CASE OF A.M. AND OTHERS v. GREECE
The judgment in the case of *A.M. and Others v. Greece* (Applications nos. 11022/17 and 3 others), delivered on 24 September 2026, addresses the systemic failures of the Greek reception system for asylum-seekers. The Court examined four joined applications concerning individuals who endured substandard living conditions in various facilities, including the Ritsona camp and the Moria Reception and Identification Centre. The applicants, many of whom were identified as highly vulnerable due to physical disabilities, torture-related trauma, or chronic illnesses like HIV and Hepatitis B, alleged that their treatment violated Article 3 of the Convention. While the Court rejected certain claims due to a lack of substantiation or procedural time-limit issues, it found clear evidence of inhuman and degrading treatment in the majority of the cases. Ultimately, the Court ruled that the Greek authorities failed to provide adequate reception conditions and, in specific instances, failed to ensure timely access to essential medical care for vulnerable individuals.
The structure of the decision follows the standard format for a Committee-level judgment of the European Court of Human Rights. It begins with the procedural history and the joinder of the four applications, followed by an assessment of the admissibility of the complaints. The Court systematically addresses the Government’s preliminary objections regarding the exhaustion of domestic remedies and the applicants’ victim status, dismissing them by highlighting the lack of effective, accessible remedies in the Greek legal system for these specific grievances. The judgment then moves to the merits, relying heavily on the established case-law of *M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece* and *Tarakhel v. Switzerland*. A significant feature of this judgment is the detailed appended table, which serves as an integral part of the decision, categorizing the specific vulnerabilities, the facilities involved, and the individual awards for non-pecuniary damage.
The most important provisions for legal practitioners and observers are as follows:
* **Threshold of Severity and Vulnerability:** The Court reaffirms that asylum-seekers are a “particularly vulnerable group.” It underscores that when an individual’s vulnerability (such as being a victim of torture or living with HIV) is known to the authorities, the State bears a heightened positive obligation to provide specialized, trauma-informed care.
* **Rejection of “Theoretical” Remedies:** The Court clarifies that the burden of proof lies with the Government to demonstrate that a domestic remedy is not only effective in theory but also in practice. The judgment explicitly states that if the Government cannot provide concrete examples of domestic case-law showing that a remedy provides timely redress for reception condition complaints, the objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies will be dismissed.
* **Medical Negligence as a Violation:** The judgment establishes that significant delays in initiating essential medical treatments (such as antiretroviral therapy for HIV) for vulnerable asylum-seekers, without clear clinical or administrative justification, constitute a violation of Article 3.
* **Procedural Rigor:** The Court emphasizes that applicants must provide “concrete and detailed information” regarding their personal situation. Failure to substantiate the duration and specific nature of alleged shortcomings leads to the rejection of claims as manifestly ill-founded.
**:** This decision is highly relevant for Ukraine and Ukrainian legal professionals, as it reinforces the standards for the treatment of displaced persons and vulnerable groups under the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court’s strict stance on the State’s positive obligation to provide adequate medical care and living conditions for vulnerable asylum-seekers provides a critical precedent for any proceedings involving the rights of refugees or internally displaced persons within the Council of Europe member states.
CASE OF ATTALIDIS AND OTHERS v. GREECE
The judgment in *Attalidis and Others v. Greece* (application no. 57479/17) concerns a group of applicants who alleged that their detention conditions at Korydallos prison violated Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits inhuman or degrading treatment. The Court examined claims regarding severe overcrowding, specifically the lack of personal space, and the practice of holding remand and convicted prisoners together. While the Court struck out the claims of three applicants due to a lack of communication or the death of the applicant, it proceeded to examine the merits for the remaining six. Ultimately, the Court found a violation of Article 3 for these applicants, confirming that the overcrowding at Korydallos prison fell below the minimum standards required by the Convention. The judgment reinforces the Court’s established jurisprudence regarding the necessity of providing detainees with at least 3 square meters of personal space.
