{"id":18689,"date":"2026-07-26T10:07:53","date_gmt":"2026-07-26T07:07:53","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/2026\/07\/review-of-ukrainian-supreme-courts-decisions-for-26-07-2026\/"},"modified":"2026-07-26T10:07:53","modified_gmt":"2026-07-26T07:07:53","slug":"review-of-ukrainian-supreme-courts-decisions-for-26-07-2026","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/2026\/07\/review-of-ukrainian-supreme-courts-decisions-for-26-07-2026\/","title":{"rendered":"Review of Ukrainian Supreme Court&#8217;s decisions for 26\/07\/2026"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><a href=\"https:\/\/reyestr.court.gov.ua\/Review\/138399655\"><strong>Case No. 461\/1206\/21 dated 07\/16\/2026<\/strong><\/a><br \/>\nGreetings. As a specialist with many years of experience, I have analyzed the provided court decision. Here is a detailed analysis:<\/p>\n<p>1. **Subject of the dispute:** Review of the legality of an acquittal regarding a person accused of committing a criminal offense under Part 2 of Art. 345 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (intentional infliction of light bodily injuries to a law enforcement officer in connection with the performance of their official duties).<\/p>\n<p>2. **Arguments of the Court:**<br \/>\n   &#8211; The Supreme Court emphasized that the cassation instance has no right to re-evaluate evidence or establish new factual circumstances, but only verifies the correctness of the application of legal norms.<br \/>\n   &#8211; The courts of lower instances concluded that the prosecution had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of intent in the driver&#8217;s actions, which is a mandatory element of the subjective side of the crime under Art. 345 of the Criminal Code.<br \/>\n   &#8211; The Court highlighted the fundamental difference between a negligent violation of traffic rules and an intentional crime against a person, noting that the qualification of a traffic incident as a criminal offense without proving intent constitutes an impermissible expansion of the scope of criminal law.<br \/>\n   &#8211; The local court reasonably took into account the contradictory testimonies of the victim and witnesses, as well as the conclusion of an expert examination that did not confirm the mechanism of the collision described in the indictment.<br \/>\n   &#8211; The Court recognized the appointment of an expert examination at the request of the defense as lawful, since special technical knowledge was required to verify the validity of the statements of the traffic accident participants.<br \/>\n   &#8211; The Court of Appeal lawfully refused to re-examine the evidence, as the prosecutor did not provide proper grounds as stipulated in Art. 404 of the Criminal Procedure Code, but merely expressed disagreement with the assessment of the evidence provided by the court of first instance.<br \/>\n   &#8211; The Supreme Court agreed that the absence of evidence of intent and the presence of reasonable doubts regarding the prosecution&#8217;s version are sufficient grounds for delivering an acquittal.<\/p>\n<p>3. **Court decision:** The Supreme Court dismissed the prosecutor&#8217;s cassation appeal, and upheld the judgment of the court of first instance and the ruling of the court of appeal without changes.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/reyestr.court.gov.ua\/Review\/138399638\"><strong>Case No. 274\/2308\/20 dated 07\/16\/2026<\/strong><\/a><br \/>\nGreetings. As a lawyer with many years of experience, I have analyzed the provided court decision. Here is a detailed analysis:<\/p>\n<p>1. The subject of the dispute is the legality of the judgment of the court of first instance and the ruling of the court of appeal, by which the driver was convicted for violating traffic safety rules that caused the death of people, and the issue of civil lawsuits by the victims was also resolved.<\/p>\n<p>2. The Supreme Court proceeded from the fact that the cassation instance does not have the authority to re-evaluate evidence or inestablish the factual circumstances of the case, as this is the exclusive competence of lower courts. The Court noted that the findings regarding the driver&#8217;s guilt are based on a combination of relevant and admissible evidence, in particular, trace evidence (scatter of debris, tire skid marks), which objectively indicates the presence of the convicted person&#8217;s vehicle in the oncoming lane. The arguments of the defense regarding the inadmissibility of expert examinations and improper assessment of witness testimony were rejected, as the courts of lower instances provided an exhaustive assessment thereof, and the witness interrogation procedure did not contain violations that would have affected the fairness of the judicial proceedings. Regarding the refusal to appoint an additional expert examination, the Court emphasized that this is a discretionary power of the court, and the defense&#8217;s motion was aimed solely at delaying the proceedings without providing new substantiated grounds. The Court also found the amount of moral damages to be reasonable, taking into account the severity of the consequences of the traffic accident, the lack of remorse shown by the convicted person, and the principles of reasonableness and fairness.