{"id":19915,"date":"2026-09-25T10:38:59","date_gmt":"2026-09-25T07:38:59","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/2026\/09\/review-of-echr-decisions-for-25-09-2026\/"},"modified":"2026-09-25T10:38:59","modified_gmt":"2026-09-25T07:38:59","slug":"review-of-echr-decisions-for-25-09-2026","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/2026\/09\/review-of-echr-decisions-for-25-09-2026\/","title":{"rendered":"Review of ECHR decisions for 25\/09\/2026"},"content":{"rendered":"

<\/p>\n

CASE OF A.M. AND OTHERS v. GREECE<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

This judgment, *A.M. and Others v. Greece* (24 September 2026), concerns the systemic failure of the Greek state to provide adequate reception and living conditions for asylum-seekers, as well as failures to provide necessary medical care to vulnerable individuals. The Court joined four separate applications due to their shared subject matter regarding the treatment of asylum-seekers in various facilities, including the Moria Reception and Identification Centre. While the Court rejected some claims due to a lack of substantiation or failure to meet the six-month time limit, it found clear violations of Article 3 of the Convention in the majority of cases. The judgment highlights that asylum-seekers are a particularly vulnerable group, and the state bears a positive obligation to ensure their living conditions remain compatible with human dignity. Ultimately, the Court ordered the respondent State to pay non-pecuniary damages to the applicants, reinforcing the standard of care required for those seeking international protection. ****: This decision is highly relevant to the current European context, particularly for Ukraine, as it reaffirms the strict obligations of host states toward displaced persons and vulnerable populations, setting a clear precedent for the standard of medical and living conditions that must be maintained for those fleeing conflict or persecution.<\/p>\n

### Structure and Provisions
\nThe judgment is structured into four main sections:
\n1. **Procedural History and Joinder:** The Court consolidated four applications (nos. 11022\/17, 18179\/20, 48822\/20, and 1880\/21) into a single proceeding to ensure procedural efficiency.
\n2. **Admissibility:** The Court addressed the Government\u2019s preliminary objections regarding the exhaustion of domestic remedies and the “victim status” of the applicants. It dismissed these objections, noting that the Government failed to demonstrate the existence of effective domestic remedies for these specific grievances.
\n3. **Merits (Article 3):** The Court examined the living conditions in Ritsona and Moria camps. It distinguished between claims that were insufficiently supported by evidence (which were rejected) and those where the conditions clearly fell below the minimum threshold of severity.
\n4. **Just Satisfaction (Article 41):** The Court awarded non-pecuniary damages to the applicants based on established case-law but rejected claims for legal costs and expenses due to a lack of documentary evidence proving that such costs were actually incurred.<\/p>\n

### Key Provisions for Legal Use
\n* **Burden of Proof:** The Court clarified that applicants must provide “concrete and detailed information” regarding their personal situation and the duration of the alleged shortcomings. Failure to do so results in the application being declared manifestly ill-founded.
\n* **Effectiveness of Domestic Remedies:** The judgment reinforces that it is the Government\u2019s burden to prove that a domestic remedy is not only available in theory but also effective in practice (accessible, capable of providing redress, and offering reasonable prospects of success). General administrative procedures that do not specifically address the failure to provide adequate reception conditions are insufficient.
\n* **Vulnerability and Medical Care:** The Court established that for vulnerable individuals (such as torture victims or those with chronic illnesses like HIV), the failure to provide timely, specialized, and trauma-informed care constitutes a violation of Article 3. Administrative delays in initiating essential treatments\u2014such as antiretroviral therapy\u2014cannot be excused as mere “administrative inconvenience.”
\n* **Interim Measures:** The Court\u2019s reliance on its own previously indicated interim measures (under Rule 39) serves as a critical indicator of the state’s failure to comply with its obligations, which the Court then uses to substantiate findings of a violation on the merits.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

CASE OF ATTALIDIS AND OTHERS v. GREECE<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

The judgment in *Attalidis and Others v. Greece* (application no. 57479\/17) concerns a group of applicants who alleged that their detention conditions at Korydallos Prison in Greece violated Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits inhuman or degrading treatment. The Court examined claims regarding severe overcrowding, specifically focusing on instances where detainees were afforded less than 3 square meters of personal living space. While some applicants were removed from the proceedings due to a lack of communication or death, the Court proceeded to evaluate the claims of the remaining applicants. Ultimately, the Court found that the Greek authorities failed to provide adequate living space, confirming a violation of Article 3. The judgment reaffirms the Court\u2019s established jurisprudence regarding the minimum standards of detention and the state\u2019s obligation to ensure humane conditions.<\/p>\n

The structure of this decision follows the standard format for a Committee-level judgment of the European Court of Human Rights. It begins with the procedural history, followed by the Court\u2019s decision to strike out specific applicants who failed to maintain contact or whose legal standing ceased. The core of the decision addresses the admissibility and merits of the Article 3 complaints, relying heavily on the principles established in the landmark case *Mur\u0161i\u0107 v. Croatia*. A notable change in the Court\u2019s approach here is the strict application of the “exhaustion of domestic remedies” rule regarding one applicant who had been transferred to a different facility before lodging his complaint, thereby requiring him to have pursued a specific civil law remedy under Greek law.<\/p>\n