The decision is structured into four primary sections: procedural history, the facts of the case, the legal assessment (admissibility and merits), and the application of Article 41 regarding “just satisfaction.” The structure follows the standard format for a Committee-level judgment, focusing on the exhaustion of domestic remedies and the substantive assessment of detention conditions. A notable change or specific application here is the rigorous enforcement of the “3-square-meter rule,” where the Court rejected the Government’s unsubstantiated claims regarding cell occupancy. The Court relied heavily on reports from the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) to refute the state’s assertions about prison capacity, marking a consistent trend in the Court’s oversight of Greek prison conditions.
The most important provisions for future legal use are as follows:
* **The 3-Square-Meter Threshold:** The Court reaffirmed that providing less than 3 square meters of personal space in a multi-occupancy cell creates a strong presumption of a violation of Article 3.
* **Burden of Proof:** The judgment clarifies that when the Government asserts that cells are not overcrowded, they must provide concrete evidence. Mere assertions are insufficient when official reports (such as those from the CPT) indicate systemic overcrowding.
* **Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies:** The Court clarified that if an applicant is transferred to a different facility before lodging their application, they must pursue domestic remedies (such as Article 105 of the Introductory Law to the Civil Code) to seek redress for the past violation, rather than bringing the complaint directly to Strasbourg.
* **Procedural Compliance:** The decision highlights the necessity for applicants to remain in contact with the Court; failure to provide updates or information regarding heirs in the event of death leads to the application being struck from the list.
This judgment serves as a critical precedent for practitioners dealing with prison conditions in Greece, emphasizing that the Court will not accept generalized defenses from the State when objective data on overcrowding is available.
CASE OF GALINA ROŞCA AND OTHERS v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
The case of *Galina Roşca and Others v. the Republic of Moldova* concerns a violation of the principle of legal certainty resulting from contradictory judicial decisions regarding inheritance rights. The applicants successfully obtained a final court judgment in 2012 confirming their right to inherit property not covered by a will, with the court explicitly ruling that another claimant, R.I., had no such right. However, in a subsequent set of proceedings initiated in 2013, the domestic courts reached a different conclusion, effectively nullifying the findings of the first final judgment and forcing the applicants to share the property with R.I. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) found that by ignoring the *res judicata* effect of the first judgment, the domestic courts undermined the stability of the judicial system. Consequently, the Court ruled that this inconsistency violated the applicants’ right to a fair trial and their right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions.
The decision is structured as a standard Chamber judgment, consisting of the facts of the case, the Court’s assessment of admissibility and merits, and the application of Article 41 regarding just satisfaction. The structure follows the Court’s established methodology for addressing “legal certainty” cases: first, it establishes the existence of a final judgment; second, it analyzes whether subsequent proceedings directly contradicted the findings of that judgment; and third, it determines if there were “compelling circumstances” to justify such a departure. Unlike previous cases where the Court might have focused on the procedural errors of a single trial, this decision emphasizes the systemic failure of the Moldovan courts to respect the finality of their own prior rulings, thereby creating a conflict between two sets of final decisions.
The most important provisions for the practical application of this decision are as follows:
* **The Principle of *Res Judicata*:** The Court reaffirms that once a legal issue has been finally determined by a court, it should not be called into question. This is a cornerstone of the rule of law, ensuring that litigation does not continue indefinitely.
* **Prohibition of Contradictory Final Judgments:** The Court established that even if a second judgment does not formally “set aside” the first, it violates Article 6 § 1 if it reaches conclusions that directly contradict the principal findings of a previously adopted final judgment.
* **Protection of Property Rights:** The Court clarified that when a breach of legal certainty leads to the loss of property rights previously recognized by a court, it constitutes a simultaneous violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
* **Limited Grounds for Departure:** The judgment reinforces that departure from the principle of *res judicata* is only permissible in exceptional circumstances, such as the correction of fundamental defects or a clear miscarriage of justice, neither of which were present in this case.
This judgment serves as a critical reminder to national judiciaries that the finality of court decisions is not merely a procedural formality but a substantive requirement for the protection of human rights.