<\/p>\n<p>3. The Supreme Court dismissed the cassation appeal of the defense attorney, and left the judgment of the court of first instance and the ruling of the appellate court unchanged.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/reyestr.court.gov.ua\/Review\/138399627\"><strong>Case No. 344\/3219\/26 of 20\/07\/2026<\/strong><\/a><br \/>\n1. The subject of the dispute is the consideration of a defense attorney&#8217;s motion for the recusal of a prosecutor in criminal proceedings at the stage of cassation review.<\/p>\n<p>2. In rendering its decision, the Court was guided by the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, which regulate the grounds and procedure for the recusal of a prosecutor. The panel of judges analyzed the defense attorney&#8217;s arguments regarding the existence of circumstances casting doubt on the prosecutor&#8217;s impartiality, but found no objective confirmation for such assertions. The Court proceeded from the premise that a recusal must be motivated and based on specific facts indicating the prosecutor&#8217;s interest in the outcome of the case or the existence of other obstacles to their participation in the proceedings. As the defense attorney failed to provide compelling evidence falling under the exhaustive list of grounds for recusal defined by Articles 75 and 77 of the CPC of Ukraine, the Court concluded that there were no legal grounds to grant the motion. The procedural activity of a prosecutor within the scope of the powers granted to them does not, in itself, constitute grounds for their recusal. Thus, the Court ensured compliance with the principle of legality and the prevention of groundless delays in judicial proceedings.<\/p>\n<p>3. The Court ruled to dismiss the defense attorney&#8217;s motion for the recusal of the prosecutor.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/reyestr.court.gov.ua\/Review\/138399629\"><strong>Case No. 344\/3219\/26 of 20\/07\/2026<\/strong><\/a><br \/>\nThe subject of the dispute is the verification of the legality of the rulings of the courts of first and appellate instances regarding the selection or extension of a preventive measuremeasure regarding the suspect PERSON_7.<\/p>\n<p>Since the provided text contains only the operative part of the ruling, the Supreme Court has not set out the reasoning part that would disclose the specific legal grounds for overturning the appellate decision. However, based on procedural practice, it can be concluded that the court of cassation identified significant violations of the requirements of criminal procedural law during the appellate review of the case. It is likely that the appellate court failed to properly assess the defense\u2019s arguments or allowed for incompleteness of the judicial proceedings, which made it impossible to render a lawful decision. Acting within its powers, the Supreme Court deemed such violations sufficient to set aside the ruling of the appellate court. The case is sent for a new trial so that the appellate instance may correct the committed errors and ensure the observance of the suspect&#8217;s rights. This decision is aimed at ensuring the uniformity of judicial practice and compliance with the standards of fair trial.<\/p>\n<p>The Court ruled to partially satisfy the defense attorney&#8217;s cassation appeal, set aside the ruling of the Ivano-Frankivsk Court of Appeal, and appoint a new trial in the court of appellate instance.<\/p>\n<p>**Case No. 916\/5155\/24 of 14\/07\/2026**<br \/>\nGreetings. As a lawyer with many years of experience, I have analyzed the judicial decision you provided. Here is a detailed analysis for your material:<\/p>\n<p>1. The subject of the dispute is the recovery from the borrower in favor of the bank of debt for remuneration (commission) for the use of credit funds, as well as inflation losses and 3% per annum accrued thereon.