{"id":19579,"date":"2026-09-09T10:36:28","date_gmt":"2026-09-09T07:36:28","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/2026\/09\/review-of-echr-decisions-for-09-09-2026\/"},"modified":"2026-09-09T10:36:28","modified_gmt":"2026-09-09T07:36:28","slug":"review-of-echr-decisions-for-09-09-2026","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/2026\/09\/review-of-echr-decisions-for-09-09-2026\/","title":{"rendered":"Review of ECHR decisions for 09\/09\/2026"},"content":{"rendered":"

<\/p>\n

CASE OF A.A. v. THE NETHERLANDS<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

The case of *A.A. v. the Netherlands* (application no. 7481\/23) concerns the refusal of Dutch authorities to grant family reunification to five minor children born of the applicant\u2019s second and third polygamous marriages. The applicant, a Yemeni national granted asylum in the Netherlands, sought to bring these children from T\u00fcrkiye, where they resided with their mothers. The Dutch authorities denied the request based on the national policy prohibiting the recognition of polygamous marriages as contrary to public order. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) examined whether this refusal violated the applicant\u2019s right to respect for family life under Article 8 of the Convention. Ultimately, the Court ruled that the Netherlands did not violate the Convention, finding that the state had struck a fair balance between the applicant’s interests and the state’s interest in maintaining its immigration and public order policies. ****: This decision is particularly relevant for Ukrainian citizens and other refugees who may have complex family structures or marital statuses that conflict with the legal frameworks of host European countries, as it clarifies the limits of family reunification rights in the context of polygamy.<\/p>\n

### Structure and Provisions
\nThe judgment follows the standard structure of an ECtHR ruling: it outlines the facts, the domestic legal framework (including the Dutch Aliens Act and the EU Family Reunification Directive), and the competing arguments of the parties. The core of the decision rests on the “positive obligations” of the state under Article 8. A significant aspect of this judgment is the Court\u2019s explicit recognition of a “wide margin of appreciation” afforded to member states regarding polygamous households. Unlike previous cases that might have focused solely on the “legitimacy” of the union, this decision emphasizes the applicant’s personal choice to maintain multiple marriages despite being aware of the legal consequences in the Netherlands. It confirms that while family life exists between the father and his children, this does not automatically grant a right to reside in the host state.<\/p>\n

### Key Provisions for Legal Application
\nThe following points are the most critical for understanding the Court’s reasoning:<\/p>\n

* **Wide Margin of Appreciation:** The Court established that because there is a strong European consensus against polygamy, states have broad discretion in deciding whether to allow family reunification for children born of such unions.
\n* **Individualized Assessment Requirement:** While the state may deny reunification due to the “public order” implications of polygamy, the Court reiterated that authorities must still conduct an individualized assessment of the specific circumstances of the children involved.
\n* **The “Legitimization” Factor:** The Court placed significant weight on the fact that the applicant was given the opportunity to “legitimize” his situation (by choosing one marriage for recognition) but declined to do so. This choice was viewed as a factor the applicant took with full knowledge of the potential immigration hurdles.
\n* **Best Interests of the Child:** The Court reaffirmed that while the best interests of the child are of “paramount importance,” they do not function as a “trump card” that overrides all other considerations, such as immigration control and public order.
\n* **Availability of Alternatives:** The Court noted that the children were not in a “dire” situation in T\u00fcrkiye, as they had access to basic services and were living with their biological mothers. The lack of an “insurmountable obstacle” to maintaining family life through other means (such as visits or digital communication) supported the finding that no violation occurred.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

CASE OF ABDULALIYEV AND ISMAYILOV v. AZERBAIJAN<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

This judgment concerns the case of *Abdulaliyev and Ismayilov v. Azerbaijan*, involving two individuals arrested during a 2015 police operation in Nardaran. The applicants alleged that they were subjected to excessive force, including the use of firearms and rubber bullets, and were subsequently denied adequate medical care for their injuries. Furthermore, they claimed that they were ill-treated during their detention and that the domestic authorities failed to conduct an effective investigation into these grievances. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found that the state failed to justify the necessity of the force used and failed to provide adequate medical treatment. Consequently, the Court ruled that there were violations of Article 3 of the Convention under both its substantive and procedural limbs.<\/p>\n

