Review of US courts opinions for 15/11/2024

FOMB, et al v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, et al / 23-02036 (2024-11-13)

The bondholders have a valid lien on PREPA’s “Net Revenues” (gross revenues minus operating expenses), not just on funds deposited in specific accounts
This lien extends to future Net Revenues that PREPA has not yet acquired
The bondholders’ lien is properly perfected and cannot be avoided in bankruptcy
The bondholders have a claim for the full face value of the bonds (approximately $8.5 billion) but can only recover from their collateral (the Net Revenues)
The bondholders cannot pursue additional unsecured claims against PREPA beyond their collateral

The court’s opinion provides detailed analysis of:

The Trust Agreement governing the bonds and its various provisions regarding security interests and payment obligations
The interaction between Puerto Rico law, the Bankruptcy Code, and PROMESA regarding secured creditor rights
The proper classification and perfection of security interests in revenue streams
The scope of bondholder remedies, including rights to an equitable accounting

The court affirmed some parts of the lower court’s ruling while reversing others, and remanded certain issues for further proceedings. The opinion provides important guidance on the treatment of revenue bonds in municipal bankruptcy proceedings.

FOMB, et al v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, et al / 23-02036 (2024-06-12)

This opinion addresses the rights of bondholders who hold revenue bonds issued by the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) before it entered reorganization proceedings. Here are the key provisions:1. The court holds that the bondholders have a non-recourse claim on PREPA’s estate for the principal amount of the bonds plus matured interest. This claim is secured by PREPA’s Net Revenues (defined as revenues minus operating expenses) and by liens on certain funds created by the bond agreement.2. The court finds that the bondholders’ security interest extends to both current and future Net Revenues of PREPA. The lien on Net Revenues is perfected with respect to revenues PREPA has already acquired, and will be perfected immediately upon PREPA acquiring any future Net Revenues.3. The proper amount of the bondholders’ claim is the face value (principal plus matured interest) of the bonds, approximately $8.5 billion. However, this is a non-recourse claim, meaning the bondholders can only recover from their collateral (Net Revenues and liened funds) and cannot pursue PREPA’s other assets.4. The court dismisses the bondholders’ breach of trust claim but reinstates their claim for an equitable accounting under Puerto Rico law, though this accounting cannot expand their recovery rights beyond the Net Revenues.The court declines to determine how the Title III court should account for the Net Revenue lien in PREPA’s restructuring, leaving that question for future proceedings.

FOMB, et al v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, et al / 23-02054 (2024-11-13)

The bondholders have a valid lien on PREPA’s “Net Revenues” (revenues minus operating expenses), not just on funds deposited in specific accounts
This lien extends to future Net Revenues that PREPA has not yet acquired
The lien is properly perfected and cannot be avoided in bankruptcy
The bondholders’ claim amount is the full face value of the bonds (approximately $8.5 billion)
The bondholders are non-recourse creditors who can only recover from their collateral (Net Revenues and specific funds)

The court’s main provisions include:

Reversing the lower court’s finding that bondholders only had security interests in specific funds
Confirming that bondholders have a broader security interest in all Net Revenues
Clarifying that while the claim amount is $8.5 billion, recovery is limited to the value of the collateral
Dismissing the bondholders’ breach of trust claim but reinstating their right to an accounting
Leaving open how exactly to account for the Net Revenue lien in PREPA’s restructuring

The opinion provides a detailed analysis of the Trust Agreement governing the bonds, the interplay between Puerto Rico law and federal bankruptcy provisions, and the nature of revenue bond security interests in municipal bankruptcies.

FOMB, et al v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, et al / 23-02054 (2024-06-12)

Martinez-Diaz v. Garland / 23-02027 (2024-11-13)

This opinion concerns a case of Geovanny Alexander Martinez-Diaz, who petitioned for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision that denied his applications for asylum and withholding of removal. The court denied his petition, finding that he failed to establish the required connection between his alleged persecution and any statutorily protected ground.The key elements of the opinion include:

Martinez-Diaz, from El Salvador, claimed he was threatened and harmed by gang members who wanted him to distribute drugs at school.
The court found that gang members targeted him solely to expand their criminal enterprise for financial gain, not because of any protected characteristics like family membership or social group.
The court emphasized that when gang recruitment is motivated by desire to increase criminal activities, it does not constitute persecution on protected grounds under immigration law.

The most significant provisions of the opinion are:

The court reaffirmed that persecution requires proof of three elements: serious harm, nexus to government action/inaction, and connection to statutorily protected grounds.
The petitioner must provide evidence that danger arises specifically because of a protected characteristic, not incidental reasons.
When financial gain is the primary motivation for threats or harm, it does not qualify as persecution under asylum law, even if the victim belongs to a particular social group.

FOMB v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, et al / 23-02053 (2024-11-13)

This opinion from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit addresses the rights of bondholders who hold revenue bonds issued by the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) in PREPA’s bankruptcy proceedings under PROMESA.The key findings of the court are:

The bondholders have a valid lien on PREPA’s “Net Revenues” (gross revenues minus operating expenses), not just on funds deposited in specific accounts
This lien extends to future Net Revenues that PREPA has not yet acquired
The lien is properly perfected and cannot be avoided in bankruptcy
The bondholders’ claim amount is approximately $8.5 billion (the face value of the bonds plus matured interest)
The bondholders are non-recourse creditors, meaning they can only recover from their collateral (the Net Revenues) and cannot pursue PREPA’s other assets

The court’s opinion provides detailed analysis of:

The Trust Agreement governing the bonds and its various provisions regarding security interests and payment obligations
The interaction between Puerto Rico law, the Bankruptcy Code, and PROMESA regarding security interests in future revenues
The proper classification of PREPA’s Net Revenues as collateral under the UCC
The scope of bondholders’ rights to an equitable accounting of PREPA’s use of Net Revenues

The court affirmed the dismissal of bondholders’ breach of trust claim but reversed the dismissal of their accounting claim. The court declined to address how its holdings should be implemented in PREPA’s restructuring plan, leaving that to the lower court to determine.

FOMB v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, et al / 23-02053 (2024-06-12)

This opinion addresses the rights of bondholders who hold revenue bonds issued by the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) in its reorganization proceedings under PROMESA. Here are the key provisions:1. The court holds that bondholders have a non-recourse claim on PREPA’s estate for the principal amount of the bonds plus matured interest. This claim is secured by PREPA’s Net Revenues (defined as revenues minus operating expenses) and by liens on certain funds created by the bond agreement.2. The court finds that the bondholders’ security interest extends to both current and future Net Revenues of PREPA. The lien on Net Revenues is perfected with respect to revenues PREPA has already acquired, and will be perfected immediately upon PREPA acquiring any future Net Revenues.3. The proper amount of the bondholders’ claim is the face value (principal plus matured interest) of the Revenue Bonds, approximately $8.5 billion. However, this claim is only secured up to the value of the bondholders’ interest in the Net Revenues and specified Funds.4. The bondholders are non-recourse creditors, meaning they can only look to their collateral (Net Revenues and specified Funds) for satisfaction of their debt and cannot seek payment from PREPA’s other assets.5. While the court dismissed the bondholders’ breach of trust claim, it reinstated their claim for an equitable accounting under Puerto Rico law, though this accounting cannot expand their recourse beyond the Net Revenues.The court declined to determine how the Title III court should account for the bondholders’ lien during PREPA’s restructuring, leaving that question for future proceedings.

FOMB, et al v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, et al / 23-02057 (2024-11-13)

This opinion from the First Circuit Court of Appeals addresses the rights of bondholders who hold revenue bonds issued by the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) in PREPA’s bankruptcy proceedings under PROMESA. Here are the key aspects:Main Essence (3-5 sentences):
The court held that bondholders have a non-recourse claim on PREPA’s estate for the principal amount of the bonds plus matured interest (approximately $8.5 billion). This claim is secured by PREPA’s Net Revenues (revenues minus operating expenses) and by liens on certain funds created by the bond agreement. The court determined that bondholders’ security interest extends to future Net Revenues but they cannot pursue claims beyond their collateral.Structure and Main Provisions:

The court analyzed whether bondholders have a lien on PREPA’s revenues beyond just funds in specific accounts
It determined bondholders have a valid, perfected security interest in all Net Revenues, not just those deposited in specific funds
The security interest extends to future Net Revenues
The claim amount is the full face value of the bonds (~$8.5B)
Bondholders are limited to their collateral and cannot pursue deficiency claims against other PREPA assets
The court reinstated bondholders’ right to an accounting of how Net Revenues were used

Most Important Provisions:

Bondholders have a security interest in all of PREPA’s Net Revenues, not just those in specific funds
The security interest is perfected and extends to future Net Revenues
The claim amount is the full ~$8.5B face value of the bonds
Bondholders are non-recourse creditors limited to their collateral
Bondholders can pursue an accounting of how Net Revenues were used but only related to their collateral

FOMB, et al v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, et al / 23-02057 (2024-06-12)

This opinion addresses the rights of bondholders who hold revenue bonds issued by the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) before it entered reorganization proceedings. Here are the key provisions:1. The court holds that the bondholders have a non-recourse claim on PREPA’s estate for the principal amount of the bonds plus matured interest. This claim is secured by PREPA’s Net Revenues (defined as revenues minus operating expenses) and by liens on certain funds created by the bond agreement.2. The court finds that the bondholders’ security interest extends to both current and future Net Revenues of PREPA. The lien on Net Revenues is perfected with respect to revenues PREPA has already acquired, and will be perfected immediately upon PREPA acquiring any future Net Revenues.3. The proper amount of the bondholders’ claim is the face value (principal plus matured interest) of the Revenue Bonds, approximately $8.5 billion. However, this claim is only secured up to the value of the bondholders’ interest in the Net Revenues and certain funds.4. The bondholders are non-recourse creditors, meaning they can only look to their collateral (Net Revenues and certain funds) for satisfaction of their debt and cannot seek payment from PREPA’s other assets.5. While the court dismissed the bondholders’ breach of trust claim, it reinstated their claim for an equitable accounting under Puerto Rico law, though this accounting cannot expand their recourse beyond the Net Revenues.

