The CJEU provides guidance to the national court on how to assess the fairness and transparency of these fees, particularly concerning the level of detail required in disclosing the services covered by the fee and the method of expressing the fee amount.

The judgment is structured as follows:

* It begins by outlining the context of the request for a preliminary ruling, which comes from a Spanish court (Juzgado de Primera Instancia no 8 de Donostia – San Sebastián) in a case between FG (a borrower) and Caja Rural de Navarra SCC (a bank) regarding the alleged unfairness of a loan arrangement fee.
* It then identifies the EU directives in question: Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts and Directive 2014/17/EU on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property.
* The judgment summarizes the relevant articles of Directive 93/13, focusing on Articles 3 (unfair terms), 4 (assessment of unfairness), 5 (plain and intelligible language), and 7 (means to prevent the use of unfair terms). It also mentions Article 7 and 43 of Directive 2014/17.
* It also includes the relevant provisions of Spanish law, specifically Law 5/2019 regulating property credit agreements and an Order of the Office of the Prime Minister on the transparency of financial terms in mortgage loans.
* The judgment then details the facts of the main proceedings, the questions referred by the Spanish court, and the arguments made by the involved parties (FG, Caja Rural de Navarra SCC, the Spanish Government, and the European Commission).
* The Court addresses the admissibility of the questions, rejecting most objections but declaring the third and ninth questions inadmissible because Directive 2014/17 does not apply to agreements predating March 21, 2016.
* The Court then provides its substantive answers to the remaining questions, focusing on the interpretation of Directive 93/13.

The main provisions of the judgment are:

1. **Transparency of Loan Arrangement Fees:** The Court clarifies that Article 5 of Directive 93/13 does not require a detailed breakdown of all services covered by a loan arrangement fee. However, the consumer must be able to understand the nature of the services, assess the economic consequences, and ensure there is no overlap between costs. The key is that the consumer is in a position to understand what they are paying for.
2. **Expression of Fee as a Percentage:** The Court states that expressing the arrangement fee as a percentage of the total loan amount is not inherently unfair, as long as the consumer can still assess the economic consequences and understand the services covered.
3. **National Case Law and Assessment of Unfairness:** The Court rules that national case law can consider the average cost of arrangement fees in the market when assessing unfairness, but this should not be the sole factor. The national court must still conduct an effective review of whether the term creates a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations.

These provisions are important because they provide guidance to national courts on how to interpret and apply the Unfair Terms Directive in the context of mortgage loan agreements. The judgment clarifies the level of detail required in disclosing the services covered by loan arrangement fees and emphasizes the importance of ensuring that consumers can understand the economic consequences of these fees. It also confirms that national courts can consider market averages when assessing unfairness but must conduct a comprehensive review of the specific circumstances of each case.

Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 30 April 2025.P. K. v Dyrektor Izby Administracji Skarbowej we Wrocławiu.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Common system of value added tax (VAT) – Directive 2006/112/EC – Article 273 – Measures to ensure the correct collection of VAT – VAT debt of a taxable person – National legislation providing for the joint and several liability of the former chair of the board of directors of the taxable person – Exemption from joint and several liability – Absence of fault – Application for a declaration of insolvency – Existence of only one creditor – Proportionality – Equal treatment – Right to property – Legal certainty.Case C-278/24.

Here’s a breakdown of the Court’s judgment in Case C-278/24 [Genzyński]:

**Essence of the Act:**

This judgment clarifies the extent to which national laws can hold company directors liable for a company’s VAT debts. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) was asked to assess Polish regulations that allow for the joint and several liability of a company’s board members for unpaid VAT. The ruling balances the need to ensure VAT collection with the fundamental rights of individuals, particularly concerning proportionality, equal treatment, and the right to property. The CJEU determined that such liability is permissible under certain conditions, but it cannot be applied in an arbitrary or disproportionate manner.

**Structure and Main Provisions:**

The judgment addresses questions raised by a Polish court regarding the compatibility of Polish tax law with EU VAT directives and fundamental rights. The Polish law in question allows tax authorities to hold former board members of a company jointly and severally liable for the company’s VAT debts if the company cannot pay. A key aspect of the Polish law is that a director can avoid liability by demonstrating they filed for insolvency in a timely manner or that the failure to do so was not their fault.

The referring court questioned whether this system was fair, especially when the company’s sole creditor is the tax authority itself, making an insolvency application potentially futile.

The CJEU’s judgment analyses the relevant articles of the VAT Directive (specifically Articles 193, 205, and 273) and their relationship with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and general principles of EU law like proportionality, legal certainty, and equal treatment.

