{"id":19855,"date":"2026-09-23T10:25:45","date_gmt":"2026-09-23T07:25:45","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/2026\/09\/review-of-echr-decisions-for-23-09-2026\/"},"modified":"2026-09-23T10:25:45","modified_gmt":"2026-09-23T07:25:45","slug":"review-of-echr-decisions-for-23-09-2026","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/2026\/09\/review-of-echr-decisions-for-23-09-2026\/","title":{"rendered":"Review of ECHR decisions for 23\/09\/2026"},"content":{"rendered":"

<\/p>\n

CASE OF STANTON AND BOWEN v. THE UNITED KINGDOM<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

This judgment in *Stanton and Bowen v. the United Kingdom* addresses the critical intersection between judicial release directions and the practical, resource-dependent implementation of those decisions by the executive. The applicants, both serving indeterminate sentences, challenged their continued detention for 118 and 69 days, respectively, following Parole Board decisions that authorized their release subject to residence at specific “Approved Premises.” The Court examined whether this administrative delay, caused by a lack of immediate bed space, rendered their detention arbitrary or broke the causal link between their original conviction and their ongoing deprivation of liberty. Ultimately, the Court ruled that the detention remained lawful and consistent with the Convention, provided the delay was reasonable and the conditions were integral to the risk management plan. The judgment clarifies that while administrative delays cannot be used to circumvent judicial control, a “friction” between available facilities and the need for safe release is permissible within the bounds of reasonableness.<\/p>\n

### Structure and Provisions
\nThe decision is structured as a standard Chamber judgment, moving from the factual background of the two applicants to the domestic legal framework, the parties’ submissions, and the Court\u2019s final assessment. <\/p>\n

* **Key Provisions:** The Court focuses on Article 5 \u00a7 1 (the right to liberty) and Article 5 \u00a7 4 (the right to judicial review of detention).
\n* **Changes\/Context:** The judgment highlights the evolution of the domestic legal framework, specifically noting the 2022 amendment to the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 (Section 32ZB). This amendment explicitly requires the Secretary of State to give effect to Parole Board directions “as soon as is reasonably practicable,” acknowledging the need to arrange licence conditions. The Court views this as a clarification of existing practice rather than a departure from it, reinforcing that the system was already operating under these principles.<\/p>\n

### Important Provisions for Legal Application
\nFor practitioners and legal observers, the following points are the most significant:<\/p>\n

1. **The “Integral Condition” Doctrine:** The Court held that when the Parole Board makes release contingent upon specific conditions (like residence at an Approved Premises) to ensure public safety, those conditions are “part and parcel” of the release direction. Therefore, detention until those conditions are met does not break the causal link to the original conviction.
\n2. **Reasonableness of Administrative Delay:** The Court established that while “mere administrative formalities” cannot justify significant delays, delays resulting from the need to secure specific, risk-mitigating facilities are acceptable if they are reasonable. The Court will assess this based on the specific facts, including whether the delay was foreseeable and whether the authorities made genuine efforts to find earlier availability.
\n3. **Absence of Structural Failure:** A pivotal element of the Court\u2019s reasoning was the finding that there was no “systemic failure” or “structural lack of capacity” in the UK\u2019s provision of Approved Premises. The Court distinguishes this case from previous rulings where structural shortages led to arbitrary detention, noting that in this instance, the delays were localized and not indicative of a broken system.
\n4. **Judicial Oversight:** The Court rejected the argument that the Parole Board lacked sufficient control. Because the Board was fully aware of the anticipated wait times when it issued its directions, it effectively exercised its judicial function by tailoring the release to the reality of the available risk-management infrastructure.<\/p>\n

This judgment serves as a robust defense of the principle that public safety and the practical requirements of rehabilitation can, in specific, non-arbitrary circumstances, justify a period of post-decision detention.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

CASE OF \u0110OR\u0110EVI\u0106 AND MILOSAVLJEVI\u0106 v. SERBIA<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