The most important provisions for future legal use are as follows:<\/p>\n

* **The 3-Square-Meter Threshold:** The Court reinforces that personal space of less than 3 square meters per detainee in a multi-occupancy cell creates a strong presumption of a violation of Article 3. This serves as a critical benchmark for practitioners challenging prison conditions.
\n* **Burden of Proof regarding Occupancy:** The decision highlights that when the Government fails to provide concrete evidence (such as official records) to refute an applicant\u2019s claim regarding cell occupancy and living space, the Court will accept the applicant\u2019s version of events. This places a significant evidentiary burden on the State to document prison conditions accurately.
\n* **Exhaustion of Remedies for Past Violations:** The judgment clarifies that if a detainee is transferred to a facility with acceptable conditions before filing an application, they must pursue domestic legal remedies (in this case, Article 105 of the Greek Introductory Law to the Civil Code) to seek redress for the *past* violation, rather than applying directly to the Court. Failure to do so will result in the complaint being declared inadmissible.
\n* **Assessment of Overcrowding:** The Court explicitly utilized reports from the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) as objective evidence to reject the Government\u2019s assertions regarding occupancy rates, demonstrating the weight the Court gives to international monitoring body findings.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

CASE OF GALINA RO\u015eCA AND OTHERS v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

The case of *Galina Ro\u015fca and Others v. the Republic of Moldova* concerns a violation of the principle of legal certainty resulting from contradictory final judicial decisions regarding inheritance rights. The applicants successfully established their right to inherit property in a first set of proceedings, which concluded with a final judgment from the Supreme Court of Justice. However, in a subsequent set of proceedings, the domestic courts reached a contradictory conclusion, effectively nullifying the findings of the first judgment and forcing the applicants to share the property with an individual previously excluded by the court. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found that this inconsistency undermined the finality of the original proceedings and the stability of the judicial system. Consequently, the Court ruled that the Republic of Moldova violated Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention (right to a fair trial) and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property). This judgment serves as a stern reminder that once an issue is finally determined by the courts, it cannot be reopened to reach a different outcome without compelling, fundamental justification.<\/p>\n

### Structure and Provisions
\nThe judgment follows the standard structure of an ECtHR decision:
\n* **Subject Matter:** Outlines the factual background, specifically the two sets of inheritance proceedings and the conflicting outcomes.
\n* **Admissibility:** The Court rejected the Government\u2019s objections regarding the applicants’ victim status and the alleged abuse of the right of petition, confirming that the applicants were directly affected by the contradictory rulings.
\n* **Merits:** The Court analyzed the breach of *res judicata*. It emphasized that while the requirements of legal certainty are not absolute, they can only be set aside for “substantial and compelling” reasons, such as correcting a fundamental miscarriage of justice.
\n* **Just Satisfaction:** The Court awarded the applicants a total of EUR 3,600 for non-pecuniary damage and EUR 1,500 for costs and expenses.<\/p>\n

Compared to previous case law, this decision reinforces the established doctrine of *res judicata* (as seen in *Brum\u0103rescu v. Romania*), clarifying that even if a second court proceeding does not formally “set aside” the first, reaching a conclusion that directly contradicts the core findings of a final judgment constitutes a violation of the Convention.<\/p>\n

### Key Provisions for Legal Use
\nFor legal practitioners and observers, the following aspects are most critical:
\n1. **The “Direct Contradiction” Standard:** The Court established that a violation occurs when new proceedings reach conclusions that directly contradict the principal findings of a previously adopted final judgment, even if the first judgment was not formally quashed.
\n2. **Protection of *Res Judicata*:** The judgment underscores that the principle of *res judicata* is essential for public confidence in the judiciary. It prevents the “relitigation” of established facts under the guise of new proceedings.
\n3. **Property Rights:** The Court confirmed that when a judicial inconsistency leads to the loss of a portion of property that was previously awarded by a final court decision, it constitutes a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, as the applicants are deprived of their “legitimate expectation” of ownership.
\n4. **Exhaustion of Arguments:** The Court noted that the arguments used by the domestic courts in the second set of proceedings had already been raised and rejected during the first set of proceedings, further highlighting the arbitrariness of the second outcome.<\/p>\n

This decision is a significant precedent for ensuring that domestic courts respect the finality of their own judgments, preventing parties from using subsequent litigation to “re-try” settled inheritance disputes.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

CASE OF IMMOBILIARE BERGAMELLA SECONDA DI CARLO MARIANI & C. S.A.S. AND OTHERS v. ITALY<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

This judgment concerns a long-standing dispute over the adequacy of compensation paid by the Italian authorities for the expropriation of land belonging to several applicant companies. The core of the issue lies in the fact that the domestic authorities imposed an expropriation-aimed restraint in 1963, but did not formally expropriate the land until 1975, followed by decades of litigation regarding the calculation of compensation. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) examined whether the compensation, which failed to account for the long period of uncertainty and inflation during the administrative delays, was proportionate. The Court concluded that the state\u2019s failure to provide adequate compensation for the loss of property and the inability to use the land during these lengthy periods violated Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Consequently, the Court awarded the applicant companies significant pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages to rectify the financial imbalance caused by the state’s inaction.<\/p>\n

### Structure and Provisions
\nThe decision is structured into three primary segments: the factual background, the Court\u2019s legal assessment, and the application of Article 41 (just satisfaction).
\n* **Admissibility:** The Court first addressed the standing of the applicants, declaring the application inadmissible regarding the first applicant company because it was not the formal addressee of the expropriation order.
\n* **Merits:** The Court analyzed the proportionality of the compensation under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. It focused on two specific periods of state-induced delay: the time between the initial restraint (1963) and physical occupation (1972), and the time between the expropriation order (1975) and the initiation of legal proceedings (1986).
\n* **Just Satisfaction:** The Court moved away from the domestic courts’ narrow interpretation of “fault” and applied its own criteria to calculate the loss of property value, inflation adjustments, and non-pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n