**Key Provisions and Implications:**

* **Member States’ Discretion:** The CJEU acknowledges that EU member states have the power to implement measures to ensure VAT collection and prevent evasion (under Article 273 of the VAT Directive).
* **Proportionality is Key:** However, this power is not unlimited. Any national measures must comply with EU law and its general principles, especially proportionality. This means the measures must be appropriate and not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objective.
* **Rebuttable Presumption of Fault:** The CJEU finds that it’s acceptable for national law to presume that a company director is responsible for VAT debts incurred during their tenure, but this presumption *must* be rebuttable. The director must have a real opportunity to prove they acted diligently and that the company’s failure to pay VAT was not due to their fault.
* **Insolvency Application:** The CJEU clarifies that requiring a director to file for insolvency as a condition for avoiding liability is generally acceptable. However, the mere act of filing (not the success of the application) can be sufficient to demonstrate that the director has fulfilled their obligations, regardless of the number of creditors the company has.
* **Equal Treatment:** The judgment stresses that directors should not be treated unequally based on whether the company has one creditor (the tax authority) or multiple creditors. A director cannot be exempted from liability *solely* because the company’s only creditor is the public exchequer.
* **Right to Property:** The CJEU confirms that holding directors liable for company debts does not violate their right to property, as long as the liability is limited to the amount of the unpaid tax and enforcement against the company has been unsuccessful.

In essence, the CJEU’s ruling seeks to strike a balance. It allows Member States to hold company directors accountable for VAT debts, but it insists on fairness, proportionality, and the protection of fundamental rights. The ruling emphasizes that directors must have a genuine opportunity to demonstrate they acted responsibly and that the company’s failure to pay VAT was not their fault.

Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 30 April 2025.Celní jednatelství Zelinka s. r. o. v Generální ředitelství cel.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Customs union – Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 – Union Customs Code – Article 116(7) – Reinstatement of the customs debt – Concept of repayment granted ‘in error’ – Incorrect tariff classification.Case C-330/24.

This is a judgment from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) regarding the interpretation of Article 116(7) of the Union Customs Code (Regulation (EU) No 952/2013). The case concerns the reinstatement of a customs debt after a repayment was initially granted due to an incorrect tariff classification. The CJEU clarifies whether the term “error” in Article 116(7) is limited to unintentional errors by customs authorities or if it also includes situations where the authorities deliberately made an incorrect tariff classification.

The judgment is structured as follows: It begins with an introduction outlining the context of the preliminary ruling and the parties involved. It then presents the legal context, focusing on the relevant articles of the Union Customs Code. Following this, the judgment details the dispute in the main proceedings and the question referred by the Nejvyšší správní soud (Supreme Administrative Court, Czech Republic). The core of the judgment is the “Consideration of the question referred,” where the CJEU provides its interpretation of Article 116(7). Finally, the judgment concludes with a ruling and a section on costs.

The most important provision clarified is Article 116(7) of the Union Customs Code, which states that “Where the customs authorities have granted repayment or remission in error, the original customs debt shall be reinstated.” The CJEU interprets the term “in error” broadly, concluding that it covers not only unintentional errors by customs authorities but also situations where the authorities deliberately made a tariff classification that later proved to be incorrect. This interpretation ensures that customs debts can be reinstated even if the initial error was a deliberate, albeit incorrect, assessment by the customs authority. The CJEU also emphasizes that the reinstatement of the customs debt is subject to the condition that the debt is not time-barred under Article 103 of the Union Customs Code.

Arrêt du Tribunal (neuvième chambre élargie) du 30 avril 2025.#Ville Kivikoski e.a. contre Conseil de l’Union européenne.#Fonction publique – Fonctionnaires – Promotion – Exercice de promotion 2022 – Décision de ne pas promouvoir le requérant au grade AST 8 – Recours en annulation – Intérêt à agir – Démonstration de la perspective d’être promu – Recevabilité – Article 6, paragraphe 2, du statut – Taux multiplicateurs de référence – Article 45, paragraphe 1, du statut – Comparaison des mérites.#Affaire T-202/23.

This is a judgment of the General Court of the European Union regarding a dispute between three officials of the Council of the European Union and the Council itself, concerning the 2022 promotion exercise. The officials contested the decision not to promote them to grade AST 8.

**Structure and Main Provisions:**

The judgment addresses the officials’ claim that the Council wrongly calculated the number of available promotions to grade AST 8, and that the Council should have applied a 25% promotion rate as provided in the Staff Regulations.
The court first examines the admissibility of the action, focusing on whether the officials demonstrated a sufficient interest in bringing the case, meaning that a favorable judgment could lead to their promotion. The court then examines the substance of the case, focusing on the correct application of the Staff Regulations regarding promotion rates.
The court annuls the Council’s decision not to promote the officials, finding that the Council incorrectly applied the Staff Regulations when determining the number of available promotions to grade AST 8. The Council was ordered to bear the costs of the proceedings.

