{"id":18441,"date":"2026-07-12T10:11:34","date_gmt":"2026-07-12T07:11:34","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/2026\/07\/review-of-ukrainian-supreme-courts-decisions-for-12-07-2026\/"},"modified":"2026-07-12T10:11:34","modified_gmt":"2026-07-12T07:11:34","slug":"review-of-ukrainian-supreme-courts-decisions-for-12-07-2026","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/2026\/07\/review-of-ukrainian-supreme-courts-decisions-for-12-07-2026\/","title":{"rendered":"Review of Ukrainian Supreme Court&#8217;s decisions for 12\/07\/2026"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><a href=\"https:\/\/reyestr.court.gov.ua\/Review\/138038205\"><strong>Case No. 648\/1274\/19 dated 06\/23\/2026<\/strong><\/a><br \/>\nThe subject of the dispute is the verification of the legality of the appellate court ruling, which upheld the decision of the court of first instance in criminal proceedings regarding the accusation of a person for committing theft (Part 1, Article 185 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine).<\/p>\n<p>The Supreme Court, while considering the prosecutor\u2019s cassation appeal, analyzed the compliance of the appellate court with the norms of criminal procedural law during the review of the verdict. The panel of judges concluded that the appellate court, within the scope of its powers, properly examined the arguments of the parties and the validity of the conclusions of the court of first instance. The court did not identify any material violations of the requirements of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine that would serve as grounds for overturning or amending the challenged judicial decision. The arguments of the prosecutor set forth in the cassation appeal were not confirmed during the review of the case materials. The Supreme Court confirmed that the legal assessment of the defendant\u2019s actions and the imposed penalty comply with the requirements of current legislation. Thus, there were no grounds for interfering with the decision of the appellate court.<\/p>\n<p>The Supreme Court dismissed the prosecutor\u2019s cassation appeal and upheld the ruling of the Kherson Court of Appeal.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/reyestr.court.gov.ua\/Review\/138037870\"><strong>Case No. 560\/15237\/25 dated 07\/07\/2026<\/strong><\/a><br \/>\nHere is a detailed analysis of the judicial decision prepared for you:<\/p>\n<p>1. The subject of the dispute is the lawfulness of the Pension Fund&#8217;s inaction regarding the failure to recalculate the plaintiff&#8217;s pension, taking into account the annual salary indexation coefficients for the period from 2022 to 2025.<\/p>\n<p>2. The Supreme Court emphasized that a pension is a monthly periodic payment; therefore, its amount is known to the recipient, who has an objective opportunity to learn about the violation of their rights immediately after the pension is paid in a reduced amount. The Court stressed that a pensioner&#8217;s receipt of a response letter from the Pension Fund does not change the moment from which the person should have known about the violation if they did not take active steps to verify the accruals within a reasonable time. In accordance with the principle of legal certainty, establishing time limits for applying to the court is necessary to balance the protection of a person\u2019s rights and the stability of legal relations. The Court noted that the plaintiff, by applying to the court only in September 2025, missed the six-month deadline for challenging actions for past periods, starting from 2022. The Supreme Court confirmed that the validity of the reasons for missing the deadline was not proven, and therefore the claims for the period prior to March 3, 2025, are not subject to review. Thus, the court applied Article 122 of the Code of Administrative Judiciary of Ukraine, limiting the possibility of judicial protection to only the last six months before applying to the court.<\/p>\n<p>3. The Supreme Court partially satisfied the cassation appeal of the Pension Fund, overturned the decisions of the lower courts regarding claims for the period from March 01, 2022, to March 02, 2025, and left the claim in this part without consideration, leaving the decision&#8230;with changes only regarding the claims pertaining to the period from March 03, 2025.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/reyestr.court.gov.ua\/Review\/138037889\"><strong>Case No. 280\/4591\/25 dated 07\/07\/2026<\/strong><\/a><br \/>\nGreetings. As a lawyer with many years of experience, I have analyzed the Supreme Court decision you provided. Here is a brief analysis for your material:<\/p>\n<p>1. **Subject of the dispute:** The plaintiff attempted, through the court, to compel the justice authority to exclude information from the Unified State Register identifying him as the head (coordinator) of a local branch of a political party, on the grounds that he had resigned from the party, but the party had not conducted the procedure for electing a new head.<\/p>\n<p>2. **Arguments of the Court:** The Supreme Court confirmed that the state registrar acted lawfully, as the law clearly defines an exhaustive list of documents for changing the head of a party&#8217;s structural unit, and those documents were not submitted. The Court emphasized that an individual\u2019s resignation from a party by personal application occurs automatically by operation of law; however, this does not negate the party&#8217;s obligation to update the data in the register through the established procedure. Importantly, the Court distinguished between the concepts of &#8220;termination of membership&#8221; and &#8220;registration action&#8221;: resignation from a party does not require registration, whereas changing the head in the register does require the submission of minutes regarding the election of a new leader. The Court also noted that the inability to hold party meetings due to occupation does not empower the registrar to ignore the requirements of the law or to replace the party&#8217;s statutory bodies. At the same time, the Supreme Court corrected the error of the lower courts, pointing out that the powers of the head of a local branch terminate precisely at the moment the resignation application is submitted, rather than from the moment a successor is elected. Consequently, although the reasoning part of the lower courts&#8217; decisions was amended due to an erroneous interpretation of the moment when powers terminate, the final conclusion to dismiss the claim remained unchanged.<\/p>\n<p>3. **Court Decision:** The Supreme Court partially satisfied the cassation appeal, amending the reasoning part of the lower courts&#8217; decisions but upholding the operative part regarding the dismissal of the claim.