Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1719:
This regulation is a technical fix. It corrects errors in the geographic coordinates of specific fishing areas within the South-Western Waters (Cantabrian Sea) and the Baltic Sea as initially defined in Regulation (EU) 2019/1241. These coordinates are crucial because they define areas with specific fishing restrictions designed to protect sensitive marine species and ecosystems. The corrections provided in the Annex, replaces the incorrect coordinates with the accurate ones.
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/789:
This regulation specifies how the European Banking Authority (EBA) will determine when extraordinary circumstances allow financial institutions temporary relief from certain market risk model requirements, specifically related to back-testing and profit and loss attribution under the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR). The regulation outlines conditions and indicators, such as volatility levels and correlation shifts, that the EBA will use to assess whether a significant cross-border financial market stress or major regime shift has occurred, potentially making model outcomes unrepresentative.
CJEU Judgment on Directive (EU) 2016/343 (C-117/23):
The CJEU clarified the scope of the presumption of innocence and the right to a fair trial under Directive 2016/343. The Court ruled that EU law does not prevent a national court from convicting a defendant of a crime even if the public prosecutor withdraws support for that charge during the trial. The Court emphasized that national courts can independently assess the evidence and convict based on their own conviction, provided they respect principles of independence, impartiality, and presumption of innocence.
CJEU Judgment in Case C-703/23 P:
The Court of Justice upheld sanctions imposed on Elena Timchenko due to her association with her husband, Gennady Timchenko, who was already sanctioned in relation to the situation in Ukraine. The Court clarified that “association” requires common interests beyond a mere family relationship but does not necessarily demand economic activity. Crucially, the Court confirmed that there is no legal requirement to establish a direct link between the activities of an associated person and the destabilization of Ukraine.
CJEU Judgment on Asylum Seekers’ Reception Conditions:
The CJEU clarified that a Member State (Ireland) cannot avoid its responsibility to provide basic reception conditions, such as housing, food, and water, to asylum seekers by claiming “force majeure” due to an unexpected influx of applications. The Court emphasized that even in exceptional circumstances, Member States must ensure minimum standards are met, upholding the dignity of asylum seekers.
CJEU Judgment on Free Movement and Social Benefits (Case C-406/22):
The CJEU ruled that Germany cannot deny a residence permit to a Polish national, residing in Germany and being a parent of a minor child who is a Union citizen but not a German national, solely because the child does not hold German nationality. This judgment reinforces the principle of equal treatment for all Union citizens when exercising their right to move and reside freely within the EU.
CJEU Judgment on Sanctions against Gennady Timchenko:
The Court of Justice upheld the EU sanctions imposed on Gennady Timchenko in relation to the situation in Ukraine. The judgment clarifies what constitutes “supporting” actions against Ukraine or “supporting” Russian decision-makers. The Court highlighted that a person’s failure to distance themselves from certain activities, especially with significant influence, can be considered as evidence of support.
CJEU Judgment on Directive (EU) 2019/1158 Transposition Failure (Ireland):
The Court of Justice found Ireland guilty of failing to transpose Directive 2019/1158 on work-life balance for parents and carers into national law by the required deadline. As a penalty, the Court ordered Ireland to pay a lump sum of EUR 1,540,000. The court found that there was an obligation to transpose the directive by August 2, 2022.
CJEU Judgment on VAT and Sudoku Books:
The CJEU ruled that periodically published books containing number sudoku games can be classified as “periodicals” under the Combined Nomenclature (CN), even if they don’t consist predominantly of text. This allows Member States to apply reduced VAT rates to such publications.
CJEU Judgment on Arbitration Awards and EU Law (Case C-600/23):
The CJEU has strengthened the rights of individual within the sports industry. It clarified that national courts must ensure that arbitration awards, including those by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), comply with fundamental EU law. National courts must be able to review these awards to protect individuals’ rights under EU law. EU law prevents national laws from automatically recognizing CAS awards, even if they have been reviewed by courts outside the EU.
CJEU Judgment on PNB Banka AS Appeal:
The Court of Justice dismissed an appeal by PNB Banka AS against a decision of the General Court, which had upheld the ECB’s decision to oppose the acquisition of a qualifying holding in another credit institution. The Court found PNB Banka’s single ground of appeal inadmissible because it did not criticize the General Court’s analysis of the pleas raised at first instance and did not clearly identify any error of law in the judgment.
CJEU Judgment on Directive (EU) 2019/1158 Transposition Failure (Spain):
The Court of Justice found Spain guilty of failing to transpose Directive 2019/1158 within the deadline and has imposed a lump sum payment of EUR 6,832,000 and a daily penalty of EUR 19,700 if the failure to transpose the Directive persists.
CJEU Judgment on Wrongly Collected Import Duties:
The Court of Justice of the EU has stated that the national customs authority is obliged to repay customs duties on its own initiative if it determines within three years of the duties being entered in the accounts that those duties were wrongly collected and it knows who paid the duties and the amount to be repaid.
CJEU Judgment on Trade Mark Directive (EU) 2015/2436:
The judgment stated that trade mark directive should be interpreted broadly with limited national deviations. National law cannot preclude the trade mark owner’s right to prohibit the use of a similar sign by a third party based on the owner’s inactivity.
CJEU Judgment on Arbitration Awards and EU Law (Case C-600/23):
The Court ruled that arbitration awards must comply with EU public policy (including free movement and competition rules). Even without a direct appeal mechanism against a CAS award within the EU, national courts must provide a way for individuals to challenge the award’s compatibility with EU law indirectly.
CJEU Judgment on Bird’s Directive (2009/147/EC):
This ruling interpretes the Bird’s directive, clarifyiong that only disturbance of bidrs significantly affects the conservation objectives. Court rejected questions regarding derogations and compatibility with the Charter of Fundamental Rights because they were hypothetical in the context of the main proceedings.
CJEU Judgment on Trade Marks outside the Member State of Registration:
The Court stated that the trade mark proprietor may prohibit a third party from stocking goods outside the Member State of registration, and defined the term ‘stocking’ in Article 10(3)(b) of Directive 2015/2436 broadly to cover not only cases in which the third party has direct and actual control over the goods concerned, but also those in which he or she has indirect but nonetheless actual control over those goods.
CJEU Judgment on Silver Bracelet containing Cadmium :
This case concerns the application of the REACH Regulation to a silver bracelet with cadmium in its brazing. It clarified that the bracelet falls under paragraph 10(ii) as a metal part of jewelry, specifically a bracelet, rather than as a brazing filler.
CJEU Judgment on incorrectly invoiced VAT:
The judgement clarified scope of Article 203 of the VAT Directive and stated that the judgment allows tax authorities and national courts to use estimates to determine the proportion of invoices for which a taxable person is liable for incorrectly invoiced VAT.
CJEU Judgment on rule of law and judicial independence, as well as public procurement directives:
The Court clarified that the temporary assignment of judges, even without their consent, does not necessarily violate EU law, provided that such measures are based on legitimate reasons, are temporary, do not affect the judges’ original assignments, and do not result in demotion or removal.
CJEU Judgment on motor vehicle type approval and pollutant emissions:
The CJEU ruled that a manufacturer cannot be exempt from liability based on an “unavoidable error” if a national authority approved or would have approved the defeat device and confirms that manufacturers are liable for damages caused by defeat devices installed via software updates.
CJEU Judgment on the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Directive 2011/92/EU:
The judgment clarifies the scope of “main reports and advice” that must be made available to the public and whether national legislation must allow the public to comment on opinions from consulted authorities. The court ultimately rules that the EIA Directive does not mandate that the public must be able to comment on the opinions of consulted authorities.
CJEU Judgment on PNB Banka AS appeal against ECB:
Appellants must clearly identify the specific errors in the lower court’s judgment and provide coherent and precise legal arguments as to why those errors warrant setting aside the judgment. General allegations or criticisms of national law, without a clear link to the contested judgment, are unlikely to be considered admissible.
CJEU Judgment on “packaging” under Directive 94/62/EC:
The ECJ ruled that labels directly affixed to fruits and vegetables are not always considered packaging under the Directive, unless they must fulfill at least one of the packaging functions outlined in Article 3(1) of the Directive.
CJEU Judgment on Directive 2007/64/EC on payment services:
The Court confirmed that Article 58 of Directive 2007/64 imposes a dual obligation on payment service users: to notify their payment service provider “without undue delay” upon becoming aware of an unauthorized transaction and, in any event, no later than 13 months after the debit date.
CJEU Judgment on Return Directive (2008/115/EC):
The most important aspect of the judgement are: that a decision regarding the period for voluntary departure has legal consequences and is not merely an enforcement measure, and that Third-country nationals have the right to challenge decisions regarding the period for voluntary departure in court.
CJEU Judgment on interpretation of the VAT Directive:
The most important takeaway from this judgment is that it allows art dealers to apply the margin scheme even when acquiring art from a company representing the artist, provided the company is essentially acting as the artist’s marketing arm and the transaction represents the artwork’s initial entry into the EU market.
CJEU Judgment on the Parent-Subsidiary Directive (Directive 2011/96/EU):
The most important provision is the ruling that Article 4 of Directive 2011/96/EU precludes national legislation that allows a Member State to tax more than 5% of dividends received by parent companies from subsidiaries in other Member States, even if it’s through a tax that isn’t a corporate income tax but includes those dividends in its tax base.
CJEU Judgment on Belgium failing to transpose Directive (EU) 2019/1158 on work-life balance for parents and carers:
The judgment confirms the importance of Member States meeting deadlines for transposing EU directives into national law.
CJEU Judgment on PNB Banka AS against European Central Bank:
The most important provision of the judgment is the Court of Justice’s ruling on the admissibility of the appeal. The Court emphasizes that an appeal must precisely indicate the contested elements of the General Court’s judgment and provide clear legal arguments.
CJEU Judgment on Interpretation of Article 146(1)(b) of the VAT Directive (2006/112/EC):
The judgment clarified that Article 146(1)(b) of the VAT Directive should be interpreted to mean that the exemption applies to a supply of goods initially declared as an intra-Community supply, but which the purchaser then exports outside the EU without the supplier’s knowledge, provided the tax authorities have proof of the export based on customs documents.
CJEU Judgment on potatoes from Romagnoli Fratelli SpA:
The most important provisions of the act are those concerning the service of documents by the CPVO and The Court emphasizes that if a user opts for electronic communication, notifications sent via MyPVR are considered validly served.
CJEU Judgment on failing of PNB Banka AS as credit institution:
The most important provisions of the act for its use are the Court’s findings on the alleged errors in the procedures leading to the ECB’s decision. The Court rejected PNB Banka’s arguments that its procedural rights were violated, emphasizing that the General Court had adequately examined the complaints and that PNB Banka had not sufficiently demonstrated errors in the General Court’s analysis.
CJEU Judgment on the classification and labeling of titanium dioxide:
This highlights the limits of judicial intervention in complex scientific assessments made by specialized agencies like ECHA, but the judgment also underscores the importance of these agencies to demonstrate that they have duly considered all relevant factors and circumstances when exercising their discretion.
CJEU Judgment on Periodic Tachographs inspections in Slovakia:
The judgment clarifies that the principle of lex posterior mitius can apply to administrative penalties if they are “criminal in nature,” offering guidance on how to assess this and The EU law definition of “final conviction,” which ensures a uniform application of the principle of lex posterior mitius across Member States, regardless of national procedural rules.
CJEU Judgment on services related to the administration of VAT refunds to non-EU residents:
Businesses cannot assume that past acceptance of VAT returns implies a continued exemption for these services and The taxable amount should be the gross fee, including VAT, particularly when the VAT cannot be recovered from the customer.
CJEU Judgment on EU directives on the promotion of renewable energy use:
The most important provision is the ruling that national courts cannot assess the compatibility of specific modalities of a State aid scheme (like the “negative incentive” mechanism) with EU directives if the European Commission has already approved the overall aid scheme.
Review of each of legal acts published today:
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1719 of 28 May 2025 amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1241 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards geographic coordinates in Annexes VII and XIII thereto
This Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1719 focuses on correcting errors in the geographic coordinates specified in Annexes VII and XIII of Regulation (EU) 2019/1241, which concerns technical measures for fisheries and marine ecosystem conservation. The corrections address inaccuracies reported by the South-Western Waters Member States (regarding areas in the Cantabrian Sea) and BALTFISH (concerning sites in the Baltic Sea). These errors, present in all language versions, pertain to areas with specific fishing restrictions or mitigation measures for sensitive species. The Regulation aims to ensure the accurate implementation of established conservation measures.