**Main Provisions for Use:**

The key takeaway from this judgment is the interpretation of Article 6(2) of the Staff Regulations, specifically how the promotion rates in Annex I, Section B, should be applied. The court clarifies that while the principle of promotion based on merit remains paramount, it cannot be used to circumvent the application of the promotion rates when determining the number of vacant posts. The judgment reinforces that the promotion rates must be applied on the basis of the number of officials in active service in the lower grade on January 1 of the previous year.

Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 30 April 2025.References for a preliminary ruling – Rule of law – Judicial independence – Second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU – Effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law – Judicial body competent to propose the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against judges, public prosecutors and investigating magistrates, with a view to the imposition of disciplinary penalties – Members of the judicial body remaining in office after the expiry of their term of office – Protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data – Regulation (EU) 2016/679 – Data security – Access by a judicial body to data relating to the bank accounts of judges and public prosecutors and of their family members – Judicial authorisation for the purpose of lifting banking secrecy – Court authorising the lifting of banking secrecy – Article 4(7) – Concept of ‘controller’ – Article 51 – Concept of ‘supervisory authority’.Joined Cases C-313/23 and C-316/23.

Here’s a breakdown of the judgment from the Court of Justice of the European Union, focusing on its key aspects and implications:

**1. Essence of the Act**

This judgment addresses the scope and interpretation of EU law concerning judicial independence and data protection. It clarifies the responsibilities of national courts when authorizing access to personal financial data of judges, prosecutors, and their families for the purpose of asset verification. The Court emphasizes the need to safeguard judicial independence and ensure compliance with data protection regulations, specifically the GDPR. The case arises from Bulgaria, where an inspectorate sought access to such data, raising questions about the inspectorate’s independence and the role of the courts in authorizing data access.

**2. Structure and Main Provisions**

The judgment is structured around six questions referred by a Bulgarian court (Sofia District Court) for a preliminary ruling. These questions concern:

* The independence of a judicial body (the Inspectorate) whose members’ terms have expired but continue to serve.
* The applicability of the GDPR to the disclosure of financial data for asset verification purposes.
* The classification of a court authorizing data access as a “controller” or “supervisory authority” under the GDPR.
* The obligations of a court to ensure data protection when authorizing access to personal data, especially in light of past data breaches.

The Court’s analysis covers key articles of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the GDPR, including:

* Article 19(1) TEU (effective legal protection and judicial independence)
* Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (right to an effective remedy)
* Article 2 of the GDPR (material scope)
* Article 4(7) of the GDPR (definition of “controller”)
* Article 51 of the GDPR (supervisory authority)
* Article 79(1) of the GDPR (right to an effective judicial remedy)

The Court clarifies that extending the terms of office for members of a judicial body without a clear legal basis and time limit can undermine judicial independence. It also confirms that the GDPR applies to the processing of personal data for asset verification of judges and prosecutors. However, it finds that a court authorizing data access is generally not a “controller” or “supervisory authority” under the GDPR.

**3. Main Provisions Important for Use**

Several aspects of this judgment are particularly important:

* **Judicial Independence:** The judgment reinforces the importance of judicial independence, emphasizing that bodies involved in disciplinary proceedings against judges must be free from external influence. The extension of terms of office must be based on clear rules.
* **GDPR Applicability:** The Court confirms the broad scope of the GDPR, including its application to the processing of personal data of judges and prosecutors for asset verification.
* **Role of National Courts:** The judgment clarifies that national courts authorizing data access are not automatically considered “controllers” or “supervisory authorities” under the GDPR. However, Member States must ensure that the practical arrangements for the exercise of remedies provided for in the GDPR effectively meet the requirements arising from the right to an effective remedy enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter.
* **Data Security:** While the authorizing court is not primarily responsible for data security, the judgment underscores the importance of data security measures and the obligations of data controllers to protect personal data.

Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 30 April 2025.Bundesrepublik Deutschland v Mutua Madrileña Automovilista.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Judicial cooperation in civil matters – Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 – Jurisdiction in matters relating to insurance – Article 11(1)(b) – Article 13(2) – Action brought by an injured party directly against an insurer – Concept of ‘injured party’ – Official injured in a road traffic accident – Continued remuneration during that official’s incapacity to work – Member State acting as the employer subrogated to that official’s rights to compensation – Jurisdiction of the courts for the place where the claimant is domiciled – Place where the administrative body employing that official has its seat.Case C-536/23.

This judgment by the Court of Justice of the European Union clarifies the interpretation of Regulation No. 1215/2012 concerning jurisdiction in insurance matters, specifically regarding who can be considered an “injured party” when bringing a direct action against an insurer. The case revolves around a German federal official injured in Spain, whose employer, the Federal Republic of Germany, continued to pay her salary during her incapacity and then sought to recover those costs from the Spanish insurance company. The central question is whether Germany, as the employer, can sue the Spanish insurer in German courts under the provisions that allow injured parties to sue insurers in their own place of domicile.