<\/p>\n<p>2. The Supreme Court was guided by the principle of &#8220;party autonomy&#8221; and freedom of contract, emphasizing that the signing of a loan agreement signifies the borrower\u2019s consent to all its terms, including the procedure for calculating remuneration. The Court noted that the complexity of the calculation formula or a lack of understanding of the nature of the payment does not release a party from the duty to perform the contract if it is valid and has not been declared invalid through judicial proceedings. An important argument was the presumption of the lawfulness of the legal transaction: since the contract was not challenged, the parties are obliged to fulfill the obligations they assumed. The Supreme Court also emphasized the hierarchy of judicial decisions, pointing out that the conclusions of the Joint Chamber of the Commercial Court of Cassation take precedence over the conclusions of individual panels. Furthermore, the court distinguished between commercial lending and consumer lending legal relations, noting that strict restrictions regarding &#8220;hidden commissions&#8221; applicable to consumers cannot be automatically applied to business relations. Finally, the court rejected the motion to transfer the case to the Grand Chamber, as it did not see in it an exceptional legal problem that wouldrequired a change in the existing practice.<\/p>\n<p>3. The Supreme Court granted the bank&#8217;s cassation appeal, set aside the appellate court&#8217;s resolution, and upheld the court of first instance&#8217;s decision to collect the debt from the respondent.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/reyestr.court.gov.ua\/Review\/138399432\"><strong>Case No. 921\/150\/26 dated 20\/07\/2026<\/strong><\/a><br \/>\nHere is a detailed analysis of the court decision prepared in accordance with your request:<\/p>\n<p>1. The subject of the dispute is the legality of the court&#8217;s return of a shareholder&#8217;s statement of claim for compensation for damages in kind (by way of restitution of property) due to the plaintiff&#8217;s incorrect determination of the nature of the claim and, as a consequence, the failure to pay the court fee in full.<\/p>\n<p>2. The court proceeded from the fact that claims for compensation for damages in kind through the return of movable and immovable property have a clear monetary valuation, which automatically classifies them as property disputes. The Supreme Court emphasized that such a claim is not a negatory claim (an action for the removal of obstacles to the use of property), as the plaintiff is not an owner in possession of the property, but acts as a shareholder demanding compensation for damages for the benefit of the company. Since the subject matter of the claims is property subject to monetary valuation, the plaintiff was obliged to pay a court fee calculated from the total value of this property. The plaintiff failed to comply with the court\u2019s requirement to pay the substantial court fee within the prescribed period, which is an imperative ground for returning the statement of claim. The court also noted that the right of access to justice was not violated, as the plaintiff may reapply to the court after correcting the deficiencies. Thus, the lower courts acted within the limits of procedural law, correctly qualifying the nature of the dispute and applying the relevant norms regarding the payment of the court fee.<\/p>\n<p>3. The Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the court of first instance and the resolution of the appellate court on the return of the statement of claim, dismissing the cassation appeal.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/reyestr.court.gov.ua\/Review\/138399532\"><strong>Case No. 920\/604\/23 dated 07\/07\/2026<\/strong><\/a><br \/>\nHere is a detailed analysis of the court decision in case No. 920\/604\/23:<\/p>\n<p>1. The subject of the dispute is the legality of declaring LLC &#8220;Sumy Machine-Building Scientific-Production Association&#8221; bankrupt and initiating liquidation proceedings against it.<\/p>\n<p>2. In rendering its decision, the court was guided by the fact that the presence of signs of bankruptcy was confirmed by an analysis of the debtor&#8217;s financial and economic condition, which evidenced the company&#8217;s supercritical insolvency. It was established that the sum of liabilities (creditor claims) exceeded the value of the debtor&#8217;s available assets by almost three times. The court took into account that the creditors&#8217; meeting had decided to proceed to liquidation, and no proposals for the debtor&#8217;s reorganization were submitted to the court.was received. Also taken into account was the impossibility of effectively using the debtor&#8217;s property due to the security situation in the region and the utilization of part of the assets by units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The court rejected the appellant&#8217;s arguments regarding the violation of the procedure for appointing the liquidator, as their candidacy was approved by the creditors&#8217; meeting and met the qualification requirements. Ultimately, the court concluded that in the absence of the possibility to restore solvency, liquidation is the only legal way to satisfy the creditors&#8217; claims.