The Regulation consists of two articles and an annex. Article 1 states that Annexes VII and XIII to Regulation (EU) 2019/1241 are amended in accordance with the Annex to this Regulation. Article 2 specifies that the Regulation will enter into force twenty days after its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. The Annex provides the corrected geographic coordinates for specific areas in the South Western Waters (Annex VII) and the Baltic Sea (Annex XIII). Specifically, Annex VII is amended by replacing point 5.1 in Part C, which details the coordinates for areas in the western Cantabrian Sea where fishing with bottom set longlines and bottom trawls is prohibited during certain months. Annex XIII is amended by replacing point 3.1 in Part A, which details the coordinates for “Northern Midsea Bank” where fishing shall only be permitted with pots, fish traps and longlines. Also, point 3.3. shall be amended as follows: ‘Between 1 November and 31 January, fishing with static nets shall be prohibited in the areas enclosed by rhumb lines, seaward separation lines of the German EEZ or delimitation lines of the German territorial sea sequentially joining the following sets of coordinates, which shall be measured according to the WGS84 system. Furthermore, in point 3.3, the sections ‘Natura 2000 site “Adlergrund” (DE1251301)’, ‘Natura 2000 site “Westliche Rönnebank” (DE1249301)’ and ‘Natura 2000 site “Pommersche Bucht mit Oderbank” (DE1652301)’ are replaced. Finally, in point 3.3, the Section ‘Natura 2000 site “Pommersche Bucht” (DE1552401)’ is replaced.
The most important provisions for users are the corrected geographic coordinates in the Annex. Fishermen and authorities need to be aware of these updated coordinates to ensure compliance with fishing restrictions and conservation measures in the specified areas of the Cantabrian Sea and Baltic Sea. The accuracy of these coordinates is crucial for the effective enforcement of the regulations and the protection of marine ecosystems and sensitive species.
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/789 of 23 April 2025 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards specifying the conditions and indicators that the EBA is to use to determine whether extraordinary circumstances in the sense of Article 325az(5) and Article 325bf(6) of that Regulation have occurred
This Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/789 specifies the conditions and indicators that the European Banking Authority (EBA) will use to determine whether extraordinary circumstances have occurred, as defined in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR). These extraordinary circumstances relate to situations where institutions may be temporarily unable to meet certain requirements of the alternative internal models approach for market risk, specifically concerning back-testing and profit and loss attribution. The regulation aims to provide clarity on when such circumstances can be deemed to exist, ensuring a consistent approach across the Union.
The regulation consists of two articles. Article 1 outlines the conditions and indicators the EBA must consider when assessing whether extraordinary circumstances have occurred. It stipulates that a 250-day business period used for back-testing or profit and loss attribution can be considered a period of extraordinary circumstances if it contains a timespan where a significant cross-border financial market stress or a major regime shift has been observed, and this stress or shift is likely to make the outcome of those tests unrepresentative of the internal model’s adequacy. The EBA is required to take into account indicators such as volatility indices, the speed at which the stress manifested, and changes in correlations. Article 2 states that the regulation will enter into force twenty days after its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.
The most important provision of this regulation is Article 1, which details the specific conditions and indicators the EBA will use to determine the existence of extraordinary circumstances. This article is crucial for institutions using internal models for market risk, as it clarifies the criteria under which they may be temporarily exempt from certain requirements related to back-testing and profit and loss attribution. The indicators listed, such as volatility levels and correlation changes, provide a framework for assessing whether a market event qualifies as an extraordinary circumstance.
Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 1 August 2025.Sofiyska gradska prokuratura v KP.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Area of freedom, security and justice – Judicial cooperation in criminal matters – Directive (EU) 2016/343 – Article 6 – Burden of proof that the accused person is guilty – Second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Right of access to an independent and impartial tribunal – Charge withdrawn in part by the public prosecutor’s office during the hearing – Obligation for the court to rule on the elements of the charge not maintained at the hearing.Case C-404/24.
This is a judgment from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) concerning the interpretation of the Directive (EU) 2016/343 on the presumption of innocence and the right to a fair trial, specifically focusing on the burden of proof in criminal proceedings and the impartiality of the court. The case originates from Bulgaria and involves a situation where the public prosecutor partially withdrew charges against the accused during the hearing, but the national court believed there was sufficient evidence to convict on the original charges. The CJEU clarifies whether the national court is obligated to follow the prosecutor’s withdrawal or if it can independently assess the evidence and convict based on its own conviction.
The judgment addresses the question of whether a national court can convict a defendant of a crime even when the public prosecutor has withdrawn support for that specific charge during the trial. It examines Article 6(1) of Directive 2016/343, which deals with the burden of proof, and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which guarantees the right to an independent and impartial tribunal. The Court interprets these provisions as not precluding national legislation that requires a court to rule on the indictment based on its own conviction, even if the prosecutor requests acquittal or conviction on a lesser charge. The Court emphasizes that the directive aims for minimum harmonization and does not prevent national courts from independently assessing guilt based on the evidence presented.
The most important provision is the CJEU’s interpretation of Article 6(1) of Directive 2016/343 in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter. The court clarifies that while the burden of proof lies with the prosecution, this does not prevent a national court from independently assessing the evidence and convicting the accused based on its own conviction, even if the prosecutor has withdrawn support for the charge. This ensures that national courts retain the power to apply criminal law fully and punish offenders, while still respecting the principles of independence, impartiality, and the presumption of innocence.
Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 1 August 2025.Elena Petrovna Timchenko v Council of the European Union.Appeal – Restrictive measures taken in view of the situation in Ukraine – Decision 2014/145/CFSP – Article 1(1) in fine – Restrictive measures imposed on a natural person associated with another natural person who is in turn subject to restrictive measures – Concept of ‘association in the case of two people who have a family relationship’.Case C-703/23 P.
This is the judgment of the Court of Justice (Fifth Chamber) in Case C-703/23 P, concerning an appeal by Elena Petrovna Timchenko against a General Court judgment. The General Court had dismissed her action seeking the annulment of Council decisions and implementing regulations that imposed restrictive measures on her due to her association with her husband, Gennady Timchenko, who was already subject to sanctions related to the situation in Ukraine. She also sought compensation for non-material harm.
The judgment addresses whether the General Court erred in its interpretation of the concept of “association” in the context of restrictive measures imposed in view of the situation in Ukraine, specifically concerning family members of sanctioned individuals. It also examines the interpretation of the term “unduly” in relation to benefits derived by family members and whether a link between the sanctioned person’s activities and the invasion of Ukraine must be established.
The Court of Justice dismisses the appeal, upholding the General Court’s decision. It clarifies the interpretation of “association,” stating that it requires common interests that objectively go beyond a mere family relationship but does not necessarily require economic activity or formal legal structures. The court acknowledges that the General Court misinterpreted the word “unduly” but finds that this error did not affect the operative part of the judgment. Finally, the court confirms that there is no requirement to establish a direct link between the activities of a person associated with a sanctioned individual and the destabilization of Ukraine.
Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 1 August 2025.S.A. and R.J. v The Minister for Children, Equality, Disability, Integration and Youth and Others.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Liability of a Member State in the event of infringement of EU law – Sufficiently serious infringement – Asylum policy – Directive 2013/33/EU – Standards for the reception of applicants for international protection – Significant influx of applicants for temporary or international protection – No access to material reception conditions – Basic needs – Temporary exhaustion of housing capacity.Case C-97/24.
This judgment concerns the liability of a Member State (Ireland) for failing to provide adequate reception conditions to asylum seekers, specifically housing, food, and water, as required by EU law. The case arose because Ireland experienced a significant influx of asylum seekers, leading to a temporary exhaustion of housing capacity. The Court of Justice was asked whether Ireland could avoid liability for this failure by claiming “force majeure” due to the unexpected surge in asylum applications.
The judgment clarifies the obligations of Member States under Directive 2013/33/EU, which sets standards for the reception of applicants for international protection. It emphasizes that Member States must ensure access to material reception conditions from the moment an application for international protection is made. These conditions must provide an adequate standard of living, guaranteeing subsistence and protecting physical and mental health. While Member States have some flexibility in how they provide these conditions, they cannot fall below minimum standards, even temporarily. The judgment also addresses the possibility of temporary exhaustion of housing capacity, allowing Member States to set different modalities for material reception conditions, but these must still cover basic needs.
The most important provision of this act is that a Member State cannot avoid liability for failing to provide basic reception conditions to asylum seekers by claiming that a surge in applications temporarily exhausted its housing capacity. The Court clarified that even in such circumstances, Member States must ensure that basic needs are met, either through alternative housing arrangements or financial assistance. The Court emphasized that the obligation to respect human dignity, as enshrined in Article 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, precludes depriving asylum seekers of minimum standards of protection, even temporarily.
Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 1 August 2025.FL v Jobcenter Arbeitplus Bielefeld.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Citizenship of the Union – Free movement of persons – Article 18 TFEU – Prohibition of discrimination based on nationality – Directive 2004/38/EC – Article 24 – Principle of equal treatment – Minor child who is a Union citizen with a right of residence under that directive – Grant of a national residence permit to the parent of that child so that the parent can exercise parental authority over that child – Distinction based on the nationality of the child – Parent with a right of residence as a job-seeker – Derogation from the principle of equal treatment as regards entitlement to social assistance – Scope.Case C-397/23.
This is a judgment from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) regarding the interpretation of EU law on the free movement of persons and citizenship of the Union. The case concerns a Polish national, FL, residing in Germany, who was denied social benefits because his right of residence was solely based on seeking employment. The core issue is whether German law can restrict the issuance of a residence permit for parental authority to parents of German children only, thereby excluding parents of children who are Union citizens but not German nationals.
The judgment is structured as follows:
1. **Introduction:** Briefly outlines the context of the preliminary ruling and the dispute in the main proceedings.
2. **Legal Context:** Details the relevant EU law (Directive 2004/38/EC and Regulation (EC) No 883/2004) and German law (regarding residence and social assistance).
3. **The Dispute in the Main Proceedings and the Question Referred for a Preliminary Ruling:** Describes the factual background of the case, the arguments of the parties, and the question posed by the German court to the CJEU.
4. **Consideration of the Question Referred:** This is the core of the judgment, where the CJEU analyzes the question and provides its interpretation of EU law.
5. **Costs:** Addresses the allocation of costs in the proceedings.
6. **Ruling:** States the Court’s answer to the question referred.
The main provision at stake is Article 24 of Directive 2004/38/EC, which ensures equal treatment for Union citizens residing in a host Member State. The Court interprets this article to mean that a Member State cannot deny a residence permit to a Union citizen who is the parent of a minor child (who is also a Union citizen but not a national of that Member State) solely because the child does not hold the nationality of that Member State. This ensures that all Union citizens are treated equally, regardless of their nationality, when exercising their right to move and reside freely within the EU.
The most important aspect of this judgment is its reaffirmation of the principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination based on nationality within the EU. It clarifies that Member States cannot impose stricter requirements on Union citizens who are not their nationals when it comes to granting residence permits for the purpose of exercising parental authority, especially when such permits are linked to access to social benefits. The judgment ensures that the rights of Union citizens and their family members to move and reside freely within the EU are protected and that they are not discriminated against based on their nationality.
Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 1 August 2025.Gennady Nikolayevich Timchenko v Council of the European Union.Appeal – Restrictive measures taken in view of the situation in Ukraine – Decision 2014/145/CFSP – Article 2(1)(a) and (d) – Inclusion of the appellant’s name due to his support for the actions or policies of the Russian Federation against Ukraine and to the material or financial support provided to Russian decision-makers – Effect of the appellant’s failure to distance himself and of his passive attitude.Case C-702/23 P.
This is a judgment by the Court of Justice of the European Union regarding an appeal against restrictive measures imposed on Gennady Nikolayevich Timchenko in view of the situation in Ukraine. The court upholds the decision to include Timchenko on the EU’s sanctions list. The judgment addresses whether Timchenko’s actions met the criteria for sanctions related to undermining Ukraine’s territorial integrity and supporting Russian decision-makers.
The structure of the judgment is as follows:
1. It starts with an introduction outlining the appeal against the General Court’s judgment.
2. It describes the legal context, including Council Decision 2014/145 and Regulation No 269/2014, which form the basis for the restrictive measures.
3. It details the acts at issue, namely the decisions and regulations that initially imposed sanctions on Timchenko and subsequently maintained them.
4. It summarizes the procedure before the General Court and the judgment that was appealed.
5. It outlines the forms of order sought by Timchenko and the Council.
6. It presents the two grounds of appeal raised by Timchenko: that the General Court misinterpreted the criteria for imposing sanctions.