The judgment focuses on Article 13(2) of Regulation No. 1215/2012, in conjunction with Article 11(1)(b). The Court confirms that a Member State, acting as an employer and subrogated to the rights of its injured official, can indeed be considered an “injured party.” This means the Member State can sue the insurer directly. However, the Court specifies that the lawsuit should be filed in the courts where the administrative body employing the official has its seat, not necessarily where the injured official is domiciled. This distinction is crucial. The Court emphasizes that this interpretation aligns with the regulation’s objectives of ensuring predictability in jurisdiction and facilitating sound administration of justice.

The key provision to note is that while a Member State can act as an “injured party” in these cases, the jurisdiction lies where the administrative body employing the injured official is located, ensuring a direct link between the dispute and the court. This clarifies that the right to sue the insurer in a different Member State extends to the employer (here, the Member State), but the specific court is determined by the employer’s location, not the employee’s.

Judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) of 30 April 2025.EL v European Commission.Civil service – Officials – Recruitment – Internal competition COM/AD6/2022 – Decision not to admit the applicant to the next stage of the competition – Neutralisation of certain questions in the multiple-choice questionnaire test – Method of neutralisation – Lack of rounding.Case T-325/24.

This is a judgment from the General Court of the European Union regarding an action brought by an applicant, EL, against the European Commission. The case concerns an internal competition for officials (COM/AD6/2022) and specifically challenges the decision not to admit the applicant to the next stage of the competition. The core of the dispute revolves around the method used to neutralize certain questions in a multiple-choice questionnaire (MCQ) and the alleged lack of proper rounding of scores.

The structure of the judgment is as follows: It outlines the background to the dispute, including the publication of the competition notice, the applicant’s participation, and the decision not to admit her to the next stage due to her score on the MCQ. The judgment then addresses the forms of order sought by the applicant, which include the annulment of the Commission’s decision and an order for the Commission to readmit her to the competition. The Court clarifies its jurisdiction, stating it cannot issue directions to the administration. It then focuses on the subject matter of the action, considering the claim for annulment against both the contested decision and the rejection of the applicant’s complaint. The Court then examines two pleas raised by the applicant: (1) manifest errors of assessment and infringement of the competition notice, and (2) infringement of the principle of proportionality.

The most important provisions of the judgment are those concerning the method of neutralisation of questions and the rounding of scores. The Court finds that the selection board acted correctly in neutralising seven questions from the MCQ and redistributing the points, without the need for rounding. The Court emphasizes that the selection board adhered to the competition notice, which did not prescribe any specific method for rounding final marks in the event of neutralisation. The Court rejects the applicant’s argument that the selection board should have rounded her final mark to reach the required minimum, finding no basis for this in the competition notice. Ultimately, the Court dismisses the action in its entirety and orders the applicant to pay the costs.

Judgment of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 30 April 2025.ZH and KN v AxFina Hungary Zrt.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Consumer protection – Directive 93/13/EEC – Unfair terms in consumer contracts – Leasing agreement denominated in a foreign currency – Articles 6 and 7 – Unfair term placing the exchange rate risk on the consumer – Effects of a finding that the term is unfair – Invalidity of the contract – Effects of the annulment of the contract in its entirety.Case C-630/23.

Here’s a breakdown of the judgment to help you understand its key aspects:

### Essence of the Act

This judgment addresses the legal consequences of unfair terms in consumer leasing agreements denominated in foreign currencies, specifically concerning exchange rate risks. It clarifies how EU law, particularly Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts, should be interpreted when a term placing the exchange rate risk entirely on the consumer is deemed unfair and removed from the contract. The core issue is whether the contract can continue to exist without the unfair term and, if not, what the appropriate remedies are to protect the consumer.

### Structure and Main Provisions

The judgment is structured as follows:

1. **Background:** It outlines the context of the case, including the request for a preliminary ruling from the Hungarian Supreme Court (Kúria) and the dispute between the consumers (ZH and KN) and the financial institution (AxFina Hungary Zrt.).
2. **Legal Context:** It references relevant articles of Directive 93/13/EEC, specifically Article 1(2), Article 6(1), and Article 7(1), as well as pertinent Hungarian laws (previous Civil Code, DH1 Law, DH2 Law, and DH7 Law) related to consumer loan agreements and currency conversion.
3. **The Dispute:** It details the specifics of the leasing agreement, the unfair term concerning exchange rate risk, and the legal proceedings in Hungary.
4. **Questions Referred:** It presents the questions posed by the Hungarian Supreme Court regarding the interpretation of EU law in the context of unfair terms and the validity of contracts.
5. **Consideration of the Questions Referred:** This section contains the Court’s analysis and rulings on the questions, focusing on whether a contract can continue to exist without the unfair term and what legal consequences should follow if it cannot.
6. **Ruling:** The judgment concludes with the Court’s decision, providing guidance on how Directive 93/13/EEC should be interpreted in such cases.