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/reyestr.court.gov.ua\/Review\/138037609\"><strong>Case No. 904\/4510\/24 dated 06\/30\/2026<\/strong><\/a><br \/>\nGreetings. As a specialist with 15 years of experience, I have analyzed the court decision you provided. Here is a summary of the essence of the case and the legal position of the Supreme Court:<\/p>\n<p>1. The subject of the dispute is the claim by the Dnipro City Council to remove obstacles to the use of a land plot of communal property by demolishing an unauthorized gas station (filling station) and terminating the defendant&#8217;s right of possession thereof.<\/p>\n<p>2. The Court proceeded from the fact that the object is unauthorized construction, as it was erected on a land plot that was not allocated for this purpose, in the absence of proper permitting documentation. The Supreme Court emphasized that ownership of a real estate object can only belong to a person who has the corresponding proprietary right to the land plot, and the principle of the unity of the legal fate of the land plot and the structure excludes the possibility of legitimizingof unauthorized construction solely due to the fact of state registration of the right of ownership. The court noted that registration of the right of ownership by the defendant does not change the legal status of the object as unauthorized, and therefore a claim for demolition is a proper and effective way to protect the rights of the territorial community. The interference with the defendant&#8217;s right of ownership was recognized as proportionate, as it pursues a public interest, and the defendant is not deprived of the right to claim damages within the framework of recourse claims against the previous owner. The court also indicated that a claim for termination of the right of ownership is an improper way of protection, as it does not resolve the legal fate of the construction object itself.<\/p>\n<p>3. The Supreme Court left the decisions of the courts of lower instances unchanged, confirming the legitimacy of the claim for the demolition of an unauthorizedly constructed object.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/reyestr.court.gov.ua\/Review\/138038109\"><strong>Case No. 454\/2293\/23 dated 07\/07\/2026<\/strong><\/a><br \/>\nGreetings. As a lawyer with many years of experience, I have analyzed the provided court decision. Here is a detailed analysis:<\/p>\n<p>1. The subject of the dispute is the resolution of the issue regarding the recovery of expenses for professional legal assistance incurred by a party in the court of cassation instance.<\/p>\n<p>2. When rendering the decision, the court was guided by the fact that the deadline for submitting evidence of expenses had been missed for valid reasons, since the party was not registered in the &#8220;Electronic Court&#8221; system and a paper copy of the resolution had not been received. Regarding the amount of the fee, the court emphasized that although the agreement between the attorney and the client provided for a fixed sum of 20,000 UAH, this is not an unconditional basis for recovering the entire amount from the other party. The court analyzed the volume of work performed, which was limited only to the preparation of a response to the cassation appeal, the content of which actually duplicated previous procedural documents. Considering the criteria of proportionality, reasonableness, and reality of expenses, the court concluded that the claimed amount was excessive. Therefore, guided by the principles of justice, the court independently evaluated the scope of services provided and the complexity of the case at the cassation stage. As a result, the court deemed it justified to reduce the amount of compensation to 5,000 UAH.<\/p>\n<p>3. The Supreme Court partially satisfied the application, restored the deadline for submitting evidence, and ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff 5,000 UAH for legal assistance expenses.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/reyestr.court.gov.ua\/Review\/138037599\"><strong>Case No. 916\/1736\/24 dated 02\/07\/2026<\/strong><\/a><br \/>\nGreetings. As a lawyer with many years of experience, I have analyzed the court decision you provided. Here is a detailed analysis for your material:<\/p>\n<p>1. **Subject of the dispute:** Challenging rulings on the approval of a debt restructuring plan for an individual debtor and the closure of insolvency proceedings due to the passive procedural behavior of one of the creditors.<\/p>\n<p>2. **Court arguments:**<br \/>\n   &#8211; The Supreme Court emphasized that the insolvency procedure for an individual aims at the rehabilitation of the debtor, not just the satisfaction of creditors&#8217; claims, therefore priority is given to the fulfillment of the restructuring plan.<br \/>\n   &#8211; The court emphasized that the Code of Ukraine on ProceThe bankruptcy procedure places an obligation upon creditors to independently submit applications with monetary claims within the timeframe established by law.<br \/>\n   &#8211; Although the restructuring manager is obliged to inform known creditors, their passive conduct (ignoring the case) cannot be grounds for an endless delay of the procedure.<br \/>\n   &#8211; In this case, the creditor, PERSON_2, was aware of the existence of the proceedings, as she herself initiated the appellate review of previous rulings; however, she did not exercise her right to declare her claims even after the case was returned for a new consideration.<br \/>\n   &#8211; The court recognized the notification of the creditor as proper, as it was sent to a postal address, and the risks of non-receipt of correspondence at this address lie with the addressee.<br \/>\n   &#8211; Therefore, the approval of the plan and the closure of the proceedings upon its execution are lawful, since the rights of the creditor who did not declare claims were not violated, and the debtor fulfilled its obligation to the recognized creditor.<\/p>\n<p>3. **Court Decision:** The Supreme Court left the cassation appeal unsatisfied and the decisions of the lower courts unchanged.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/reyestr.court.gov.ua\/Review\/138037719\"><strong>Case No. 925\/1339\/24 dated 07\/01\/2026<\/strong><\/a><br \/>\nGreetings. As a lawyer with many years of experience, I have analyzed the provided court decision. Here is a detailed analysis for your material:<\/p>\n<p>1. The subject of the dispute is the lawfulness of imposing joint and several liability on the debtor&#8217;s management bodies for the non-satisfaction of creditor claims in a bankruptcy case due to the untimely filing of an application for the opening of proceedings in the case.