The case of *\u0110or\u0111evi\u0107 and Milosavljevi\u0107 v. Serbia* concerns a violation of the right to a fair trial due to inconsistent judicial practice regarding salary supplements for police officers. The applicants, two Serbian police officers, sought compensation for work during unsociable hours, but their claims were dismissed by domestic courts despite a Supreme Court legal opinion that had been issued to harmonize such disputes. While the Supreme Court had established that police officers should be compared to “authorised officers” for salary coefficient purposes, the lower courts ignored this guidance in the applicants’ cases. The Constitutional Court of Serbia subsequently failed to address these inconsistencies, effectively denying the applicants a coherent legal outcome. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found that this judicial failure created legal uncertainty and violated Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. Consequently, the Court ruled that the state failed to ensure the consistency of its own judicial system, leading to a finding of a violation.<\/p>\n

The structure of the judgment follows the standard ECtHR format: it begins with the background of the systemic issue of conflicting case-law in Serbia, details the specific procedural history of the two applicants, and addresses the Government\u2019s objections regarding the exhaustion of domestic remedies. The Court\u2019s assessment focuses on the application of Article 6 \u00a7 1, specifically the principle of legal certainty. A key change or development compared to the earlier *\u0160abanovi\u0107 and Others v. Serbia* judgment is that, in the present case, the domestic courts ruled against the applicants *after* the Supreme Court had already issued its harmonizing legal opinion. This distinguishes the applicants\u2019 situation from those in previous cases where the lack of guidance was the primary issue; here, the issue was the failure of the judiciary to apply existing, binding guidance.<\/p>\n

The most important provisions for legal practitioners and observers are as follows:<\/p>\n

* **The Principle of Legal Certainty:** The Court reaffirms that it is the responsibility of Contracting States to organize their legal systems to avoid discordant judgments. The failure of a national supreme court\u2019s harmonizing opinion to be implemented by lower courts constitutes a breach of Article 6 \u00a7 1.
\n* **Rejection of Excessive Formalism:** The Court held that when a Constitutional Court does not reject an appeal on the grounds of failure to exhaust specific procedural remedies (like an appeal on points of law), it is “excessively formalistic” for the Government to later raise that failure as an objection before the ECtHR.
\n* **Duty of Constitutional Courts:** The judgment underscores that a Constitutional Court must engage with the substance of a complaint regarding inconsistent case-law, especially when the applicant provides evidence that their case was decided contrary to established Supreme Court guidance.
\n* **Assessment of Evidence:** The Court clarified that if an applicant provides sufficient evidence of inconsistent case-law, the national court cannot simply dismiss the claim in an “automatic manner” without addressing the specific legal context of the case.<\/p>\n

This judgment serves as a critical reminder that the existence of a harmonizing legal opinion is insufficient if the domestic judiciary fails to apply it consistently in practice, and that constitutional review must be substantive rather than merely procedural.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

CASE OF MARINOV v. BULGARIA<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

The judgment in *Marinov v. Bulgaria* (application no. 45501\/22) addresses the legal standards for short-term police detention and the subsequent right to compensation. The applicant was detained for less than two hours after a police encounter that domestic courts later ruled was based on “police provocation.” While the applicant sought compensation for this unlawful detention, domestic courts denied his claims, citing the short duration of the incident and a lack of proven harm. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) found that the initial detention violated Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention because it lacked a lawful basis. However, the Court ultimately ruled that the applicant\u2019s right to an enforceable claim for compensation under Article 5 \u00a7 5 was satisfied by the domestic proceedings, even though no monetary award was granted. Consequently, the Court held that the finding of a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 served as sufficient just satisfaction.<\/p>\n

### Structure and Provisions
\nThe decision follows the standard structure of a Committee-level judgment:
\n1. **Admissibility:** The Court addressed the Government\u2019s objections regarding “victim status” and “abuse of the right of petition,” ultimately rejecting them because the applicant\u2019s previous compensation for separate criminal charges did not cover the specific unlawful police detention.
\n2. **Merits (Article 5 \u00a7 1):** The Court reaffirmed that any detention must strictly follow a “procedure prescribed by law.” Since domestic courts had already declared the detention unlawful, the ECHR found a violation of the Convention.
\n3. **Merits (Article 5 \u00a7 5):** The Court examined whether the domestic courts provided an effective remedy for the unlawful detention. It distinguished this case from previous rulings by noting that the Supreme Administrative Court had moved away from an overly formalistic approach, instead using its discretion to deny compensation based on the specific facts and the brevity of the detention.
\n4. **Just Satisfaction (Article 41):** The Court exercised its discretion to award no monetary compensation, ruling that the judgment itself acts as sufficient redress.<\/p>\n