7. It analyzes each ground of appeal, ultimately rejecting both and dismissing the appeal.
8. Finally, it addresses the issue of costs, ordering Timchenko to pay them.
The main provisions of the act concern the interpretation and application of the criteria for imposing restrictive measures (sanctions) on individuals in relation to the situation in Ukraine. These criteria include:
* Supporting actions or policies that undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence.
* Providing material or financial support to Russian decision-makers responsible for the annexation of Crimea or the destabilization of Ukraine.
The judgment clarifies that a person’s failure to distance themselves from the actions of an entity (like a bank) can be considered as evidence of support for those actions, especially if the person has significant influence over the entity. The court emphasizes that the measures must be based on a sufficiently solid factual basis, with specific, precise, and consistent evidence.
The most important provision of this act is the interpretation of what constitutes “supporting” actions against Ukraine or “supporting” Russian decision-makers. The court’s emphasis on the significance of a person’s influence and their failure to distance themselves from certain activities sets a precedent for future sanctions cases. This means that individuals with close ties to sanctioned entities or decision-makers may face increased scrutiny, even if their direct involvement is not immediately apparent.
Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 1 August 2025.European Commission v Ireland.Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations – Article 258 TFEU – Work-life balance for parents and carers – Directive (EU) 2019/1158 – Article 20(1) – Failure to transpose and notify transposition measures – Article 260(3) TFEU – Application for the imposition of a lump sum – Criteria for establishing the amount of the penalty.Case C-69/24.
This is the Court’s judgment regarding the European Commission’s action against Ireland for failing to transpose Directive (EU) 2019/1158 on work-life balance for parents and carers into national law by the deadline. The Court found that Ireland failed to fulfill its obligations and ordered it to pay a lump sum of EUR 1,540,000. The Court also ordered Ireland to pay its own costs and those incurred by the Commission.
**Structure and Main Provisions:**
The judgment is structured as follows:
* It starts by outlining the Commission’s claims against Ireland, which include a declaration of failure to fulfill obligations, a request for a lump sum payment, and a penalty payment.
* It then provides the legal context, focusing on the relevant articles of Directive 2019/1158 and the Commission’s communication on financial sanctions.
* The judgment summarizes the pre-litigation procedure, detailing the exchanges between the Commission and Ireland regarding the transposition of the Directive.
* It outlines the developments during the court proceedings, including the Commission’s withdrawal of its request for a penalty payment after Ireland implemented the necessary measures.
* The Court then presents the arguments of both parties regarding the failure to fulfill obligations and the request for a lump sum payment.
* The Court makes its findings, declaring that Ireland failed to fulfill its obligations under Directive 2019/1158 by not transposing it into national law within the prescribed period.
* Finally, the Court addresses the request for a lump sum payment, determining the appropriate amount based on the seriousness of the infringement, its duration, and Ireland’s ability to pay.
**Main Provisions and Changes:**
The core of the judgment revolves around Article 20(1) of Directive 2019/1158, which required Member States to transpose the directive by August 2, 2022. The key change is the imposition of a lump sum payment for failure to transpose, as per Article 260(3) TFEU, which aims to ensure timely compliance with EU law.
**Most Important Provisions:**
For practical use, the following provisions are most important:
* **Article 20(1) of Directive 2019/1158:** This article sets the deadline for Member States to transpose the directive into national law.
* **Article 260(3) TFEU:** This article allows the Commission to request the Court to impose financial penalties on Member States that fail to notify transposition measures.
* The Court’s findings regarding the calculation of the lump sum, particularly the factors considered (seriousness, duration, ability to pay) and the rejection of Ireland’s arguments for reducing the amount.
Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 1 August 2025.Keesing Deutschland GmbH v Finanzamt für Körperschaften II.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Taxation – Common system of value added tax (VAT) – Directive 2006/112/EC – Article 98 – Option for the Member States to apply a reduced rate of VAT to certain supplies of goods and services – National legislation using the Combined Nomenclature to establish the coverage of the category of goods subject to a reduced rate – Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 – Combined Nomenclature – Tariff headings – Heading 4902 – Scope – Concept of ‘periodicals’ – Books containing number sudoku games and published periodically – Absence of text composed mainly of alphabetic characters.Case C-375/24.
This is a judgment from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) regarding the interpretation of the Combined Nomenclature (CN) in the context of Value Added Tax (VAT). The case revolves around whether books containing number sudoku games, published periodically, can be classified under tariff heading 4902 of the CN, which covers “Newspapers, journals and periodicals.” The German tax authorities argued that these books should be subject to a standard VAT rate because they lack “qualifying text” and should be classified under a different heading. The CJEU was asked to clarify whether heading 4902 requires printed matter to consist predominantly of sequences of letters.
The judgment clarifies the interpretation of tariff heading 4902 of the CN, specifically concerning the classification of periodically published books containing number sudoku games. The Court emphasizes that while Member States can use the CN to define categories for reduced VAT rates, they must adhere to the categories outlined in Annex III of the VAT Directive and respect the principle of fiscal neutrality. The Court notes discrepancies in the language versions of heading 4902, particularly between the German version (“periodische Druckschriften,” meaning periodical printed writings) and the English and French versions (“newspapers, journals and periodicals” and “journaux et publications périodiques imprimés,” respectively). It resolves this by referring to the purpose and general scheme of the CN, as well as the Harmonized System (HS) on which the CN is based. The Court concludes that heading 4902 covers periodicals, and it does not require them to contain mainly text.
The key takeaway from this judgment is that periodically published books containing number sudoku games can be classified under tariff heading 4902 of the CN, even if they do not consist predominantly of text. The Court emphasizes that the term “printed” in the context of Chapter 49 of the HS (and by extension, the CN) does not depend on the form of the characters used, including letters, figures, or other symbols. This interpretation ensures that Member States can apply reduced VAT rates to such publications, promoting access to these goods for consumers.
Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 1 August 2025.Royal Football Club Seraing v Fédération internationale de football association (FIFA) and Others.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Article 19(1) TEU – Obligation of Member States to provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law – Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Right to an effective remedy – Possibility of recourse to arbitration – Arbitration between individuals – Imposed arbitration – Decision of a body of an international sports federation imposing a sanction – Award by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) upheld by a decision of a court of a third State – Legal remedy against the arbitral award – National legislation conferring on that arbitral award the authority of res judicata between the parties and probative value vis-à-vis third parties – Powers and obligations of the national courts before which that arbitral award is relied on – Effective review of the consistency of such an arbitral award with the principles and provisions falling under EU public policy.Case C-600/23.
Here’s a breakdown of the judgment from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Case C-600/23, designed to be informative for a journalist:
**1. Essence of the Act**
This CJEU judgment clarifies the extent to which national courts must review arbitration decisions, specifically those from the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), to ensure they comply with EU law. The Court ruled that EU law, particularly the right to an effective remedy, prevents national laws from automatically recognizing CAS awards (giving them “res judicata” or probative value) if a national court hasn’t first had the chance to ensure the award respects fundamental EU legal principles. This is especially important when the arbitration is essentially “imposed” by a sports federation.
**2. Structure and Main Provisions**
The judgment addresses a request from a Belgian court regarding a dispute involving football club Royal Football Club Seraing SA (RFC Seraing), FIFA, UEFA, and the Belgian football association (URBSFA). The core issue is whether a CAS ruling, already upheld by the Swiss Federal Tribunal, should be automatically recognized in Belgium, preventing the club from arguing that FIFA rules violate EU law.
* **Key EU Law:** The judgment centers on Article 19(1) TEU (providing effective legal protection in areas of EU law), Article 267 TFEU (the preliminary ruling procedure), and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (right to an effective remedy).
* **Arbitration and EU Law:** The court acknowledges that private arbitration is generally acceptable but stresses that it cannot undermine EU law. Arbitration decisions must be subject to judicial review to ensure compliance with fundamental EU principles.
* **”Imposed” Arbitration:** The judgment highlights that arbitration mandated by organizations like FIFA carries special considerations. National courts must be able to review these awards to protect individuals’ rights under EU law.
* **Res Judicata and Probative Value:** The court finds that national laws automatically granting “res judicata” (the issue has already been decided) or probative value (evidentiary weight) to CAS awards are incompatible with EU law if they prevent national courts from reviewing the award’s compliance with EU public policy.
* **Scope of Review:** National courts must be able to assess the interpretation of EU principles, the legal consequences, and the classification of facts by the arbitration body. They must also be able to order interim measures to ensure effective legal protection.
**3. Main Provisions Important for Use**
* **National Courts’ Obligations:** National courts are obligated to ensure that CAS awards, especially in sports-related economic activities, comply with EU public policy (including free movement and competition rules).
* **Disapplication of National Law:** National courts must disapply national laws that prevent them from effectively reviewing CAS awards for compliance with EU law.
* **Indirect Review:** Even without a direct appeal mechanism against a CAS award within the EU, national courts must provide a way for individuals to challenge the award’s compatibility with EU law indirectly.
* **Interim Measures:** National courts must have the power to grant interim measures to protect rights potentially violated by a CAS award, pending a full decision.
* **Burden of Proof:** The judgment clarifies that the burden of proof lies on the party seeking to rely on the CAS award to demonstrate its compatibility with EU law.
This judgment strengthens the role of national courts in safeguarding EU law when sports-related disputes are resolved through arbitration. It ensures that individuals have an effective remedy and that EU law is consistently applied, even in the context of international sports governance.
Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 1 August 2025.PNB Banka AS v European Central Bank.Appeal – Economic and monetary policy – Prudential supervision of credit institutions – Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 – Procedural rights – Effective judicial protection – Inadmissibility.Case C-101/23 P.
This is a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union regarding an appeal by PNB Banka AS against a decision of the General Court. The General Court had dismissed PNB Banka’s action for annulment of the European Central Bank’s (ECB) decision to oppose the acquisition of qualifying holdings in another credit institution. The Court of Justice dismisses PNB Banka’s appeal, finding that the single ground of appeal is inadmissible. The court orders PNB Banka to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the ECB and the European Commission.
The judgment addresses PNB Banka’s appeal against the General Court’s decision, which upheld the ECB’s opposition to PNB Banka’s acquisition of a qualifying holding in another Latvian credit institution. The legal context refers to Article 15 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, which outlines the procedure for assessing proposed acquisitions of qualifying holdings in credit institutions. The background to the dispute details the notifications made by PNB Banka and its shareholders to the Financial and Capital Market Commission (FCMC) of Latvia, the FCMC’s proposal to the ECB to oppose the acquisition, and the ECB’s subsequent decision to do so. It also mentions the later events of PNB Banka being declared failing or likely to fail, the Single Resolution Board’s decision not to adopt a resolution scheme, and the eventual withdrawal of PNB Banka’s authorization. The action before the General Court and the judgment under appeal summarizes the pleas raised by PNB Banka before the General Court and the General Court’s reasons for dismissing the action.
The most important provision for practical use is the Court of Justice’s emphasis on the requirements for admissibility of an appeal. The Court reiterates that an appeal must precisely indicate the contested elements of the judgment and the legal arguments supporting the appeal. The Court found PNB Banka’s single ground of appeal inadmissible because it did not criticize the General Court’s analysis of the pleas raised at first instance and did not clearly identify any error of law in the judgment. This highlights the need for appellants to clearly and specifically articulate the errors they allege the lower court made and how those errors affected the outcome of the case.
Arrêt de la Cour (sixième chambre) du 1er août 2025.#Commission européenne contre Royaume d’Espagne.#Manquement d’État – Article 258 TFUE – Équilibre entre vie professionnelle et vie privée des parents et des aidants – Directive (UE) 2019/1158 – Article 20, paragraphe 1 – Absence de transposition et de communication des mesures de transposition – Article 260, paragraphe 3, TFUE – Demande de condamnation au paiement d’une somme forfaitaire et d’une astreinte journalière – Critères d’établissement du montant de la sanction.#Affaire C-70/24.
This is a judgment by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) regarding a failure by the Kingdom of Spain to transpose Directive (EU) 2019/1158 on work-life balance for parents and carers into national law within the prescribed deadline. The European Commission brought the action against Spain for failing to adopt and communicate the necessary measures to comply with the Directive, specifically regarding paternity leave, parental leave, and flexible working arrangements. The Court found Spain in breach of its obligations and imposed a lump sum payment and a daily penalty payment if the failure to transpose the Directive persists.
The judgment is structured as follows:
* **Background:** It outlines the Commission’s claim that Spain failed to transpose Directive 2019/1158, specifically Article 20(1), and seeks financial penalties under Article 260(3) TFEU.