CASE OF IMMOBILIARE BERGAMELLA PRIMA DI CARLO MARIANI & C. S.A.S. v. ITALY
This judgment concerns a long-standing dispute regarding the adequacy of compensation paid by the Italian authorities for the expropriation of land owned by several applicant companies. The case originated from an expropriation-aimed restraint imposed in 1963, followed by physical occupation in 1972 and a formal expropriation order in 1975. The applicant companies spent decades in domestic litigation challenging the valuation of the land and the lack of inflation adjustments. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) examined whether the compensation, as determined by the Italian courts, remained proportional and fair given the excessive duration of the proceedings and the authorities’ inaction. Ultimately, the Court found that the failure to account for inflation during the period of administrative inaction and the lack of compensation for the inability to use the land prior to occupation violated the applicants’ property rights.
**Structure and Provisions**
The decision is structured into three primary segments: the factual background of the protracted domestic proceedings, the Court’s assessment of admissibility and merits under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, and the application of Article 41 regarding just satisfaction. A key change in the Court’s approach compared to previous domestic rulings is the rejection of the Italian Court of Cassation’s view that the state was only “at fault” once the applicants initiated legal challenges. The ECHR established that the state’s failure to act during the pre-litigation phase created a disproportionate burden, necessitating a recalculation of the compensation to include inflation adjustments and damages for the loss of use of the property.
**Main Provisions for Legal Application**
The most significant aspects of this judgment for future litigation include:
* **The “Inaction” Principle:** The Court reaffirmed that when domestic law provides no remedy for administrative inaction, the state bears full responsibility for the resulting delays. This prevents the state from shifting the burden of inflation onto the property owner by claiming that the owner should have initiated litigation earlier.
* **Proportionality of Compensation:** The judgment clarifies that compensation for expropriation is not merely a static figure based on the date of the order; it must be updated to offset inflation and account for the “loss of use” of the land during periods of administrative limbo.
* **Admissibility Standards:** The Court strictly applied *ratione personae* criteria, declaring the application inadmissible for a company that was not the formal addressee of the expropriation order and had not been a party to the domestic proceedings, reinforcing the necessity of proper standing in human rights litigation.
* **Calculation of Damages:** The Court provided a clear methodology for calculating “just satisfaction” in cases of excessive delay, specifically by awarding damages for the period between the initial restraint and the physical occupation, and by mandating inflation adjustments for the period between the expropriation order and the commencement of legal proceedings.
CASE OF KISSNÉ FÖVENYI AND OTHERS v. HUNGARY
The judgment in *Kissné Fövenyi and Others v. Hungary* (application no. 13854/25) addresses a systemic issue regarding the excessive duration of civil proceedings within the Hungarian judicial system. The European Court of Human Rights (the Court) examined a collective application involving 76 individuals who complained that their civil cases had remained pending for over a decade, violating the “reasonable time” requirement under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. While the Court declared the application partially inadmissible regarding two individuals who were not parties to the underlying domestic proceedings, it found that the remaining applicants’ rights had been breached. The Court reaffirmed its established case-law, noting that the State failed to provide any justification for the protracted length of these proceedings. Consequently, the Court ruled in favor of the applicants, awarding them just satisfaction for the non-pecuniary damage suffered due to the judicial delay.
The structure of the decision follows the standard format for a Committee-level judgment of the Court. It begins with the procedural history, followed by the “Facts” section, which outlines the nature of the complaint. The “Law” section is divided into three distinct parts: the admissibility criteria (where the Court filters out non-eligible applicants), the merits of the Article 6 § 1 claim, and the application of Article 41 regarding just satisfaction. This judgment aligns with the Court’s recent trend of utilizing Committee compositions to address repetitive cases concerning the length of proceedings in Hungary, specifically referencing the precedent set in *Gazsó v. Hungary* and *Csatári and Others v. Hungary*. There are no significant deviations from the Court’s established procedural framework, confirming that the Court continues to apply a consistent standard to evaluate judicial efficiency in the respondent State.