FOMB, et al v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, et al / 23-02049 (2024-11-13)

This opinion from the First Circuit Court of Appeals addresses the rights of bondholders who hold revenue bonds issued by the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) before it entered reorganization proceedings under PROMESA.The key findings of the court are:

The bondholders have a valid lien on PREPA’s Net Revenues (gross revenues minus operating expenses), not just on funds deposited in specific accounts
This lien extends to future Net Revenues that PREPA has not yet acquired
The bondholders’ lien is properly perfected and cannot be avoided in bankruptcy
The proper amount of the bondholders’ claim is the face value of the bonds (approximately $8.5 billion)
The bondholders are non-recourse creditors, meaning they can only recover from their collateral (Net Revenues and specific funds) and cannot pursue PREPA’s other assets

The court’s main provisions include:

Reversing the lower court’s finding that bondholders only had security interests in specific funds
Confirming that the bondholders’ security interest in Net Revenues is properly perfected
Setting the claim amount at the bonds’ face value rather than the lower court’s $2.4 billion estimate
Affirming dismissal of breach of trust claims but reinstating bondholders’ right to an accounting
Leaving open how to account for the Net Revenue lien in PREPA’s restructuring

The most important aspects for implementation are:

The bondholders have a valid, perfected lien on all of PREPA’s Net Revenues, including future revenues
The total claim amount is approximately $8.5 billion
Recovery is limited to the collateral (Net Revenues and specific funds) with no recourse to other PREPA assets
The court preserved bondholders’ right to an accounting of how Net Revenues were used
The restructuring court must determine how to account for the Net Revenue lien going forward

FOMB, et al v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, et al / 23-02049 (2024-06-12)

1. Essence of the opinion (3-5 sentences):
This opinion addresses the rights of bondholders who hold revenue bonds issued by the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) before it entered reorganization proceedings. The court holds that the bondholders have a non-recourse claim on PREPA’s estate for the principal amount of the bonds plus matured interest, secured by PREPA’s Net Revenues and liens on certain funds created by the bond agreement. The court also determines that while the bondholders have a valid lien on both current and future Net Revenues, they cannot pursue claims beyond their collateral.2. Structure and main provisions:
The opinion analyzes several key aspects:- The scope of bondholders’ security interest in PREPA’s revenues- Whether the security interest extends to future revenues- Whether the security interest is avoidable in bankruptcy- The proper amount of bondholders’ claim ($8.5 billion rather than $2.4 billion)- Whether bondholders can pursue claims beyond their collateral (they cannot)- The validity of trust-related claims3. Most important provisions:
– Bondholders have a valid lien on PREPA’s Net Revenues (gross revenues minus operating expenses), not just on funds in specific accounts- The lien extends to future Net Revenues and cannot be avoided in bankruptcy- The proper amount of bondholders’ claim is the full face value of the bonds (approximately $8.5 billion)- Bondholders are non-recourse creditors who can only look to their collateral for satisfaction of the debt- While bondholders cannot pursue a breach of trust claim, they can seek an equitable accounting under Puerto Rico law

Wadsworth v. Nguyen / 23-01400 (2024-11-13)

This opinion concerns a procedural matter in a sexual harassment case where Chuck Nguyen, a school social worker, appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for summary judgment regarding tort claims filed by former student Adrianna Wadsworth.The case involves allegations that Wadsworth, while a minor student, was subjected to sexual harassment by her high school principal, Andrew Cavanaugh. Wadsworth claims that Nguyen, who was aware of some harassment incidents, failed to take appropriate action as a mandatory reporter and dismissed her concerns about the principal’s behavior as normal.The Court of Appeals focuses on three main aspects:

The final decision rule, which generally allows appeals only from final judgments of district courts
The collateral-order doctrine, which provides exceptions to the final decision rule under specific circumstances
The distinction between federal and state law regarding appealability of non-final orders

The Court’s key findings are:

Nguyen failed to establish appellate jurisdiction as he relied on Maine state cases rather than federal law
His attempt to equate Maine Tort Claims Act discretionary function immunity with qualified immunity was unsuccessful
The district court’s denial of summary judgment was based on factual disputes, which are not immediately appealable

As a result, the Court dismissed Nguyen’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, as he failed to demonstrate that the case qualified for an exception to the final decision rule under federal law.

FOMB, et al v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n / 23-02052 (2024-11-13)

This opinion from the First Circuit Court of Appeals addresses the rights of bondholders who hold revenue bonds issued by the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) in PREPA’s bankruptcy proceedings under PROMESA. Here are the key aspects:Main Essence (3-5 sentences):
The court held that bondholders have a non-recourse claim on PREPA’s estate for the principal amount of the bonds plus matured interest (approximately $8.5 billion). This claim is secured by PREPA’s Net Revenues (gross revenues minus operating expenses) and by liens on certain funds created by the bond agreement. The court found that the bondholders’ security interest extends to future Net Revenues that PREPA has not yet acquired.Structure and Main Provisions:

The court analyzed whether bondholders have a lien on PREPA’s revenues beyond just the funds specifically designated in the Trust Agreement
It determined that bondholders have a valid, perfected security interest in all of PREPA’s Net Revenues, not just those deposited in specific funds
The court found that bondholders’ claim amount should be the full face value of the bonds (~$8.5 billion), not the $2.4 billion estimated by the lower court
The opinion clarifies that bondholders are non-recourse creditors who can only look to their collateral for satisfaction of the debt
The court reinstated bondholders’ right to an equitable accounting of how PREPA has used Net Revenues

Most Important Provisions:

Bondholders have a security interest in all of PREPA’s Net Revenues, including future revenues
The security interest is properly perfected and cannot be avoided in bankruptcy
The claim amount is the full face value of the bonds (~$8.5 billion)
Bondholders are limited to recovering from their collateral only (non-recourse)
Bondholders retain the right to an accounting of how PREPA has used Net Revenues

FOMB, et al v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n / 23-02052 (2024-06-12)

This opinion addresses the rights of bondholders who hold revenue bonds issued by the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) before it entered reorganization proceedings. Here are the key provisions:1. The court holds that the bondholders have a non-recourse claim on PREPA’s estate for the principal amount of the bonds plus matured interest (approximately $8.5 billion). This claim is secured by PREPA’s Net Revenues (revenues minus operating expenses) and by liens on certain funds created by the bond agreement.2. The court finds that the bondholders’ security interest extends to both current and future Net Revenues that PREPA acquires. The lien on Net Revenues is perfected with respect to revenues PREPA has already acquired, and will be perfected immediately upon PREPA acquiring any future Net Revenues.3. The bondholders are non-recourse creditors, meaning they can only look to their collateral (Net Revenues and liened funds) for repayment and cannot seek payment from PREPA’s other assets.4. The court dismisses the bondholders’ breach of trust claim but reinstates their ‘accounting’ claim which allows them to bring an equitable action for Net Revenues wrongly diverted from debt service, though this is still limited to their collateral.The court declines to determine how the Title III court should account for the bondholders’ lien during PREPA’s restructuring, leaving that question for future proceedings.

FOMB, et al v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, et al / 23-02050 (2024-11-13)

This opinion from the First Circuit Court of Appeals addresses several key issues regarding bonds issued by the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) before it entered reorganization proceedings under PROMESA.The main provisions of the opinion are:

The bondholders have a lien on PREPA’s Net Revenues (gross revenues minus operating expenses), not just on funds deposited in specific accounts
The lien extends to future Net Revenues that PREPA has not yet acquired
The bondholders’ claim amount should be the face value of the bonds (approximately $8.5 billion) rather than the $2.4 billion estimated by the lower court
The bondholders are non-recourse creditors, meaning they can only recover from their collateral (Net Revenues and specific funds) and cannot pursue PREPA’s other assets
While the bondholders cannot bring a breach of trust claim against PREPA, they can pursue an equitable accounting claim under Puerto Rico law

The most important aspects of the opinion are:

The court’s detailed analysis of the Trust Agreement’s language regarding the scope and nature of the bondholders’ security interest
The clarification that the bondholders’ lien covers both current and future Net Revenues
The determination that the proper claim amount is the full face value of the bonds
The limitation that bondholders can only recover from their specified collateral
The preservation of bondholders’ right to an equitable accounting while limiting its scope to the collateral they can reach

FOMB, et al v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, et al / 23-02050 (2024-06-12)

Serrano Colon v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, et al / 22-01089 (2024-11-13)

This case concerns an employment discrimination dispute between a Transportation Security Officer (TSO) and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). The plaintiff, Almaris Serrano-Colon, claimed she was terminated due to disability, gender, and parental status discrimination, as well as retaliation for filing EEOC complaints.The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of TSA on all claims. The key findings were:

On Title VII discrimination claims – Serrano failed to show that TSA’s stated reasons for termination (chronic attendance issues) were pretextual or motivated by discriminatory animus
On Title VII retaliation claims – Serrano did not provide evidence that TSA’s actions were retaliatory rather than based on legitimate reasons
On Rehabilitation Act claims – Serrano could not establish she was qualified to perform essential job functions due to her poor attendance record, even when accommodated with a modified schedule

The opinion notably addressed but declined to resolve questions about whether TSA employees can bring Rehabilitation Act claims after the 2012 Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act, instead disposing of those claims on their merits. The court emphasized that regular attendance was an essential function of the TSO position that Serrano failed to meet despite accommodations.

United States v. Spencer High Hawk / 23-03695 (2024-11-13)

This is a procedural notice from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, informing counsel that the court has issued an opinion in the case United States v. Spencer High Hawk (Case No. 23-3695) and that judgment has been entered.The notice outlines the post-submission procedures, specifically emphasizing that:

Petitions for rehearing and petitions for rehearing en banc must be received within 14 days of the judgment entry date
Counsel-filed petitions must be submitted electronically through CM/ECF
No grace period for mailing is allowed except as provided by FRAP 25(a)(2)(iii)
Late petitions may be denied as untimely

The document serves as an administrative notification rather than a substantive court opinion, providing instructions for potential post-judgment proceedings and emphasizing compliance with filing deadlines and procedures.

PHT Holding I v. Security Life of Denver Insurance Company / 23-01326 (2024-11-13)

The case involves a dispute between PHT Holding I, LLC and Security Life of Denver Insurance Company regarding universal life insurance policies. The key issue is whether Security Life breached the policies by increasing the cost of insurance (COI) rates in 2015. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Security Life, holding that the ‘nonparticipating’ provisions in the policies did not prevent Security Life from considering losses when setting COI rates. The court found that these provisions only meant policyholders would not receive dividends from surplus earnings. The opinion has three main structural components: 1) Analysis of the cost of insurance provision, which gives Security Life discretion to set rates subject to certain limitations; 2) Examination of the nonparticipating provisions, which the court found only address dividends and surplus earnings; and 3) Discussion of extrinsic evidence like board memos and testimony. Key provisions include:

The cost of insurance provision giving Security Life discretion to set rates ‘from time to time’ while considering certain mortality factors
The nonparticipating provisions stating the policies ‘do not participate in surplus earnings’ and are ‘not eligible for dividends’
The requirement that COI rate changes be uniform across premium classes

The dissenting opinion argued the policies were ambiguous regarding whether policyholders must participate in losses, noting the term ‘nonparticipating’ was not clearly defined and extrinsic evidence supported the policyholder’s interpretation.