**Main Provisions and Changes:**

* The judgment emphasizes that unfair terms in consumer contracts should not be binding on the consumer, and national courts must ensure that consumers are placed in the situation they would have been in had the unfair term never existed.
* It clarifies that while Member States have the autonomy to define the detailed rules for establishing unfairness and its legal effects, these rules must allow for the restoration of the consumer’s original legal and factual situation.
* The judgment states that if a contract cannot continue to exist without the unfair term, the aim should be to restore the consumer to the position they would have been in had the contract never been concluded. This includes reimbursement of payments made by the consumer.
* The Court clarifies that national legislation cannot undermine the protection guaranteed to consumers by Directive 93/13.

### Main Provisions Important for Use

The most important provisions of the judgment are those that:

* **Define the Scope of Consumer Protection:** The judgment reinforces the importance of protecting consumers from unfair terms in contracts, particularly in complex financial agreements.
* **Outline the Consequences of Unfair Terms:** It clarifies that unfair terms should be treated as if they never existed, and consumers should be compensated accordingly.
* **Limit National Discretion:** While Member States have some flexibility in implementing Directive 93/13, they must ensure that national laws do not diminish the level of protection guaranteed by the Directive.
* **Restoration of the Original Situation:** If a contract is deemed invalid due to unfair terms, the primary goal is to restore the consumer to the legal and factual position they would have been in had the contract never existed. This includes reimbursement of payments made.
* **Interpretation of National Law:** National courts are required to interpret domestic law in a way that aligns with EU law, even if it means changing established case law.

Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 30 April 2025.St. Kliment Ohridski Primary Private School EOOD v QX.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Consumer protection – Directive 2011/83/EU – Concept of ‘consumer’ – Article 2(1) – Concept of ‘service contract’ – Article 2(6) – Enrolment contracts for the schooling of children of compulsory school age – Private education – Article 27 – Inertia selling of services – Compulsory subjects in accordance with national education standards.Case C-429/24.

This document is a judgment from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) regarding the interpretation of the Consumer Rights Directive (2011/83/EU) in the context of private education. The case originates from Bulgaria and concerns a dispute between a private school and a parent who unilaterally terminated enrolment contracts for her children. The Bulgarian court sought clarification on whether a parent in this situation can be considered a “consumer” under EU law, and whether the enrolment contract qualifies as a “service contract.”

The judgment clarifies the scope and application of Directive 2011/83/EU, particularly concerning the definitions of “consumer” and “service contract.” It addresses whether a parent who enrolls their child in a private school for compulsory education can be considered a consumer, and whether the child can also be considered a consumer. It also examines whether such enrolment contracts fall under the definition of “service contracts.” Finally, it considers whether parents can be exempt from payment obligations if they are not satisfied with the education provided, referring to the directive’s provisions on inertia selling.

The CJEU ruled that a parent who concludes an enrolment contract with a private school for their child’s compulsory education is considered a “consumer” under the Directive. However, the child receiving the education is not considered a consumer in this context. The Court also determined that such enrolment contracts are “service contracts” within the meaning of the Directive. Furthermore, the Court clarified that parents cannot be exempted from paying school fees for compulsory subjects based on dissatisfaction with the education quality, as this falls under national contract law, not the EU Directive. The Court emphasized that the provisions regarding unsolicited services do not apply in this context, as the education is provided under a freely agreed contract.

Arrêt du Tribunal (dixième chambre) du 30 avril 2025.#Deutsche Lufthansa AG contre Commission européenne.#Recours en annulation – Aides d’État – Secteur aérien – Aide au fonctionnement accordée par l’Allemagne à l’aéroport de Francfort-Hahn – Subvention directe visant à couvrir les pertes d’exploitation attendues de l’aéroport sur la période 2017-2021 – Décision de ne pas soulever d’objections – Recours ne tendant pas à assurer la sauvegarde des droits procéduraux – Irrecevabilité.#Affaire T-218/18 RENV.

Here is a description of the act:

This is a judgment by the General Court of the European Union regarding a case between Deutsche Lufthansa AG and the European Commission concerning state aid granted by Germany to the Frankfurt-Hahn Airport. The court dismisses Lufthansa’s action for annulment of the Commission’s decision, which had approved the aid. The court found that Lufthansa did not sufficiently demonstrate that its procedural rights were violated or that its market position was substantially affected by the aid.