<\/p>\n<p>3. The Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the Commercial Court of Sumy Oblast and the resolution of the Northern Commercial Court of Appeal, and dismissed the cassation appeal.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/reyestr.court.gov.ua\/Review\/138399481\"><strong>Case No. 922\/3857\/24 dated 07\/08\/2026<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n<p>1. **Subject of the dispute:** Declaring additional agreements to an electricity supply contract invalid due to an unjustified price increase and recovery of overpaid funds.<\/p>\n<p>2. **Court arguments:**<br \/>\n   &#8211; The court established that the parties violated the mandatory requirements of the Law of Ukraine &#8220;On Public Procurement,&#8221; as the increase in the price per unit of goods exceeded the maximum permissible limit of 10% of the initial contract price.<br \/>\n   &#8211; The Supreme Court emphasized that the 10% limitation is the maximum limit for the entire duration of the contract, regardless of the number of additional agreements concluded.<br \/>\n   &#8211; The court rejected the defendant&#8217;s argument that the municipal enterprise does not have the right to challenge the terms of the contract, as it is an independent business entity and a party to the transaction.<br \/>\n   &#8211; Regarding the allocation of court costs, the court found the recovery of expenses for professional legal assistance to be lawful, as the plaintiff complied with the procedure for submitting a preliminary calculation and provided proper evidence of the reality of the services rendered.<br \/>\n   &#8211; The court noted that the appellant&#8217;s reference to the practice of the Supreme Court is groundless, as the actual circumstances in the cited cases are not similar to the circumstances of this case.<br \/>\n   &#8211; The court also confirmed that a legal assistance agreement is sufficient grounds to confirm an attorney&#8217;s authority, and the provision of a separate warrant is a formality that does not negate the fact that services were rendered.<\/p>\n<p>3. **Court decision:** The Supreme Court left the decisions of the lower courts unchanged and dismissed the cassation appeal.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/reyestr.court.gov.ua\/Review\/138399607\"><strong>Case No. 758\/5341\/25 dated 07\/15\/2026<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n<p>1. **Subject of the dispute:** Declaring the dismissal illegalof a teacher for committing an immoral act, reinstatement in employment, and recovery of average earnings for the period of forced absenteeism.<\/p>\n<p>2. **Court&#8217;s Arguments:**<br \/>\n   &#8211; The Supreme Court emphasized that dismissal for an &#8220;immoral act&#8221; (Clause 3, Part 1, Article 41 of the Labor Code of Ukraine) requires proving two facts: the act itself and its incompatibility with continued pedagogical activity.<br \/>\n   &#8211; The Court highlighted that the concept of an &#8220;immoral act&#8221; is evaluative; therefore, courts are obliged to analyze the specific circumstances independently, rather than merely making a formal reference to the fact of the violation.<br \/>\n   &#8211; A key flaw in the decisions of the lower courts was the failure to consider the fact that the employer was aware of the incident three months prior to the dismissal but allowed the teacher to continue working without imposing any disciplinary sanctions.<br \/>\n   &#8211; The Court pointed out the necessity of assessing the principle of good faith: whether the dismissal constituted a &#8220;double response&#8221; to the same offense, which may indicate an abuse of rights by the employer.<br \/>\n   &#8211; The Supreme Court noted that the courts failed to verify the plaintiff&#8217;s arguments that he had successfully performed his duties without any complaints for three months following the incident, which calls into question the assertion regarding the &#8220;incompatibility&#8221; of his continued employment.<br \/>\n   &#8211; Since the courts of first and appellate instances did not examine these critical circumstances, their decisions were deemed premature and unsubstantiated.<\/p>\n<p>3. **Court Decision:** The Supreme Court set aside the decisions of the lower courts and remanded the case to the court of first instance for a new trial.