<\/p>\n<p>2. The Supreme Court emphasized that joint and several liability under Article 34 of the Code of Ukraine on Bankruptcy Procedures is of a tortious (compensatory) nature, and therefore its amount must be equal to the actual amount of damages caused to creditors. The court established that the liquidator filed the application for the recovery of joint and several liability prematurely, as the procedure for the realization of the debtor&#8217;s assets had not yet been completed at that time, and the final amount of unsatisfied creditor claims had not been established. Moreover, significant accounts receivable were discovered in the case, the collection of which could have covered the creditors&#8217; claims, which makes the claim against the executives premature. The court emphasized that joint and several liability cannot automatically be equal to the total sum of creditors&#8217; claims but must be calculated as the difference between the sum of the claims and the value of the assets that were actually recovered into the liquidation estate. Thus, the lack of evidence that all measures to replenish the liquidation estate have been exhausted makes it impossible to hold the executives liable at this stage. The court also noted that the prematurity of the filing of the application is an independent ground for denying its satisfaction, regardless of whether or not the deadlines for applying to the court were violated.<\/p>\n<p>3. The Supreme Court left unchanged the resolution of the appellate court, which denied the satisfaction of the liquidator&#8217;s application to impose joint and several liability on the debtor&#8217;s management bodies due toprematurity of such a claim.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/reyestr.court.gov.ua\/Review\/138038104\"><strong>Case No. 638\/5965\/22 dated 07\/07\/2026<\/strong><\/a><br \/>\nGreetings. As a specialist with many years of experience, I have analyzed the court decision you provided. Here is a detailed breakdown of the case:<\/p>\n<p>1. **Subject of the dispute:** Challenging by the debtor the actions of the state enforcement officer regarding the calculation of alimony arrears, which was carried out based on the average wage for the given locality, rather than based on the income actually received by the debtor in the form of interest on a bank deposit.<\/p>\n<p>2. **Court arguments:**<br \/>\n   &#8211; The court emphasized that, pursuant to Part 2 of Article 195 of the Family Code of Ukraine, if the alimony payer was not employed at the time the arrears arose, the amount thereof shall be determined based on the average wage of an employee for the given locality.<br \/>\n   &#8211; Although interest on a deposit is indeed income from which alimony may be collected, this does not relieve the debtor of the obligation to prove the amount of their income and to timely provide the relevant documents to the enforcement officer.<br \/>\n   &#8211; The debtor did not provide the enforcement officer with proper evidence of income received during the disputed period and did not make regular voluntary alimony payments, which made it impossible to perform the calculation using a different methodology.<br \/>\n   &#8211; The court emphasized that the status of an able-bodied person imposes on the debtor the duty to ensure the maintenance of the child, and the lack of official employment is not grounds for exemption from the execution of a court decision.<br \/>\n   &#8211; The Supreme Court noted that the applicant did not refute the enforcement officer\u2019s calculation with any alternative evidence or their own counter-calculation based on confirmed income.<br \/>\n   &#8211; The courts of previous instances correctly established that the actions of the enforcement officer complied with the requirements of the Law &#8220;On Enforcement Proceedings&#8221; and the Instruction on the Organization of Compulsory Execution of Decisions.<\/p>\n<p>3. **Court decision:** The Supreme Court dismissed the cassation appeal, and the decisions of the courts of first and appellate instances were left unchanged.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/reyestr.court.gov.ua\/Review\/138038207\"><strong>Case No. 163\/1691\/21 dated 02\/07\/2026<\/strong><\/a><br \/>\nGreetings. As a lawyer with many years of experience, I have analyzed the court decision you provided. Here is a detailed analysis:<\/p>\n<p>1. **Subject of the dispute:** Criminal proceedings regarding the indictment of an obstetrician-gynecologist for improper performance of professional duties, which caused the death of a patient (Part 1 of Article 140 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine).<\/p>\n<p>2. **Court arguments:**<br \/>\n* The court emphasized that the accusation must be proven &#8220;beyond reasonable doubt,&#8221; and any doubts regarding guilt must be interpreted in favor of the accused.<br \/>\n* It was established that the violations of regulatory acts incriminated to the doctor were not confirmed, as the clinical protocols in effect at that time did not contain the requirements that, in the opinion of the prosecution, were violated.<br \/>\n* The court critically assessed the conclusions of the forensic medical examinations, noting that they are of a probabilistic nature, do not contain categorical conclusions about defects in the provision of care, and do not prove a direct causal link between the doctor\u2019s actions and the patient&#8217;s death.* The examined evidence indicated that the cause of death was closed blunt abdominal trauma (rupture of the spleen), rather than obstetric pathology, which excludes the fault of the gynecologist.<br \/>\n* The court found the prosecutor&#8217;s arguments regarding the obligation to refer the patient to a higher level of medical care to be unfounded, as this was not provided for by the relevant orders of the Ministry of Health in this clinical case.<br \/>\n* The appellate court rightfully refused to re-examine evidence and appoint additional expert examinations, as the prosecution failed to prove any significant incompleteness in the examination of the case materials.<br \/>\n* The court of cassation instance confirmed that the courts of lower instances provided a proper assessment of all evidence, and the appellants&#8217; arguments essentially boil down to a disagreement with this assessment, which does not constitute grounds for overturning the verdict.<\/p>\n<p>3. **Court decision:** The Supreme Court left the verdict of the court of first instance and the ruling of the appellate court unchanged, and dismissed the cassation appeals of the prosecutor and the victim&#8217;s representative.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/reyestr.court.gov.ua\/Review\/138038195\"><strong>Case No. 591\/3720\/24 dated 02\/07\/2026<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n<p>1. **Subject of the dispute:** Review of the legality of a person&#8217;s conviction for high treason (Part 2, Article 111 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine) due to the use of inadmissible evidence and incorrect legal qualification of the act.<\/p>\n<p>2. **Main arguments of the court:**<br \/>\n   &#8211; The court established that the key evidence for the prosecution was a video interview with a prisoner of war, which was obtained with the systemic assistance of state bodies, effectively turning it into a &#8220;functional equivalent of an interrogation&#8221; without adhering to procedural guarantees.<br \/>\n   &#8211; The Supreme Court emphasized that state permission for the publication of such interviews violates the norms of international humanitarian law (Art. 13 of the Third Geneva Convention), which prohibit subjecting prisoners of war to &#8220;public curiosity.