### Key Provisions for Practical Use
\nFor legal practitioners, this judgment is significant for the following reasons:
\n1. **Rejection of “Fault-Based” Compensation Limits:** The Court explicitly rejected the Italian Court of Cassation\u2019s view that inflation adjustment should only apply from the moment the applicant challenged the compensation in court. The ECtHR established that the state is responsible for the consequences of its own administrative inaction regardless of when the applicant formally complained.
\n2. **Compensation for “Inability to Dispose”:** The decision reinforces that the period between the imposition of an expropriation-aimed restraint and the actual taking of the land constitutes a compensable loss, even if the land was not yet physically occupied.
\n3. **Inflation Adjustment as a Requirement of Proportionality:** The judgment serves as a strong precedent that in cases of abnormally lengthy administrative or judicial proceedings, the initial compensation amount must be updated to offset inflation to satisfy the requirements of the Convention.
\n4. **Standing Requirements:** The case serves as a reminder of the strict *ratione personae* requirements; only the direct addressee of an expropriation order or a party formally recognized in the domestic proceedings has standing to claim a violation of property rights before the Court.<\/p>\n

*Note: While this case concerns Italian law, the principles regarding the state’s obligation to provide timely and inflation-adjusted compensation for expropriation are universal within the Convention’s framework and are highly relevant for any jurisdiction facing similar systemic delays in property rights protection.*<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

CASE OF KISSN\u00c9 F\u00d6VENYI AND OTHERS v. HUNGARY<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

The judgment in *Kissn\u00e9 F\u00f6venyi and Others v. Hungary* (application no. 13854\/25) addresses a systemic issue regarding the excessive duration of civil proceedings within the Hungarian judicial system. The European Court of Human Rights (the Court) examined a collective application involving 76 individuals who complained that their civil cases had remained pending for over a decade, violating the “reasonable time” requirement under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. While the Court declared the application inadmissible for two individuals who were not parties to the underlying domestic proceedings, it found a clear violation of the Convention for the remaining applicants. The Court reaffirmed its established case-law, noting that the Hungarian authorities failed to justify the protracted length of these proceedings. Consequently, the Court ordered the respondent State to pay just satisfaction to the applicants for the non-pecuniary damage sustained.<\/p>\n

The structure of the decision follows the standard format for a Committee-level judgment of the Court. It begins with the procedural history, followed by the “Facts” section, which identifies the applicants and the nature of their complaint. The “Law” section is divided into three parts: the inadmissibility of specific complaints due to a lack of standing (*ratione personae*), the merits of the Article 6 \u00a7 1 claim, and the application of Article 41 regarding just satisfaction. This decision aligns with the Court\u2019s recent trend of addressing repetitive cases concerning the length of proceedings in Hungary, specifically citing the leading cases of *Gazs\u00f3 v. Hungary* and *Csat\u00e1ri and Others v. Hungary*. There are no significant deviations from the Court\u2019s established procedural framework, as the judgment serves to reinforce existing jurisprudence regarding the State’s obligation to ensure efficient judicial processes.<\/p>\n

The most important provisions for legal practitioners and observers are as follows:<\/p>\n

* **Application of the “Reasonable Time” Criterion:** The Court reiterates that the assessment of “reasonable time” is based on the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicants, the conduct of the relevant authorities, and the stakes involved for the applicants. This serves as a reminder that the burden of proof regarding the efficiency of the judicial process rests heavily on the State.
\n* **Admissibility Standards:** The decision highlights the strict requirement of *ratione personae* standing; individuals who were not formal parties to the domestic proceedings cannot claim a violation of their rights under Article 6 \u00a7 1, leading to the immediate rejection of their claims.
\n* **Repetitive Nature of Violations:** By explicitly referencing *Gazs\u00f3* and *Csat\u00e1ri*, the Court signals that the excessive length of civil proceedings in Hungary remains a recurring problem. This is a critical point for legal professionals, as it suggests that the Court will continue to rule against the State in similar cases where domestic remedies have failed to expedite proceedings.
\n* **Just Satisfaction:** The Court\u2019s decision to award a specific sum (200 EUR per applicant) underscores the financial consequences for the State when it fails to provide a timely trial, setting a predictable precedent for future claims of a similar nature.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

CASE OF KOUKOURAS AND OTHERS v. GREECE<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

The judgment in *Koukouras and Others v. Greece* (application no. 7936\/18) addresses systemic issues regarding detention conditions within the Greek prison system, specifically at Korydallos Prison. The Court examined complaints from three applicants who alleged that their incarceration involved severe overcrowding, falling below the minimum standards of personal space required by the European Convention on Human Rights. While one applicant was removed from the proceedings due to a lack of communication with the Court, the remaining two successfully demonstrated that their living conditions violated Article 3 of the Convention. The Court relied on established jurisprudence, including the *Mur\u0161i\u0107 v. Croatia* standard, to confirm that the lack of personal space\u2014less than 3 square meters\u2014constitutes degrading treatment. Consequently, the Court awarded non-pecuniary damages and legal costs to the successful applicants, reinforcing the state’s obligation to provide humane detention environments.<\/p>\n