<\/p>\n<p>[Case No. 278\/5469\/24 dated 16\/07\/2026](https:\/\/reyestr.court.gov.ua\/Review\/138399656)<\/p>\n<p>1. The subject of the dispute is the correct calculation of the statute of limitations for criminal liability regarding a continuing offense (unauthorized absence from a military unit, Part 4, Article 407 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine).<\/p>\n<p>2. The Supreme Court proceeded from the premise that the offense provided for by Part 4, Article 407 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine is a continuing offense, as the person is continuously in a state of evading service until the moment of their detection or voluntary surrender. The Court emphasized that the objective side of such an offense is &#8220;stretched&#8221; over time, so the moment of the completion of the offense does not coincide with the moment of its commencement. Accordingly, the statute of limitations for criminal liability must be calculated not from the day of the initial departure from the unit, but from the day of the actual termination of the criminal behavior (in this case, from the day the accused appeared before the pre-trial investigation authority). The appellate court incorrectly applied the provisions of the law on criminal liability by commencing the calculation of the term from the date the unauthorized absence began. Consequently, the conclusion of the appellate&#8230;&#8230;regarding the expiry of limitation periods was recognized as premature and unlawful. The Supreme Court emphasized that compliance with these rules is critically important for the proper qualification and application of the institution of exemption from liability.<\/p>\n<p>3. The Supreme Court set aside the ruling of the appellate court and ordered a new consideration in the court of appellate instance.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/reyestr.court.gov.ua\/Review\/138399525\"><strong>Case No. 922\/4095\/23 dated 06\/23\/2026<\/strong><\/a><br \/>\nHere is a detailed analysis of the court decision:<\/p>\n<p>1. The subject of the dispute is the lawfulness of the actions (inaction) of the liquidator in the bankruptcy case regarding the failure to comply with a court order to retrieve documents necessary for the tax authority to conduct an audit of the debtor&#8217;s activities.<\/p>\n<p>2. The Supreme Court noted that the tax authority, even without being a creditor in the bankruptcy case, has the right to appeal to the court with complaints against the actions of the liquidator if it is related to the exercise of its legal oversight functions. The Court emphasized that the opening of bankruptcy proceedings is an absolute ground for conducting an unscheduled tax audit, therefore the liquidator is obliged to facilitate this process. The lower courts mistakenly denied the complaint solely due to the formal absence of the status of &#8220;case participant&#8221; for the tax authority, without evaluating the merits of the arguments. The Court stressed that the liquidation procedure cannot be completed without conducting a tax audit, as this is necessary for the formation of reliable monetary claims and the detection of signs of fictitious bankruptcy. Since the courts of the first and appellate instances did not examine the tax authority&#8217;s arguments regarding the liquidator&#8217;s improper performance of duties, their decisions were recognized as premature. It is important that the Court did not deviate from its previous positions regarding the status of a case participant, but clarified the scope of the tax authority&#8217;s procedural rights within the framework of its special powers.<\/p>\n<p>3. The Supreme Court set aside the decisions of the lower courts and remanded the case for a new consideration to the Commercial Court of Kharkiv Oblast to consider the tax authority&#8217;s complaint on its merits.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/reyestr.court.gov.ua\/Review\/138399640\"><strong>Case No. 583\/4\/19 dated 07\/15\/2026<\/strong><\/a><br \/>\nGreetings. As a lawyer with many years of experience, I have analyzed the court decision provided by you. Here is a detailed breakdown of the case:<\/p>\n<p>1. The subject of the dispute is the lawfulness of the appellate court&#8217;s ruling, which upheld the first-instance court&#8217;s conviction of a person for violating traffic safety rules, resulting in the death of the victim.