The most important provisions for legal practitioners and observers are:
* **Admissibility (Ratione Personae):** The Court strictly enforces the requirement that applicants must be direct parties to the domestic proceedings in question. Those who were not formally involved in the national litigation lack the standing to claim a violation of the right to a fair trial under Article 6.
* **The “Reasonable Time” Criterion:** The Court reiterates that the assessment of “reasonable time” is not based on a fixed duration but on a multi-factor test: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicants, the conduct of the national authorities, and what is at stake for the parties.
* **Systemic Failure:** By citing *Gazsó* and *Csatári*, the Court signals that the excessive length of civil proceedings in Hungary remains a recurring issue. This indicates that the Court is likely to continue finding violations in similar cases where the State cannot justify delays exceeding a decade.
* **Just Satisfaction:** The Court’s decision to award a specific sum (200 EUR per applicant in this instance) serves as a standardized remedy for the frustration and uncertainty caused by prolonged litigation, reinforcing the State’s financial liability for judicial inefficiency.
CASE OF KOUKOURAS AND OTHERS v. GREECE
The judgment in *Koukouras and Others v. Greece* (application no. 7936/18) addresses the systemic issue of prison overcrowding at Korydallos Prison in Greece. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) examined complaints from three applicants regarding their detention conditions, specifically focusing on the lack of personal living space. The Court found that the applicants were subjected to conditions falling below the minimum standards required by Article 3 of the Convention, which prohibits inhuman or degrading treatment. While one applicant’s case was struck from the list due to a failure to maintain contact with the Court, the remaining two were awarded compensation for non-pecuniary damage and legal costs. This decision reinforces the Court’s established jurisprudence regarding the “rebuttable presumption” of a violation when a detainee is afforded less than 3 square meters of personal space. The ruling serves as a further confirmation of the persistent structural deficiencies within the Greek penitentiary system.
The structure of the decision follows the standard format for a Committee-level judgment of the ECtHR. It begins with the procedural history, followed by the Court’s decision to strike out the application regarding the second applicant for lack of cooperation. The core of the judgment is dedicated to the Article 3 assessment, where the Court applies the principles from its landmark *Muršić v. Croatia* ruling. The judgment concludes with the application of Article 41, awarding specific sums for damages and costs. There are no radical changes in legal doctrine here; rather, it is a consistent application of existing case-law regarding prison conditions, confirming that the Court continues to rely on reports from the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) to verify domestic claims of overcrowding.
The most critical provisions for legal practitioners and observers are:
* **The 3-Square-Meter Threshold:** The Court reaffirmed that providing less than 3 square meters of personal space in a multi-occupancy cell creates a strong presumption of a violation of Article 3. The Court’s willingness to rely on the Government’s own admissions regarding cell dimensions and occupancy numbers makes this a powerful precedent for similar cases.
* **Evidence and CPT Reports:** The judgment highlights the weight the Court places on independent international monitoring, specifically citing CPT reports and Ministry of Justice statistics to corroborate the applicants’ claims of systemic overcrowding.
* **Procedural Compliance:** The decision serves as a reminder of the necessity for applicants to remain in contact with the Court and provide updated information. The striking out of the second applicant’s claim underscores that failure to respond to the Court’s requests for information regarding factual developments can lead to the termination of the case.
* **Non-Pecuniary Damages:** The Court awarded significant sums (12,500 EUR and 8,100 EUR) based on the duration of the detention, providing a clear reference point for the valuation of claims involving prolonged exposure to inadequate conditions.
This decision is **** for Ukraine and Ukrainians, as the Court’s consistent application of the “3-square-meter rule” and its reliance on objective data regarding prison capacity are highly relevant to the ongoing monitoring of detention conditions in Ukraine. As Ukraine continues to reform its penitentiary system, the principles established in this judgment—particularly the emphasis on the state’s burden to prove adequate living space and the use of external monitoring reports—provide a clear benchmark for the protection of human rights in custodial settings.