The decision is structured into four primary sections: the procedural history, the facts of the case, the legal assessment, and the final award under Article 41. The judgment begins by addressing the procedural status of the applicants, specifically the decision to strike out the application of Mr. Kalfakakos due to his failure to provide requested information. The legal analysis follows a standard format: it first addresses the Article 3 violation regarding prison conditions, then moves to the Article 13 complaint (which the Court deemed unnecessary to examine separately), and finally addresses the Article 5 complaint, which was declared inadmissible. Compared to previous rulings on Korydallos Prison, this judgment maintains consistency with the Court\u2019s established line of case-law, reaffirming that persistent overcrowding in this specific facility remains a recurring breach of the Convention.<\/p>\n

The most critical provisions for legal practitioners and observers are as follows:<\/p>\n

* **The “3 Square Meter” Rule:** The Court reaffirmed that providing less than 3 square meters of personal space per detainee creates a strong presumption of a violation of Article 3. The Court explicitly rejected the Government\u2019s arguments by calculating the “inhabitable” space, noting that even under the state’s own figures, the space provided was insufficient.
\n* **Reliance on CPT Reports:** The judgment highlights the importance of objective evidence, specifically citing reports from the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) and Ministry of Justice statistics to corroborate the applicants’ claims of systemic overcrowding.
\n* **Article 13 Judicial Economy:** The Court applied the principle of judicial economy, ruling that once a violation of Article 3 is found, it is not strictly necessary to examine a separate complaint under Article 13 (the right to an effective remedy) if the core issue has been addressed.
\n* **Damages and Costs:** The Court awarded specific sums for non-pecuniary damage based on the duration of the detention in inadequate conditions, alongside a joint award for legal costs, providing a clear benchmark for future litigation against the Greek state regarding this facility.<\/p>\n

This decision serves as a reminder that the Greek authorities remain under the Court’s scrutiny regarding the material conditions at Korydallos, and it provides a clear roadmap for how the Court assesses evidence in overcrowding cases.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

CASE OF KRAVCHENKO AND SLABETSKYY v. UKRAINE<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

The judgment in *Kravchenko and Slabetskyy v. Ukraine* addresses systemic issues regarding the right to liberty and security under Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) examined two joined applications concerning the excessive length of pre-trial detention and the failure of domestic courts to provide relevant and sufficient justifications for such measures. The Court concluded that the Ukrainian authorities failed to demonstrate “special diligence” in the proceedings and relied on repetitive, fragile reasoning that did not adequately justify the continued deprivation of liberty. By failing to consider alternative measures of restraint, the domestic courts breached the applicants’ rights. Consequently, the Court found a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 3 and awarded the applicants compensation for non-pecuniary damage and legal costs.<\/p>\n

The structure of the decision follows the standard format for a Committee-level judgment: it begins with the joinder of the applications, moves to the assessment of the merits under Article 5 \u00a7 3, and concludes with the application of Article 41 regarding just satisfaction. The decision does not introduce new legal standards but reinforces the established jurisprudence set out in landmark cases such as *Kharchenko v. Ukraine* and *Buzadji v. the Republic of Moldova*. It maintains the Court\u2019s consistent position that the persistence of a “reasonable suspicion” is a necessary but insufficient condition for prolonged detention. The judgment serves as a reiteration of the requirement for national authorities to provide concrete, case-specific justifications for detention rather than relying on standard, repetitive formulas.<\/p>\n

The most important provisions for legal practitioners and observers are:<\/p>\n

1. **The “Relevant and Sufficient” Standard:** The Court reaffirms that judicial authorities must provide specific, non-repetitive reasons for detention from the very first hearing. The use of generic or “fragile” reasoning, as noted in the case of Mr. Slabetskyy, is insufficient to meet the Convention\u2019s requirements.
\n2. **The Duty of “Special Diligence”:** The Court emphasizes that the State must act with particular speed and diligence in cases involving pre-trial detention. Any lack of progress in the proceedings, as seen in Mr. Kravchenko\u2019s case, renders the continued detention excessive.
\n3. **Mandatory Consideration of Alternatives:** The judgment underscores that authorities are legally obligated to actively consider alternative, less restrictive measures to ensure a defendant\u2019s appearance at trial. A failure to examine these alternatives, even when the initial detention might have been justified, constitutes a violation.
\n4. **Systemic Implications:** By citing *Kharchenko*, *Ignatov*, and *Korban*, the Court signals that these violations remain a recurring issue in the Ukrainian judicial system, reinforcing the need for domestic courts to align their practice with the “special diligence” and “reasoning” standards established by the ECtHR.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

CASE OF MELNYK v. UKRAINE<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

The case of *Melnyk v. Ukraine* (application no. 25753\/18) concerns the ill-treatment of a protestor by law enforcement officers during the “Euromaidan” events on February 18, 2014. The applicant, Mr. Mark Yuriyovych Melnyk, suffered bodily injuries during police operations and subsequently alleged that the state failed to conduct an effective investigation into these events. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) examined the case in the context of the established jurisprudence regarding the Maidan protests. The Court concluded that the applicant was subjected to ill-treatment and that his right to peaceful assembly was disproportionately interfered with. Furthermore, the Court found that the domestic investigation into the applicant\u2019s complaints remained ineffective. Consequently, the Court ruled that there were violations of both the substantive and procedural limbs of Article 3, as well as a violation of Article 11 of the Convention.<\/p>\n