* **Legal Framework:** It details the relevant articles of Directive 2019/1158, focusing on the directive’s objectives, scope, and specific provisions regarding parental leave, paternity leave, carer’s leave, flexible working arrangements, and protection against dismissal. It also references the Commission’s 2023 Communication on financial sanctions for infringement procedures, explaining the methodology for calculating lump sums and daily penalties.
* **Pre-litigation Procedure:** It describes the exchange between the Commission and Spain, including the Commission’s initial letter of formal notice, the reasoned opinion, and Spain’s responses, which included attempts to transpose the Directive that were ultimately unsuccessful.
* **Developments During the Court Procedure:** It notes Spain’s attempts to transpose the Directive through Royal Decree-Law 2/2024, which was validated by the Spanish Parliament, but which the Commission still considered insufficient to end the infringement.
* **The Claim:** It presents the arguments of both the Commission and Spain regarding the alleged failure to transpose the Directive. The Commission argues that Spain failed to transpose Article 8(3) (remuneration for parental leave), Article 9 (flexible working arrangements), and Article 12 (protection against dismissal) of the Directive. Spain argues that it has partially transposed the Directive, that some provisions are not applicable to public sector employees, and that the proposed penalties are disproportionate.
* **The Court’s Assessment:** The Court finds that Spain failed to transpose the Directive within the prescribed deadline. It rejects Spain’s arguments that certain provisions are not applicable to public sector employees, emphasizing that Member States must still adopt measures to ensure the Directive’s provisions are implemented, even if certain activities or concepts do not exist in national law. The Court also addresses the calculation of financial penalties, considering the gravity and duration of the infringement, as well as Spain’s ability to pay.
* **Decision:** The Court rules that Spain failed to fulfill its obligations under Article 20(1) of Directive 2019/1158. It orders Spain to pay a lump sum of EUR 6,832,000 and a daily penalty of EUR 19,700 if the failure to transpose the Directive persists at the time of the judgment.
The most important provisions of the act are:
* **Finding of Failure:** The Court’s declaration that Spain failed to transpose Directive 2019/1158 within the deadline.
* **Financial Penalties:** The imposition of a lump sum payment and a daily penalty payment, which serve as a deterrent and aim to ensure Spain complies with its obligations under EU law.
* **Clarification of Transposition Obligations:** The Court’s emphasis that Member States must adopt measures to transpose directives even if certain activities or concepts do not exist in national law.
* **Impact on Work-Life Balance:** The judgment underscores the importance of Directive 2019/1158 in promoting gender equality and facilitating work-life balance for parents and carers.
Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 1 August 2025.YX and Logistica i Gestió Caves Andorranes i Vidal SA v Ministre de l’Économie, des Finances et de la Relance and Directeur général des douanes et droits indirects.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Customs union – Repayment or remission of import or export duties – Regulation (EEC) No 1430/79 – Customs duties collected in infringement of EU law – Third subparagraph of Article 2(2) – Conditions for repayment on their own initiative – Finding that those duties were wrongly collected before the expiry of a period of three years from the date on which they were entered in the accounts – Finding that the national customs authorities are aware of the identity of the operators concerned and of the amount to be repaid to each of them – Obligation on those authorities to take the necessary and appropriate measures to obtain the information necessary to make such repayment.Case C-206/24.
This judgment addresses the conditions under which national customs authorities are obliged to repay import duties that were wrongly collected. It clarifies the interpretation of Article 2(2) of Regulation No. 1430/79 concerning the repayment or remission of import or export duties. The Court of Justice was asked to determine whether the obligation to repay duties on the authorities’ own initiative is limited by a specific time frame and whether it depends on the authorities’ knowledge of the concerned operators and the amounts to be repaid.
The judgment focuses on Article 2(2) of Regulation No. 1430/79, which outlines the procedures for repaying import duties. It distinguishes between repayment upon application by the concerned party and repayment on the customs authorities’ own initiative. The Court clarifies that the authorities must establish that duties were wrongly collected within three years from the date the duties were entered in the accounts. The judgment specifies that the authorities should be aware of the identity of the payers and the amount to be repaid. It also clarifies that authorities must take necessary and appropriate measures to obtain information needed for repayment, provided that such measures do not involve disproportionate research efforts.
The key provision is the third subparagraph of Article 2(2) of Regulation No. 1430/79. The Court interprets this provision to mean that a national customs authority is obliged to repay customs duties on its own initiative if it determines within three years of the duties being entered in the accounts that those duties were wrongly collected. This determination implies that the authority knows who paid the duties and the amount to be repaid. If the authority lacks necessary information, it must take reasonable steps to obtain it, but is not required to conduct disproportionate research.
Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 1 August 2025.Lunapark Scandinavia Oy Ltd v Hardeco Finland Oy.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Trade marks – Directive (EU) 2015/2436 – Article 10 – Exclusive rights of the proprietor of a registered trade mark to oppose the use, by a third party, of a sign which is identical with, or similar to, that mark – Infringement action – Limitations of the exclusive rights of the proprietor of that trade mark – Article 9 and Article 18(1) – Preclusion due to acquiescence – Exhaustive nature of the conditions under which that preclusion can arise – Inapplicability of a general principle of national law that provides for preclusion of the right to prohibit the use of a sign in situations other than those provided for in those articles.Case C-452/24.
This is a preliminary ruling by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) concerning the interpretation of Article 10 of Directive (EU) 2015/2436 relating to trade marks. The case originates from a dispute in Finland between Lunapark Scandinavia Oy Ltd, the owner of the trade mark “DRACULA” for confectionery, and Hardeco Finland Oy, which sells similar goods using the same sign. The Finnish court sought clarification on whether national law can restrict a trade mark owner’s rights beyond what is explicitly allowed in the Directive, specifically regarding the owner’s inactivity in preventing the use of a similar sign by a third party.
The judgment clarifies the scope of Article 10 of Directive 2015/2436, emphasizing the exclusive rights conferred by a registered trade mark. It confirms that these rights are comprehensively harmonized at the EU level. The Court rules that a national law cannot preclude the trade mark owner’s right to prohibit the use of a similar sign by a third party based on the owner’s inactivity, except in situations explicitly outlined in Article 18(1) of the Directive, read in conjunction with Article 9(1) or (2), which relate to preclusion due to acquiescence regarding later *registered* trade marks. This means national laws cannot impose additional limitations on trade mark rights beyond those already harmonized in the Directive.
The most important provision is the Court’s interpretation of Article 10 of Directive 2015/2436, which states that the conditions under which a trade mark owner can lose the right to oppose the use of a similar sign are exhaustively defined by EU law. National laws cannot introduce additional grounds for limiting these rights based on the trade mark owner’s inactivity, especially when the third party’s sign is not a registered trade mark. This ensures uniform protection for trade marks across the EU and prevents Member States from creating loopholes that could weaken trade mark rights.
Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 1 August 2025.Royal Football Club Seraing v Fédération internationale de football association (FIFA) and Others.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Article 19(1) TEU – Obligation of Member States to provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law – Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Right to an effective remedy – Possibility of recourse to arbitration – Arbitration between individuals – Imposed arbitration – Decision of a body of an international sports federation imposing a sanction – Award by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) upheld by a decision of a court of a third State – Legal remedy against the arbitral award – National legislation conferring on that arbitral award the authority of res judicata between the parties and probative value vis-à-vis third parties – Powers and obligations of the national courts before which that arbitral award is relied on – Effective review of the consistency of such an arbitral award with the principles and provisions falling under EU public policy.Case C-600/23.
Here’s a breakdown of the judgment by the Court of Justice of the European Union in Case C-600/23, focusing on its key aspects:
**1. Essence of the Act**
This judgment clarifies the extent to which national courts must review arbitration awards, specifically those from the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), to ensure compliance with EU law. It emphasizes that even when an arbitration award has been upheld by a court in a non-EU country (in this case, Switzerland), national courts within the EU must still be able to effectively review the award’s consistency with fundamental EU law principles, especially when the arbitration was essentially “imposed.” The judgment ensures that individuals can still rely on their EU rights, even when subject to mandatory arbitration.
**2. Structure and Main Provisions**
The judgment addresses a request for a preliminary ruling from Belgium’s Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation). The case involves a dispute between Royal Football Club Seraing SA (RFC Seraing) and football governing bodies (FIFA, UEFA, URBSFA) regarding the validity of FIFA regulations on “third-party influence” and “third-party ownership” of players. RFC Seraing argued that these regulations violated EU law.
* **Background:** RFC Seraing entered into contracts with Doyen Sports Investment Ltd. FIFA initiated disciplinary proceedings against RFC Seraing, alleging violations of FIFA regulations. The CAS upheld FIFA’s decision, but RFC Seraing appealed to the Tribunal fédéral (Federal Supreme Court, Switzerland), which also dismissed the appeal.
* **Belgian Proceedings:** RFC Seraing then pursued legal action in Belgium, arguing the FIFA regulations were incompatible with EU law. The Belgian Court of Appeal dismissed RFC Seraing’s claims, citing the CAS award as having *res judicata* (the matter has already been decided) and probative value.
* **Questions Referred:** The Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation) asked the CJEU whether EU law (specifically Article 19(1) TEU, Article 267 TFEU, and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights) allows national law to give *res judicata* or probative value to an arbitration award reviewed by a court in a non-EU state (Switzerland) that cannot make preliminary references to the CJEU.
* **The Court’s Reasoning:** The CJEU emphasizes the importance of effective judicial protection under EU law. It acknowledges that individuals can agree to arbitration, but this must not undermine compliance with EU law. The Court distinguishes between voluntary and imposed arbitration, noting that arbitration imposed by bodies like FIFA requires careful scrutiny.
* **The Ruling:** The CJEU ruled that EU law *precludes* national law from automatically granting *res judicata* or probative value to a CAS award if its consistency with fundamental EU law principles has not been effectively reviewed by a court within the EU authorized to make preliminary references to the CJEU.
**3. Main Provisions for Practical Use**
* **Effective Review:** National courts must be able to conduct an effective review of CAS awards (or similar arbitration) for consistency with EU public policy (including free movement and competition rules). This review must cover the interpretation of EU law, its application to the facts, and the legal classification of those facts.
* **Interim Measures:** National courts must have the power to grant interim measures to ensure the full effectiveness of EU law, even when a preliminary ruling is requested from the CJEU.
* **Disapplication of National Law:** National courts must disapply national laws that prevent them from conducting an effective review of arbitration awards or granting interim measures.
* **”Imposed” Arbitration:** The judgment highlights that the requirements for judicial review are particularly important when arbitration is effectively “imposed” by a powerful sports organization.
Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 1 August 2025.OÜ Voore Mets and AS Lemeks Põlva v Keskkonnaamet.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Environment – Directive 2009/147/EC – Conservation of wild birds – Article 5 – Prohibitions to ensure the protection of birds – Article 9 – Derogations – Articles 16 and 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Prohibition on felling trees during the period of bird breeding and rearing.Case C-784/23.
This is a judgment from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) regarding the interpretation of the Birds Directive (2009/147/EC) in the context of forest felling during bird breeding season in Estonia. The case revolves around two Estonian companies, OÜ Voore Mets and AS Lemeks Põlva, who were issued injunctions by the Environmental Board of Estonia to suspend forest felling activities to protect bird breeding. The Estonian Supreme Court referred questions to the CJEU regarding the interpretation of the Birds Directive, specifically concerning the prohibitions on deliberate killing or disturbance of birds and the possibility of derogations from these prohibitions.
The judgment clarifies the scope and application of Article 5 of the Birds Directive, which establishes a general system of protection for wild birds. It specifies that the prohibitions on deliberate killing or destruction of nests apply regardless of the purpose of the activity, while the prohibition on disturbance applies only if it significantly affects the conservation objectives of the Directive. The Court also clarifies that the “deliberateness” condition in Article 5 is met if the actor intended the prohibited action or accepted the possibility of it occurring.
The Court ruled on the interpretation of Article 5(a), (b) and (d) of the Birds Directive, clarifying that the prohibition of bird disturbance applies only when it significantly affects the conservation objectives. However, the prohibitions of deliberate killing or nest destruction apply regardless of the activity’s purpose. Additionally, the Court clarified that carrying out forest felling during the bird breeding season, where a significant number of birds are nesting, falls under the prohibitions of the Birds Directive. The Court deemed the questions regarding derogations and compatibility with the Charter of Fundamental Rights inadmissible because they were hypothetical in the context of the main proceedings.
Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 1 August 2025.Tradeinn Retail Services S.L. v PH.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Intellectual property – Trade marks – Directive (EU) 2015/2436 – Approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks – Article 10(3)(b) – Rights conferred by a trade mark – Right to prevent a third party from offering the goods, putting them on the market or stocking them for those purposes under the sign – Online trade – Goods offered for sale from a Member State other than that in which the mark is registered – Concept of ‘stocking’.Case C-76/24.
This judgment concerns the interpretation of Article 10(3)(b) of Directive 2015/2436, which deals with the rights conferred by a trade mark. The case revolves around a dispute between Tradeinn Retail Services S.L. (TRS) and PH, the proprietor of German trade marks for diving equipment. The core issue is whether PH can prevent TRS, based in Spain, from stocking goods bearing identical signs to PH’s German trade marks in Spain, when those goods are intended for sale in Germany. The Court clarifies the scope of the trade mark proprietor’s rights regarding the “stocking” of infringing goods in a different Member State and the level of control required to constitute “stocking.”
The judgment clarifies two main points regarding Article 10(3)(b) of Directive 2015/2436. First, it confirms that a trade mark owner in one Member State can prevent someone in another Member State from stocking goods that infringe their trade mark if those goods are intended to be offered for sale or put on the market in the country where the trade mark is protected. Second, it defines “stocking” as not only having direct access to the infringing goods but also having the ability to influence the person who has actual access to those goods. This clarifies the extent to which a trade mark owner can control the distribution and storage of goods that infringe their trade mark, even if those goods are located in another country.
The most important provision of this act is that the trade mark proprietor may prohibit a third party from stocking goods outside the Member State of registration if that stocking constitutes a preliminary step to the making of such an offer or its implementation, with the result that it may be regarded as having been carried out for that purpose. Also, the term ‘stocking’ in Article 10(3)(b) of Directive 2015/2436 covers not only cases in which the third party has direct and actual control over the goods concerned, but also those in which he or she has indirect but nonetheless actual control over those goods in that he or she has control or direction over the person who has direct and actual control over those goods.
Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 1 August 2025.BÁV Zrt. v Budapest Főváros Kormányhivatala.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 (REACH Regulation) – Registration, evaluation and authorisation of chemicals – Annex XVII – Restrictions on the manufacture, placing on the market and use of certain dangerous substances, mixtures and articles – Restrictions concerning cadmium – Maximum concentration in metal parts of jewellery and imitation jewellery articles and hair accessories – Derogation – Silver bracelet dating from the 1940s, the brazing of which contains cadmium.Case C-512/24.
This document is a judgment from the Court of Justice of the European Union regarding the interpretation of the REACH Regulation, specifically Annex XVII, entry 23, which concerns restrictions on cadmium in certain products. The case revolves around a silver bracelet containing cadmium in its brazing, which was placed on the market in Hungary. The Hungarian authorities fined the seller, BÁV Zrt., for violating the cadmium restrictions.
The judgment clarifies whether the cadmium content in the brazing of the bracelet should be assessed under paragraph 8 (brazing fillers) or paragraph 10 (metal parts of jewelry) of entry 23 of Annex XVII to the REACH Regulation. It also considers a potential derogation in paragraph 11 for jewelry older than 50 years. The Court interprets that the bracelet falls under paragraph 10(ii) as a metal part of jewelry, specifically a bracelet, rather than as a brazing filler.
The key provision is that a silver bracelet with cadmium in its brazing is considered a “metal part of jewellery” under entry 23(10)(ii) of Annex XVII of the REACH Regulation. This means that the restrictions on cadmium concentration apply to the bracelet as a whole, not just the brazing filler. The national court must determine if the bracelet qualifies for the derogation in entry 23(11) based on its age (being more than 50 years old on 10 December 2011).
Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 1 August 2025.Finanzamt Österreich v P GmbH.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Common system of value added tax (VAT) – Directive 2006/112/EC – Article 203 – Incorrect amount of VAT entered on the invoice – Article 238 – Simplified invoicing – Services invoiced to non-taxable persons and to taxable persons who do not have a right to deduct VAT – Obligation to pay the part of the VAT invoiced incorrectly – No risk of loss of tax revenue.Case C-794/23.
This is a judgment from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) regarding the interpretation of the VAT Directive, specifically concerning situations where VAT is incorrectly invoiced. The case revolves around an Austrian company, P GmbH, which operates an indoor playground and incorrectly applied a 20% VAT rate instead of the reduced 13% rate on admission fees. The Austrian tax authority refused to adjust P GmbH’s VAT return, leading to a legal dispute and the referral of questions to the CJEU.
The judgment clarifies the scope of Article 203 of the VAT Directive, which states that VAT is payable by any person who enters the VAT on an invoice. It specifies that a taxable person is not liable for the incorrectly invoiced VAT if the service was supplied to a non-taxable person, even if the taxable person also supplied similar services to other taxable persons. The judgment defines “final consumers who do not have a right to deduct input VAT” as only non-taxable persons, excluding taxable persons who might use the service for private purposes or other non-deductible purposes. Finally, it allows for the use of estimates to determine the proportion of invoices for which the taxable person is liable, provided that all relevant circumstances are considered and the principles of fiscal neutrality, proportionality, and the rights of the defense are respected.
The main provisions of the act are:
– Clarification of Article 203 of the VAT Directive: The judgment clarifies that Article 203 applies only when there is a risk of loss of tax revenue. If the recipient of the incorrectly invoiced VAT is a non-taxable person, there is no such risk, and the issuer is not liable for the incorrectly invoiced amount.
– Definition of “final consumer”: The judgment provides a strict definition of “final consumer,” limiting it to non-taxable persons. This means that even if a taxable person uses a service for private purposes, they are not considered a final consumer for the purposes of Article 203.
– Use of estimates: The judgment allows tax authorities and national courts to use estimates to determine the proportion of invoices for which a taxable person is liable for incorrectly invoiced VAT. However, it sets conditions for the use of such estimates, requiring consideration of all relevant circumstances and adherence to the principles of fiscal neutrality, proportionality, and the rights of the defense.
The most important provisions for its use are those related to the conditions of using estimates. The judgment emphasizes that the data used for estimates must be correct, reliable, and up to date. Taxable persons must be given the opportunity to challenge the accuracy of the estimate and present evidence to the contrary. This ensures that the use of estimates does not lead to unfair or disproportionate outcomes for taxable persons.
Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 1 August 2025.T.B. and Others v T. S.A. and Others.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Rule of law – Effective judicial protection in fields covered by EU law – Second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU – Principles of the irremovability and independence of judges – Non-consensual designation of a judge of a supreme court to sit, for a specified period, in another chamber of that court – Primacy of EU law – Public procurement – Directive 2004/17/EC – Procurement procedures – Application to an agreement for the transfer of ownership rights relating to green electricity certificates of origin – Directive 92/13/EEC – Article 2d(1) – Review procedures in relation to the award of public contracts – No effect of the contract – Contracting entity seeking the annulment of a contract concluded in breach of the public procurement rules – Abuse of rights – None.Joined Cases C-422/23, C-455/23, C-459/23 and C-486/23.
This is a judgment from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) concerning several preliminary ruling requests from the Polish Supreme Court. The cases touch upon the interpretation of EU law regarding the rule of law and judicial independence, as well as public procurement directives.
The judgment addresses concerns about judicial independence within the Polish Supreme Court, specifically regarding the practice of temporarily assigning judges from one chamber to another without their consent. It also deals with questions about public procurement rules, particularly in the context of electricity supply and green energy certificates.
**Here’s a breakdown of the judgment’s structure and key provisions:**
1. **Introduction:** The judgment consolidates five preliminary ruling requests from the Polish Supreme Court. These requests concern the interpretation of Article 19(1) TEU (Treaty on European Union) related to effective judicial protection, the principle of EU law primacy, and several articles of Directives 2004/17/EC and 92/13/EEC concerning public procurement.
2. **Legal Framework:** The judgment outlines the relevant EU law, including directives on working time (2003/88/EC), procurement procedures for entities operating in specific sectors (2004/17/EC and 92/13/EEC), renewable energy (2009/28/EC), and procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors (2014/25/EU). It also presents the relevant Polish laws, notably the Law on the Supreme Court and the Law on Public Procurement.
3. **Main Proceedings and Questions Referred:** This section details the factual background of the five cases before the Polish Supreme Court, which led to the preliminary ruling requests. These cases involve disputes related to inheritance, guarantees, contracts, and obligations. The referring court expresses concerns about the independence and impartiality of the judicial panels due to the temporary assignment of judges. The questions referred to the CJEU revolve around whether these assignments compromise judicial independence under EU law and whether certain contracts related to green certificates fall under EU public procurement rules.
4. **Admissibility of the References for a Preliminary Ruling:** The CJEU confirms that the Polish Supreme Court, despite concerns about its composition, generally meets the criteria of a “court or tribunal” under Article 267 TFEU. It acknowledges that this presumption can be rebutted but finds insufficient evidence to do so in these specific cases.
5. **The Questions Referred for a Preliminary Ruling:** This section contains the CJEU’s analysis and answers to the questions posed by the Polish Supreme Court.
* **Judicial Independence:** The CJEU finds that the temporary assignment of judges, even without their consent, does not necessarily violate EU law, provided that such measures are based on legitimate reasons, are temporary, do not affect the judges’ original assignments, and do not result in demotion or removal.
* **Public Procurement:** The CJEU clarifies that the purchase of green certificates by a public electricity trading undertaking falls under the scope of Directive 2004/17/EC. It also clarifies the conditions under which a contract can be considered a “framework agreement” and the methods for calculating the estimated value of contracts to determine whether EU procurement rules apply.
* **Abuse of Rights:** The CJEU states that the principle of the prohibition of abuse of rights does not prevent a contracting entity from seeking the annulment of a contract concluded in breach of public procurement rules, even if the real reason is a reduction in profitability.
6. **Costs:** The CJEU states that the decision on costs is a matter for the referring court.
**Main Provisions and Changes:**
* The judgment clarifies the scope of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU concerning judicial independence, particularly in the context of temporary assignments of judges.
* It interprets key provisions of Directive 2004/17/EC, providing guidance on the application of EU public procurement rules to the electricity sector and green energy certificates.
* It reaffirms the principle of the prohibition of abuse of rights but clarifies that it does not apply in cases where a contract was awarded without a prior call for competition.
**Most Important Provisions for Use:**
* **Paragraph 100:** This paragraph provides a summary of the conditions under which the temporary assignment of judges is compatible with EU law.
* **Paragraph 119:** This paragraph clarifies that the purchase of green certificates by a public electricity trading undertaking falls under the scope of Directive 2004/17/EC.
* **Paragraph 139:** This paragraph summarizes the conditions for a contract to be considered a “framework agreement” and the rules for calculating the estimated value of contracts.
* **Paragraph 148:** This paragraph confirms that concluding a contract in disregard of public procurement rules is subject to the penalties provided for in Directive 92/13.
* **Paragraph 159:** This paragraph clarifies that the principle of the prohibition of abuse of rights does not prevent a contracting entity from seeking the annulment of a contract concluded in breach of public procurement rules, even if the real reason is a reduction in profitability.
This judgment provides important clarifications on the interpretation of EU law in the areas of judicial independence and public procurement. It offers guidance to national courts and contracting entities on how to apply these rules in practice.
Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 1 August 2025.CM and DS v Volkswagen AG.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Approximation of laws – Approval of motor vehicles – Directive 2007/46/EC – Article 18(1) – Article 26(1) – Article 46 – Regulation (EC) No 715/2007 – Article 5(2) – Motor vehicles – Diesel engine – Pollutant emissions – Reduction in nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions limited by a ‘temperature window’ – Defeat device – Protection of the interests of an individual purchaser of a vehicle equipped with an unlawful defeat device – Installation of that device after the vehicle’s entry into service – Right to compensation from the vehicle manufacturer on the basis of tortious liability – Ground for exemption – Unavoidable error on the part of the manufacturer as regards the unlawfulness of the defeat device – Principle of effectiveness – Adequate compensation for the loss or damage – Method of calculating compensation – Compensation bracket.Case C-666/23.
This is a preliminary ruling by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) concerning the interpretation of EU law on motor vehicle type approval and pollutant emissions, specifically regarding the use of “defeat devices” in diesel vehicles. The case revolves around a dispute between individual vehicle purchasers (CM and DS) and Volkswagen AG, concerning compensation for damages suffered due to the purchase of vehicles equipped with unlawful defeat devices that reduced the effectiveness of emission control systems. The German court seeks clarification on whether a manufacturer can be exempt from liability for using such devices, particularly when a national authority has approved or would have hypothetically approved their use, and on how compensation should be calculated.