CASE OF MELNYK v. UKRAINE
The case of *Melnyk v. Ukraine* (application no. 25753/18) concerns the ill-treatment of a protestor by law enforcement officials during the “Euromaidan” events on 18 February 2014. The applicant, Mr. Mark Yuriyovych Melnyk, suffered bodily injuries during police operations, which were subsequently documented in medical reports. Despite ongoing domestic investigations into the Maidan-related violence, the Court found that the state failed to provide an effective investigation into the specific circumstances of the applicant’s case. The Court concluded that the police action constituted a violation of the applicant’s rights under the European Convention on Human Rights. Ultimately, the judgment confirms that the state’s failure to identify perpetrators and ensure accountability for the events of 2014 remains a systemic issue. The applicant did not submit a claim for just satisfaction, and therefore, no financial award was granted.
**Structure and Provisions**
The decision follows the standard structure of a Committee judgment, consisting of the admissibility assessment, the merits, and the application of Article 41. The Court maintains consistency with its landmark ruling in *Shmorgunov and Others v. Ukraine* (2021), which serves as the primary legal framework for all Maidan-related cases. Unlike earlier, more complex judgments, this decision is concise, focusing on the application of established principles to the specific facts of Mr. Melnyk’s case. It rejects the Government’s argument that the case was premature due to ongoing domestic investigations, reaffirming that the duration and lack of progress in these investigations constitute a procedural violation.
**Main Provisions for Legal Use**
1. **Substantive Violation of Article 3:** The Court confirms that the use of force against the applicant was unjustified and amounted to ill-treatment, establishing state responsibility for the actions of its police officers.
2. **Procedural Violation of Article 3:** The judgment serves as a precedent that even if domestic investigations are “ongoing,” the lack of tangible progress and failure to identify specific perpetrators over a prolonged period (in this case, over 12 years) constitutes a breach of the state’s procedural obligation to investigate.
3. **Violation of Article 11:** The Court reaffirms that the police crackdown on the Euromaidan protests represented a disproportionate interference with the right to freedom of peaceful assembly, reinforcing the protection of protestors against state-sponsored violence.
4. **Rejection of “Prematurity” Defense:** The decision is a vital tool for legal practitioners, as it explicitly rejects the Government’s recurring argument that applicants must wait indefinitely for domestic investigations to conclude before seeking redress at the Strasbourg level.
CASE OF MESHCHERYAKOV v. UKRAINE
This judgment, *Meshcheryakov v. Ukraine* (application no. 27003/16), concerns the systemic failures within the Ukrainian criminal justice system regarding the duration of proceedings and the lack of transparency in covert surveillance. The applicant, who was subject to criminal investigations for nearly a decade, challenged the excessive length of his trial and the inability to verify the legality of wiretapping measures used against him. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found that the state failed to justify the nearly ten-year duration of the proceedings, which included significant periods of unexplained inactivity. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the destruction of judicial authorizations for interception of communications prevented the applicant from exercising his right to a remedy, thereby violating his privacy rights. Ultimately, the Court awarded the applicant compensation for non-pecuniary damage and legal costs. ****: This decision highlights recurring issues in Ukrainian judicial practice, particularly regarding the destruction of sensitive case files and the “reasonable time” requirement in criminal investigations.
### Structure and Provisions
The judgment is structured as a standard Committee-level ruling, focusing on four primary legal complaints:
1. **Article 6 § 1 (Length of Proceedings):** The Court assessed the overall duration (2008–2018) against the complexity of the case and the conduct of the authorities.
2. **Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 (Freedom of Movement):** The Court evaluated the proportionality of travel restrictions imposed on the applicant during his bail period.
3. **Article 8 (Right to Privacy/Family Life):** This was split into two parts: the inability to meet family members (deemed inadmissible) and the interception of communications (found to be a violation).
4. **Article 13 (Right to an Effective Remedy):** The Court deemed it unnecessary to examine this separately, as it was subsumed by the findings under Articles 6 and 8.
Compared to previous jurisprudence, this decision reinforces the Court’s strict stance on the “destruction of evidence” by domestic courts, which effectively strips individuals of their ability to challenge state surveillance.