The structure of the decision follows the standard format for a Committee-level judgment of the ECtHR. It begins with the admissibility phase, where the Court rejects the Government\u2019s argument that the application was premature due to ongoing domestic investigations, citing established precedents such as *Shmorgunov and Others v. Ukraine*. The merits section relies heavily on the principles established in *Shmorgunov*, applying them to the specific facts of Mr. Melnyk\u2019s case. Unlike many other judgments, this decision does not award financial compensation under Article 41, as the applicant did not submit a claim for just satisfaction. The judgment maintains consistency with previous rulings on Maidan-related violence, reinforcing the Court\u2019s stance on the systemic nature of these violations.<\/p>\n

The most important provisions of this decision for legal practitioners and observers include:<\/p>\n

1. **Rejection of the “Prematurity” Argument:** The Court explicitly reaffirmed that the ongoing nature of domestic investigations into Maidan-related crimes does not preclude the Court from examining the merits of a complaint, effectively dismissing the Government’s attempt to delay proceedings based on the duration of domestic inquiries.
\n2. **Substantive and Procedural Article 3 Violations:** The judgment confirms that the state bears responsibility not only for the physical ill-treatment of protestors (substantive limb) but also for the failure to conduct a prompt, thorough, and independent investigation into such acts (procedural limb).
\n3. **Article 11 Protection:** The Court reiterated that the use of force against peaceful protestors constitutes a disproportionate interference with the right to freedom of assembly, reinforcing the protection of democratic participation.
\n4. **Reliance on Established Precedent:** By aligning this case with the *Shmorgunov* and *Krasnyanchuk and Kovalyov* rulings, the Court signals that the legal assessment of the Maidan events is settled, and individual cases will be decided based on the established pattern of state failure to protect protestors and investigate abuses.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

CASE OF MESHCHERYAKOV v. UKRAINE<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

This judgment, *Meshcheryakov v. Ukraine* (Application no. 27003\/16), concerns the systemic failures of the Ukrainian judicial and investigative systems regarding the duration of criminal proceedings and the lack of transparency in covert surveillance. The applicant, who was subject to criminal investigations for nearly a decade, challenged the excessive length of these proceedings and the state’s inability to provide access to judicial decisions authorizing the interception of his communications. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found that the nearly ten-year duration of the case, characterized by periods of unexplained inactivity and multiple remittals, violated the “reasonable time” requirement of Article 6. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the destruction of judicial wiretapping authorizations prevented any meaningful review of whether the surveillance was lawful or necessary, constituting a violation of Article 8. While the applicant also challenged restrictions on his freedom of movement, the Court found these measures proportionate given the gravity of the charges and the specific circumstances of the case. This decision serves as a significant precedent regarding the state’s obligation to maintain records of surveillance and the right to a timely trial. ****: This case highlights ongoing challenges within the Ukrainian legal system regarding the preservation of judicial records and the procedural rights of individuals under long-term criminal investigation.<\/p>\n

### Structure and Provisions
\nThe judgment is structured into four primary sections: the factual background, the Court\u2019s assessment of the alleged violations, the application of Article 41 (just satisfaction), and the final operative provisions.
\n* **Article 6 (Length of Proceedings):** The Court assessed the “reasonableness” of the ten-year investigation, focusing on case complexity, the applicant’s conduct, and the authorities’ diligence.
\n* **Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 (Freedom of Movement):** The Court evaluated the proportionality of travel restrictions imposed during the proceedings.
\n* **Article 8 (Right to Privacy\/Surveillance):** The Court examined the state’s failure to provide access to wiretapping authorizations, which had been destroyed.
\n* **Article 13 (Effective Remedy):** The Court declared this complaint unnecessary to examine separately, as it had already addressed the core issues under Articles 6 and 8.<\/p>\n

Compared to previous jurisprudence, this decision reinforces the Court’s strict stance on the “destruction of evidence” defense. The Court explicitly rejected the government’s justification for destroying surveillance records\u2014even when cited as a security measure during the ongoing war\u2014because the state failed to provide any compelling reason for denying access to those documents *prior* to their destruction in 2018.<\/p>\n

### Key Provisions for Legal Practice
\nFor practitioners, the most critical aspects of this judgment are:
\n1. **The “Access to Surveillance” Standard:** The Court established that surveillance subjects have a default right to access authorization documents. The destruction of these documents by the state, regardless of the reason, creates a presumption that the surveillance lacked the “proper and detailed judicial scrutiny” required by the Convention. This effectively shifts the burden of proof onto the state to demonstrate that the surveillance was lawful.
\n2. **Reasonable Time Assessment:** The Court reaffirmed that even in complex cases involving organized crime, “lengthy periods of unexplained inactivity” are incompatible with Article 6. The ruling serves as a reminder that the state cannot use the complexity of a case as a blanket excuse for administrative delays or repeated remittals to the prosecution.
\n3. **Proportionality of Travel Bans:** The Court clarified that while travel restrictions are a standard part of criminal procedure, they must not be applied automatically. The Court\u2019s finding that the restrictions were proportionate in this case\u2014due to the nature of the charges and the specific destination (the Russian Federation)\u2014provides a clear boundary for when such restrictions are considered “necessary in a democratic society.”<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

CASE OF MOLLA MOLLA BLEDAR AND OTHERS v. GREECE<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

The judgment in *Molla Molla Bledar and Others v. Greece* (application no. 868\/16), delivered on 24 September 2026, addresses systemic issues regarding detention conditions in the Amfissa prison. The Court examined complaints from multiple applicants concerning severe overcrowding and inadequate living conditions, which they argued violated Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. While some parts of the application were struck out due to the death of an applicant or lack of contact, and others were rejected for failure to exhaust domestic remedies, the Court found a clear violation of Article 3 for the remaining applicants. The ruling underscores the state’s responsibility to provide adequate personal living space and hygienic conditions for detainees. Ultimately, the Court awarded non-pecuniary damages to the successful applicants, reflecting the severity of the conditions they endured.<\/p>\n