### Structure and Provisions
\nThe judgment is structured into four main sections: the facts of the case, the relevant legal framework, the Court\u2019s assessment of the merits, and the final award of just satisfaction.
\n* **Substantive Article 3 (Excessive Force):** The Court analyzed the necessity of the force used during the arrests. It found that the government failed to provide a credible, consistent account of why lethal or potentially lethal force was strictly necessary.
\n* **Substantive Article 3 (Medical Care):** The Court examined the adequacy of medical treatment provided to the applicants post-arrest, finding that the authorities failed to ensure prompt and accurate care, particularly regarding the removal of bullet fragments.
\n* **Procedural Article 3:** The Court assessed the effectiveness of the domestic investigations, concluding that they were “plagued by defects,” including a reliance on the statements of the implicated officers and a failure to investigate contradictory evidence.
\n* **Detention:** The Court found no violation regarding the specific allegations of ill-treatment *during* detention, as the evidence did not reach the threshold of “beyond reasonable doubt,” though it noted this was partly due to the ineffective investigation.<\/p>\n

### Important Provisions for Legal Use
\nFor practitioners and observers, the following points are particularly significant:
\n1. **Burden of Proof:** The Court reaffirmed that when injuries are sustained at the hands of the police, the burden of proof shifts to the Government to demonstrate that the force used was “strictly necessary.”
\n2. **Procedural Ineffectiveness:** The judgment highlights that “rubber-stamping” police accounts without conducting independent investigative measures (such as ballistic reports or questioning neutral witnesses) renders an investigation ineffective under Article 3.
\n3. **Medical Duty of Care:** The Court established that the state\u2019s duty includes not just initial treatment, but a “comprehensive therapeutic strategy.” The failure to remove foreign objects (bullets) when there are no medical contraindications constitutes a failure to provide adequate care.
\n4. **Exhaustion of Remedies:** The Court clarified that in cases of “inaction” by authorities, applicants are not required to adhere to rigid formalistic interpretations of domestic law if the domestic practice is inconsistent or contradictory, reinforcing the principle of flexibility in the exhaustion of domestic remedies.<\/p>\n

This judgment serves as a critical precedent for cases involving police operations where the state relies heavily on internal, self-serving reports to justify the use of force and the subsequent handling of detainees.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

CASE OF ALEXANDROS SAVVAS v. GREECE<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

This judgment in the case of *Alexandros Savvas v. Greece* concerns the limits of freedom of expression for members of the judiciary when defending their professional reputation. The applicant, a judge, was sanctioned with a three-month suspension after issuing out-of-court declarations via a bailiff to colleagues who had made critical, and allegedly false, statements about his performance during a promotion procedure. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found that these declarations, while strongly worded, were essentially value judgments supported by a sufficient factual basis. The Court emphasized that the statements were made in an internal context and were not public, meaning they did not undermine the authority of the judiciary in the way the domestic authorities claimed. Ultimately, the Court ruled that the disciplinary sanction was disproportionate and lacked sufficient justification, thereby violating Article 10 of the Convention. This decision reinforces the principle that judges, while bound by a duty of discretion, retain the right to defend their reputation against unsubstantiated claims made by peers.<\/p>\n

### Structure and Provisions
\nThe decision follows the standard structure of an ECtHR judgment:
\n1. **Introduction and Facts:** Details the applicant\u2019s promotion process, the critical comments made by colleagues, the subsequent out-of-court declarations, and the resulting disciplinary proceedings.
\n2. **Legal Framework:** Outlines the relevant Greek constitutional provisions and the Code of Courts (Law 1756\/1988) regarding disciplinary offences.
\n3. **The Law (Merits):**
\n * **Admissibility:** The Court rejected the Government\u2019s argument regarding the failure to exhaust domestic remedies, noting that the applicant had invoked the substance of his rights under the Greek Constitution.
\n * **Interference:** The Court confirmed that the disciplinary suspension constituted an interference with the applicant\u2019s Article 10 rights.
\n * **Proportionality:** This is the core of the judgment. The Court analyzed whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society.” It distinguished this case from previous rulings where judges were sanctioned for public statements or failures in their adjudicatory duties, noting that the applicant\u2019s actions were a private response to professional criticism.
\n * **Just Satisfaction:** The Court awarded the applicant pecuniary damages for lost salary, non-pecuniary damages, and legal costs.<\/p>\n