### Key Provisions for Legal Practice
For legal practitioners and observers, the following points are of critical importance:
* **The “Destruction of Evidence” Doctrine:** The Court explicitly held that when the state destroys judicial rulings authorizing surveillance, it cannot demonstrate that the measures were subject to “proper and detailed judicial scrutiny.” This creates a presumption of a violation of Article 8 because the state effectively denies the subject the ability to verify the legality of the interference.
* **Reasonable Time Assessment:** The Court reaffirmed that even in complex cases involving organized crime, periods of “unexplained inactivity” by the prosecution or the courts are inexcusable. The fact that the case was remitted twice for further investigation without clear progress was a decisive factor in finding a violation of Article 6.
* **Proportionality of Travel Restrictions:** While the Court found no violation regarding the restriction of movement, it emphasized that such measures must not be applied automatically. The state successfully argued that the restriction was justified by the nature of the charges and the fact that the applicant’s requested travel destinations were in territories outside government control.
* **Procedural Transparency:** The judgment serves as a warning to domestic authorities that the destruction of documents—even under the guise of security or statutory storage limits—does not absolve the state of its obligations under the Convention to provide access to information necessary to challenge state interference.
CASE OF MOLLA MOLLA BLEDAR AND OTHERS v. GREECE
The judgment in *Molla Molla Bledar and Others v. Greece* (application no. 868/16), delivered on 24 September 2026, concerns the systemic issue of inadequate detention conditions in the Amfissa prison. The Court examined complaints from multiple applicants regarding severe overcrowding and poor living conditions, which they argued violated Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. While the Court struck out the claims of two applicants due to procedural failures and rejected others for failure to exhaust domestic remedies, it found a clear violation of Article 3 for the remaining applicants. The ruling underscores the state’s responsibility to provide adequate personal living space, specifically citing the standard of 3 square meters per detainee. The Court ultimately awarded non-pecuniary damages to the successful applicants, reflecting the gravity of the conditions they endured.
### Structure and Provisions
The decision is structured into four primary sections:
1. **Procedural History:** Outlines the filing of the application and the subsequent communication with the Greek Government.
2. **Striking Out of Complaints:** Addresses the removal of two applicants (A. Dimitropoulos and S. Mustafa) due to the representative’s failure to provide necessary updates or proof of continued interest in the case.
3. **Admissibility and Merits (Article 3):** This is the core of the judgment. The Court distinguishes between applicants who were still in detention or had exhausted domestic remedies and those who had not. It establishes that for those who had been released or transferred, an action under Article 105 of the Introductory Law to the Civil Code was a required domestic remedy that had been bypassed.
4. **Just Satisfaction (Article 41):** The Court awards specific financial compensation to the remaining applicants based on the duration and severity of the overcrowding they experienced.
Compared to previous versions of similar detention cases, this judgment reinforces the strict application of the “exhaustion of domestic remedies” rule for former detainees, while maintaining a firm stance on the evidentiary burden placed on the State to prove that prison conditions meet international standards.
### Key Provisions for Legal Use
* **The 3-Square-Meter Rule:** The Court reaffirms the *Muršić v. Croatia* standard, noting that a lack of space (less than 3 sq. m per detainee) is a critical factor in determining a violation of Article 3.
* **Evidentiary Burden:** The judgment is highly significant for its ruling on the burden of proof. The Court held that the State’s failure to provide detailed, dormitory-specific occupancy records for the period 2017–2021 meant it could not refute the applicants’ claims of overcrowding. This sets a precedent that the absence of precise government data will be interpreted in favor of the applicant.
* **Exhaustion of Remedies:** The decision clarifies that for applicants who have already been released or transferred, a claim for damages under the Greek Civil Code (Article 105) is an effective remedy that must be pursued before approaching the Court. Failure to do so renders the application inadmissible.
* **Procedural Diligence:** The case serves as a warning regarding the necessity of maintaining active contact with the Court. The striking out of two applicants highlights that the Court will not continue to process cases where legal representatives fail to provide basic updates, such as death certificates or proof of ongoing interest.