J. L. v. East Stroudsburg Area School District / 23-03035 (2024-11-13)

The case concerns a student with disabilities (J.L.) who claimed denial of free appropriate public education (FAPE) because one of his guardians (grandmother) did not participate in the decision to extend his school suspension. The student was initially suspended for 45 days for bringing a pocketknife to school and placed in an alternative educational setting.The court’s opinion has three main structural components:

Initial suspension and placement decision, which was made with both guardians’ participation
Extension of placement at Colonial Academy for 16 additional days, agreed to by the grandfather but without formal notice to the grandmother
Analysis of whether this procedural violation significantly impeded the grandmother’s participation rights

The key provisions of the opinion are:

For a procedural violation under IDEA to constitute denial of FAPE, the guardian’s participation rights must have been ‘significantly impeded’
The hearing officer’s factual findings are treated as prima facie correct by federal courts
The grandmother’s participation was not significantly impeded because:
- The other guardian (grandfather) consented to the extension
- The grandmother was involved in decision-making process both before and after the extension
- She participated in multiple IEP team meetings regarding the student’s placement

Matthews. v. United States, et al / 24-01412 (2024-11-13)

This is a brief dismissal order from the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in the case of Felton L. Matthews, Jr. against the United States of America and various military personnel. The case was dismissed for lack of prosecution, meaning the appellant failed to actively pursue the case.The order is structured in a straightforward manner, simply stating the case details and the court’s decision to dismiss. It cites Tenth Circuit Rules 3.3(B) and 42.1 as the legal basis for the dismissal.The key provisions of this order are:

The dismissal is based on lack of prosecution
The order itself serves as the mandate of the court
The dismissal is made pursuant to specific Tenth Circuit Rules (3.3(B) and 42.1)

Benjamin Collins v. Attorney General United States of America / 24-01155 (2024-11-13)

The opinion concerns a petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision denying Benjamin T. Collins’s application for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) to Liberia.The Court’s opinion is structured around three main elements:

The standard of review, where the Court reviews legal determinations de novo and factual findings for substantial evidence
Analysis of Collins’s main argument regarding potential torture due to his relation to J.P.B. (another Liberian national who provided information about former President Weah’s alleged drug trafficking)
Examination of other potential sources of harm, including Collins’s escape from child-soldier conscription and his status as an American criminal deportee

The key provisions of the opinion are:

The Court found that Collins’s theory about being targeted due to family ties was undermined by evidence that other relatives returned to Liberia without facing torture
The Court determined that Collins’s claims about other potential sources of harm relied on ‘unsupported suppositions’
The Court concluded that Collins failed to establish a likelihood of future torture, even when considering all risk factors in aggregate
The petition for review was denied as substantial evidence supported the BIA’s determination

Crump v. Ciolli, et al / 24-01420 (2024-11-13)

This is a brief procedural order from the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit dismissing an appeal filed by Norvell Webster Crump against various prison officials and agencies. The appeal was dismissed for lack of prosecution under Tenth Circuit Rule 42.1.The order is straightforward and contains two main elements:

The dismissal of the appeal for failure to prosecute
A directive that the order itself shall serve as the court’s mandate

The key provision is the court’s reliance on Tenth Circuit Rule 42.1, which allows for dismissal when an appellant fails to actively pursue their appeal. This is a standard procedural mechanism used by courts to manage their dockets and dispose of inactive cases. The order was signed by the Clerk of Court, Christopher M. Wolpert, rather than by a judge, indicating its administrative nature.

Cohen v. Howard, et al / 24-01202 (2024-11-13)

The case concerns an appeal by Emily Cohen against the district court’s dismissal of her complaint against her former criminal defense attorneys. The essence of the case revolves around Cohen’s allegations that her attorneys acted in concert with state officials to deny her ADA accommodations and access to the state courthouse, particularly by discouraging her from bringing her service dog to court.The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision on several key grounds:

Title II of the ADA applies only to public entities and prohibits discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities in public services, programs, or activities.
Defense attorneys, whether private or public defenders, are not considered public entities under the ADA, even though they must comply with court’s professional norms.
Individual defendants can only be named in ADA cases in their official capacity, which effectively makes it a suit against the public entity.

The Court also addressed additional matters:

Denied Cohen’s request for in forma pauperis status due to lack of a reasoned, non-frivolous argument
Rejected her claims about the district court’s alleged failure to consider her disabilities
Denied her request for appointment of counsel
Found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s handling of the case

Magleby Cataxinos v. Vitamins Online, et al / 24-00605 (2024-11-13)

This is a straightforward dismissal order from the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in the case of Magleby Cataxinos & Greenwood, P.C. (now known as Magleby Cataxinos, PC) against Vitamins Online, Inc. and Heartwise, Inc.The order is a response to the Petitioner’s Motion for Voluntary Dismissal, which was filed following the Court’s previous order dated October 31, 2024. The Court granted the motion and dismissed the case.The order is notably brief and contains only the essential procedural elements: identification of the parties, reference to the previous order and motion for dismissal, and the Court’s decision to grant the dismissal. It represents a final disposition of the case through voluntary dismissal by the petitioner.The key provision of this order is simply the granting of the voluntary dismissal motion, effectively terminating the proceedings in this matter. The order does not include any substantive legal analysis or conditions attached to the dismissal.

Williams v. Stancil / 24-01168 (2024-11-13)

The opinion addresses a case where Norman Williams, a Colorado state prisoner, sought a certificate of appealability (COA) to challenge the dismissal of his habeas corpus application under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The Court of Appeals denied his request because he had already received the earned time he was seeking in his original application.The opinion is structured around three main components:

Background of the case, explaining Williams’ 48-year prison sentence and the initial dispute over his earned time eligibility
Discussion of the legal requirements for obtaining a COA, including the need to show denial of constitutional rights
The Court’s conclusion that Williams’ case faces a procedural bar because he already received the relief he sought

Key provisions of the opinion include:

The Colorado Department of Corrections had already granted Williams 1,280 days of earned time and continues to award him earned time
The types of claims cognizable under § 2241 must seek either immediate release or shortened period of imprisonment
Since Williams already received the earned time he sought, he cannot obtain additional relief through habeas corpus proceedings
The Court declined to consider whether Williams could obtain a declaratory judgment through other legal avenues

Stella, et al v. Davis County, et al / 23-04122 (2024-11-13)

This case involves a jury verdict finding Davis County and jail nurse Marvin Anderson liable for deliberate indifference to the medical needs of detainee Heather Miller, resulting in her death. The jury awarded $300,000 against Anderson and $3,850,000 against the County under federal law, plus another $3,850,000 against the County under state law.The opinion addresses multiple challenges to the verdict, including evidentiary rulings, sufficiency of evidence, qualified immunity, jury instructions, verdict consistency, relationship between federal and state claims, damages, and attorney fees. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment on all grounds.Key provisions of the opinion include:

The evidence was sufficient to show Anderson was deliberately indifferent to Miller’s serious medical needs by failing to properly assess and monitor her condition after a fall
The County was properly found liable based on its lack of nursing protocols and training
The jury could reasonably award separate damages under federal and state law for distinct injuries (pre-death suffering vs. death itself)
The total damages award of $7.7 million against the County was not excessive given the evidence
The attorney fee award of $728,256 was properly supported by counsel’s time records

The opinion thoroughly analyzes each challenge to the verdict while giving appropriate deference to the jury’s factual findings and the district court’s discretionary rulings. It upholds liability against both the individual nurse and the County for their respective roles in causing Miller’s death through inadequate medical care.

Clark, et al v. Haaland, et al / 22-02141 (2024-11-13)

This is a complex decision regarding sovereign immunity and jurisdiction in a water rights case. The key points are: 1. The case involved claims by private plaintiffs against federal, state and tribal officials regarding water rights and alleged violations of federal water laws. The district court dismissed all claims for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity, and the appeals court affirmed. 2. The court found that plaintiffs failed to overcome sovereign immunity barriers because: (a) their claims against state officials did not qualify for the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity; (b) there was no clear waiver of tribal sovereign immunity for claims against Navajo officials; and (c) there was no applicable waiver of federal sovereign immunity for claims against federal officials. 3. The key deficiency was that plaintiffs relied on conclusory allegations rather than specific facts showing ongoing violations of federal law by the defendants. The court emphasized that jurisdiction requires clear factual allegations, not just legal conclusions. The decision reinforces strict requirements for overcoming sovereign immunity and establishing jurisdiction when suing government officials. It shows courts will carefully scrutinize the factual basis for claims rather than accepting general allegations of legal violations.

Medina v. Bauby, et al / 24-01403 (2024-11-13)

This is a brief order from the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit dismissing an appeal in the case of Delano Medina v. August Bauby and Colorado Department of Corrections. The appeal was dismissed for lack of prosecution under Tenth Circuit Rule 42.1.The order consists of a single operative provision dismissing the appeal, with a statement that the order itself shall serve as the mandate of the court. The case originated from the District Court of Colorado (Case No. 1:24-CV-01014-LTB-RTG).The key provision in this order is the dismissal for lack of prosecution, which means the appellant (Delano Medina) failed to take the necessary steps to pursue the appeal according to court rules and procedures. The order is signed by Christopher M. Wolpert as Clerk of Court.

Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran / 23-00700 (2024-11-13)

This is a concurring opinion in a case involving Bank Markazi (Iran’s Central Bank) and the question of sovereign immunity in relation to asset turnover proceedings. The judge addresses two main issues: congressional intent regarding sovereign immunity and the application of Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding required parties.The opinion is structured in two main parts:

The first part discusses Congress’s intent regarding jurisdictional immunity, noting that Congress clearly intended to facilitate the turnover of certain assets while still maintaining sovereign immunity from suit.
The second, more extensive part analyzes Rule 19 and its application to Bank Markazi’s case, particularly comparing it to the Supreme Court’s decision in Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel.

