1. The subject of the dispute is the legality of the refusal by the High Council of Justice (HCJ) to consider a judge’s complaint against a ruling of a Disciplinary Chamber on the termination of disciplinary proceedings, in which, despite the termination, a negative assessment was given to the judge’s actions.
2. The Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court proceeded from the premise that, although formally a ruling on the termination of proceedings is not a final decision on imposing liability, it effectively contains conclusions regarding the judge’s violation of their oath and the Convention on Human Rights. The Court emphasized that such conclusions were made without a full consideration of the case on its merits, which violates the judge’s right to defense and the principles of fair trial. The HCJ, by providing a unilateral response regarding the impossibility of appeal, effectively deprived the judge of the right to have a decision reviewed that has negative consequences for them and affects their career prospects. The Court emphasized that judicial independence requires the existence of clear procedural guarantees, and the absence of an explicit statutory prohibition on appealing such rulings should not be interpreted to the detriment of the judge. The Grand Chamber effectively departed from a narrow interpretation of procedural norms, establishing that any ruling of a disciplinary body that essentially qualifies a judge’s actions as misconduct is subject to appeal to the HCJ, regardless of whether the proceedings ended in termination.
3. The Court granted the claim, declared the actions of the HCJ unlawful, and obliged the Council to consider the judge’s complaint on its merits.