CASE OF ORLANDO AND OTHERS v. ITALY
The judgment in *Orlando and Others v. Italy* (2026) addresses the systemic issue of Italian administrative courts routinely denying or failing to justify the reimbursement of legal costs to successful litigants. The Court found that when individuals successfully challenge public authorities, the State’s refusal to cover their legal expenses—or the awarding of only symbolic amounts—without a clear, reasoned justification, violates the right of access to a court under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The Court emphasized that the “loser pays” principle is a fundamental safeguard, and while administrative courts have discretion, they cannot shift the financial burden of State errors onto the citizens. By failing to provide specific, proportionate reasons for denying or limiting these costs, the Italian courts effectively discouraged individuals from seeking judicial protection. Consequently, the Court ruled that Italy breached the Convention, reinforcing the principle that the risk of administrative mistakes must be borne by the State, not the individual.
### Structure and Provisions
The decision follows the standard structure of a Committee-level judgment:
* **Factual Background:** The Court joined three separate applications involving disputes over access to administrative documents. In each case, the applicants were successful in their claims against the State, yet were denied full reimbursement of legal costs by the *Consiglio di Stato* or regional courts.
* **Legal Analysis:** The Court focused on the proportionality of the restriction on the right of access to a court. It analyzed the domestic legal framework (Articles 91 and 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure), noting that while the “loser pays” principle can be disapplied for “serious and exceptional reasons,” the domestic courts failed to provide such reasons or conducted an inadequate proportionality test.
* **Changes/Evolution:** This judgment builds upon recent case-law (e.g., *Moskalj v. Croatia*, *Zustović v. Croatia*) by clarifying that the “simplicity” of a case does not automatically justify the denial of legal costs. It further rejects the argument that applicants should represent themselves to avoid costs, affirming the essential role of lawyers in the administration of justice.
### Key Provisions for Legal Practice
* **Duty to Provide Reasons:** The most critical takeaway is the procedural requirement for domestic courts to explicitly justify any departure from the “loser pays” principle. Vague references to “circumstances of the case” or “justified reasons” are insufficient under Article 6 § 1.
* **Proportionality Test:** Even if a case is procedurally “simple,” courts must perform a proportionality assessment before awarding symbolic or reduced costs. The Court established that while simplicity might justify a *reduction* in fees, it cannot be used as a blanket excuse to deny them entirely.
* **State Responsibility:** The decision reinforces the principle that the State cannot shift the financial burden of its own administrative errors onto the successful party. This is a powerful tool for practitioners arguing for full cost recovery in administrative litigation against public bodies.
* **Role of Counsel:** The Court explicitly protected the right to legal representation, stating that the possibility of self-representation in administrative matters does not absolve the State of its obligation to reimburse reasonable legal fees incurred by a successful litigant.
CASE OF TANRIVERDI v. TÜRKİYE
The judgment in *Tanrıverdi v. Türkiye* (Application no. 16088/17) addresses the systemic issue of prolonged pre-trial detention within the Turkish judicial system. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) examined the complaints of six applicants, focusing on the lack of sufficient justification for their extended detention and the overall duration of their criminal proceedings. The Court found that four of the applicants were held in pre-trial detention for over four years without the domestic courts providing “relevant and sufficient” reasons to justify such a deprivation of liberty. Consequently, the Court ruled that there was a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention. Conversely, the Court declared the complaints regarding the excessive length of criminal proceedings inadmissible, as the applicants had already received adequate redress and compensation from the Turkish Constitutional Court. This decision reinforces the Court’s established jurisprudence regarding the necessity of rigorous judicial oversight when depriving individuals of their liberty pending trial.
### Structure and Provisions
The decision follows the standard structure of an ECtHR Committee judgment:
1. **Procedure and Facts:** Outlines the background of the six applicants and their specific legal grievances regarding detention and trial length.
2. **The Law (Article 5 § 3):** The Court applies the principles established in *Kudła v. Poland* and *McKay v. the United Kingdom*. It specifically references the “fragility and repetitiveness” of reasoning used by domestic courts, citing *Tercan v. Turkey* as a precedent.