The judgment is structured as follows:

* **Background:** Details the dispute, the parties involved (Deutsche Lufthansa AG as the applicant, the European Commission as the defendant, supported by Land Rheinland-Pfalz and the Federal Republic of Germany as interveners), and the initial decision by the Commission regarding state aid to Frankfurt-Hahn Airport.
* **Facts:** Describes Lufthansa’s business, the location and operation of Frankfurt-Hahn Airport, and the specifics of the state aid in question, which was intended to cover the airport’s operational losses between 2017 and 2021. It also mentions previous Commission decisions related to Frankfurt-Hahn Airport and Ryanair.
* **Procedure:** Outlines the legal proceedings, including the initial judgment by the General Court, the appeals to the Court of Justice, and the subsequent referral of the case back to the General Court.
* **Law:** This section contains the legal reasoning of the General Court. It discusses the admissibility of Lufthansa’s action, focusing on whether Lufthansa has the standing to bring the case. The court examines the criteria for being directly and individually concerned by the Commission’s decision, as required under Article 263 TFEU. It distinguishes between the preliminary examination phase and the formal investigation phase of state aid procedures. The court concludes that Lufthansa has not adequately demonstrated that the action aims to safeguard its procedural rights or that its competitive position is substantially affected.
* **Costs:** The court orders Lufthansa to bear its costs and those of the Commission.

The most important provisions of the act for its use are:

* The clarification of the criteria for establishing standing (admissibility) in cases concerning state aid decisions, particularly the need for a clear indication of whether the action aims to protect procedural rights or challenge the substance of the decision.
* The emphasis on the applicant’s responsibility to specify the objective of each argument presented in the application, either to safeguard procedural rights or to challenge the merits of the decision.
* The reaffirmation that the EU Court cannot interpret an action challenging the merits of a state aid decision as one aimed at safeguarding procedural rights unless the applicant explicitly raises a plea to that effect.
* The judgment reinforces the importance of procedural discipline in actions for annulment before the EU Courts, particularly in state aid cases.

Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 30 April 2025.ZZ v Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Frankfurt am Main.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Common foreign and security policy – Restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine – Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 – Article 5i(2)(a) – Prohibition on exporting euro-denominated banknotes – Exemption in case of export necessary for personal use – Banknotes intended to cover medical expenses.Case C-246/24.

Here’s a breakdown of the judgment to help you understand its implications:

**1. Essence of the Act:**

This judgment clarifies the scope of an exception to the EU’s ban on exporting euro-denominated banknotes to Russia. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled that exporting euros to pay for medical treatment in Russia does *not* fall under the exemption for “personal use” as defined in Article 5i(2)(a) of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014. This means individuals cannot circumvent the export ban by claiming the money is for medical procedures.

**2. Structure and Main Provisions:**

* **Regulation No 833/2014:** This regulation introduced restrictive measures in response to Russia’s actions destabilizing Ukraine. It includes a prohibition on exporting euro-denominated banknotes to Russia (Article 5i(1)).
* **Article 5i(2)(a):** This article provides an exception to the export ban, allowing the export of euro banknotes if it’s “necessary for the personal use of natural persons travelling to Russia or members of their immediate families travelling with them.”
* **The Case:** The case involves a German resident, ZZ, who was caught at the airport with a large sum of euros and Russian rubles, intending to use the euros for medical treatments in Russia. German courts questioned whether this fell under the “personal use” exception.
* **The CJEU’s Ruling:** The CJEU determined that “personal use” is limited to expenses related to travel and stay in Russia, not to cover medical treatments.

**3. Main Provisions Important for Use:**

* **Definition of “Personal Use”:** The judgment provides a clear interpretation of “personal use” in the context of the euro export ban. It’s restricted to covering the costs of travel and stay, such as accommodation, food, and local transport.
* **Scope of the Restriction:** The ruling reinforces the broad scope of the export ban, clarifying that it aims to prevent the Russian economy from accessing euro-denominated cash, even if intended for non-commercial purposes.
* **Burden of Proof:** Individuals attempting to export euros to Russia under the “personal use” exception must demonstrate that the funds are strictly for travel-related expenses.
* **** This judgement has implications for individuals who are subject to the EU’s sanctions regime concerning Russia, including Ukrainian citizens residing in the EU. It clarifies the limitations on exporting euro-denominated banknotes to Russia, even for purposes that might be considered personal but are not directly related to travel and stay.

Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 30 April 2025.Justa v Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Consumer protection – Directive 93/13/EEC – Articles 4 and 5 – Unfair terms in consumer contracts – Mortgage loan agreements – Term concerning loan arrangement fees – Plainness and intelligibility of the terms.Case C-39/24.

Here’s a breakdown of the judgment to help you understand its implications:

This judgment addresses the issue of unfair terms in consumer contracts, specifically focusing on mortgage loan agreements and the transparency of loan arrangement fees. The case originates from a dispute in Spain between a consumer, Justa, and Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA (BBVA) concerning the fairness of a fee charged for arranging a mortgage loan. The Spanish court seeks clarification from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on how to interpret EU law regarding the transparency requirements for such fees.