### Key Provisions for Legal Practice
\n* **Presumption of Suffering:** The Court reiterated that unlawful detention generally creates a presumption of mental suffering, and requiring strict proof of such harm is often “excessively formalistic.”
\n* **Discretion in Compensation:** The judgment clarifies that while Article 5 \u00a7 5 guarantees an *enforceable right* to seek compensation, it does not mandate a specific monetary award in every instance. If a national court provides a reasoned decision\u2014even if it denies compensation based on the minor nature of the incident\u2014it may satisfy the requirements of the Convention.
\n* **Victim Status:** The Court clarified that compensation received for separate, parallel proceedings (such as unjustified criminal charges) does not automatically strip an applicant of “victim status” regarding a distinct, unlawful administrative detention.
\n* **Costs and Expenses:** The ruling serves as a reminder that claims for legal costs before the ECHR will be dismissed if the applicant fails to provide evidence that such costs were actually incurred or that a legal liability to pay them exists.<\/p>\n

This decision is a significant reminder that while the ECHR protects against unlawful state interference, the “just satisfaction” provided may be limited to the moral weight of the judgment itself when the underlying violation is deemed minor in duration and impact.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

CASE OF MELLIOU v. GREECE<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

The case of *Melliou v. Greece* (application no. 15807\/19) centers on the degrading treatment of a photojournalist who was subjected to a full strip-search by police following a non-arrest “transfer for identification purposes.” The applicant was taken to the Attica General Police Directorate after noting down police license plate numbers, where she was subsequently stripped and searched despite not being charged with any crime. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) scrutinized whether this intrusive measure was strictly necessary, particularly given the lack of less invasive alternatives like body scanners. The Court ultimately concluded that the search served no established security purpose and was not justified by the applicant\u2019s conduct. Consequently, the Court ruled that the incident constituted a violation of Article 3 of the Convention, which prohibits degrading treatment. This judgment reinforces the principle that law enforcement must respect human dignity even when dealing with individuals who are not formally detained.<\/p>\n

**Structure and Provisions**
\nThe judgment follows the standard structure of an ECtHR ruling: it outlines the facts, the procedural history, the parties’ arguments, and the Court\u2019s legal assessment. A notable aspect of this decision is the Court\u2019s departure from the domestic appellate court\u2019s reasoning, which had previously justified the search as a “preventive measure” due to alleged suspicions of terrorism. The Court rejected the Government\u2019s arguments regarding the necessity of the search, emphasizing that the applicant was never arrested or formally charged. Compared to previous jurisprudence, this decision applies a “stricter application” of existing standards because the applicant was not a prisoner or a detainee, but a member of the public brought in for identification.<\/p>\n

**Key Provisions for Legal Use**
\nFor legal practitioners and human rights advocates, the following elements of the decision are particularly significant:
\n* **The “Strict Necessity” Threshold:** The Court established that for individuals who are not under arrest or formal detention, the threshold for justifying a full strip-search is extremely high. The absence of less intrusive alternatives (such as metal detectors or body scanners) is a critical factor in finding a violation.
\n* **Article 3 vs. Article 8:** The Court prioritized the finding under Article 3 (prohibition of degrading treatment) over Article 8 (right to privacy). By finding a violation of Article 3, the Court signaled that the humiliation and loss of dignity inherent in an unjustified strip-search reach the level of “degrading treatment,” rendering a separate examination of Article 8 unnecessary.
\n* **Inadmissibility of Domestic Damages Claims:** The Court reaffirmed that an action for damages against the State under domestic civil law is not an “appropriate remedy” for allegations of police ill-treatment, thereby confirming that applicants do not need to exhaust such civil avenues before approaching the ECtHR.
\n* **Impact of Procedural Context:** The Court highlighted that the denial of access to a lawyer during the identification process exacerbated the applicant\u2019s feelings of isolation and vulnerability, which contributed to the finding of degrading treatment.<\/p>\n