&#8221;<br \/>\n   &#8211; The court declared the video recording inadmissible evidence, as it was obtained by circumventing the constitutional right to defense and the right not to testify against oneself.<br \/>\n   &#8211; The appellate court committed significant violations by ignoring the defense&#8217;s arguments regarding coercion to perform actions, which is critically important for establishing the subjective side of the crime.<br \/>\n   &#8211; Furthermore, the courts of lower instances failed to provide a legal assessment of the competition of norms, failing to explain why the person&#8217;s actions were qualified under the general article on high treason (Art. 111 of the Criminal Code) rather than under the special provision regarding participation in enemy armed formations (Part 7, Art. 111-1 of the Criminal Code).<br \/>\n   &#8211; Since the cassation court does not have the authority to establish factual circumstances on its own, the case was remanded for a new trial to the appellate instance to correct the aforementioned errors.<\/p>\n<p>3. **Court decision:** The Supreme Court partially satisfied the defense attorney&#8217;s cassation appeal, overturned the ruling of the appellate court, and ordered a new trial in the appellate court.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/reyestr.court.gov.ua\/Review\/138038209\"><strong>Case No. 755\/8937\/21 dated 02\/07\/2026<\/strong><\/a><br \/>\n1. The subject of the dispute is the consideration of a cassation&#8230;cassation appeal of the defense counsel against the ruling of the appellate court in criminal proceedings regarding the indictment of a citizen of the Republic of Poland for committing a number of crimes, in particular, fraud and unauthorized interference with the operation of information systems.<\/p>\n<p>2. The Court concluded that it is necessary to refer the case to the Joint Chamber of the Criminal Cassation Court due to identified discrepancies in law enforcement practice. The panel of judges established that there are contradictions between their interpretation of a legal provision and the position set forth by another composition of the court (the Third Judicial Chamber) quite recently, in March 2026. To ensure the uniformity of judicial practice and eliminate legal uncertainty, the panel deems it necessary to review the previously formulated conclusion. This will avoid situations where courts in similar cases render diametrically opposite decisions. Thus, the issue of the legal qualification of the accused&#8217;s actions requires a higher level of judicial generalization. The Court explicitly states that it is initiating a departure from the previous legal position set forth in the Supreme Court resolution of March 9, 2026.<\/p>\n<p>3. The Supreme Court ordered to refer the criminal proceedings to the Joint Chamber of the Criminal Cassation Court for the purpose of departing from the previously expressed legal conclusion.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/reyestr.court.gov.ua\/Review\/138037721\"><strong>Case No. 904\/1926\/23 (904\/3629\/25) of 07\/08\/2026<\/strong><\/a><br \/>\nHere is a detailed analysis of the court decision prepared for you:<\/p>\n<p>1. The subject of the dispute is the legality of the seizure of funds of &#8220;Terminal &#8220;Borivage&#8221; LLC as a measure to secure a claim in a case on declaring a mandate contract invalid and recovering funds within the framework of bankruptcy proceedings.<\/p>\n<p>2. The court proceeded from the fact that securing a claim is an instrument for preventing situations where the execution of a future court decision becomes impossible or significantly complicated. The appellate court duly followed the instructions of the Supreme Court provided during the previous review and verified the validity of the risks associated with the possible withdrawal of the debtor&#8217;s assets. It was established that there is a real threat of the defendant losing its core assets due to parallel litigation, which casts doubt on the ability to enforce the decision in this case. The selected measure (seizure of funds within the limits of the claim amount) was recognized as adequate, proportionate, and directly related to the subject of the dispute. The court also emphasized that the defendant had sufficient time to provide evidence to refute these risks but did not exercise this right properly. Furthermore, procedural legislation provides for mechanisms to lift such measures in the future or to compensate for damages if the claim is dismissed.<\/p>\n<p>3. The Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the appellate court on the seizure of funds, and the cassation appeal of &#8220;Terminal &#8220;Borivage&#8221; LLC was dismissed.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/reyestr.court.gov.ua\/Review\/138037724\"><strong>Case No. 5015\/2060\/11 of 07\/08\/2026<\/strong><\/a><br \/>\nHere is a detailed analysis of the courtnew decision, prepared from a professional standpoint:<\/p>\n<p>1. The subject of the dispute is the lawfulness of the inaction of a private enforcement officer who refused to terminate the enforcement proceedings, despite the debtor&#8217;s arguments regarding the full execution of the court decision in national currency.<\/p>\n<p>2. The Supreme Court was guided by the principle of legal certainty and the binding nature of the previous conclusions of the cassation court adopted in the same case. The Court emphasized that the credit obligation was denominated in foreign currency, and the court decision, although it contained an amount in hryvnias, provided for a currency peg; therefore, the execution must be carried out taking into account the official exchange rate of the National Bank of Ukraine on the day of payment. The cassation instance emphasized that the lower courts had no right to ignore the previously formulated legal position of the Supreme Court regarding the nature of this obligation. It was also noted that a court decision cannot change the content of a contractual obligation, and the debtor is obliged to repay the debt taking into account the exchange rate difference. The Court rejected the debtor&#8217;s arguments regarding the prejudicial nature of other court decisions, as they concerned only legal assessment rather than the establishment of new factual circumstances. As a result, the actions of the enforcement officer regarding the continuation of collection were recognized as lawful, since the debt is not considered fully repaid in currency equivalent.<\/p>\n<p>3. The Supreme Court overturned the decisions of the lower courts and adopted a new decision to refuse the satisfaction of the debtor&#8217;s complaint regarding the inaction of the private enforcement officer.