The judgment addresses three main questions raised by the German court. First, it clarifies whether a vehicle manufacturer can avoid liability for using a prohibited defeat device by claiming an “unavoidable error” regarding the device’s illegality, especially if a national authority approved or would have approved the device. Second, it examines whether a manufacturer is liable for compensation if a defeat device is installed via a software update after the vehicle’s initial type approval. Third, it addresses the calculation of compensation, specifically whether benefits derived from using the vehicle can be deducted from the compensation amount and whether compensation can be limited to a percentage of the vehicle’s purchase price.
The CJEU rules that a manufacturer cannot be exempt from liability based on an “unavoidable error” if a national authority approved or would have approved the defeat device. It also confirms that manufacturers are liable for damages caused by defeat devices installed via software updates, even after the vehicle’s initial approval. Finally, the CJEU states that while national courts can deduct benefits derived from vehicle use and limit compensation to a percentage of the purchase price, such measures must ensure “adequate” compensation for the damages suffered.
Judgment of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 1 August 2025.Asociación Petón do Lobo v Dirección Xeral de Planificación Enerxética Recursos Naturais de la Xunta de Galicia.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Environment – Directive 2011/92/EU – Assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment – Article 6 – Consultations with authorities likely to be concerned by the project by reason of their specific environmental responsibilities or local and regional competences, and with the public concerned – Public participation in decision-making – Article 6(3)(b) – Scope of the concept of ‘main reports and advice’.Case C-461/24.
This is a judgment from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) regarding the interpretation of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Directive 2011/92/EU. The case concerns a wind farm project in Galicia, Spain, and specifically addresses the extent to which the public must be informed and consulted during the environmental impact assessment process. The CJEU clarifies the scope of “main reports and advice” that must be made available to the public and whether national legislation must allow the public to comment on opinions from consulted authorities. The court ultimately rules that the EIA Directive does not mandate that the public must be able to comment on the opinions of consulted authorities.
The judgment addresses a request for a preliminary ruling from a Spanish court regarding the interpretation of Article 6(3) of Directive 2011/92/EU. The referring court asked three questions related to the meaning of “main reports and advice,” whether reports from specific authorities fall under this definition, and whether Spanish laws comply with the directive’s requirement to make these reports available to the public. The CJEU examines the provisions of the EIA Directive, particularly Article 6, which outlines the consultation process with both authorities and the public. It clarifies that the directive does not explicitly require Member States to allow the public to comment on the opinions provided by consulted authorities. The Court emphasizes that effective public participation requires access to information and the opportunity to express comments, but it does not necessitate a specific stage for commenting on the opinions of consulted authorities.
The most important provision clarified in this judgment is Article 6 of the EIA Directive, specifically regarding public participation in environmental decision-making. The court’s interpretation provides Member States with flexibility in designing their environmental assessment procedures. Member States are not obligated to provide the public with an opportunity to comment specifically on the opinions of authorities consulted during the EIA process. However, the public must still have access to key information, including the environmental impact assessment report, and be given an opportunity to express their views before a decision is made on the project. This clarification helps to balance the need for effective public participation with the efficiency of the decision-making process.
Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 1 August 2025.PNB Banka AS v European Central Bank.Appeal – Economic and monetary policy – Prudential supervision of credit institutions – Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 – Procedural rights – Effective judicial protection – Inadmissibility.Case C-99/23 P.
This is a judgment by the Court of Justice of the European Union (Eighth Chamber) regarding an appeal by PNB Banka AS against a previous judgment of the General Court. The case concerns the European Central Bank’s (ECB) decision to conduct an on-site inspection at PNB Banka’s premises. The Court of Justice ultimately dismissed PNB Banka’s appeal, finding it inadmissible because the arguments presented were insufficiently clear and precise and did not directly challenge the General Court’s analysis of the original pleas.
**Structure and Main Provisions:**
The judgment outlines the background of the dispute, the legal context (specifically Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 concerning the prudential supervision of credit institutions), the proceedings before the General Court, and the arguments made by PNB Banka in its appeal. The core of the judgment is the Court of Justice’s assessment of the admissibility of PNB Banka’s appeal. The court refers to articles of the Rules of Procedure to explain why the appeal does not meet the requirements for a valid appeal. The court emphasizes that an appeal must precisely indicate the contested elements of the judgment and provide specific legal arguments. The judgment concludes by dismissing the appeal and ordering PNB Banka to pay the costs of the proceedings.
**Main Provisions for Use:**
The key takeaway from this judgment is the strict interpretation of the requirements for lodging an appeal with the Court of Justice. Appellants must clearly identify the specific errors in the lower court’s judgment and provide coherent and precise legal arguments as to why those errors warrant setting aside the judgment. General allegations or criticisms of national law, without a clear link to the contested judgment, are unlikely to be considered admissible.
Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 1 August 2025.Association interprofessionnelle des fruits et légumes frais (Interfel) v Premier ministre and Others.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Packaging and packaging waste – Meaning – Directive 94/62/EC – Article 3 and Annex I – Labels affixed directly to fruit or vegetables – National legislation prohibiting such labels, with the exception of labels that are home-compostable and composed, in whole or in part, of biosourced materials.Case C-772/24.
This judgment clarifies the definition of “packaging” under Directive 94/62/EC, specifically concerning labels affixed directly to fruits and vegetables. The case originated from a dispute in France regarding national legislation that prohibits most labels on fresh produce, allowing only home-compostable, bio-sourced labels. The French court sought guidance from the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on whether all such labels should be considered “packaging” under EU law.
The ECJ ruled that labels directly affixed to fruits and vegetables are not *always* considered packaging under the Directive. To be classified as such, these labels must fulfill at least one of the packaging functions outlined in Article 3(1) of the Directive: containment, protection, handling, delivery, or presentation of the goods. Additionally, they must fall into one of the three categories of packaging: sales, grouped, or transport packaging.
The judgment emphasizes that while Annex I of the Directive includes “labels hung directly on or attached to a product” as an example of packaging, this does not automatically classify all such labels as packaging. The key is whether the label performs a packaging function. The ECJ left it to the national court to determine, based on the specific characteristics and purpose of the labels in question, whether they meet these criteria.
Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 1 August 2025.IL v Veracash SAS.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Payment services in the internal market – Directive 2007/64/EC – Article 56(1)(b) – Obligation for the payment service user to notify the payment service provider ‘without undue delay’ of the loss, theft, misappropriation or unauthorised use of his or her payment instrument – Article 58 – Notification of unauthorised payment transactions – Rectification of such a transaction by the payment service provider subject to the obligation for the user of those services to notify that transaction ‘without undue delay … and no later than 13 months after the debit date’ – Articles 60 and 61 – Respective liabilities of the payment service provider and of the payer for unauthorised payment transactions – Successive unauthorised payment transactions resulting from the loss, theft, misappropriation or unauthorised use of a payment instrument – Delayed notification without intent or gross negligence – Scope of the right to a refund.Case C-665/23.
This is a judgment by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) regarding the interpretation of Directive 2007/64/EC on payment services. The case concerns a dispute between an individual (IL) and a payment service provider (Veracash SAS) over unauthorized withdrawals from IL’s account. The core issue is whether IL is entitled to a refund for these withdrawals, considering he notified Veracash about them after a delay, but within the 13-month limit set by the Directive.
The judgment clarifies the obligations of payment service users and providers in cases of unauthorized transactions. It focuses on the interpretation of Articles 56, 58, 60, and 61 of Directive 2007/64/EC, addressing the time limits and conditions for users to report unauthorized transactions and receive refunds. The CJEU specifies the circumstances under which a payer can be deprived of the right to reimbursement for unauthorized transactions, especially when there is a delay in notification.
The key points of the judgment are:
* **Notification Deadlines:** The judgment confirms that Article 58 of Directive 2007/64 imposes a dual obligation on payment service users: to notify their payment service provider “without undue delay” upon becoming aware of an unauthorized transaction and, in any event, no later than 13 months after the debit date.
* **Conditions for Deprivation of Right to Rectification:** The CJEU clarifies that a payer can only be deprived of the right to rectification (refund) if the delay in notification was due to intent or gross negligence on their part, especially in cases involving lost, stolen, or misappropriated payment instruments.
* **Successive Unauthorized Transactions:** In cases of multiple unauthorized transactions, the payer can only be deprived of a refund for those specific transactions that they delayed reporting with intent or gross negligence.
* **Burden of Proof and Assessment of Negligence:** The judgment refers to Article 59(2) of Directive 2007/64, clarifying that the use of a payment instrument recorded by the payment service provider is not in itself sufficient to prove that the payment transaction was authorized by the payer or that the payer acted fraudulently or with intent or gross negligence. Recital 33 of the Directive states that, in order to assess possible negligence by the payment service user, account should be taken of all the circumstances and that the evidence and the degree of alleged negligence should be assessed in accordance with national law.
This judgment provides guidance on how to interpret the provisions of Directive 2007/64/EC regarding unauthorized payment transactions, particularly concerning the balance between the user’s obligation to report issues promptly and the provider’s responsibility to ensure secure payment services.
Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 1 August 2025.W and X v Belgische Staat and État belge, représenté par la Secrétaire d’État à l’Asile et la Migration.References for a preliminary ruling – Border controls, asylum and immigration – Immigration policy – Directive 2008/115/EC – Common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals – Article 3(4) and (6), Article 7(1) and (4), Article 8(1) and (2), Article 11(1) and Article 13 – Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Return decision – Decision not to grant a period for voluntary departure – Entry ban – Actionable administrative act – Enforceability of a return decision not containing a provision relating to the period for voluntary departure – Right to an effective remedy – Entry ban decision adopted after a considerable period of time.Joined Cases C-636/23 and C-637/23.
This is a judgment from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) regarding the interpretation of the Return Directive (2008/115/EC) in the context of two cases concerning third-country nationals (W and X) in Belgium who were issued orders to leave the territory and entry bans. The referring courts are the Raad voor Vreemdelingenbetwistingen and the Conseil du contentieux des étrangers, both in Belgium. The judgment clarifies the legal nature of decisions regarding the period for voluntary departure, the possibility to challenge such decisions in legal proceedings, the timing of entry bans, and the consequences of any unlawfulness in the provision relating to the period for voluntary departure.
**Structure and Main Provisions:**
The judgment addresses several key aspects of the Return Directive:
1. **Nature of Decision on Voluntary Departure:** The CJEU clarifies that the decision to grant or refuse a period for voluntary departure is not a mere enforcement measure. It has immediate legal consequences and affects the legal position of the third-country national.
2. **Right to an Effective Remedy:** The judgment emphasizes that a decision not to grant a period for voluntary departure must be open to challenge in legal proceedings. This ensures the protection of the third-country national’s fundamental rights.
3. **Timing of Entry Ban:** The CJEU states that the Return Directive does not prevent a competent national authority from imposing an entry ban even after a considerable period, based on a return decision that does not grant a period for voluntary departure.
4. **Consequences of Unlawfulness:** The judgment specifies that the provision relating to the period for voluntary departure is an integral part of the obligation to return. Therefore, if any unlawfulness is found regarding that provision, the entire return decision must be annulled.
**Main Provisions Important for Use:**
* A decision regarding the period for voluntary departure has legal consequences and is not merely an enforcement measure.
* Third-country nationals have the right to challenge decisions regarding the period for voluntary departure in court.
* Member States can impose an entry ban even after a significant delay following a return decision without a period for voluntary departure.
* If a decision regarding the period for voluntary departure is found to be unlawful, the entire return decision is invalid.
Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 1 August 2025.Galerie Karsten Greve v Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances et de la Souveraineté industrielle et numérique.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Taxation – Common system of value added tax (VAT) – Directive 2006/112/EC – Special arrangements for second-hand goods, works of art, collectors’ items and antiques – Taxable dealers – Margin scheme – Article 316(1)(b) – Option to apply the margin scheme – Concept of ‘supply of a work of art by the creator’ – Supply by the creator through a legal person.Case C-433/24.
This is a judgment from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) regarding the interpretation of the VAT Directive, specifically concerning the margin scheme for second-hand goods, works of art, collectors’ items, and antiques. The case revolves around a French art gallery, Galerie Karsten Greve (GKG), which was assessed additional VAT for applying the margin scheme to works of art it acquired from a company (SRG) where the artist was a partner. The French court questioned whether a legal person (like a company) could be considered the “creator” of a work of art for VAT purposes, allowing the margin scheme to be applied.