### Structure and Provisions
\nThe decision is structured into four primary sections:
\n1. **Procedural History:** Outlines the filing of the application and the subsequent communication with the Greek Government.
\n2. **Striking Out of Complaints:** The Court removed two applicants from the list due to the death of one and the failure of the other to maintain contact with legal counsel.
\n3. **Admissibility and Merits (Article 3):** The Court bifurcated the applicants. It rejected the claims of those who had been released or transferred prior to their application, ruling they failed to exhaust domestic remedies under the Greek Civil Code. For the remaining applicants, the Court analyzed the evidence of overcrowding, finding that the Government failed to provide sufficient data to refute the claims of inadequate living space.
\n4. **Just Satisfaction (Article 41):** The Court awarded specific sums for non-pecuniary damages based on the duration and severity of the detention conditions, while dismissing claims for costs and expenses due to a lack of supporting documentation.<\/p>\n

Compared to previous jurisprudence, this decision reinforces the strict evidentiary burden placed on governments to prove that prison conditions meet the minimum standards of personal space (the 3 sq. m rule established in *Mur\u0161i\u0107 v. Croatia*).<\/p>\n

### Key Provisions for Legal Use
\n* **Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies:** The judgment serves as a reminder that for past violations (where the applicant is no longer in the facility), the Court requires the use of specific domestic legal avenues\u2014in this case, Article 105 of the Introductory Law to the Greek Civil Code\u2014before the application can be considered admissible.
\n* **Burden of Proof regarding Overcrowding:** The Court established that where a government fails to provide detailed, verifiable records of occupancy per dormitory, it cannot effectively rebut an applicant\u2019s credible allegations of overcrowding. The absence of such data is interpreted against the State.
\n* **Article 3 Standards:** The decision reaffirms that severe overcrowding, when combined with poor hygiene and lack of adequate facilities, constitutes degrading treatment. It confirms that the “continuing situation” doctrine does not apply if an applicant fails to demonstrate that conditions in a new facility are identical to the ones previously complained about.
\n* **Procedural Compliance:** The Court strictly enforced the requirement for documentation regarding legal representation and the status of applicants, leading to the dismissal of claims where such proof was absent.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

CASE OF OLAG AND OTHERS v. UKRAINE<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

The judgment in *Olag and Others v. Ukraine* (Applications nos. 7509\/22 and 6 others), delivered on 24 September 2026, concerns a systemic issue regarding the conditions of detention within the Ukrainian penitentiary system. The European Court of Human Rights (the Court) examined seven joined applications from individuals held in various pre-trial detention facilities, who complained of severe overcrowding, poor hygiene, and a lack of effective domestic remedies to address these grievances. The Court reaffirmed its established case-law, noting that the Government failed to provide evidence of adequate living standards or to demonstrate that the applicants had access to a functional compensatory mechanism. Consequently, the Court found violations of Articles 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment) and 13 (right to an effective remedy) of the Convention. This ruling serves as a stern reminder of the state\u2019s obligation to ensure that detention conditions meet the minimum standards of human dignity. ****: As this judgment directly addresses the systemic failure of the Ukrainian state to provide adequate detention conditions and effective legal remedies for its citizens, it has significant implications for the ongoing reform of the Ukrainian penitentiary and judicial systems.<\/p>\n

### Structure and Main Provisions
\nThe decision follows the standard structure of a Committee-level judgment:
\n1. **Procedural History and Joinder:** The Court joined the seven applications due to their identical subject matter. It also addressed the *locus standi* of a deceased applicant\u2019s sister, allowing her to pursue the claim, which is a standard procedural protection for the rights of the deceased.
\n2. **Admissibility and Merits:** The Court rejected the Government\u2019s objection regarding the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, clarifying that a compensatory remedy is only considered “effective” if the poor conditions have already ceased.
\n3. **Legal Findings:** The Court applied the principles from *Mur\u0161i\u0107 v. Croatia* and *Sukachov v. Ukraine*, emphasizing that overcrowding and poor material conditions constitute degrading treatment.
\n4. **Article 41 (Just Satisfaction):** The Court awarded specific sums for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages, as well as costs and expenses, which are detailed in the appended table for each applicant.<\/p>\n

Compared to previous versions of such judgments, this decision maintains the Court\u2019s strict evidentiary requirement: the Government must provide specific documentation (cell floor plans, inmate counts, and maintenance records) to rebut a *prima facie* case of ill-treatment.<\/p>\n

### Key Provisions for Legal Use
\nFor practitioners and legal observers, the following points are the most critical:
\n* **The “Effective Remedy” Threshold:** The judgment reinforces that in Ukraine, there is currently no effective domestic remedy for poor detention conditions. This allows applicants to bypass domestic civil courts if the detention conditions are ongoing, as the Court deems such domestic litigation ineffective in the absence of a specific compensatory mechanism.
\n* **Evidentiary Burden:** The Court explicitly lists the types of evidence the Government must produce to defend against Article 3 claims, including cell floor plans, temperature and luminosity measurements, and records of pest control. Failure to produce this primary evidence typically results in a finding against the State.
\n* **Systemic Violations:** Beyond the conditions of detention, several applicants successfully invoked “well-established case-law” regarding the excessive length of pre-trial detention (Article 5 \u00a7 3) and the excessive length of criminal proceedings (Article 6 \u00a7 1). This confirms that the Court continues to view these issues as recurring systemic problems in the Ukrainian legal landscape.
\n* **Calculation of Damages:** The appended table provides a clear benchmark for the financial compensation awarded for various durations and severities of detention, which can be used as a reference for future claims.<\/p>\n