Key provisions of the opinion include:

The recognition that Congress’s intent regarding asset turnover is clear under 22 U.S.C. § 8772(a)(1)
The analysis of Rule 19(b) factors in relation to sovereign immunity, particularly focusing on:
- The potential prejudice to the absent party
- The distinction from the Pimentel case regarding international comity considerations
- The adequacy of judgment without the sovereign party’s presence
The observation that dismissing the litigation might conflict with Congress’s specific purpose in passing section 8772

Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran / 23-00700 (2024-11-13)

This opinion addresses a complex case involving efforts by victims of the 1983 Beirut Marine barracks bombing to enforce multi-billion dollar judgments against Iran by seeking turnover of $1.68 billion in bond-related assets held by Clearstream Banking on behalf of Iran’s central bank, Bank Markazi.The key elements of the opinion are:

The district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over claims against Bank Markazi, as neither Section 8772 nor principles of ancillary jurisdiction provide jurisdiction
The district court can exercise personal jurisdiction over Clearstream based on its New York business activities
Section 8772 of U.S. Code Title 22 is constitutional and does not violate equal protection principles
The district court erred in granting summary judgment without analyzing ownership interests under state law

The main provisions of the opinion include:

Detailed analysis of subject matter jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
Discussion of personal jurisdiction requirements under New York’s long-arm statute and due process principles
Examination of Section 8772’s constitutionality and scope
Framework for analyzing ownership interests in foreign assets under both state and federal law

The most important aspects for implementation are:

The case is remanded to determine if Bank Markazi is an indispensable party
State law must be applied to determine ownership interests before Section 8772 can be applied
Personal jurisdiction over foreign financial institutions can be based on their New York business activities
Section 8772’s ‘notwithstanding’ clause does not completely preempt state law analysis of property interests

Kane v. de Blasio / 22-01876 (2024-11-13)

The request to rescind the vaccine mandate is now moot since the City officially ended the mandate in February 2023
The request for preliminary injunctive relief for reinstatement and backpay fails because most plaintiffs cannot show irreparable harm after termination
The facial challenges to the mandate under First Amendment’s Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses fail due to lack of factual support for claims of religious discrimination
Most as-applied challenges fail, except for two plaintiffs (Solon and Clark) who plausibly alleged they were denied religious accommodations based on improper evaluation of their personal religious beliefs

The Court affirmed most of the lower courts’ decisions but remanded for further proceedings regarding Solon and Clark’s specific claims. The opinion emphasizes that while religious accommodation processes must respect individual beliefs, employers can deny accommodations that would pose undue hardship.

New Yorkers For Religious Liberty, Inc. v. The City of New York / 22-01801 (2024-11-13)

This opinion addresses challenges to New York City’s COVID-19 vaccination mandates for Department of Education staff and other City employees working in school settings. The key aspects are:The Court reviewed two consolidated cases challenging the constitutionality of the vaccine mandate and religious exemption process, both facially and as applied. The plaintiffs sought preliminary injunctions and challenged dismissal of their complaints.The Court’s main conclusions were:- The request to rescind the vaccine mandate is now moot since the mandate was officially rescinded in February 2023- The request for preliminary injunctive relief for reinstatement and backpay fails on the merits- The facial challenges to the mandate under First Amendment grounds fail- Most as-applied challenges fail, except for two plaintiffs (Solon and Clark) who plausibly alleged they were improperly denied religious accommodationsThe key provisions include:- Affirming denial of preliminary injunctions- Affirming dismissal of facial challenges to the mandate- Affirming dismissal of most as-applied challenges- Vacating and remanding for further proceedings only the as-applied challenges by Solon and Clark- Clarifying standards for reviewing religious accommodation requests and undue hardship claimsThe Court emphasized that while employers can deny religious accommodations based on undue hardship or lack of sincere religious belief, they cannot reject beliefs simply because they are personal or idiosyncratic rather than part of an established religious organization.

Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran / 15-00690 (2024-11-13)

The first part briefly discusses Congress’s intent regarding jurisdictional immunity, noting that Congress clearly intended to facilitate the turnover of certain assets while still maintaining sovereign immunity from suit.
The second, more extensive part analyzes Rule 19 and its application to Bank Markazi’s case, particularly comparing it to the Supreme Court’s decision in Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel.

Key provisions of the opinion include:

The recognition that Congress’s intent regarding the assets’ turnover is clear under 22 U.S.C. § 8772(a)(1)
The analysis of Rule 19(b)’s four-factor test for determining whether a case should proceed without a required party
The distinction of this case from Pimentel based on three main factors:
- Different implications for international comity
- The adequacy of judgment without the sovereign’s presence
- Different equitable considerations for the plaintiffs
The suggestion that dismissal for nonjoinder might conflict with Congress’s specific purpose in passing section 8772

Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran / 15-00690 (2024-11-13)

This opinion addresses a complex case involving efforts by victims of the 1983 Beirut Marine barracks bombing to enforce multi-billion dollar judgments against Iran by seeking turnover of $1.68 billion in bond-related assets held in Luxembourg by Clearstream Banking on behalf of Iran’s central bank, Bank Markazi.The key elements of the opinion are:

The district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the turnover claim against Bank Markazi, as neither Section 8772 nor principles of ancillary jurisdiction provide jurisdiction
The district court can exercise personal jurisdiction over Clearstream based on its New York business activities and contacts
Section 8772 of U.S. Code Title 22 is constitutional and does not violate equal protection by targeting Clearstream specifically
The district court erred in granting summary judgment without first analyzing the ownership interests in the assets under applicable state law

The main provisions of the opinion include:

Detailed analysis of subject matter jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
Discussion of personal jurisdiction requirements under New York’s long-arm statute and constitutional due process
Examination of Section 8772’s scope and interaction with state property law
Framework for determining ownership interests in foreign-held assets subject to turnover proceedings

The most important aspects for implementation are:

The case is remanded for the district court to determine if Bank Markazi is an indispensable party under FRCP 19
State law must be applied to determine ownership interests in the assets before Section 8772 can be applied
Personal jurisdiction over foreign financial institutions can be based on their New York business activities
Section 8772’s ‘notwithstanding’ clause does not completely preempt state law definitions of property interests

Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran / 15-00690 (2020-06-22)

This opinion addresses a complex case involving attempts by plaintiffs to execute judgments against Iranian assets held in various financial institutions. The case involves multiple parties including the Islamic Republic of Iran, Bank Markazi (Iran’s central bank), and several financial institutions.The Court of Appeals made several key determinations:

The Clearstream settlement agreement did not apply to plaintiffs who were not parties to the previous Peterson I judgment
The assets at issue are rights to payment held by Clearstream in Luxembourg
JPMorgan Chase was properly dismissed as it does not possess any assets subject to turnover
The district court needs to reconsider whether it has personal jurisdiction over Clearstream

The case was significantly impacted by the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2020, which specifically addressed this matter. The NDAA amended existing law to allow certain Iranian financial assets to be subject to execution or attachment to satisfy terrorism-related judgments, regardless of sovereign immunity or international comity concerns.The Court of Appeals reinstated portions of its previous ruling but directed the district court to address issues pertaining to the NDAA, personal jurisdiction, and other matters necessary for resolution. The Court also specified that any future appeals in this case should be returned to the same panel due to their familiarity with the complex issues involved.

Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran / 15-00690 (2017-11-21)

This is a significant decision by the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit regarding enforcement of judgments against Iran and execution on Iranian assets held abroad.The key aspects of the decision are:

The court held that foreign sovereign assets located outside the US are not absolutely immune from execution under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)
US courts with personal jurisdiction over a non-sovereign third party (like a bank) can order that party to bring foreign sovereign assets into the US for potential execution
Once those assets are brought to the US, they would be subject to normal FSIA execution immunity analysis
The court vacated dismissal of certain non-turnover claims against some defendants based on settlement agreement interpretations

The court’s analysis focused on reconciling two key precedents:

The Supreme Court’s NML Capital decision holding that the FSIA does not provide execution immunity for foreign sovereign assets located abroad
New York state law under Koehler allowing courts with personal jurisdiction to order parties to bring assets into New York

The court remanded for the district court to determine: (1) if it has personal jurisdiction over Clearstream, (2) if there are barriers to exercising jurisdiction to recall the assets, and (3) if recalled assets would be subject to execution immunity. The decision provides a potential pathway for judgment creditors to reach foreign sovereign assets held abroad through US courts’ jurisdiction over third-party banks.

Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran / 23-00614 (2024-11-13)

The opinion represents a concurring opinion focusing on two key issues related to sovereign immunity and procedural requirements in a case involving Bank Markazi and certain assets.The first part of the opinion addresses Congress’s intent regarding jurisdictional immunity of foreign sovereigns, noting that Congress clearly intended to facilitate turnover of specific assets while maintaining Bank Markazi’s immunity from suit.The second, more substantial part analyzes Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and its application to the case, particularly comparing it to the Supreme Court’s decision in Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel. The judge identifies three key distinctions from Pimentel:

The comity considerations differ as the choice is between litigation in the US or Luxembourg, not Iran
Bank Markazi’s participation isn’t necessary for asset turnover
The plaintiffs in this case are judgment holders themselves, unlike in Pimentel

The judge concludes that dismissal under Rule 19 isn’t necessarily required, considering that a judgment’s adequacy wouldn’t be affected by Bank Markazi’s absence, and dismissal might conflict with Congress’s intent to allow judgment enforcement.

Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran / 23-00614 (2024-11-13)

This opinion addresses a complex case involving efforts by victims of the 1983 Beirut Marine barracks bombing to enforce multi-billion dollar judgments against Iran by seeking turnover of $1.68 billion in bond-related assets held in Luxembourg by Clearstream Banking on behalf of Iran’s central bank, Bank Markazi.The key elements of the opinion are:

The district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the turnover claim against Bank Markazi, as neither Section 8772 nor principles of ancillary jurisdiction provide jurisdiction
The district court can exercise personal jurisdiction over Clearstream based on its New York business activities and contacts
Section 8772 of U.S. Code Title 22 is constitutional and does not violate equal protection principles
The district court erred in granting summary judgment by failing to apply state law to determine ownership interests in the assets before applying Section 8772

The main provisions of the opinion include:

Detailed analysis of subject matter jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
Discussion of personal jurisdiction requirements under New York’s long-arm statute and due process principles
Examination of Section 8772’s constitutionality and scope
Framework for analyzing ownership interests in foreign assets under state law before applying federal statutes

The most important aspects for using this opinion are:

The court’s holding that Section 8772 does not independently create subject matter jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns
The analysis of when U.S. courts can exercise jurisdiction over foreign financial institutions holding assets abroad
The requirement to apply state law to determine property interests before federal asset turnover provisions
The framework for analyzing personal jurisdiction over foreign entities based on New York business contacts

The Art and Antique Dealers Le v. Basil Seggos / 21-00569 (2024-11-13)

This is a dissenting opinion in a case concerning the preemption of New York State Ivory Law (NYSIL) by the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA). The main points of the dissent are:The dissenting judge argues that the ESA preempts the NYSIL because:

The ESA’s preemption clause voids any state law that prohibits what is authorized by ESA exemptions or permits
The NYSIL’s restrictions on ivory sales are more stringent than ESA’s exceptions for antiques and de minimis ivory content
The terms ‘exemption’ and ‘exception’ are used interchangeably in the ESA and should be interpreted broadly

The key provisions analyzed in the opinion include:

ESA’s Antiques Exception allowing sale of items over 100 years old
ESA’s De Minimis Exception for items with small amounts of ivory
NYSIL’s more restrictive antique exception requiring items to be both 100+ years old and less than 20% ivory
The scope of ‘interstate commerce’ under ESA versus ‘intrastate sales’ under NYSIL

The dissent concludes that since all ivory must have originally crossed state/international borders, any ivory sale constitutes interstate commerce and thus falls under ESA’s preemption clause, making NYSIL’s restrictions invalid.