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/reyestr.court.gov.ua\/Review\/138037707\"><strong>Case No. 911\/743\/24 (911\/278\/25) dated 06\/30\/2026<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n<p>**1. Subject of the dispute**<br \/>\nThe subject of the dispute is the liquidator&#8217;s demand to impose subsidiary liability on the director and founder of a bankrupt company for its obligations in connection with driving the enterprise to bankruptcy.<\/p>\n<p>**2. Court&#8217;s arguments**<br \/>\nThe Supreme Court emphasized that to hold a director liable for subsidiary responsibility, the liquidator is obliged to prove the existence of all elements of an offense, including intent and a causal link between the person&#8217;s actions and the debtor&#8217;s insolvency. The Court noted that the mere fact of the existence of a debt or improper performance of duties (e.g., failure to submit reports or transfer documents) is not an automatic ground for such liability unless it is proven that these specific actions led to the bankruptcy. In this case, insolvency arose due to an objective factor \u2014 a fire that destroyed the property where the activities were conducted, rather than through intentional manipulations by the director. The Court distinguished between liability for the preservation of property (civil law) and liability for causing bankruptcy (special, provided for by the Bankruptcy Procedures Code). Since the liquidator did not provide evidence that the director intentionally siphoned off assets or committed actions for intentional bankruptcy, there were no grounds for collecting funds from the director&#8217;s personal property.are absent. Thus, the Supreme Court confirmed that subsidiary liability cannot be a tool for covering any company debts without proving the specific person&#8217;s fault in destroying the business&#8217;s solvency.<\/p>\n<p>**3. Court Decision**<br \/>\nThe Supreme Court upheld the appellate court\u2019s ruling, which completely denied the claim for imposing subsidiary liability on the manager.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/reyestr.court.gov.ua\/Review\/138037579\"><strong>Case No. 904\/868\/22 dated 06\/30\/2026<\/strong><\/a><br \/>\nGreetings. As a lawyer with 15 years of experience, I have analyzed the court decision you provided. Here is a detailed breakdown:<\/p>\n<p>1. **Subject of the dispute:** The plaintiffs attempted to recognize as unlawful and cancel the order of a military unit and the certificates of compulsory alienation of their real estate under martial law, as well as to vindicate this property from the unlawful possession of others.<\/p>\n<p>2. **Court&#8217;s arguments:**<br \/>\n   &#8211; The court confirmed that compulsory alienation of property under martial law is a form of requisition carried out through administrative procedure to ensure defense needs, and the owner has no right to block this process if it complies with the law.<br \/>\n   &#8211; Military command has the legal authority to make decisions regarding requisition, and the absence of the owner during the drafting of the certificate does not render such a certificate illegal, as the law explicitly provides for the possibility of drafting it without the owner&#8217;s participation.<br \/>\n   &#8211; The court emphasized that the challenged order and certificates have already been executed (the property has been dismantled); therefore, their cancellation is an ineffective method of protection that would not restore ownership rights but would only deprive the plaintiffs of the right to receive compensation.<br \/>\n   &#8211; The state&#8217;s interference with property rights was recognized as proportionate and pursuing a legitimate aim \u2014 the protection of national security under the conditions of armed aggression.<br \/>\n   &#8211; The court rejected the plaintiffs&#8217; arguments regarding the non-compliance of state actions with legal norms, noting that an owner cannot assess the expediency or effectiveness of military measures, as this is within the exclusive competence of the state under martial law.<br \/>\n   &#8211; The court also pointed out that the plaintiffs chose an improper method of protection, as instead of challenging procedural documents, they should have focused on the mechanisms for obtaining full compensation for the alienated property.<\/p>\n<p>3. **Court Decision:** The Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the first and appellate instance courts, which completely denied the satisfaction of the claims.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/reyestr.court.gov.ua\/Review\/138037590\"><strong>Case No. 910\/28\/21 dated 07\/07\/2026<\/strong><\/a><br \/>\nThe subject of this dispute is the collection of debt for provided centralized water supply and sewage services, as well as a counterclaim to recognize the obligation under the relevant contract as terminated.<\/p>\n<p>Since the provided text contains only the introductory and operative parts of the judgment, we do not have access to the reasoning part, where the court&#8217;s detailed legal conclusions are set forth. However, based on the procedural outcome, it can be concluded that the Supreme Court identified significant violations of the norms of proceduralprocedural law or incompleteness of the examination of evidence by the courts of lower instances. It is likely that the courts of first and appellate instances did not properly assess the circumstances relevant to determining the scope of services consumed or the legal nature of the termination of obligations. The Supreme Court, as a court of cassation, does not have the authority to establish new facts on its own, and therefore it was compelled to set aside the previous decisions. The case has been remanded for a new trial so that the court of first instance may rectify the identified deficiencies and ensure a full and comprehensive clarification of the circumstances of the case. Such an approach is standard for ensuring the parties&#8217; right to a fair trial when prior findings are based on an incomplete evidentiary basis.<\/p>\n<p>The Supreme Court partially granted the cassation appeal, set aside the decisions of the courts of lower instances regarding the recovery of debt, and remanded the case for a new trial to the Commercial Court of the City of Kyiv.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/reyestr.court.gov.ua\/Review\/138037593\"><strong>Case No. 904\/2216\/21 (904\/3700\/25) of 07\/02\/2026<\/strong><\/a><br \/>\nGreetings. As a specialist with 15 years of experience, I have analyzed the provided court decision. Here is a detailed breakdown for your material:<\/p>\n<p>1. **Subject of the dispute:** Termination of a lease agreement for an agricultural land plot due to systematic non-payment of rent by the lessee, against whom bankruptcy proceedings have been initiated.<\/p>\n<p>2. **Court arguments:**<br \/>\n   &#8211; The court established that the lessee (debtor) systematically failed to perform its primary obligation \u2014 the payment of rent, which constitutes a material breach of the terms of the agreement and grounds for its termination in accordance with the provisions of the Civil and Land Codes of Ukraine.