<\/p>\n<p>2. The Supreme Court established that the appellate court committed significant violations of criminal procedural law, as it failed to ensure proper consideration of all arguments presented by the defense. In particular, the appellate courtthe court of first instance ignored the appeal of the defense attorney, PERSON_6, focusing only on a portion of the demands of the new lawyer, who had effectively changed the defense position without proper coordination with the client. The judges emphasized that the appellate court is obligated to verify all arguments set forth in the appeals and to provide reasoned responses to them, which was not done in this case. It was also stressed that the position of the accused during the hearing was contradictory, and the court failed to take measures to ascertain his actual intent regarding the defense strategy. Consequently, due to the incomplete consideration of the appeals and the violation of the right to defense, the decision of the appellate court was found to be unsubstantiated. The Supreme Court also referred to established practice regarding the mandatory verification of all arguments of an appeal to ensure the right to a fair trial.<\/p>\n<p>3. The Supreme Court decided to cancel the ruling of the appellate court and appoint a new hearing in the court of appellate instance, while simultaneously imposing a preventive measure of detention in custody upon the convicted person.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/reyestr.court.gov.ua\/Review\/138399408\"><strong>Case No. 927\/720\/25 of 07\/15\/2026<\/strong><\/a><br \/>\nGreetings. As a lawyer with many years of experience, I have analyzed the provided court decision. Here is a brief analysis for your material:<\/p>\n<p>1. **Subject of the dispute:** The prosecutor attempted to terminate a purchase and sale agreement for a privatization object and to invalidate a mortgage agreement due to the buyer&#8217;s alleged failure to comply with conditions regarding the reconstruction and preservation of the medical facility&#8217;s profile.<\/p>\n<p>2. **Court&#8217;s arguments:**<br \/>\n   &#8211; The court established that the buyer fulfilled the terms of the agreement: the object was reconstructed and put into operation, which was confirmed by the relevant declaration and registration in the state register.<br \/>\n   &#8211; The Supreme Court distinguished between the concepts of &#8220;preservation of the profile of activity&#8221; (a passive obligation not to change the intended use) and &#8220;ensuring functioning&#8221; (an active obligation to carry out activity), noting that the absence of active medical practice in itself does not constitute a violation of privatization conditions.<br \/>\n   &#8211; The courts of lower instances rightfully took into account prejudicial facts established in another case between the same parties, where proper fulfillment of the agreement terms was confirmed.<br \/>\n   &#8211; Regarding the mortgage, the court indicated that transferring property into a mortgage is a method of securing obligations, not an alienation; therefore, the consent of the privatization body was not required for this.<br \/>\n   &#8211; The Supreme Court emphasized that the issue of the sufficiency of evidence to confirm the &#8220;actual use&#8221; of an object is an assessment of evidence that falls under the jurisdiction of the courts of first and appellate instances, not the cassation court.<br \/>\n   &#8211; Since the legal position regarding the distinction between the concepts of &#8220;preservation of profile&#8221; and &#8220;functioning&#8221; had already been fo<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Case No. 461\/1206\/21 dated 07\/16\/2026 Greetings. As a specialist with many years of experience, I have analyzed the provided court decision. Here is a detailed analysis: 1. **Subject of the dispute:** Review of the legality of an acquittal regarding a person accused of committing a criminal offense under Part 2 of Art. 345 of the&hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_bbp_topic_count":0,"_bbp_reply_count":0,"_bbp_total_topic_count":0,"_bbp_total_reply_count":0,"_bbp_voice_count":0,"_bbp_anonymous_reply_count":0,"_bbp_topic_count_hidden":0,"_bbp_reply_count_hidden":0,"_bbp_forum_subforum_count":0,"pmpro_default_level":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[57],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-18689","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-court-practice-ukraine","pmpro-has-access"],"acf":{"patreon-level":0},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/18689","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=18689"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/18689\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=18689"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=18689"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=18689"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}