The Art and Antique Dealers Le v. Basil Seggos / 21-00569 (2024-11-13)

The case concerns a challenge to New York State’s Environmental Conservation Law § 11-0535-a (the ‘State Ivory Law’) by art and antique dealers associations regarding restrictions on ivory sales and display.The Court addressed two main claims:

Preemption claim – The Court affirmed that the State Ivory Law is not preempted by the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA). The Court found that:
- The ESA’s express preemption clause is narrower than claimed and allows states to enact broader protections
- The State’s concession not to apply its prohibitions to interstate/international sales eliminates conflict preemption
First Amendment claim – The Court reversed the lower court and ruled in favor of the dealers regarding the Display Restriction that prohibits physical display of ivory items not authorized for intrastate sale. The Court found:
- Based on the State’s concession that display constitutes commercial speech
- The Display Restriction is more extensive than necessary to serve the State’s interests
- Less restrictive alternatives were available to prevent illegal sales

The key provisions of the opinion include:

States can enact ivory sale restrictions that are more protective than federal law
The Display Restriction violates First Amendment commercial speech protections
Dealers must be allowed to display ivory items for interstate/international sale
The State must consider less restrictive alternatives like segregation and labeling of items

Rodriguez v. McDonough / 24-01347 (2024-11-13)

This opinion addresses an appeal by Jesus Rodriguez, Jr., a veteran seeking earlier effective dates for service connection for PTSD and bilateral hearing loss, reopening of previously denied claims, and service connection for a fractured right toe injury.The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Veterans Court’s decision which had affirmed the Board of Veterans’ Appeals denial of Rodriguez’s claims. The opinion focuses on three main aspects:

The Court’s jurisdiction to review Veterans Court decisions, which is limited to questions of law and constitutional issues
Analysis of Rodriguez’s arguments regarding interpretation of statutes and regulations
Examination of the Veterans Court’s handling of service records in relation to PTSD diagnosis timing

Key provisions of the opinion include:

The Court found no error in the Veterans Court’s determination that service records from 1969-1973 and 1981-1984 could not provide evidence of a PTSD diagnosis in 2013
The Court affirmed that single-judge disposition was appropriate under 38 U.S.C. § 7254
The Court dismissed arguments related to factual determinations as outside its jurisdiction under 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2)
The Court rejected Rodriguez’s RICO conspiracy claims as outside its jurisdiction

D’Agostino v. US / 24-01319 (2024-11-13)

This opinion addresses the dismissal of Steven D’Agostino’s claims against the United States and other defendants by the Court of Federal Claims for lack of jurisdiction. The case involved claims related to undelivered mail by the US Postal Service and issues with copyright registration by the US Copyright Office, as well as claims against non-federal entities.The Court’s opinion is structured around three main jurisdictional analyses:

Claims against the Postal Service for undelivered mail, which were determined to sound in tort and thus outside the court’s jurisdiction
Claims against the Copyright Office regarding copyright registration, which were found to lack a contractual basis or money-mandating source of law
Claims against non-federal entities (Discover Bank, New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission, and its director), which were dismissed as the court only has jurisdiction over claims against the United States

The key provisions of the opinion center on the Tucker Act’s jurisdictional limitations:

The Court of Federal Claims can only hear cases against the United States
Claims must be based on the Constitution, federal law, government contracts, or non-tort damages
Tort claims are explicitly excluded from the court’s jurisdiction
There must be a money-mandating source of law or valid contract to support claims

Dixon-Johnson v. OPM / 24-01716 (2024-11-13)

This court opinion addresses a case involving Carla Dixon-Johnson’s appeal regarding her federal retirement benefits. The case revolves around two main issues: eligibility for an annuity supplement and the calculation of her high-three average salary under the Federal Employees’ Retirement System (FERS).The court’s opinion confirms that Ms. Dixon-Johnson is not entitled to an annuity supplement because she receives her annuity under 5 U.S.C. § 8412(g)(1), which is not among the provisions listed in § 8421(a)(1) or (2) that qualify for supplemental benefits. The court explains that annuity supplements are only available to employees who separate with specific service requirements (such as 30 years of service, or after age 60 with 20 years of service) which Ms. Dixon-Johnson did not meet.Regarding the high-three average salary calculation, the court upholds OPM’s method of calculation, which weights salary amounts based on the duration they were in effect, as required by 5 U.S.C. § 8401(3). The court rejected Ms. Dixon-Johnson’s argument that the calculation should simply average her three highest salaries without considering the time period each salary was in effect.The key provisions of this opinion establish that:

Annuity supplements are only available to federal employees who qualify under specific statutory provisions
High-three average salary calculations must weight each salary rate by the period it was in effect
Retirement benefits calculations must strictly follow statutory requirements, regardless of an employee’s highest earned salaries

Wonge v. McDonough / 23-02355 (2024-11-13)

This opinion concerns a veteran’s appeal regarding the effective date for his disability benefits award. The case revolves around whether the veteran, David Wonge, filed a claim for benefits prior to May 7, 2009.The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, as the issues raised were primarily factual determinations that the court cannot review under 38 U.S.C. § 7292. The key aspects of the case include:

Mr. Wonge served in the Army from February to March 1976 and was discharged due to a heart condition
He claims he visited VA facilities seeking benefits shortly after discharge but was told he hadn’t served long enough to qualify
The Board found that while he did visit VA facilities, he did not file a written claim until May 7, 2009
The Veterans Court affirmed the Board’s decision, finding no clear error in the factual determinations

The opinion emphasizes several important legal principles:

An intent to file a claim for benefits must be in writing (Rodriguez v. West)
The Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction to review Veterans Court decisions is limited to questions of law, not factual determinations
Merely labeling arguments as constitutional does not automatically confer jurisdiction

Annette McEachin v. Reliance Standard Life Ins Co / 24-01071 (2024-11-13)

The case concerns a dispute between Annette McEachin and Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company regarding disability benefits payments. The key points are:1. The case revolves around interpretation of an insurance policy that provides disability benefits with a 24-month limitation for disabilities caused by or contributed to by mental health conditions.2. The court determined that the 24-month mental health limitation period began in April 2021, when McEachin’s physical disability alone no longer justified benefits. Before that date, her physical conditions were sufficient to establish total disability, making the mental health limitation irrelevant.3. The court rejected Reliance’s argument that the mental health limitation should have started earlier because McEachin had some mental health treatment before April 2021. Following the Okuno precedent, the court held that the mere presence of mental health challenges does not trigger the limitation if physical disabilities alone justify benefits.4. The court affirmed that McEachin’s physical conditions no longer caused total disability as of April 2021, based on evidence of significant improvement in her condition. However, the court remanded the case for consideration of whether post-April 2021 evidence could be used to toll the 24-month mental health limitation period.5. The decision establishes that under such insurance policies, a mental health limitation period begins only when mental health conditions become the sole cause of total disability, not when they merely coexist with qualifying physical disabilities.

Annette McEachin v. Reliance Standard Life Ins Co / 24-01100 (2024-11-13)

State of Georgia v. Shawn Still / 23-13361 (2024-10-24)

The opinion addresses appeals by David Shafer, Shawn Still, and Cathleen Latham regarding the remanding of state criminal prosecutions against them for allegedly interfering in the certification of the 2020 presidential election in Georgia.The key provisions of the opinion include:

The defendants argued they were entitled to remove their state criminal prosecutions to federal court under the federal-officer removal statute as “contingent Republican Presidential Electors”
The court ruled they could not remove their cases because the federal-officer removal statute only applies to current federal officers, not former ones
The court determined that even if the defendants were federal officers in 2020, they would not qualify as current federal officers required for removal
The court also rejected Shafer’s separate request for pretrial habeas relief, finding no abuse of discretion in the district court’s abstention

The most important aspects of the opinion are:

The court’s determination that federal-officer removal requires current federal officer status, not former status
The clarification that even if defendants were legitimate electors in 2020 (which the court questions), they still could not remove their cases as former officers
The court’s analysis that presidential electors are not “officers of the United States” under the federal-officer removal statute
The emphasis that state law governs the process for appointing electors, and Georgia never appointed these defendants as legitimate electors

State of Georgia v. Cathleen Latham / 23-13362 (2024-10-24)

The opinion addresses appeals by David Shafer, Shawn Still, and Cathleen Latham regarding their attempts to remove state criminal prosecutions against them to federal court. The key points are:1. The defendants were charged in Georgia with conspiring to interfere in the 2020 presidential election certification by purporting to be Georgia’s presidential electors and issuing fraudulent elector certificates after Biden’s victory was certified.2. The Court affirmed the district court’s orders remanding the cases back to state court, ruling that the defendants could not remove their cases under the federal-officer removal statute because:

Even if they were federal officers in 2020 (which the Court did not decide), the removal statute does not apply to former officers
The Court was bound by its precedent in Georgia v. Meadows which established that the statute only applies to current federal officers

3. The Court also ruled it lacked jurisdiction to consider Shafer’s arguments regarding denial of habeas relief since he failed to obtain a required certificate of appealability, and declined to issue one as the district court properly abstained under Younger doctrine.The opinion includes two concurring opinions that provide additional analysis of why presidential electors are not federal officers and questioning whether the precedent limiting removal to current officers was correctly decided.