<br \/>\n   &#8211; The Supreme Court emphasized that although the leasehold right is a proprietary asset that can be included in the bankrupt&#8217;s liquidation estate, this does not grant the debtor the right to use another&#8217;s property indefinitely and free of charge.<br \/>\n   &#8211; The court noted that protecting the interests of creditors in a bankruptcy case cannot occur by violating the rights of the landowner, who is deprived of income from their property and compelled to bear the tax burden.<br \/>\n   &#8211; Since there are no real estate objects belonging to the debtor on the leased plot, there are no obstacles to the termination of the lease right that might otherwise arise from the need to service buildings.<br \/>\n   &#8211; The court rejected the liquidator&#8217;s arguments regarding the impossibility of terminating the agreement due to the bankruptcy procedure, stating that forcibly holding a property owner in a legal relationship with a bad-faith lessee contradicts the principles of justice and the protection of property rights.<br \/>\n   &#8211; The court also emphasized that the liquidator did not provide any evidence of the actual payment of rent, which makes it impossible to maintain the validity of the agreement.<\/p>\n<p>3. **Court decision:** The Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the courts of lower instances, by which the land lease agreement was terminated.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/reyestr.court.gov.ua\/Review\/138037679\"><strong>Case No. 902\/1032\/25 of 06\/30\/2026<\/strong><\/a><br \/>\nGreetings. As a lawyer with many years of experience, I have analyzed the providedyou a court decision. Here is a detailed analysis:<\/p>\n<p>1. The subject of the dispute is the recovery by the distribution system operator of the cost of unmetered electricity based on an act of violation, and the consumer&#8217;s counterclaim to recognize the commission&#8217;s decision as unlawful.<\/p>\n<p>2. The court established that the act of violation was drawn up with gross procedural violations, as it was not signed by the consumer, and the fact of refusal to sign was recorded neither by video recording nor by the signatures of disinterested persons, as required by the Retail Electricity Market Rules (REMR). Furthermore, the expert opinion regarding damage to the seals proved to be ambiguous and non-definitive, which prevented the court from accepting it as proper evidence of interference with the meter&#8217;s operation. The court also drew attention to the erroneous calculations made by the regional power utility (oblenergo), as the accrual period was groundlessly inflated compared to the date of the last control inspection. The court emphasized that the REMR requirements regarding the procedure for documenting violations are imperative and do not allow for broad interpretation, even under conditions of limited access to equipment. Regarding legal expenses, the court confirmed the right to their reimbursement, guided by the criteria of reasonableness and reality, and partially satisfied the consumer&#8217;s claims.<\/p>\n<p>3. The Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the lower courts, which had denied the claim of the regional power utility and satisfied the consumer&#8217;s counterclaim to cancel the commission&#8217;s decision.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/reyestr.court.gov.ua\/Review\/138037981\"><strong>Case No. 380\/8058\/25 dated 07\/07\/2026<\/strong><\/a><br \/>\nHere is a detailed analysis of the court decision prepared for your material:<\/p>\n<p>1. The subject of the dispute is the legality of the Pension Fund&#8217;s refusal to recalculate the monthly lifetime cash maintenance of a retired judge, taking into account the current amount of the subsistence minimum for able-bodied persons as of January 1, 2024.<\/p>\n<p>2. The Supreme Court in this case departed from its previous position set forth in case No. 520\/32171\/24 regarding the application of the &#8220;frozen&#8221; subsistence minimum (2102 UAH) for calculating judicial payments. The Court emphasized that the constitutional guarantee of judicial independence does not allow for substituting the subsistence minimum provided for by the Law &#8220;On the Judiciary and the Status of Judges&#8221; with other calculation values established by the State Budget Law. The panel of judges stressed that any replacement of this component with a lower value is unlawful. The Court also distinguished the current case from the practice of the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court in case No. 240\/9028\/24, noting that the latter concerned different legal relations (severance payments) rather than the recalculation of a retired judge&#8217;s maintenance. In addition, the Court took into account new legislative changes, which consolidated the impossibility of using cost-based values other than the subsistence minimum to determine a judge&#8217;s official salary. Ultimately, the Court concluded that an increase in the subsistence minimum in the budget automatically creates grounds for the recalculation of payments to retired judges.<\/p>\n<p>3. The Supreme CourtThe Court granted the plaintiff&#8217;s cassation appeal, overturned the ruling of the appellate court, and upheld the decision of the court of first instance, which ordered the Pension Fund to recalculate the lifetime monetary allowance.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/reyestr.court.gov.ua\/Review\/138037671\"><strong>Case No. 904\/5517\/20 of 08\/07\/2026<\/strong><\/a><br \/>\nBelow is a detailed analysis of the court decision in Case No. 904\/5517\/20:<\/p>\n<p>1. The subject of the dispute is the lawfulness of the appellate court\u2019s refusal to initiate proceedings due to the respondent&#8217;s failure to meet the deadline for filing an appeal against the decision of the court of first instance.<\/p>\n<p>2. The Supreme Court supported the position of the appellate instance, emphasizing that the right to appeal is not absolute and must be exercised within the time limits established by law. The Court established that the respondent was duly notified of the case proceedings and received the decision of the court of first instance personally back in 2021; therefore, claims of lack of awareness are groundless. The appellant&#8217;s arguments regarding the extension of procedural deadlines due to quarantine restrictions were rejected, as the quarantine had been lifted, and martial law in itself is not an automatic ground for reinstatement of deadlines without proving objective obstacles. The Court noted that the respondent failed to provide evidence of the existence of force majeure circumstances that would have prevented it from filing the appeal on time. It was also emphasized that a party&#8217;s negligent attitude toward its procedural rights cannot be grounds for reinstating deadlines, as this violates the principle of legal certainty and the finality of court decisions. Ultimately, the Supreme Court stated that the appellate court acted within its discretionary powers, properly assessed the parties&#8217; arguments, and adhered to the norms of procedural law.