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CASE OF ORLANDO AND OTHERS v. ITALY<\/strong><\/h3>\n

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This judgment, *Orlando and Others v. Italy* (2026), addresses the systemic issue of Italian administrative courts refusing to reimburse legal costs to successful litigants without providing adequate reasoning. The Court examined three joined applications where individuals and a company successfully challenged public authorities regarding access to documents, only to be denied full recovery of their legal expenses. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled that such blanket refusals, or the awarding of merely symbolic sums, constitute an unjustified restriction on the right of access to a court under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. The Court emphasized that the State cannot shift the financial burden of its own administrative errors onto the citizens who successfully challenge them. Consequently, the Court found a violation of the Convention, affirming that while courts have discretion in cost allocation, they must provide clear, proportional, and reasoned justifications for departing from the “loser pays” principle.<\/p>\n

### Structure and Provisions
\nThe decision follows the standard structure of a Committee-level judgment:
\n* **Subject Matter:** Outlines the procedural history of the three applicants, noting that in all cases, the Consiglio di Stato either denied reimbursement or awarded nominal amounts despite the applicants’ success in obtaining access to public documents.
\n* **Legal Assessment:** The Court reaffirms the principle that the risk of a State\u2019s administrative error must be borne by the State. It clarifies that while administrative courts have a margin of appreciation, this is not absolute.
\n* **Proportionality Test:** The Court distinguishes between the “simplicity” of a case (which might justify a reduced fee) and the total denial of costs (which is deemed a disproportionate barrier to justice).
\n* **Changes\/Clarifications:** Unlike previous jurisprudence that may have granted broader deference to domestic courts on cost-shifting, this decision reinforces the strict requirement that domestic courts must explicitly state their reasons for departing from the “loser pays” principle, as mandated by Italian law (Articles 91 and 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure).<\/p>\n

### Key Provisions for Legal Practice
\nFor practitioners and observers, the following points are critical:
\n1. **The “Loser Pays” Principle:** The Court reinforces that this is the default standard. Any departure from it requires explicit, case-specific justification. Vague references to “circumstances of the case” or “justified reasons” are insufficient to satisfy Article 6 \u00a7 1.
\n2. **Role of Counsel:** The Court explicitly rejected the Government\u2019s argument that applicants could have avoided costs by representing themselves. It reaffirmed the “special role of lawyers in the administration of justice,” meaning the State cannot penalize a citizen for choosing professional legal representation.
\n3. **Proportionality of Awards:** While the Court accepts that “simplified” proceedings may warrant lower legal fees, it mandates that the amount awarded must still be reasonable. A “symbolic” award that effectively forces a successful party to bear their own costs is considered a violation.
\n4. **State Responsibility:** The judgment serves as a strong precedent that individuals should not be financially penalized for successfully correcting State administrative failures. This is a vital tool for human rights lawyers litigating against public authorities.<\/p>\n

***<\/p>\n

*Note: This decision is highly relevant for legal systems where administrative courts frequently use “compensation of costs” (spese compensate) to avoid ordering the State to pay for the legal fees of successful plaintiffs.*<\/p>\n

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CASE OF TANRIVERD\u0130 v. T\u00dcRK\u0130YE<\/strong><\/h3>\n

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The judgment in *Tanr\u0131verdi v. T\u00fcrkiye* (Application no. 16088\/17) concerns the excessive duration of pre-trial detention and the lack of sufficient justification provided by domestic courts for such measures. Four of the six applicants argued that their detention periods, spanning several years, were not supported by relevant and sufficient reasons as required by Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) reaffirmed its established case-law, finding that the reasoning provided by the Turkish authorities was repetitive and failed to justify the continued deprivation of liberty. Consequently, the Court ruled in favor of the applicants regarding the violation of their rights under Article 5 \u00a7 3. However, the Court rejected the applicants’ additional claim regarding the length of criminal proceedings under Article 6 \u00a7 1, noting that they had already received adequate redress and compensation from the Turkish Constitutional Court.<\/p>\n

### Structure and Provisions
\nThe decision follows the standard structure of a Committee-level judgment, consisting of the procedural history, the facts of the case, the legal assessment, and the final ruling on just satisfaction.
\n* **Article 5 \u00a7 3 (Pre-trial detention):** The Court applied the principles established in landmark cases such as *Kud\u0142a v. Poland* and *McKay v. the United Kingdom*. It specifically referenced its own previous findings in *Cahit Demirel*, *Galip Do\u011fru*, and *Tercan v. Turkey* to highlight the systemic issue of “fragility and repetitiveness” in the reasoning used by Turkish courts to justify detention.
\n* **Article 6 \u00a7 1 (Length of proceedings):** The Court utilized the “victim status” test under Articles 34 and 35. Because the Turkish Constitutional Court had already acknowledged the violation and provided compensation, the applicants were no longer considered victims under the Convention for this specific complaint, leading to its inadmissibility.
\n* **Changes:** This judgment does not introduce new legal standards but serves as a reaffirmation of the Court\u2019s consistent position on the necessity for specific, individualized reasoning in detention orders, reinforcing the precedent set by the cases cited in paragraph 9.<\/p>\n