USA v. Hector Lind, Jr. / 24-11022 (2024-11-13)

The opinion addresses the enforceability of a sentence appeal waiver in a criminal case involving Hector Lind, Jr., who was sentenced to 262 months for enticement of a minor and receipt of child pornography.The Court’s analysis focuses on three key aspects:

The validity of the appeal waiver – finding it was made knowingly and voluntarily during the plea hearing where the magistrate judge specifically questioned Lind about understanding he was giving up appeal rights except in limited circumstances
The scope of the waiver – determining that Lind’s challenges to his sentence calculation fell within the waiver’s scope, and none of the exceptions (sentence exceeding statutory maximum, sentence outside guidelines, or government appeal) applied
The alleged breach of plea agreement – rejecting Lind’s argument that the government breached the agreement by seeking a sentence over 15 years and discussing conduct related to a dismissed count, as the agreement expressly allowed the government to present all relevant sentencing facts

The Court’s key provisions include:

Appeal waivers are enforceable if made knowingly and voluntarily
The government must show either specific questioning about the waiver during the plea or clear record evidence of understanding
A valid appeal waiver includes waiver of right to appeal even blatant errors
Breach of plea agreement claims can overcome appeal waivers, but the agreement’s unambiguous meaning controls

USA v. Matthew Choy / 24-10056 (2024-11-13)

The opinion addresses an appeal by Matthew James Choy regarding his conviction and 40-month sentence for criminal contempt. The appellant’s sole argument concerned the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ failure to designate a medical prison facility and their decision to place him in solitary confinement.The Court’s opinion is structured around two main points: (1) the criteria for summary disposition and (2) the jurisdiction over prisoner placement decisions. The Court relies on the precedent set in Groendyke Transportation, which establishes when summary disposition is appropriate, and references 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b), which vests authority for prisoner placement with the Bureau of Prisons.The key provision of this opinion is that the Court affirmed the original conviction and sentence because Choy’s appeal did not actually challenge either of these aspects. Instead, his arguments focused on prison placement decisions, which are under the Bureau of Prisons’ authority, not the district court’s jurisdiction. The Court granted the government’s motion for summary affirmance and denied as moot the motion to stay the briefing schedule.

US v. Brandon McMillan / 23-04322 (2024-11-13)

The opinion addresses an appeal in a criminal case where Brandon McMillan pled guilty to possession of a firearm and ammunition by a felon. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and dismissed in part the appeal, upholding the 120-month prison sentence.The opinion’s structure revolves around two main elements: (1) the validity of McMillan’s appellate waiver and guilty plea, and (2) the alleged breach of the plea agreement by the government. The Court found that McMillan knowingly and intelligently waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence, with limited exceptions not applicable in this case.Key provisions of the opinion include:

The Court confirmed that McMillan’s guilty plea was knowing, voluntary, and supported by sufficient factual basis
The Court found no plain error in the government’s conduct regarding the plea agreement, as the agreement did not require the government to actively argue for a concurrent sentence
The Court emphasized that the government is only bound by promises actually made in the plea agreement, citing United States v. Lewis and United States v. Benchimol
The appellate waiver was deemed valid and enforceable for all issues within its scope

State of Georgia v. David Shafer / 23-13360 (2024-10-24)

The defendants argued they were entitled to remove their state criminal prosecutions to federal court under the federal-officer removal statute as “contingent Republican Presidential Electors”
The court ruled they could not remove their cases because the federal-officer removal statute only applies to current federal officers, not former ones
The court determined the defendants were never actually presidential Electors for Georgia in 2020, as they were not appointed through the state’s lawful process
Even if they had been legitimate Electors, presidential Electors do not qualify as federal officers under the removal statute

The most important aspects of the opinion are:

The court’s determination that the federal-officer removal statute does not apply to former officers
The detailed explanation of why the defendants were never legitimate presidential Electors under state and federal law
The analysis showing that even legitimate presidential Electors are not considered federal officers under the Constitution and relevant statutes
The court’s rejection of the concept of “contingently elected presidential electors” as having no basis in law

USA v. Nacoe Brown / 23-11449 (2024-11-13)

The opinion addresses an appeal by Nacoe Brown regarding his sentence of 96 months’ incarceration and 3 years’ supervised release for bank robbery, along with a consecutive 24-month sentence for supervised release violation.The main issue in the case was whether the district court erred by not orally pronouncing the standard conditions of supervised release during the sentencing hearing, which were later included in the written judgment. The court relied on the recent precedent set in United States v. Hayden (2024), which established that when a district court references the standard conditions of supervised release for the Middle District of Florida during sentencing, it satisfies due process requirements.Key provisions of the opinion include:

The court confirmed that district courts need not individually pronounce each condition of supervised release at sentencing
It’s sufficient for the court to reference a written list of supervised release conditions or adopt conditions recommended in the presentence investigation report
When the district court states that standard conditions apply and the defendant doesn’t object, the claim is subject to plain error review
The standard conditions listed in the publicly available judgment form that track the sentencing guidelines are considered properly imposed when referenced during sentencing

Robert Decker v. J. Wadas / 23-02179 (2024-11-13)

The opinion addresses a case involving a prisoner’s First Amendment claim against a prison warden regarding communication restrictions with his wife. The court upheld the district court’s decision to dismiss the case as moot after the prisoner’s transfer to another facility.The key elements of the opinion are:

The original claim challenged a specific warden’s decision to place the prisoner’s wife on a no-contact list at FCI Terre Haute.
After the prisoner’s transfer to USP Marion, the district court dismissed the case as moot since the claim was for injunctive relief against the specific warden.
The court rejected the prisoner’s attempt to recharacterize his claim on appeal as a challenge to a system-wide Bureau of Prisons policy, noting this was inconsistent with his original complaint.

The most significant provisions of the opinion are:

A prisoner’s claim for injunctive relief regarding specific prison conditions becomes moot upon transfer to another facility, unless the claim challenges a system-wide policy that applies at both facilities.
A plaintiff cannot amend their complaint on appeal to include new allegations not present in the original complaint.
When a case becomes moot, the court loses jurisdiction and cannot enter any substantive orders, including transfer of venue.

USA v. Lekey Davis / 23-12727 (2024-11-13)

The opinion addresses an appeal by Lekey Davis regarding his 210-month sentence for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine. The Court of Appeals vacates the sentence and remands for resentencing based on United States v. Dupree decision, while rejecting other arguments of the appellant.The opinion’s structure includes three main parts:

Background of the case and initial sentencing
Procedural history including Davis’s § 2255 motion and the impact of Dupree decision
Analysis of three key issues: application of Dupree, resentencing procedure, and ineffective assistance claims

The key provisions of the opinion are:

The Court vacates Davis’s sentence because under Dupree, conspiracy offenses are considered ‘inchoate offenses’ and cannot trigger career offender status under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b)
The Court affirms that in cases where counsel failed to file an appeal, the district court should reimpose the same sentence to allow for a timely appeal, rather than conduct a de novo sentencing
The Court declines to address ineffective assistance of counsel claims, stating these should first be examined by the district court

Alma Castaneda-Martinez v. U.S. Attorney General / 21-10115 (2024-11-13)

This opinion concerns a case of Alma Aracely Castaneda-Martinez, a Honduran citizen, who petitioned for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision denying her claim for withholding of removal.The Court dismissed Castaneda-Martinez’s petition because she failed to properly exhaust her administrative remedies before the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The key issue was that while the Immigration Judge denied her claims based on both the lack of cognizable social group and lack of nexus between proposed groups and feared harm, Castaneda-Martinez only challenged the social group determination in her BIA appeal, not the nexus finding.The Court’s analysis focused on two main aspects:

The requirement to exhaust administrative remedies under Immigration and Nationality Act § 242(d)(1) is a mandatory claims-processing rule, not a jurisdictional requirement (following Supreme Court’s Santos-Zacaria decision)
Since the government properly raised the exhaustion issue, the Court must enforce this rule and dismiss the petition because Castaneda-Martinez failed to challenge a core finding (lack of nexus) in her BIA appeal

The Court emphasized that to properly exhaust a claim, a petitioner must both raise the ‘core issue’ before the BIA and set out discrete arguments supporting that claim. A mere passing reference to an issue is insufficient for exhaustion purposes.

Alma Castaneda-Martinez v. U.S. Attorney General / 21-10115 (2021-11-15)

The case concerns a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit regarding Alma Castaneda-Martinez’s petition for withholding of removal after facing threats from a gang in Honduras called Los Chentes.The Court dismissed the petition due to lack of jurisdiction, as Castaneda-Martinez failed to properly challenge before the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) the immigration judge’s finding that there was no nexus between her proposed social groups and the harm she feared in Honduras. The immigration judge had determined that her fear was merely a generalized fear of crime and violence rather than persecution based on membership in a particular social group.Key provisions of the opinion include:

The Court can only review issues that were properly raised and exhausted before the BIA
Merely making passing references to an issue before the BIA is not sufficient for exhaustion purposes
Even if the BIA addresses an unraised issue sua sponte, the petitioner still fails to exhaust that claim
For withholding of removal, an applicant must demonstrate it is ‘more likely than not’ they will be persecuted based on membership in a particular social group
Evidence of private violence or criminal activity alone does not constitute persecution based on a statutorily protected ground

The Court’s dismissal was based on procedural grounds (lack of jurisdiction due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies) rather than the merits of whether Castaneda-Martinez actually qualified for withholding of removal.

Yvette Nonte v. Kent Burstein / 23-02002 (2024-11-13)

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court’s decision regarding the non-dischargeability of debt in a bankruptcy case involving former spouses Kent David Burstein and Yvette Nonte. The court upheld that debts arising from their separation agreement cannot be discharged through bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15).The opinion is structured as a brief per curiam decision that addresses a single issue: whether debt incurred in connection with a separation agreement can be discharged in bankruptcy. The court found no reversible error in the district court’s determination that such debt is non-dischargeable.Key provisions of the opinion include:

Confirmation that debts arising from separation agreements fall under the non-dischargeable category of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15)
Denial of Burstein’s motion for a stay pending appeal
Affirmation of the district court’s order without oral argument, as the court deemed the written materials sufficient for decision-making

USA v. Aaron Holmes, Jr. / 22-10266 (2024-11-13)

The opinion concerns a child pornography investigation case where the FBI received two cybertips from NCMEC (National Center for Missing and Exploited Children). The key issue was whether evidence obtained after an FBI agent viewed images from Facebook without a warrant should be suppressed.The Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, finding that neither the good-faith exception nor the inevitable discovery exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement applied:1. The good-faith exception did not apply because the binding appellate precedent that existed when the agent conducted her investigation was contradictory and only plausibly supported her warrantless viewing of the images.2. The inevitable discovery exception did not apply because:- The government failed to prove that another agent would have separately obtained the same evidence through a parallel investigation- The timing and circumstances of any hypothetical discovery were too speculative- There was no certainty that the evidence would have been found in the same way without the unlawful searchThe opinion provides detailed analysis of the requirements for both exceptions to apply:- For good faith, there must be clear binding precedent specifically authorizing the conduct- For inevitable discovery, there must be demonstrated historical facts showing discovery was truly inevitable, not just possible- The government bears the burden of proving these exceptions apply by a preponderance of evidence- Speculation and assumptions are not sufficient to establish inevitability

Muscogee (Creek) Nation, et al v. Buford Rollin, et al / 21-11643 (2024-10-11)

The case involves a dispute between the Muscogee (Creek) Nation and officials of the Poarch Band of Creek Indians regarding the excavation and development of a sacred burial site called Hickory Ground in Alabama.The Court of Appeals vacated the district court’s dismissal order and remanded the case for several key reasons:1. The district court erred by failing to analyze the Poarch officials’ sovereign immunity claim-by-claim and defendant-by-defendant, instead considering multiple claims and remedies together.2. The Court confirmed that Coeur d’Alene (which creates an exception to Ex parte Young for claims that are functionally equivalent to quiet title actions and implicate special sovereignty interests) remains valid law but is a narrow exception.3. The Court found that the complaint’s “shotgun pleading” style made it unclear which remedies related to which claims, requiring amendment to conform to notice pleading requirements.The key provisions include:

Courts must examine sovereign immunity on a claim-by-claim and defendant-by-defendant basis
The Coeur d’Alene exception requires three specific circumstances to apply
Claims must be clearly drafted to show which remedies relate to which defendants

The Court remanded for the district court to permit amendment of the complaint and conduct a proper claim-by-claim analysis of sovereign immunity.