The judgment clarifies the scope of Article 316(1)(b) of the VAT Directive, which allows Member States to grant taxable dealers the right to opt for application of the margin scheme to the supply of works of art supplied to the tax dealer by their creators or their successors in title. The CJEU rules that this provision *can* apply even when the artist or their successors act through a legal person (like a company). However, this is conditional on two key factors: 1) the supply by the legal person must be attributable to the artist or their successors (e.g., the company was set up to market the artist’s work), and 2) the supply of the artwork to the taxable dealer must represent the *first* introduction of that work of art onto the EU market.
The most important takeaway from this judgment is that it allows art dealers to apply the margin scheme even when acquiring art from a company representing the artist, provided the company is essentially acting as the artist’s marketing arm and the transaction represents the artwork’s initial entry into the EU market. This prevents a situation where artists who operate through companies are treated differently for VAT purposes compared to those who operate as individuals, ensuring tax neutrality and preventing distortions of competition. The judgment also clarifies that overly strict criteria, such as specific legal regimes for the company or detailed ownership structures, should not be used, as they could create excessive administrative burdens.
Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 1 August 2025.Banca Mediolanum SpA v Agenzia delle Entrate – Direzione Regionale della Lombardia.References for a preliminary ruling – Taxation – Common system of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States – Directive 2011/96/EU – Article 4(1)(a) – Prohibition on taxing profits received by the parent company – Prevention of double taxation of dividends – Scope – Regional tax on production activities – Inclusion of 50% of dividends received by the parent companies in the basis of assessment for that tax.Joined Cases C-92/24 and C-93/24.
This is a judgment from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) regarding the interpretation of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive (Directive 2011/96/EU). The case concerns an Italian regional tax on production activities (IRAP) and whether including 50% of dividends received by parent companies from subsidiaries in other Member States in the tax base is compatible with the directive. The CJEU ruled that it is not compatible, as it effectively taxes profits that should be exempt under the directive.
The judgment addresses a request for a preliminary ruling from an Italian court (Corte di giustizia tributaria di secondo grado della Lombardia). The main issue is whether Article 4 of Directive 2011/96/EU, which aims to eliminate double taxation of dividends paid by subsidiaries to parent companies in different Member States, precludes a national law like the Italian one. The Italian law includes 50% of dividends received by financial intermediaries (parent companies) from subsidiaries in other EU countries in the tax base for IRAP. The Court examines the wording, context, and purpose of the directive. It emphasizes that the directive aims to prevent economic double taxation and that the exemption system should apply to any tax that includes dividends in its tax base, regardless of the tax’s nature.
The most important provision is the ruling that Article 4 of Directive 2011/96/EU precludes national legislation that allows a Member State to tax more than 5% of dividends received by parent companies from subsidiaries in other Member States, even if it’s through a tax that isn’t a corporate income tax but includes those dividends in its tax base. This clarifies the scope of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and its aim to prevent double taxation, ensuring that Member States cannot circumvent the directive’s purpose by imposing taxes on dividends through different mechanisms.
Arrêt de la Cour (sixième chambre) du 1er août 2025.#Commission européenne contre Royaume de Belgique.#Manquement d’État – Article 258 TFUE – Équilibre entre vie professionnelle et vie privée des parents et des aidants – Directive (UE) 2019/1158 – Article 20, paragraphe 1 – Absence de transposition et de communication des mesures de transposition – Article 260, paragraphe 3, TFUE – Demande de condamnation au paiement d’une somme forfaitaire – Critères d’établissement du montant de la sanction.#Affaire C-68/24.
This is a judgment by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) regarding a failure by Belgium to transpose Directive (EU) 2019/1158 on work-life balance for parents and carers into national law. The Court found that Belgium failed to implement the necessary laws, regulations, and administrative provisions by the deadline and has imposed a lump sum payment as a penalty.
**Structure and Main Provisions:**
The judgment is structured as follows:
1. **Background:** The European Commission initiated proceedings against Belgium for failing to transpose Directive 2019/1158 into national law by the deadline of August 2, 2022. The Commission argued that Belgium had neither adopted the necessary measures nor communicated them to the Commission, as required by Article 20(1) of the Directive.
2. **Legal Framework:** The judgment outlines the key provisions of Directive 2019/1158, which aims to establish minimum requirements to achieve equality between men and women regarding labor market opportunities and treatment at work by facilitating work-life balance for parents and carers. It covers aspects such as paternity leave, parental leave, carer’s leave, and flexible working arrangements.
3. **Pre-litigation Procedure:** The Commission sent a letter of formal notice and a reasoned opinion to Belgium, highlighting the failure to transpose the Directive. Belgium acknowledged the delay but cited various reasons, including the complexity of the matter, the COVID-19 pandemic, and institutional factors.
4. **Proceedings Before the Court:** The Commission brought the case before the CJEU, seeking a declaration that Belgium had failed to fulfill its obligations under EU law. The Commission initially sought a daily penalty payment but withdrew this claim after Belgium implemented the Directive. However, the Commission maintained its claim for a lump sum payment to penalize Belgium for the delay.
5. **Judgment of the Court:** The Court found that Belgium had indeed failed to transpose the Directive by the deadline and had not provided adequate justification for the delay. The Court rejected Belgium’s arguments regarding the COVID-19 pandemic and institutional factors.
6. **Penalty:** The Court ordered Belgium to pay a lump sum of EUR 2,352,000 to the Commission. The amount was determined based on the gravity and duration of the infringement, as well as Belgium’s ability to pay.
**Main Provisions and Changes:**
* The judgment confirms the importance of Member States meeting deadlines for transposing EU directives into national law.
* It clarifies that Member States cannot rely on internal difficulties, such as institutional factors or the COVID-19 pandemic, as justifications for failing to transpose directives on time.
* The judgment reinforces the principle that penalties for failing to transpose EU law should be proportionate to the gravity and duration of the infringement and should be sufficiently dissuasive.
**Most Important Provisions for Use:**
* **Article 20(1) of Directive 2019/1158:** This article sets the deadline for Member States to transpose the Directive into national law.
* **Article 260(3) TFEU:** This article provides the legal basis for the Commission to seek financial penalties against Member States that fail to transpose directives.
* **The Court’s reasoning regarding the justification for delays:** The Court’s rejection of Belgium’s arguments regarding the COVID-19 pandemic and institutional factors is important for future cases involving failures to transpose EU law.
* **The Court’s approach to calculating the lump sum payment:** The Court’s methodology for determining the amount of the lump sum payment provides guidance for future cases involving financial penalties for failures to transpose EU law.
Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 1 August 2025.PNB Banka AS v European Central Bank.Appeal – Economic and monetary policy – Prudential supervision of credit institutions – Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 – Procedural rights – Effective judicial protection – Inadmissibility.Case C-100/23 P.
This is a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union regarding an appeal by PNB Banka AS against a decision of the General Court. The General Court had dismissed PNB Banka’s action for annulment of the European Central Bank’s (ECB) decision to classify PNB Banka as a significant entity subject to its direct prudential supervision. The Court of Justice upholds the General Court’s decision, dismissing PNB Banka’s appeal.
The structure of the judgment is as follows: It outlines the background of the dispute, including the initial decision by the ECB, PNB Banka’s subsequent insolvency, and the proceedings before the General Court. It then presents the forms of order sought by both parties (PNB Banka and the ECB). The core of the judgment addresses PNB Banka’s single ground of appeal, which alleges infringement of its procedural rights. The Court of Justice finds this ground inadmissible because it does not sufficiently challenge the General Court’s analysis of the pleas raised in the initial action. The judgment concludes with a decision on costs, ordering PNB Banka to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the ECB.
The most important provision of the judgment is the Court of Justice’s ruling on the admissibility of the appeal. The Court emphasizes that an appeal must precisely indicate the contested elements of the General Court’s judgment and provide clear legal arguments. Since PNB Banka’s appeal failed to do so, it was deemed inadmissible. This highlights the importance of clearly articulating the grounds for appeal and directly addressing the reasoning of the lower court.
Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 1 August 2025.Dyrektor Izby Administracji Skarbowej w W. v W. sp. z o.o.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Taxation – Common system of value added tax (VAT) – Directive 2006/112/EC – Exemptions on exportation – Article 146(1)(b) – Supply of goods dispatched or transported to a destination outside the European Union – Transport of goods outside the European Union following an agreement between the person acquiring the goods and the supplier providing for their supply in another Member State – Goods which have actually left the territory of the European Union – Proof – Refusal of the exemption on exportation – Principles of fiscal neutrality and proportionality.Case C-602/24.
This is a judgment from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) regarding the interpretation of Article 146(1)(b) of the VAT Directive (2006/112/EC). The case concerns a Polish company, W. sp. z o.o., which was denied a VAT exemption on exported goods. The Polish tax authorities argued that the goods were not delivered to another EU member state as initially declared but were instead exported outside the EU.
The judgment clarifies the conditions under which a supply of goods can be considered an export and thus be exempt from VAT, even if initially declared as an intra-Community supply. It addresses situations where the goods are exported outside the EU by the purchaser without the supplier’s knowledge. The CJEU was asked whether the VAT exemption applies when goods, initially intended for intra-community supply, are exported outside the EU by the buyer without the seller’s knowledge.
The key provision is that Article 146(1)(b) of the VAT Directive should be interpreted to mean that the exemption applies to a supply of goods initially declared as an intra-Community supply, but which the purchaser then exports outside the EU without the supplier’s knowledge, provided the tax authorities have proof of the export based on customs documents. The Court emphasizes that the concept of “supply of goods” is objective and that the exemption should be granted if the substantive requirements are met, even if some formal requirements are not. The Court also notes that Member States must respect the principle of proportionality when implementing conditions for export exemptions, and should not impose excessive formal requirements that disregard the objective characteristics of the transaction.
Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 1 August 2025.Romagnoli Fratelli SpA v Community Plant Variety Office.Appeal – Community plant variety rights – Regulation (EC) No 2100/94 – Regulation (EC) No 874/2009 – Potato variety Melrose (EU 31618) – Failure to pay on time the annual fee due in respect of the Community plant variety right – Service – Cancellation of Community plant variety rights – MyPVR user area – Application for restitutio in integrum – Dismissal of application.Case C-426/24 P.
This is a judgment by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) regarding an appeal against a decision of the General Court concerning Community Plant Variety Rights (CPVR). The case revolves around the potato variety “Melrose” and the cancellation of its CPVR due to the holder, Romagnoli Fratelli SpA, failing to pay the annual fee on time. The core issue is whether the Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO) properly served notifications regarding the fee payment and whether Romagnoli Fratelli SpA is entitled to “restitutio in integrum” (restoration of rights) despite missing the deadline.
The judgment is structured as follows: It begins by outlining the background of the case, including the initial grant of the CPVR, the failure to pay the annual fee, the cancellation of the right, and the subsequent application for restitutio in integrum. It then details the legal context, referencing Regulation (EC) No 2100/94 on Community plant variety rights and Regulation (EC) No 874/2009, which sets out implementing rules for proceedings before the CPVO. The judgment also refers to a decision of the President of the CPVO concerning electronic communication. The Court then examines the appellant’s arguments, which are based on three grounds: (1) the unlawfulness of the President of the CPVO’s decision regarding electronic notifications, (2) breach of the CPVO’s duty of care, and (3) an incorrect assessment of evidence relating to force majeure. The Court dismisses all three grounds of appeal and upholds the General Court’s decision.
The most important provisions of the act are those concerning the service of documents by the CPVO, particularly Article 64 of Regulation No 874/2009, which allows for service by electronic means, and the decision of the President of the CPVO, which details how electronic communication via the MyPVR user area is to be carried out. The Court emphasizes that if a user opts for electronic communication, notifications sent via MyPVR are considered validly served. The judgment also clarifies the conditions for “restitutio in integrum” under Article 80 of Regulation No 2100/94, stating that the applicant must demonstrate that they took all due care and faced particular circumstances that prevented them from meeting the deadline.
Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 1 August 2025.PNB Banka AS v European Central Bank.Appeal – Economic and monetary policy – Prudential supervision of credit institutions – Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 – Procedural rights – Statement of reasons.Case C-102/23 P.
This is the judgment of the Court of Justice (Eighth Chamber) in Case C-102/23 P, concerning an appeal by PNB Banka AS against the judgment of the General Court, which had dismissed PNB Banka’s action for annulment of the European Central Bank’s (ECB) decision to withdraw its authorization as a credit institution. The Court of Justice upheld the General Court’s decision, dismissing PNB Banka’s appeal. The core issue revolves around procedural rights and the statement of reasons provided by the ECB in its decision to withdraw PNB Banka’s authorization.