<\/p>\n<p>3. The Supreme Court left the ruling of the appellate court to refuse the initiation of appellate proceedings unchanged, and the cassation appeal was dismissed.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/reyestr.court.gov.ua\/Review\/138037901\"><strong>Case No. 600\/1007\/24-a of 07\/07\/2026<\/strong><\/a><br \/>\nGreetings. As a specialist with 15 years of experience, I have analyzed the court decision provided by you. Here is a detailed breakdown:<\/p>\n<p>1. The subject of the dispute is the lawfulness of the dismissal of a civil servant from their position in connection with receiving a negative rating based on the results of an annual performance evaluation.<\/p>\n<p>2. The Court established that the evaluation procedure was conducted in compliance with the requirements of the Law of Ukraine &#8220;On Civil Service&#8221; and Procedure No. 640. The key argument was that the plaintiff&#8217;s immediate supervisor provided a detailed and reasoned explanation for each score awarded, supporting them with facts of systematic violation of executive discipline and improper performance of official duties. The Court emphasized that the justification for the rating was not formal, as it contained specific examples of failure to perform tasks, which meets the criteria defined in Appendix 5 to Procedure No. 640. It was also taken into account that the plaintiff had the opportunity to provide her explanations before the conclusion was approved, thereby upholding her right to a defense. The Supreme Court emphasized the ddiscretionary powers of the evaluating entity, noting that the court has no right to substitute the head of the agency and re-evaluate scores if the procedure was followed. Consequently, the existence of a negative evaluation constitutes a lawful ground for dismissal pursuant to Clause 3 of Part 1 of Article 87 of the Law.<\/p>\n<p>3. The Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the lower courts to deny the claim, recognizing the plaintiff&#8217;s dismissal as lawful.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/reyestr.court.gov.ua\/Review\/138038230\"><strong>Case No. 760\/29397\/25 dated 06\/07\/2026<\/strong><\/a><br \/>\n1. The subject of the dispute is a defense attorney&#8217;s motion to change the territorial jurisdiction of criminal proceedings and transfer the case from one court to another within the jurisdiction of different appellate courts.<\/p>\n<p>2. In considering this motion, the Court was guided primarily by the requirements of Articles 31, 32, and 34 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, which clearly regulate the rules for determining jurisdiction. The Supreme Court proceeds from the premise that a change of jurisdiction is an exceptional measure that requires the existence of objective and compelling grounds provided for by law. In this case, the panel of judges did not find sufficient legal arguments to justify the necessity of transferring the case to another court. The Court took into account that compliance with the established rules of jurisdiction is a guarantee of the right to have a case heard by a lawfully constituted court. Since the defense did not prove the existence of circumstances that would make it impossible to hear the case in the designated court, there are no grounds to grant the motion. Thus, the Court ensured the stability of the judicial process by refusing the unfounded redistribution of cases between courts.<\/p>\n<p>3. The Court ruled to dismiss the defense attorney&#8217;s motion to refer the materials of the criminal proceedings to another court.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/reyestr.court.gov.ua\/Review\/138038228\"><strong>Case No. 760\/28242\/25 dated 06\/07\/2026<\/strong><\/a><br \/>\n1. The subject of the dispute is a defense attorney&#8217;s motion to change the territorial jurisdiction of criminal proceedings and refer the case from one court to another within the jurisdiction of different appellate courts.<\/p>\n<p>2. In considering this matter, the Court was guided primarily by the requirements of Articles 31, 32, and 34 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, which regulate the rules for determining jurisdiction. The Supreme Court proceeds from the premise that a change of jurisdiction is an exceptional measure that must be duly substantiated by the existence of objective circumstances that make it impossible for the case to be heard by the court designated by law. In this case, the defense failed to provide compelling evidence that hearing the case in the relevant court would violate the rights of the accused or lead to an inability to administer justice. The Court took into account that the general rule is for the case to be heard by the court within whose territorial jurisdiction the criminal offense was committed. The absence of exceptional circumstances provided for by law for the transfer of the case became the key factor for denying the motion. Thus, the Court concluded that there were no legal grounds for interfering with the determinedjurisdiction by law.<\/p>\n<p>3. The Supreme Court ruled to dismiss the defense attorney\u2019s motion to transfer the criminal proceedings to another court.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/reyestr.court.gov.ua\/Review\/138037689\"><strong>Case No. 916\/4972\/24 dated 06\/30\/2026<\/strong><\/a><br \/>\nBelow is a detailed analysis of the court decision in case No. 916\/4972\/24:<\/p>\n<p>**1. Subject matter of the dispute**<br \/>\nThe subject matter of the dispute is the recovery of over UAH 221 million from JSC &#8220;Odesagas&#8221; in favor of LLC &#8220;Gas TSO of Ukraine&#8221; for unauthorized natural gas off-take carried out by a consumer (JSC &#8220;Odesa Port Plant&#8221;) in September 2024.<\/p>\n<p>**2. Arguments of the Court**<br \/>\nThe Supreme Court concluded that the court of appeal committed significant violations of procedural law by failing to properly examine all circumstances of the case. Firstly, the court of appeal groundlessly relied on the prejudicial nature of circumstances from another case, despite the fact that the subject of proof and legal grounds in them differ. Secondly, no assessment was provided regarding the defendant&#8217;s arguments that another entity (LLC &#8220;Ukrnaftogazburinnia&#8221;) acted as the customer of transportation services during the disputed period, from which funds for imbalances had already been recovered within the framework of another judicial proceeding. The Court also failed to clarify whether the notification in form No. 9 constituted a sufficient legal basis for the emergence of an obligation on the part of JSC &#8220;Odesagas&#8221; to physically terminate the gas supply. Furthermore, the issue of whether the defendant had the actual technical capability and legal grounds for the forced disconnection of the consumer, considering the facts of denial of access to the facility for workers, remained unclarified. Finally, the court did not analyze the systemic interrelation of the norms of the Gas Transmission System Code regarding the liability of the transportation service customer and the gas distribution network operator in the event of rejection of nominations due to the lack of financial security.