Fane Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Florida / 23-11119 (2024-10-16)

The case involves a property dispute between Fane Lozman and the City of Riviera Beach, Florida, regarding development restrictions on his parcel of mostly submerged land. The court had to determine whether Lozman’s takings claim was ripe for judicial review.The court’s opinion is structured around three main elements:

The requirement for a ‘final decision’ from the government entity before a takings claim can be reviewed
Analysis of whether the city’s comprehensive plan and ordinance constitute such a ‘final decision’
Examination of whether seeking a final decision would have been futile

The key provisions of the opinion are:

A takings claim is not ripe until the government entity has made a final decision on how regulations apply to the specific property
Neither a comprehensive plan nor a general ordinance alone constitutes a ‘final decision’
Property owners must typically apply for at least one variance before claiming a ‘final decision’
The futility exception to seeking a final decision applies only in limited circumstances, such as repeated denials or when no viable variance is possible
The court concluded that Lozman’s claim was not ripe because he never applied for any permits or variances to develop his land

Thomas Jacobi Allen v. US / 24-01519 (2024-11-13)

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Thomas C. Jacobi Allen’s civil action brought under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. The case was dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.The opinion’s structure revolves around two main elements: (1) the procedural history of the case, where the district court referred pretrial matters to a magistrate judge who recommended summary dismissal as frivolous, and (2) the legal basis for affirming the dismissal, which centered on Allen’s failure to file specific objections to the magistrate’s recommendation despite receiving proper notice.The key provisions of the opinion are:

The requirement for timely filing of specific objections to preserve appellate review when parties have been warned of noncompliance consequences
The forfeiture of appellate review rights due to failure to file objections after proper notice
The denial of Allen’s motions for default judgment and other forms of relief
The court’s decision to dispense with oral argument as unnecessary for the decisional process

Karl Wright, III v. Milwaukee County Jail / 24-02069 (2024-11-13)

The case concerns a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit that affirmed the dismissal of a lawsuit filed by Karl Wright against Milwaukee County Jail regarding an alleged assault that occurred in 2016.The Court’s opinion addresses two main legal issues: the statute of limitations and issue preclusion. The Court found that Wright’s claims were barred by Wisconsin’s six-year statute of limitations, as he filed the lawsuit in 2024, nearly eight years after the alleged incident. Additionally, the Court determined that issue preclusion prevented Wright from relitigating matters related to the assault, as these issues had been previously decided in a 2019 case where summary judgment was granted to the jail officials due to lack of evidence.Key provisions of the opinion include:

Confirmation that Wisconsin’s six-year statute of limitations (WIS. STAT. § 893.53) applies to the case, rather than the amended three-year period introduced in 2018
Rejection of Wright’s argument for tolling the statute of limitations based on his recent discovery of a third official’s involvement
Application of issue preclusion doctrine to prevent relitigation of the assault claims that were previously decided in the 2019 case
Affirmation that courts may raise issue preclusion sua sponte when it is apparent from the face of the complaint

Nehemias Samayoa v. L. Kelly / 23-06605 (2024-11-13)

This is a brief per curiam opinion from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirming the district court’s denial of a federal prisoner’s habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.The case involves federal prisoner Nehemias Samayoa who challenged the execution of his sentence through a habeas corpus petition. The district court denied both his initial petition and his motion for reconsideration.The Fourth Circuit’s opinion is straightforward and contains three key elements:

Confirmation that they reviewed the record and found no reversible error
Affirmation of both district court orders (from February 2 and June 7, 2023)
Decision to dispense with oral arguments as unnecessary given the adequate presentation of facts and legal contentions in the existing materials

The opinion is notably concise and follows standard form for unpublished opinions, which are not binding precedent in the Fourth Circuit. The court provided minimal analysis, simply stating their conclusion that the district court’s decisions should be affirmed.

Charles Martin v. Michael Fugate, et al / 24-01823 (2024-11-13)

The opinion addresses a case where a Wisconsin prisoner, Charles Martin, appealed a summary judgment that rejected his claims of excessive force by four correctional officers during his restraint after assaulting an officer.The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision, finding that no reasonable jury could conclude that the officers violated Martin’s rights under the Eighth Amendment. The key aspects of the case include:

The incident began when Martin assaulted Officer Fugate after a verbal altercation during medication distribution.
Three other officers (Rohde, Wisniewski, and Lannoye) responded to help restrain Martin.
Martin claimed excessive force was used after he had stopped resisting, resulting in a concussion.

The Court’s main conclusions were:

The officers used reasonable force to restore order after Martin’s violent assault.
The officers were not required to believe Martin’s claims that he had stopped resisting.
No evidence showed that the officers used force maliciously or sadistically, rather than in a good-faith effort to maintain discipline.
The force applied was consistent with the need to restrain Martin after his assault on an officer.

The Court emphasized that to prove an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner must demonstrate that force was applied ‘maliciously and sadistically’ to cause harm, rather than in a good-faith effort to maintain discipline. Even considering Martin’s version of events, the Court found the officers’ actions were reasonable and within constitutional bounds.

K.C., et al v. Individual Members of the Medical Licensing Board, et al / 23-02366 (2024-11-13)

The opinion addresses Indiana’s Senate Enrolled Act 480 (SEA 480), which prohibits physicians from providing gender transition procedures to minors and from aiding/abetting others in providing such procedures. The key provisions include: 1. A ban on providing puberty blockers, hormone therapy, and gender reassignment surgery to minors for gender transition purposes, while allowing these treatments for other medical conditions. 2. A prohibition on physicians aiding or abetting other practitioners in providing gender transition procedures to minors. 3. Exceptions for treating disorders of sex development, injuries, or medical emergencies. The majority opinion upholds SEA 480 against constitutional challenges, finding:

The law does not violate equal protection rights as it does not discriminate based on sex or transgender status
It does not violate parents’ substantive due process rights regarding medical decisions for their children
The aiding/abetting provision does not violate First Amendment free speech rights

The dissenting opinion argues the law’s aiding/abetting provision violates the First Amendment by restricting protected speech about out-of-state treatment options. The dissent contends the majority incorrectly applied exceptions for speech integral to unlawful conduct and speech incidental to regulated conduct.

Sherman L. Fields v. John Gilley / 22-02762 (2024-11-13)

This opinion addresses a federal prisoner’s attempt to challenge his conviction through a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 after previously filing multiple motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.The case involves complex procedural history where Sherman Fields, initially sentenced to death for crimes including murder and carjacking, had his death sentence later vacated and replaced with life imprisonment. After exhausting various appeals and § 2255 motions, Fields attempted to file a § 2241 habeas petition, primarily arguing judicial bias.The court’s analysis focuses on three main aspects:

The relationship between § 2241 (general habeas corpus) and § 2255 (post-conviction remedy for federal prisoners)
The interpretation of the ‘saving clause’ in § 2255(e) which allows § 2241 petitions only when § 2255 is ‘inadequate or ineffective’
The application of recent Supreme Court precedent in Jones v. Hendrix regarding when prisoners can resort to § 2241

The key provisions of the opinion are:

§ 2255 is not ‘inadequate or ineffective’ merely because a prisoner cannot meet the requirements for filing a successive motion
The ‘saving clause’ is concerned with the adequacy of the remedial vehicle itself, not with errors of law
A claim of judicial bias can be properly addressed through § 2255’s procedures and does not justify resort to § 2241
The inability to meet standards for a successive § 2255 motion does not make § 2241 available as an alternative

Veronica Baxter, et al v. Carson Hendren, et al / 23-11902 (2024-11-13)

This case involves a fatal shooting incident where Deputy Santiago-Miranda fired his weapon into a moving vehicle, killing two young occupants. The key aspects of the opinion are:1. The Court upheld Deputy Santiago-Miranda’s use of deadly force as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, finding he had probable cause to believe the accelerating vehicle posed an immediate threat of serious physical harm when it moved toward him from close range.2. The Court analyzed the case structure through three main claims: excessive force claims under §1983, state law battery claims, and Monell claims against the Sheriff. The Court affirmed summary judgment on all claims, finding no constitutional violations occurred.3. The Court addressed jurisdictional issues regarding how the case was adjudicated through voluntary dismissal of one defendant and summary judgment for others. The majority found jurisdiction existed while a dissenting judge argued the dismissal was improper under Rule 41(a).The Court’s key findings were that the deputy’s use of force was objectively reasonable given the immediate threat posed by the accelerating vehicle, the deputy had only seconds to react from close range, and without an underlying constitutional violation, the related battery and Monell claims also failed.The opinion provides detailed analysis of vehicle-as-weapon cases and reaffirms that officers need not wait to see if a vehicle will actually strike them before using deadly force if they reasonably perceive an immediate threat of serious harm from a vehicle moving toward them.