The judgment is structured as follows: It begins with an introduction outlining the appeal’s purpose and the judgment under appeal. It then provides the legal context, referencing Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, which confers specific tasks on the ECB regarding the prudential supervision of credit institutions. The judgment summarizes the background to the dispute, detailing the events leading to the ECB’s decision, including PNB Banka’s classification as a significant entity, the finding that it was failing or likely to fail, and the request by the Finanšu un kapitāla tirgus komisija (FCMC) for the ECB to withdraw PNB Banka’s authorization. It outlines the action before the General Court and the judgment under appeal, summarizing the pleas raised by PNB Banka and the General Court’s reasons for dismissing the action. The judgment then details the forms of order sought by PNB Banka and the ECB, followed by a description of the procedure before the Court of Justice. The Court then addresses the appeal, dividing it into two main grounds: errors in the examination of procedural rights during the FCMC and ECB procedures, and infringement of PNB Banka’s procedural rights in the proceedings before the General Court. Each ground is further divided into parts, with arguments from both parties and the Court’s findings.
The most important provisions of the act for its use are the Court’s findings on the alleged errors in the procedures leading to the ECB’s decision. The Court rejected PNB Banka’s arguments that its procedural rights were violated, emphasizing that the General Court had adequately examined the complaints and that PNB Banka had not sufficiently demonstrated errors in the General Court’s analysis. The Court also highlighted that PNB Banka’s arguments regarding the roles of the national authority and the ECB were inadmissible due to a lack of clarity and precision.
Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 1 August 2025.French Republic v European Commission.Appeal – Environment and protection of human health – Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 – Classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures – Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/217 – Classification of titanium dioxide in powder form containing 1% or more of particles of a diameter equal to or below 10 μm – Criteria for classification of a substance as carcinogenic – Reliability and acceptability of scientific studies – Calculation of lung overload in particles – ‘Decisive’ nature of a scientific study – Distortion of the evidence – Error of law – Choice of calculation parameters – Particle density – Scientific assessment – Exceeding the limits of judicial review – Concept of ‘intrinsic properties’ – Grounds included for the sake of completeness.Case C-71/23 P.
This is a judgment by the Court of Justice of the European Union regarding the classification and labeling of titanium dioxide. The French Republic and the European Commission appealed a previous judgment that annulled a delegated regulation classifying titanium dioxide in powder form as a suspected carcinogen (category 2) when it contains 1% or more of particles with a diameter equal to or below 10 μm. The Court of Justice ultimately dismissed the appeals, upholding the annulment.
**Structure and Main Provisions:**
The judgment addresses several grounds of appeal raised by the French Republic and the European Commission. These grounds challenge the General Court’s assessment of scientific evidence, particularly the reliability and acceptability of a key study (the Heinrich study) used to classify titanium dioxide as a carcinogen. The Court examines whether the General Court distorted the evidence, exceeded the limits of its judicial review, or misinterpreted the concept of “intrinsic properties” of a substance that causes cancer.
**Key Points & Changes:**
* **”Decisive” Study:** The Court clarifies that the General Court did not err in considering the Heinrich study as “decisive” for the classification proposal, even though other studies were considered.
* **Particle Density:** The Court finds that the General Court exceeded its judicial review by substituting its own assessment for that of the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) regarding the appropriate particle density to use in a calculation related to lung overload. However, the Court also notes that ECHA failed to adequately consider the agglomeration phenomenon of titanium dioxide particles, which is a relevant factor.
* **Intrinsic Property:** The Court deems the arguments regarding the “intrinsic property” of titanium dioxide to cause cancer as ineffective because the General Court’s considerations on this point were made for the sake of completeness.
**Main Provisions for Use:**
The most important aspect of this judgment is the finding that the General Court exceeded its judicial review regarding the determination of particle density. This highlights the limits of judicial intervention in complex scientific assessments made by specialized agencies like ECHA. However, the judgment also underscores the importance of these agencies to demonstrate that they have duly considered all relevant factors and circumstances when exercising their discretion.
Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 1 August 2025.T.T. and BAJI Trans, s.r. o. v Národný inšpektorát práce.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Regulations (EEC) No 3821/85 and (EU) No 165/2014 – Obligation periodically to inspect tachographs – Exemption – Last sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 51(1) thereof – Principle of lex posterior mitius – Administrative penalties of a criminal nature – Appeal in cassation – New law having entered into force after the ruling which is the subject of that appeal – Concept of ‘final conviction’.Case C-544/23.
This is a judgment from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) regarding the interpretation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, specifically concerning the obligation to periodically inspect tachographs in vehicles used for road transport. The case originated from Slovakia and involves a dispute over an administrative fine imposed for failing to comply with tachograph inspection requirements.
**Essence of the Act:**
The judgment clarifies the scope and application of Article 49(1) and Article 51(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the context of administrative penalties related to EU law. It confirms that Member States are implementing EU law when imposing penalties for breaches of EU regulations, such as those concerning tachographs. The judgment also addresses the principle of *lex posterior mitius* (the application of the more lenient law) and its applicability in cases where a law is amended after a penalty has been imposed. Finally, it clarifies when a decision can be considered “final” for the purposes of applying the principle of *lex posterior mitius*.
**Structure and Main Provisions:**
The judgment is structured as follows:
* **Introduction:** Sets out the context of the request for a preliminary ruling.
* **Legal Context:** Summarizes the relevant EU and Slovak laws, including the Charter of Fundamental Rights, Regulations No 3821/85 and No 165/2014 (tachograph regulations), Regulation No 561/2006 (driving times and rest periods), and relevant Slovak legislation.
* **The Dispute in the Main Proceedings and the Questions Referred for a Preliminary Ruling:** Describes the factual background of the case in Slovakia and the specific questions posed by the Slovak court to the CJEU.
* **Consideration of the Questions Referred:** This is the core of the judgment, where the CJEU provides its answers to the questions, interpreting the relevant provisions of EU law.
* **Costs:** Addresses the allocation of costs in the proceedings.
**Main Provisions and Changes:**
* **Implementation of EU Law:** The CJEU confirms that a Member State is implementing EU law when it imposes administrative penalties for failing to fulfill obligations arising from EU law (like the tachograph regulations). This triggers the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
* ***Lex Posterior Mitius*:** The judgment clarifies that the principle of *lex posterior mitius* (the more lenient law) enshrined in Article 49(1) of the Charter can apply to administrative penalties if they are “criminal in nature.” The CJEU provides guidance on how to determine whether a penalty is “criminal in nature,” referring to the legal classification of the offense under national law, the intrinsic nature of the offense, and the severity of the penalty.
* **Application to Administrative vs. Judicial Bodies:** The principle of *lex posterior mitius* applies both when an administrative body imposes a penalty and when an administrative court reviews that penalty.
* **Definition of “Final Conviction”:** The CJEU provides an autonomous EU law definition of “final conviction” for the purpose of applying Article 49(1) of the Charter. A conviction is not final if it can still be challenged through an ordinary appeal, even if national law considers the decision final.
* **Obligations of National Courts:** A national court hearing an appeal in cassation is, in principle, required to apply a more lenient national law that came into force after the initial judicial decision, as long as the conviction is not “final” under the EU law definition.
* **Primacy of EU Law:** If national law prevents the national court from applying the guarantees of Article 49(1) of the Charter, the court must disapply the conflicting national law to ensure the full effect of EU law.
**Most Important Provisions:**
The most important aspects of this judgment are:
* The clarification that the principle of *lex posterior mitius* can apply to administrative penalties if they are “criminal in nature,” offering guidance on how to assess this.
* The EU law definition of “final conviction,” which ensures a uniform application of the principle of *lex posterior mitius* across Member States, regardless of national procedural rules.
* The confirmation that national courts must prioritize the application of Article 49(1) of the Charter, even if it means disapplying conflicting national law.
This judgment has significant implications for the application of fundamental rights in the context of EU law and administrative penalties, particularly in areas where EU regulations require Member States to implement penalty systems.
Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 1 August 2025.Határ Diszkont Kft. v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Common system of value added tax (VAT) – Directive 2006/112/EC – Article 1(2), Article 2(1)(c) and Article 78 – Exemptions on exportation – Article 146(1)(b) – Exempt supply of goods – Service for the administration of VAT refunds to customers not resident in the European Union – Single supply – Distinct and independent supplies – Principal or ancillary supply – Exemptions under Article 135(1)(d) and Article 146(1)(e) – Protection of legitimate expectations – Taxable amount.Case C-427/23.
This is the Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Fourth Chamber) in Case C-427/23, delivered on August 1, 2025. The case concerns a request for a preliminary ruling from a Hungarian court regarding the interpretation of the VAT Directive (2006/112/EC), specifically concerning the VAT treatment of services related to the administration of VAT refunds to non-EU residents. The central issue is whether fees charged for administering VAT refunds to tourists can be considered a separate, taxable service or if they are part of the exempt supply of goods.
**Essence of the Act:**
The judgment clarifies the VAT treatment of services related to administering VAT refunds to non-EU residents. It determines whether these services should be considered a separate, taxable supply or an integral part of the VAT-exempt supply of goods. The Court also addresses the principles of legitimate expectations and the calculation of the taxable amount for VAT purposes.
**Structure and Main Provisions:**
The judgment is structured around four questions referred by the Hungarian court.
* **Question 1:** The Court ruled that administering VAT refunds to non-EU residents is a distinct service from the supply of goods and is subject to VAT. It does not fall under the exemption for services directly connected with the exportation of goods.
* **Question 2:** The Court found that administering VAT refunds does not qualify as an exempt transaction concerning payments or debts under Article 135(1)(d) of the VAT Directive.
* **Question 3:** The Court held that the principle of legitimate expectations does not prevent tax authorities from retroactively applying VAT to these services, even if they had previously accepted VAT returns without challenge.
* **Question 4:** The Court determined that the taxable amount for VAT should be calculated based on the gross amount (including VAT) of the administration fees, especially when the supplier cannot recover the VAT from the customers.
**Main Provisions for Use:**
* **VAT on Refund Administration:** The key takeaway is that services for administering VAT refunds to non-EU residents are generally subject to VAT as a separate service.
* **No Legitimate Expectation:** Businesses cannot assume that past acceptance of VAT returns implies a continued exemption for these services.
* **Taxable Amount Calculation:** The taxable amount should be the gross fee, including VAT, particularly when the VAT cannot be recovered from the customer.
Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 1 August 2025.Tiberis Holding Srl v Gestore dei servizi energetici (GSE) SpA and Others.Reference for a preliminary ruling – Environment – Promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources – Directive 2009/28/EC – Article 3 – Directive (EU) 2018/2001 – Article 4 – National incentives for the production of energy from renewable sources – Aid scheme – State aid – Article 108 TFEU – Exclusive competence of the European Commission to rule on the compatibility of aid measures with the internal market – Commission decision finding such an aid scheme compatible with the internal market – Action brought before a national court by a beneficiary of aid under that scheme challenging a modality of that scheme which is inextricably linked to its functioning – Inadmissibility, in the context of that action, of a request for a preliminary ruling concerning the interpretation of those provisions of those directives.Case C-514/23.
This judgment addresses a request for a preliminary ruling concerning the interpretation of EU directives on the promotion of renewable energy use, specifically Directive 2009/28/EC and Directive (EU) 2018/2001. The case originates from a dispute in Italy regarding an incentive scheme for electricity production from renewable sources other than photovoltaic energy. The core issue revolves around whether a national regulation, which includes a “negative incentive” mechanism, is compatible with the principles of these EU directives.
The judgment is structured as follows:
1. It begins by outlining the context of the request, the legal framework involving EU regulations and directives, and the specific Italian law in question.
2. It details the dispute in the main proceedings, which involves Tiberis Holding Srl challenging the repayment of part of the aid received under the Italian incentive scheme.
3. The judgment then assesses the admissibility of the request for a preliminary ruling, considering arguments from various parties, including the Italian Government and the European Commission.
4. The Court delves into the roles of national courts and the European Commission in monitoring State aid, emphasizing the Commission’s exclusive competence in assessing the compatibility of aid measures with the internal market.
5. Finally, the Court concludes that the request for a preliminary ruling is inadmissible because the national court cannot assess the contested “negative incentive” mechanism in light of the EU directives, as this mechanism is intrinsically linked to a State aid scheme already approved by the Commission.
The most important provision is the ruling that national courts cannot assess the compatibility of specific modalities of a State aid scheme (like the “negative incentive” mechanism) with EU directives if the European Commission has already approved the overall aid scheme. This reaffirms the Commission’s central role in evaluating State aid and prevents national courts from undermining Commission decisions.