3. **The Law (Article 6 § 1):** The Court applies the “victim status” test. Because the Turkish Constitutional Court had already acknowledged the breach regarding the length of proceedings and provided compensation, the applicants were no longer considered victims under the Convention, leading to the rejection of this part of the application.
4. **Article 41 (Just Satisfaction):** The Court awards non-pecuniary damages (EUR 5,000 per applicant) and costs to the four successful applicants.
There are no significant changes in the legal standard compared to previous versions; rather, this judgment serves as a consistent application of the Court’s well-established case-law concerning the necessity of specific, individualized justifications for detention.
### Main Provisions for Practical Use
For legal practitioners and observers, the following elements are most critical:
* **The “Relevant and Sufficient” Standard:** The judgment highlights that domestic courts cannot rely on generic or repetitive reasoning (such as the nature of the offense or the upper limit of potential sentences) to justify years of pre-trial detention. The reasoning must be specific to the individual’s circumstances.
* **Domestic Redress Mechanism:** The decision serves as a clear example of the “subsidiarity principle.” By rejecting the Article 6 claim because the Turkish Constitutional Court provided adequate compensation, the ECtHR signals that if a domestic system provides effective remedies for procedural delays, the ECtHR will not intervene.
* **Precedent Reliance:** The explicit reliance on *Tercan v. Turkey* regarding the “fragility and repetitiveness” of judicial reasoning provides a template for lawyers to challenge detention orders that use boilerplate language rather than substantive, case-specific justification.
* **Financial Liability:** The Court’s award of EUR 5,000 per applicant for non-pecuniary damage confirms the current valuation of the breach of Article 5 § 3 in similar contexts.
CASE OF YAKUBOV AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA
The judgment in *Yakubov and Others v. Russia* (applications nos. 2972/15 and 19 others) is a significant ruling delivered by the Fourth Section of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) on 24 September 2026. ****: The case concerns a group of applicants who challenged judicial proceedings conducted in Crimea under the Russian legal framework following the occupation of the peninsula. The Court joined these applications due to their identical subject matter and confirmed its jurisdiction, noting that the events occurred prior to Russia’s cessation as a party to the Convention on 16 September 2022. Relying on its established jurisprudence, the Court concluded that the judicial system operating in Crimea after March 2014 could not be considered a tribunal “established by law.” Consequently, the Court found a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in respect of all applicants, as their civil rights and criminal charges were determined by illegitimate bodies.
The decision is structured as a standard Committee judgment, beginning with the procedural history and the joinder of the applications. It addresses preliminary issues, including the Court’s jurisdiction over the Russian Federation regarding its effective control of Crimea, and clarifies the *locus standi* of heirs in cases where an applicant has passed away. A key change or refinement compared to earlier individual cases is the explicit reliance on the Grand Chamber’s findings in *Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea)* (2024), which serves as the foundational legal basis for dismissing the legitimacy of the Russian-imposed judicial system in the region. The structure concludes with the application of Article 41, awarding non-pecuniary damages and costs to the applicants.
The most important provisions of this decision for legal practitioners and observers include:
* **Confirmation of Illegitimacy:** The Court reaffirms that the extension of Russian law to Crimea is contrary to the Convention and international humanitarian law. Therefore, any court operating under this framework is not a tribunal “established by law” under Article 6 § 1.
* **Jurisdictional Scope:** The judgment reinforces that the ECHR maintains jurisdiction over violations occurring in Crimea during the period of Russian effective control, specifically up until 16 September 2022.
* **Victim Status:** The Court provides a clear boundary for *locus standi*, noting that legal representatives who were not parties to the underlying domestic proceedings cannot claim “victim” status, thereby narrowing the scope of admissible complaints.
* **Procedural Economy:** By finding a violation of Article 6 § 1 regarding the lack of a tribunal “established by law,” the Court determined it was unnecessary to examine the remaining complaints, effectively streamlining the resolution of similar applications.
* **Financial Redress:** The judgment sets a clear precedent for compensation, awarding EUR 6,000 in non-pecuniary damages to each successful applicant, providing a standardized framework for future claims arising from the same context.