USA v. Nacoe Brown / 23-11441 (2024-11-13)

The opinion addresses an appeal regarding the imposition of supervised release conditions in a bank robbery case. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to impose standard conditions of supervised release.The main issue in the case was whether the district court erred by not orally pronouncing all standard conditions of supervised release during the sentencing hearing, while later including them in the written judgment. The defendant, Nacoe Brown, received a sentence of 96 months’ incarceration and 3 years’ supervised release for bank robbery, plus a consecutive 24-month sentence for supervised release violation.The Court’s decision relies heavily on the recent precedent set in United States v. Hayden (2024), which established that oral reference to ‘standard conditions’ during sentencing is sufficient when these conditions are publicly available in the judgment form and align with sentencing guidelines. The Court found that the district court’s statement that the defendant would ‘comply with the mandatory and standard conditions adopted by the Court in the Middle District of Florida’ was adequate notice of these conditions.Key provisions of the opinion include:

A district court must pronounce or reference discretionary conditions of supervised release at sentencing to satisfy due process
The court may satisfy this requirement by referencing a written list of conditions or adopting conditions recommended in the presentence investigation report
When there is merely ambiguity between oral pronouncement and written judgment (rather than conflict), the written judgment governs
The standard conditions need not be individually pronounced if they are referenced as part of an established set of conditions

GENCE v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:22-vv-00937 (2024-11-13)

This is a decision of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims regarding the award of attorneys’ fees and costs in a vaccine injury case. The court awarded $61,949.53 in total fees and costs to the petitioner’s legal team.The decision has three main structural components:

Analysis of the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees ($39,130.00)
Review of general costs like medical records and filing fees
Detailed examination of expert witness fees, particularly the $750/hour rate for Dr. Grando’s services

The key provisions of the decision include:

The court applied the lodestar method to determine reasonable fees by multiplying hours worked by reasonable hourly rates
The court accepted the expert witness rate of $750/hour despite some reservations about the supporting evidence from the Expert Institute
The decision established that future cases will need stronger evidence to justify expert rates than just Expert Institute data
The total award included $39,130.00 in attorneys’ fees and $22,819.53 in costs

GENCE v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:22-vv-00937 (2024-01-24)

This is a decision on a vaccine injury compensation case where Corinne Gence claimed that an influenza vaccine caused her to develop a skin disorder. The case was resolved through a stipulation between the parties, with the petitioner being awarded $14,750.00 in compensation.The stipulation agreement contains several key structural elements:

Confirmation that the vaccine was administered in the United States on September 23, 2019
Petitioner’s allegation that the flu vaccine caused a skin disorder with effects lasting more than six months
Respondent’s denial that the flu vaccine caused the claimed injury
Agreement on a lump sum payment of $14,750.00 as full compensation
Provisions for attorney’s fees and costs to be determined in separate proceedings

The most significant provisions of the stipulation include:

The compensation amount represents all damages available under 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(a)
The payment is subject to the availability of sufficient statutory funds
The money must be used solely for the benefit of the petitioner
The agreement includes a full release of all claims against the United States and the Secretary of Health and Human Services
The stipulation is not an admission of liability by the government

FULLER v. USA / 1:24-cv-01150 (2024-11-13)

This opinion addresses a motion for reconsideration filed by Jerrod Antonio Fuller regarding the court’s previous dismissal of his case. The court denies the motion, reaffirming its lack of jurisdiction over the matter.The opinion’s structure consists of three main parts: (1) the legal standard for reconsideration under Rule 59, (2) analysis of the plaintiff’s arguments, and (3) the final ruling. Under Rule 59, a motion for reconsideration requires showing extraordinary circumstances through either a change in controlling law, newly available evidence, or prevention of manifest injustice.The key provisions of the opinion are:

The Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction only over claims against the United States, not state courts or other parties
The court cannot review state court decisions, including those from Maryland state courts
The plaintiff’s arguments about jurisdiction issues, conflicts of interest, and alleged fraud must be addressed through the Maryland state court system
The plaintiff’s own statements confirm that his complaints are directed at state court proceedings, which are outside this court’s jurisdiction

FULLER v. USA / 1:24-cv-01150 (2024-10-17)

This is a decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims dismissing a case filed by Jerrod Antonio Fuller against the United States. The plaintiff sought compensation and other remedies related to his divorce proceedings in Maryland state courts.The Court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on several grounds:

All plaintiff’s allegations were directed at Maryland courts and their officials, not at the United States federal government
The Court lacks jurisdiction over tort claims (emotional distress, defamation, trespass etc.)
The Court has no jurisdiction to enforce criminal laws cited by the plaintiff
The Court cannot review or intervene in state court proceedings

The key provisions of the opinion focus on explaining the limited jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, which can only hear certain monetary claims against the United States federal government. The Court emphasized that it cannot hear claims against state courts or officials, cannot adjudicate tort or criminal matters, and is not an appellate court for state court decisions. The plaintiff’s proper recourse for challenging state court decisions would be through the Maryland state appellate courts.

LEWIS v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:21-vv-01298 (2024-11-13)

This is a procedural decision in a vaccine injury case where William Lewis claims that a meningococcal vaccine caused him to develop Guillain-Barré syndrome. The decision specifically addresses the petitioner’s request for interim attorneys’ fees and costs.The Special Master has decided to defer the adjudication of the motion for attorneys’ fees and costs until after considering the merits of the underlying vaccine injury claim. While the Vaccine Act allows for interim fee awards, they are not automatic, and special masters have discretion in determining when such awards are appropriate.The key provisions of the decision are:

Petitioners must establish good faith and reasonable basis for their claims to be eligible for attorneys’ fees
Special masters have discretion to determine if circumstances warrant an interim award
The reasonableness of fee requests may not be assessable prior to considering the merits of the vaccine injury claim
While technically a denial of the interim fees motion, the decision leaves open the possibility for the petitioner to recover these fees through a future motion

The decision effectively postpones the consideration of attorneys’ fees until after the substantive issues of the case are resolved through upcoming briefings, rather than denying the request outright.

Review of US courts opinions for 15/11/2024

FOMB, et al v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, et al / 23-02036 (2024-11-13)

FOMB, et al v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, et al / 23-02036 (2024-06-12)

FOMB, et al v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, et al / 23-02054 (2024-11-13)

FOMB, et al v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, et al / 23-02054 (2024-06-12)

Martinez-Diaz v. Garland / 23-02027 (2024-11-13)

FOMB v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, et al / 23-02053 (2024-11-13)

FOMB v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, et al / 23-02053 (2024-06-12)

FOMB, et al v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, et al / 23-02057 (2024-11-13)

FOMB, et al v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, et al / 23-02057 (2024-06-12)

FOMB, et al v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, et al / 23-02049 (2024-11-13)

FOMB, et al v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, et al / 23-02049 (2024-06-12)

Wadsworth v. Nguyen / 23-01400 (2024-11-13)

FOMB, et al v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n / 23-02052 (2024-11-13)

FOMB, et al v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n / 23-02052 (2024-06-12)

FOMB, et al v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, et al / 23-02050 (2024-11-13)

FOMB, et al v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, et al / 23-02050 (2024-06-12)

Serrano Colon v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, et al / 22-01089 (2024-11-13)

United States v. Spencer High Hawk / 23-03695 (2024-11-13)

PHT Holding I v. Security Life of Denver Insurance Company / 23-01326 (2024-11-13)

J. L. v. East Stroudsburg Area School District / 23-03035 (2024-11-13)

Matthews. v. United States, et al / 24-01412 (2024-11-13)

Benjamin Collins v. Attorney General United States of America / 24-01155 (2024-11-13)

Crump v. Ciolli, et al / 24-01420 (2024-11-13)

Cohen v. Howard, et al / 24-01202 (2024-11-13)

Magleby Cataxinos v. Vitamins Online, et al / 24-00605 (2024-11-13)

Williams v. Stancil / 24-01168 (2024-11-13)

Stella, et al v. Davis County, et al / 23-04122 (2024-11-13)

Clark, et al v. Haaland, et al / 22-02141 (2024-11-13)

Medina v. Bauby, et al / 24-01403 (2024-11-13)

Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran / 23-00700 (2024-11-13)

Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran / 23-00700 (2024-11-13)

Kane v. de Blasio / 22-01876 (2024-11-13)

New Yorkers For Religious Liberty, Inc. v. The City of New York / 22-01801 (2024-11-13)

Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran / 15-00690 (2024-11-13)

Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran / 15-00690 (2024-11-13)

Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran / 15-00690 (2020-06-22)

Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran / 15-00690 (2017-11-21)

Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran / 23-00614 (2024-11-13)

Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran / 23-00614 (2024-11-13)

The Art and Antique Dealers Le v. Basil Seggos / 21-00569 (2024-11-13)

The Art and Antique Dealers Le v. Basil Seggos / 21-00569 (2024-11-13)

Rodriguez v. McDonough / 24-01347 (2024-11-13)

D’Agostino v. US / 24-01319 (2024-11-13)

Dixon-Johnson v. OPM / 24-01716 (2024-11-13)

Wonge v. McDonough / 23-02355 (2024-11-13)

Annette McEachin v. Reliance Standard Life Ins Co / 24-01071 (2024-11-13)

Annette McEachin v. Reliance Standard Life Ins Co / 24-01100 (2024-11-13)

State of Georgia v. Shawn Still / 23-13361 (2024-10-24)

State of Georgia v. Cathleen Latham / 23-13362 (2024-10-24)

USA v. Hector Lind, Jr. / 24-11022 (2024-11-13)

USA v. Matthew Choy / 24-10056 (2024-11-13)

US v. Brandon McMillan / 23-04322 (2024-11-13)

State of Georgia v. David Shafer / 23-13360 (2024-10-24)

USA v. Nacoe Brown / 23-11449 (2024-11-13)

Robert Decker v. J. Wadas / 23-02179 (2024-11-13)

USA v. Lekey Davis / 23-12727 (2024-11-13)

Alma Castaneda-Martinez v. U.S. Attorney General / 21-10115 (2024-11-13)

Alma Castaneda-Martinez v. U.S. Attorney General / 21-10115 (2021-11-15)

Yvette Nonte v. Kent Burstein / 23-02002 (2024-11-13)

USA v. Aaron Holmes, Jr. / 22-10266 (2024-11-13)

Muscogee (Creek) Nation, et al v. Buford Rollin, et al / 21-11643 (2024-10-11)

Fane Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Florida / 23-11119 (2024-10-16)

Thomas Jacobi Allen v. US / 24-01519 (2024-11-13)

Karl Wright, III v. Milwaukee County Jail / 24-02069 (2024-11-13)

Nehemias Samayoa v. L. Kelly / 23-06605 (2024-11-13)

Charles Martin v. Michael Fugate, et al / 24-01823 (2024-11-13)

K.C., et al v. Individual Members of the Medical Licensing Board, et al / 23-02366 (2024-11-13)

Sherman L. Fields v. John Gilley / 22-02762 (2024-11-13)

Veronica Baxter, et al v. Carson Hendren, et al / 23-11902 (2024-11-13)

USA v. Nacoe Brown / 23-11441 (2024-11-13)

GENCE v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:22-vv-00937 (2024-11-13)

GENCE v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:22-vv-00937 (2024-01-24)

FULLER v. USA / 1:24-cv-01150 (2024-11-13)

FULLER v. USA / 1:24-cv-01150 (2024-10-17)

LEWIS v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES / 1:21-vv-01298 (2024-11-13)

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