### Key Provisions for Practical Use
\nFor legal practitioners, the most significant aspects of this decision are:
\n1. **The “Fragility and Repetitiveness” Standard:** The Court explicitly identified that using standardized, repetitive language to justify the extension of detention\u2014without addressing the specific circumstances of the individual\u2014constitutes a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 3. This serves as a vital reference point for challenging detention orders that rely on boilerplate justifications.
\n2. **Domestic Redress and Victim Status:** The decision provides a clear example of how the ECHR handles complaints where domestic remedies (specifically the Turkish Constitutional Court) have already functioned effectively. It confirms that if a national court acknowledges a breach and provides “appropriate redress” (compensation), the ECHR will declare the application inadmissible, thereby encouraging the exhaustion of domestic remedies.
\n3. **Just Satisfaction:** The Court awarded \u20ac5,000 to each of the four successful applicants for non-pecuniary damage, along with a joint award for legal costs, providing a benchmark for similar cases involving prolonged pre-trial detention.<\/p>\n

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CASE OF YAKUBOV AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA<\/strong><\/h3>\n

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This judgment, *Yakubov and Others v. Russia*, concerns a series of applications brought by individuals who were parties to judicial proceedings in Crimea following the Russian occupation of the peninsula. The applicants challenged the legitimacy of the courts operating in Crimea under the Russian legal framework, arguing that these bodies could not be considered tribunals \u201cestablished by law\u201d as required by Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. The European Court of Human Rights (the Court) joined these applications due to their identical subject matter and examined them under the established precedent regarding the Russian Federation’s effective control over Crimea. The Court ultimately ruled that the judicial system imposed by Russia in Crimea after March 2014 lacked the necessary legal basis under the Convention. Consequently, the Court found a violation of the right to a fair trial for all applicants, as their cases were determined by tribunals that failed to meet the criteria of being \u201cestablished by law.\u201d ****: This decision reaffirms the Court\u2019s stance on the illegality of the Russian judicial administration in occupied Ukrainian territories and provides a clear legal remedy for those affected by these proceedings.<\/p>\n

### Structure and Provisions
\nThe judgment is structured as a standard Committee-level decision, consisting of the following core sections:
\n* **Procedural and Jurisdictional Framework:** The Court confirms its jurisdiction over the applications, noting that the events occurred before Russia\u2019s cessation as a party to the Convention on 16 September 2022. It reaffirms the principle of extraterritorial jurisdiction based on the \u201ceffective control\u201d exercised by Russia over Crimea since 27 February 2014.
\n* **Admissibility and Locus Standi:** The Court addresses procedural nuances, such as the right of heirs to continue proceedings (as in the case of Mr. Ryabokon) and the rejection of claims from individuals who were not direct parties to the underlying domestic proceedings (the *locus standi* of Mr. Tarasov).
\n* **Merits (Article 6 \u00a7 1):** The Court relies heavily on the Grand Chamber\u2019s findings in *Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea)*. It concludes that the extension of Russian law to Crimea was contrary to international humanitarian law and that, therefore, the courts operating under that framework cannot be considered \u201cestablished by law.\u201d
\n* **Just Satisfaction:** The Court awards specific sums for non-pecuniary damages and legal costs, as detailed in the appended table, to be paid by the Russian Federation.<\/p>\n

### Key Provisions for Legal Use
\nFor legal practitioners and observers, the following aspects of the decision are most significant:
\n1. **Non-Recognition of Judicial Acts:** The judgment serves as a definitive confirmation that any judicial decision rendered by a court operating under Russian law in Crimea after March 2014 is inherently flawed under the Convention because the tribunal itself was not \u201cestablished by law.\u201d
\n2. **Reliance on *Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea)*:** The Court explicitly links its reasoning to the Grand Chamber\u2019s 2024 judgment, reinforcing a consistent, high-level legal position that the entire judicial apparatus installed by the occupying power is illegitimate.
\n3. **Jurisdictional Continuity:** The decision clarifies that the Court retains the competence to adjudicate violations that occurred during the period of occupation, even after Russia\u2019s formal departure from the Council of Europe, provided the events took place before the cut-off date of 16 September 2022.
\n4. **Procedural Precedent:** The judgment provides a template for how the Court handles the death of applicants in such cases and clarifies the strict interpretation of \u201cvictim status,\u201d ensuring that only those directly harmed by the lack of a fair trial can seek redress.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

CASE OF A.M. AND OTHERS v. GREECE This judgment, *A.M. and Others v. Greece* (24 September 2026), concerns the systemic failure of the Greek state to provide adequate reception and living conditions for asylum-seekers, as well as failures to provide necessary medical care to vulnerable individuals. The Court joined four separate applications due to their…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_bbp_topic_count":0,"_bbp_reply_count":0,"_bbp_total_topic_count":0,"_bbp_total_reply_count":0,"_bbp_voice_count":0,"_bbp_anonymous_reply_count":0,"_bbp_topic_count_hidden":0,"_bbp_reply_count_hidden":0,"_bbp_total_topic_count_hidden":0,"_bbp_total_reply_count_hidden":0,"_bbp_forum_subforum_count":0,"pmpro_default_level":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[129],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-19915","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-echr-decisions","pmpro-has-access"],"acf":{"patreon-level":0},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/19915","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=19915"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/19915\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=19915"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=19915"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=19915"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}