This decision serves as a clear warning to law enforcement agencies that administrative procedures, such as identification checks, cannot be used as a pretext for humiliating or intimidating citizens through invasive physical searches.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

CASE OF SHIRINOVA v. AZERBAIJAN<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

The judgment in *Shirinova v. Azerbaijan* (application no. 19381\/16) concerns the unlawful demolition of a residential flat by state authorities in Baku. The applicants, two sisters, challenged the demolition of their property, which occurred despite a court-ordered injunction explicitly prohibiting such works. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found that the state failed to follow the mandatory legal procedures for property demolition and ignored judicial orders. Consequently, the Court ruled that the first applicant\u2019s property rights and the second applicant\u2019s right to respect for her home had been violated. The judgment highlights the necessity for states to strictly adhere to domestic legal frameworks and court injunctions when executing urban development or demolition projects.<\/p>\n

### Structure and Provisions
\nThe decision is structured as a standard Committee judgment, focusing on the core complaints under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property) and Article 8 (right to respect for one\u2019s home).
\n* **Admissibility:** The Court bifurcated the claims, declaring the property complaint admissible only for the owner (first applicant) and the “home” complaint admissible only for the resident (second applicant).
\n* **Merits:** The Court applied established case law regarding the “lawfulness” of interference. It determined that because the authorities bypassed the specific procedural requirements of the Azerbaijani Housing Code and violated a direct court injunction, the interference was inherently unlawful.
\n* **Just Satisfaction:** The Court awarded non-pecuniary damages (EUR 3,000 per applicant) and partial costs, but dismissed claims for additional pecuniary damages due to a lack of evidence regarding the inadequacy of the compensation already received during domestic proceedings.<\/p>\n

### Key Provisions for Legal Application
\nFor practitioners and observers, the following points are the most significant:
\n1. **Strict Adherence to “Conditions Provided by Law”:** The Court reaffirmed that any interference with property or home must strictly follow the procedural steps prescribed by domestic law. The failure to obtain a prior court decision confirming the necessity of demolition rendered the state’s actions a violation of the Convention.
\n2. **The Binding Nature of Injunctions:** The judgment serves as a strong reminder that state authorities cannot ignore interim measures or court injunctions. The act of demolishing property while a court-ordered prohibition was in effect was a decisive factor in the Court\u2019s finding of a violation.
\n3. **Distinction Between Ownership and Residence:** The Court emphasized the importance of standing. It clarified that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 protects the *owner* (possession), while Article 8 protects the *resident* (home). This distinction is vital for future litigation involving multi-party family property disputes.
\n4. **Burden of Proof in Just Satisfaction:** The Court underscored that applicants must provide concrete evidence (such as valuation reports or proof of financial loss) to justify claims for pecuniary damage. Vague assertions or failure to produce domestic valuation documents will lead to the dismissal of such claims.<\/p>\n

This case serves as a critical precedent for cases involving forced evictions and urban redevelopment, reinforcing that state-led development projects do not grant authorities immunity from domestic judicial processes or the standards of the Convention.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

CASE OF STANTON AND BOWEN v. THE UNITED KINGDOM This judgment in *Stanton and Bowen v. the United Kingdom* addresses the critical intersection between judicial release directions and the practical, resource-dependent implementation of those decisions by the executive. The applicants, both serving indeterminate sentences, challenged their continued detention for 118 and 69 days, respectively, following…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_bbp_topic_count":0,"_bbp_reply_count":0,"_bbp_total_topic_count":0,"_bbp_total_reply_count":0,"_bbp_voice_count":0,"_bbp_anonymous_reply_count":0,"_bbp_topic_count_hidden":0,"_bbp_reply_count_hidden":0,"_bbp_total_topic_count_hidden":0,"_bbp_total_reply_count_hidden":0,"_bbp_forum_subforum_count":0,"pmpro_default_level":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[129],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-19855","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-echr-decisions","pmpro-has-access"],"acf":{"patreon-level":0},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/19855","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=19855"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/19855\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=19855"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=19855"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=19855"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}