The judgment refers to Council Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts, particularly Articles 4 and 5, which deal with the assessment of unfair terms and the requirement for plain and intelligible language in contracts. It also briefly mentions Directive 2014/17/EU on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property, but ultimately finds it not applicable to the case. The structure of the judgment involves an analysis of the questions raised by the Spanish court, focusing on whether national case law is compatible with EU directives regarding the transparency of arrangement fees in mortgage agreements. The Court examines previous rulings on similar matters, particularly the Caixabank cases (C-224/19, C-259/19, and C-565/21), to provide clarity on the interpretation of transparency requirements.

The most important provision of the judgment is its interpretation of Article 5 of Directive 93/13. The Court clarifies that while a detailed breakdown of services covered by the arrangement fee is not mandatory, the consumer must be able to understand the economic consequences of the fee, the nature of the services provided in exchange for it, and that there is no overlap between different costs in the contract. The national court must assess whether the consumer was given sufficient information to understand the fee’s content and function within the loan agreement, considering the perspective of an average, reasonably informed consumer. The judgment emphasizes that the assessment of transparency must be carried out on a case-by-case basis, considering all relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the contract.

Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 30 April 2025.K.L. v Migracijos departamentas prie Lietuvos Respublikos vidaus reikalų ministerijos.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Asylum policy – Refugee status or subsidiary protection status – Directive 2011/95/EU – Article 12(2)(b) – Article 18 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Exclusion from being a refugee – Grounds – Commission of a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his or her admission as a refugee – Effect of the fact that the sentence has been served.Case C-63/24.

Here’s a breakdown of the Court’s judgment in Case C-63/24, focusing on its key aspects:

**Essence of the Act**

This judgment clarifies how EU member states should interpret Article 12(2)(b) of Directive 2011/95/EU (the Qualification Directive) when deciding whether to grant refugee status to someone who has committed a serious, non-political crime before seeking refuge. Specifically, it addresses whether the fact that the person has already served their sentence for that crime should be considered. The Court rules that while serving a sentence must be taken into account, it doesn’t automatically guarantee refugee status.

**Structure and Main Provisions**

The judgment is structured as a response to a request for a preliminary ruling from the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania. The Lithuanian court was dealing with a case where an asylum seeker, K.L., was denied refugee status due to a past crime, despite potentially facing persecution in his home country.

Here’s a breakdown of the key points:

* **The Question:** The core question is whether Article 12(2)(b) of Directive 2011/95/EU, in conjunction with Article 18 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, requires consideration of a served sentence when assessing exclusion from refugee status.
* **The Law:**
* Article 12(2)(b) of Directive 2011/95/EU allows exclusion from refugee status if there are serious reasons to believe the person committed a serious non-political crime before entering the country of refuge.
* Article 18 of the Charter guarantees the right to asylum, respecting the Geneva Convention.
* **The Court’s Reasoning:**
* The Court emphasizes the need for a uniform interpretation of EU law.
* It acknowledges that the exclusion ground in Article 12(2)(b) is linked to past actions.
* It refers to the UNHCR Handbook, which suggests that a served sentence is a relevant factor.
* The Court states that the purpose of exclusion is to maintain the credibility of the refugee protection system and prevent individuals from escaping liability for serious crimes.
* It argues that excluding someone who has already served their sentence doesn’t serve the purpose of preventing them from escaping criminal liability.
* The Court reiterates that exclusion from refugee status requires an individual assessment of the specific facts of each case.
* **The Ruling:** The Court concludes that national authorities *must* consider a served sentence when assessing whether to exclude someone from refugee status under Article 12(2)(b). However, this fact alone *does not* prevent exclusion.

**Main Provisions for Practical Use**

The most important takeaway is that EU member states cannot ignore the fact that an asylum seeker has already served a sentence for a past crime when deciding on refugee status.

* **Mandatory Consideration:** National authorities are legally obligated to take a served sentence into account.
* **No Automatic Entitlement:** Serving a sentence doesn’t automatically guarantee refugee status.
* **Holistic Assessment:** Authorities must conduct a comprehensive assessment of all relevant circumstances, including the nature of the crime, the length of the sentence, the time elapsed since the crime, the person’s conduct since then, and any expressions of remorse.
* **Non-Refoulement:** The judgment clarifies that excluding someone from refugee status doesn’t automatically mean they can be deported. The principle of *non-refoulement* (not returning someone to a place where they face persecution) still applies.

Judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) of 30 April 2025.SBK Art OOO v Council of the European Union.Common foreign and security policy – Restrictive measures taken in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine – Freezing of funds – List of persons, entities and bodies subject to the freezing of funds and economic resources – Inclusion and maintenance of the applicant’s name on the list – Concept of ‘association’ – Article 2(1), in fine, of Decision 2014/145/CFSP – Article 3(1), in fine, of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 – Obligation to state reasons – Rights of the defence – Error of assessment – Proportionality – Plea of illegality.Case T-102/23.

Here’s a breakdown of the General Court’s judgment in the SBK Art OOO v Council case:

**1. Essence of the Act**

This judgment concerns the legality of EU sanctions imposed on SBK Art OOO, a Russian company, due to its alleged association with Sberbank, which is itself subject to sanctions for supporting the Russian government’s actions against Ukraine. SBK Art OOO challenged the Council’s decisions to include and maintain its name on the EU’s list of sanctioned entities, arguing that the sanctions were unlawful. The General Court ultimately dismissed SBK Art OOO’s action, upholding the EU’s sanctions regime.

**2. Structure and Main Provisions**

The judgment addresses SBK Art OOO’s challenge to several Council decisions and implementing regulations that initially placed the company on the sanctions list and subsequently maintained its listing. The court examines the following key aspects:

* **Admissibility:** The Court first confirms the admissibility of the action against the relevant implementing regulations.
* **Evidence:** It then addresses the admissibility of additional evidence submitted late by SBK Art OOO, rejecting most of it.
* **Article 45 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union:** The Court rejects the applicant’s request under Article 45 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union.
* **Plea of Illegality:** SBK Art OOO argued that the “association criterion” used to justify its sanctions was unlawful. The Court rejected this, finding the criterion consistent with the EU’s objectives and the principle of legal certainty.
* **Right to be Heard:** SBK Art OOO claimed it was not given a proper opportunity to be heard before the sanctions were imposed and maintained. The Court found no breach of this right, distinguishing between the initial listing and subsequent renewals.
* **Error of Assessment:** SBK Art OOO argued the Council incorrectly assessed the facts, particularly regarding Sberbank’s continued control over the company. The Court disagreed, finding sufficient evidence to support the Council’s assessment that SBK Art OOO was associated with Sberbank.
* **Proportionality:** SBK Art OOO contended the sanctions were disproportionate. The Court found the sanctions appropriate and necessary to achieve the EU’s objectives in addressing the situation in Ukraine.

**3. Main Provisions Important for Use**

* **The “Association Criterion”:** The judgment clarifies the scope and legality of using “association” with a sanctioned entity as a basis for imposing sanctions. This is a key tool in the EU’s sanctions regime.
* **Standard of Evidence:** The judgment reiterates the standard of evidence required for imposing and maintaining sanctions, emphasizing the need for a “sufficiently specific, precise and consistent body of evidence.”
* **Right to be Heard in Sanctions Cases:** The judgment clarifies the procedural rights of those targeted by sanctions, particularly the timing and extent of the right to be heard.
* **The extraterritorial application of EU sanctions:** The Court held that the sale of the applicant by Sberbank to the Emirati investor was subject to EU sanctions law because it involved the transfer of funds located within the territory of the European Union.
* **The principle of proportionality:** The Court found that the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue as a legal person associated with Sberbank and the resulting restrictive measures are necessary in order to achieve and implement the objectives referred to in Article 21 TEU.

**** This case is highly relevant to the EU’s response to the situation in Ukraine. It confirms the EU’s ability to target entities linked to those directly undermining Ukraine’s territorial integrity, even if the link is indirect. It also reinforces the EU’s broad discretion in defining and implementing its sanctions regime.

Information Note regarding the entry into force of the Protocol (2024-2029) implementing the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Cabo Verde [2025/832]

This Information Note announces the entry into force of the Protocol implementing the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Cabo Verde. The Protocol, covering the period from 2024 to 2029, establishes the terms and conditions for EU vessels to fish in the waters of Cabo Verde. With both parties having completed their internal procedures for conclusion, the Protocol officially came into effect on April 14, 2025. This agreement facilitates cooperation in the fisheries sector between the EU and Cabo Verde, promoting sustainable fishing practices and contributing to the economic development of Cabo Verde.

The Information Note is concise, serving primarily to declare the effective date of the Protocol. It references Article 18(1) of the Protocol, which likely outlines the conditions for its entry into force, specifically the completion of internal procedures by both parties. The note does not detail the specific provisions of the Protocol itself, but rather confirms that all necessary steps have been taken to bring it into legal effect. There are no changes compared to previous versions in this note, as it is a singular announcement.

The most important aspect of this Information Note is the date of entry into force: April 14, 2025. This date is crucial for understanding when the terms and conditions of the Protocol become legally binding for both the European Union and the Republic of Cabo Verde. Stakeholders, including EU fishing vessels and relevant authorities, need to be aware of this date to ensure compliance with the Protocol’s provisions.