<\/p>\n<p>**3. Court decision**<br \/>\nThe Supreme Court overturned the ruling of the court of appeal and remanded the case for a new trial to the South-Western Commercial Court of Appeal.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/reyestr.court.gov.ua\/Review\/138037713\"><strong>Case No. 911\/343\/16 dated 06\/30\/2026<\/strong><\/a><br \/>\nGreetings. As a lawyer with 15 years of experience, I have analyzed the Supreme Court decision you provided. Here is a detailed analysis:<\/p>\n<p>1. The subject matter of the dispute is the lawfulness of the refusal by the lower courts to change the priority of satisfying the claims of a secured creditor to claims of the fourth priority due to the actual absence of the collateral.<\/p>\n<p>2. The Supreme Court pointed out that the lower courts approached the issue formally, failing to properly examine evidence regarding the existence or absence of the collateral. The Court emphasized that in the event of the destruction or loss of the collateral, the secured creditor is not deprived of the right to request the court to change the priority of their claims, since the collateral as a means of securing an obligation effectively ceases to exist. The panel of judges emphasized that the liquidator possesses the most reliable information regarding the composition of the liquidation estate, and therefore their reports and financial analyses must be thoroughly examined by the court. The courts erroneously rejected the creditor&#8217;s arguments solelydue to the absence of additional expert opinions, without providing an assessment of the materials available in the case. The Supreme Court also noted that ensuring a balance of interests between creditors and the debtor is a key task of the court, and therefore, a refusal to consider a motion on its merits constitutes a violation of procedural norms.<\/p>\n<p>3. The Supreme Court overturned the ruling of the court of first instance and the resolution of the appellate court, remitting the case for a new trial to the Commercial Court of Kyiv Region.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/reyestr.court.gov.ua\/Review\/138037722\"><strong>Case No. 902\/858\/15(902\/541\/21) dated 06\/29\/2026<\/strong><\/a><br \/>\nHere is a detailed analysis of the court decision prepared for your interview:<\/p>\n<p>1. The subject of the dispute is the challenge to the inaction of a private enforcement officer who, in the debtor&#8217;s opinion, failed to take proper actions to verify the fact of the destruction of property subject to recovery under a court decision.<\/p>\n<p>2. The court established that the private enforcement officer did not properly fulfill the requirements of Article 60 of the Law of Ukraine &#8220;On Enforcement Proceedings,&#8221; as he did not conduct an actual verification of the debtor&#8217;s arguments regarding the destruction of the property (absence of site visits, absence of proper documentation of the condition of the objects). The lower courts erroneously obligated the enforcement officer to perform the actions provided for by Article 39 of the Law, which would have effectively meant the automatic termination of enforcement proceedings without proper procedural documentation of the verification results. The Supreme Court emphasized that the enforcement officer is obliged to first perform actions to verify the existence of property as provided by Article 60 of the Law, and only based on the results of this verification should they make a decision on the future course of the enforcement proceedings. The Court stressed that an enforcement officer cannot be compelled to terminate proceedings (Art. 39) until the objective impossibility of execution due to the absence of the subject of recovery has been established. Thus, the Supreme Court corrected the procedural error of the lower courts, which had prematurely determined the outcome of the enforcement actions.<\/p>\n<p>3. The Supreme Court partially granted the cassation appeal, amending the decisions of the lower courts by excluding the requirement for the enforcement officer to perform the actions provided for by Article 39 of the Law of Ukraine &#8220;On Enforcement Proceedings&#8221; (termination of proceedings), while upholding the obligation only regarding the performance of actions provided for by Article 60 of the Law (verification of the existence of property).<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/reyestr.court.gov.ua\/Review\/138037736\"><strong>Case No. 917\/718\/25 dated 07\/07\/2026<\/strong><\/a><br \/>\nHere is a detailed analysis of the court decision prepared for your interview:<\/p>\n<p>1. The subject of the dispute is the issue of the allocation of legal costs for professional legal assistance incurred by the plaintiff during the consideration of the case in the court of cassation instance.<\/p>\n<p>2. The Court was guided by the principle that expenses for legal assistance must be actual, justified, and proportionate to the complexity of the case, as well as the scope of work performed by the attorney. The Supreme Court emphasized that when resolving the issue of the allocation of expenses, the court is not limited solely by the terms of the agreement between the attorney and the client but must independently assess the reasonableness of the claimed amount. The Court refu<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Case No. 648\/1274\/19 dated 06\/23\/2026 The subject of the dispute is the verification of the legality of the appellate court ruling, which upheld the decision of the court of first instance in criminal proceedings regarding the accusation of a person for committing theft (Part 1, Article 185 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine). The Supreme&hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_bbp_topic_count":0,"_bbp_reply_count":0,"_bbp_total_topic_count":0,"_bbp_total_reply_count":0,"_bbp_voice_count":0,"_bbp_anonymous_reply_count":0,"_bbp_topic_count_hidden":0,"_bbp_reply_count_hidden":0,"_bbp_forum_subforum_count":0,"pmpro_default_level":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[57],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-18441","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-court-practice-ukraine","pmpro-has-access"],"acf":{"patreon-level":0},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/18441","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=18441"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/18441\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=18441"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=18441"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=18441"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}