### Key Provisions for Practical Use
\n* **Distinction between Fact and Value Judgment:** The Court reiterated that when a judge is accused of misconduct, their response\u2014even if using strong language like “fake” or “slanderous”\u2014can be classified as a value judgment if it is supported by a “sufficient factual basis.”
\n* **Context of Expression:** The Court placed significant weight on the fact that the applicant\u2019s statements were not made in the media or to the public, but were directed at specific colleagues and the Minister of Justice. This limits the potential for “harming the authority of the judiciary.”
\n* **The “Chilling Effect”:** The Court highlighted that a three-month suspension is a serious sanction that carries a “chilling effect,” potentially discouraging judges from defending their professional reputations or voicing legitimate criticism in the future.
\n* **Requirement for Detailed Reasoning:** The judgment serves as a reminder to national disciplinary bodies that they must provide “relevant and sufficient” reasons when sanctioning a judge. A mere reference to the judge’s rank or the “inappropriate” nature of the conduct is insufficient if the authority fails to perform a rigorous balancing exercise between the protection of the judiciary’s reputation and the judge’s right to freedom of expression.<\/p>\n

This case is a significant precedent for judicial independence and the right of judges to engage in internal professional discourse without fear of disproportionate disciplinary reprisal.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

CASE OF NADASHVILI v. GEORGIA<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

The case of *Nadashvili v. Georgia* (application no. 31727\/23) concerns a significant breach of the right to a fair trial due to the excessive length of civil proceedings before the Batumi City Court. The applicant, Ms. Irine Nadashvili, sought compensation for alleged unlawful detention and ill-treatment in a psychiatric facility during the COVID-19 pandemic, but her case remained stagnant for over five years at the first-instance level. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found that the Georgian authorities failed to organize their judicial system effectively, resulting in nearly five years of total inactivity. The Court rejected the Government\u2019s arguments regarding judicial reassignments and pandemic-related delays, noting that these did not justify such a prolonged lack of progress. Consequently, the Court ruled that the “reasonable time” requirement under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention had been violated.<\/p>\n

**Structure and Provisions**
\nThe judgment follows the standard structure for a Committee-level decision: it outlines the subject matter, summarizes the Court\u2019s assessment regarding the admissibility and merits of the complaint, and concludes with the application of Article 41 (just satisfaction). The decision reinforces established jurisprudence regarding the state’s positive obligation to ensure judicial efficiency. Unlike previous cases where procedural complexity might have excused delays, this decision emphasizes that internal administrative failures\u2014such as the repeated reassignment of judges and poor court management\u2014cannot be shifted onto the applicant. It serves as a reaffirmation of the Court\u2019s stance in recent Georgian cases (e.g., *Mgeladze v. Georgia*) that systemic organizational issues are not valid justifications for excessive delays.<\/p>\n

**Key Provisions for Legal Use**
\n* **Admissibility of “Continuing Situations”:** The Court clarified that when there is no effective domestic remedy for the length of proceedings, an applicant is not barred from lodging a complaint even if they wait two years after the proceedings began, provided the situation is ongoing.
\n* **The “Total Inactivity” Standard:** The Court explicitly identified that four years and eight months of the five-year period were characterized by “total inactivity.” This is a critical benchmark for practitioners: when a case remains dormant for years without any procedural steps, the Court will likely find a violation regardless of the Government\u2019s claims of complexity.
\n* **Rejection of Administrative Excuses:** The judgment establishes that judicial reassignments and internal court reorganizations are the responsibility of the State. The Court effectively signaled that the State cannot use its own internal administrative failures to justify the denial of a timely trial.
\n* **Just Satisfaction:** The Court awarded EUR 1,500 in non-pecuniary damages, providing a clear reference point for the valuation of damages in cases involving the excessive length of civil proceedings in Georgia.<\/p>\n

This decision is a stark reminder that the right to a trial within a “reasonable time” is a fundamental pillar of the Convention, and systemic administrative negligence by national courts will be met with a finding of a violation by the Strasbourg Court.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

CASE OF A.A. v. THE NETHERLANDS The case of *A.A. v. the Netherlands* (application no. 7481\/23) concerns the refusal of Dutch authorities to grant family reunification to five minor children born of the applicant\u2019s second and third polygamous marriages. The applicant, a Yemeni national granted asylum in the Netherlands, sought to bring these children from…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_bbp_topic_count":0,"_bbp_reply_count":0,"_bbp_total_topic_count":0,"_bbp_total_reply_count":0,"_bbp_voice_count":0,"_bbp_anonymous_reply_count":0,"_bbp_topic_count_hidden":0,"_bbp_reply_count_hidden":0,"_bbp_total_topic_count_hidden":0,"_bbp_total_reply_count_hidden":0,"_bbp_forum_subforum_count":0,"pmpro_default_level":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[129],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-19579","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-echr-decisions","pmpro-has-access"],"acf":{"patreon-level":0},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/19579","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=19579"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/19579\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=19579"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=19579"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=19579"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}