{"id":17854,"date":"2026-06-26T10:35:45","date_gmt":"2026-06-26T07:35:45","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/2026\/06\/review-of-echr-decisions-for-26-06-2026\/"},"modified":"2026-06-26T10:35:45","modified_gmt":"2026-06-26T07:35:45","slug":"review-of-echr-decisions-for-26-06-2026","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/2026\/06\/review-of-echr-decisions-for-26-06-2026\/","title":{"rendered":"Review of ECHR decisions for 26\/06\/2026"},"content":{"rendered":"

<\/p>\n

CASE OF SHEVCHUK v. UKRAINE<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

This judgment, **** for the Ukrainian legal system, concerns the 2019 dismissal of Mr. Stanislav Shevchuk from his positions as a judge and President of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (CCU). The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found that the disciplinary proceedings against the applicant were fundamentally flawed, violating both his right to an impartial tribunal and his right to respect for his private life. The Court determined that the CCU acted as a “tribunal” in this context, but failed to provide the necessary procedural safeguards required by the Convention. Specifically, the Court criticized the lack of impartiality of judges who acted as both accusers and adjudicators, as well as the lack of clarity in the domestic legal framework governing such dismissals. This ruling highlights the critical need for transparent and foreseeable disciplinary procedures within high-level judicial institutions.<\/p>\n

### Structure and Provisions
\nThe decision is structured into four main legal assessments:
\n1. **Admissibility:** The Court rejected the Government’s objections regarding the abuse of the right of application and the time-limit for lodging the complaint, confirming that the applicant had exhausted domestic remedies.
\n2. **Article 6 \u00a7 1 (Right to a Fair Trial):** The Court applied the *Eskelinen* test, concluding that Article 6 is applicable because the CCU acted as a “tribunal” in disciplinary matters. It found a violation of the impartiality requirement but declared the complaint regarding “access to court” inadmissible, as the CCU itself served as the tribunal.
\n3. **Article 8 (Right to Private Life):** The Court found an interference with the applicant\u2019s private life due to the professional and reputational consequences of his dismissal. It ruled that the interference was not “in accordance with the law” due to a lack of foreseeability in the domestic rules.
\n4. **Article 10 (Freedom of Expression):** This complaint was declared inadmissible as the applicant failed to substantiate that his dismissal was a direct result of his freedom of expression rather than his overall conduct.<\/p>\n

Compared to previous case-law (e.g., *Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine*), this decision reinforces the principle that even high-ranking constitutional judges are entitled to basic fair trial guarantees, specifically regarding the separation of roles between those who initiate disciplinary proceedings and those who decide them.<\/p>\n

### Key Provisions for Legal Use
\n* **Objective Impartiality:** The judgment establishes that it is a violation of Article 6 for judges who initiate disciplinary proceedings and publicly formulate accusations to subsequently sit on the panel that decides the merits of the case.
\n* **Doctrine of Necessity:** The Court clarified that while the “doctrine of necessity” might allow for the participation of biased judges in extreme cases to prevent a total paralysis of the court, it was not applicable here because the CCU had 18 judges, and it was not shown that a panel could not have been formed without the conflicted members.
\n* **Quality of Law (Article 8):** The Court emphasized that disciplinary grounds must be formulated with sufficient precision. Quoting constitutional provisions verbatim without explaining which specific actions constitute “significant” or “systematic” neglect of duty fails the “foreseeability” test required by the Convention.
\n* **Procedural Fairness:** The judgment underscores that the absence of domestic rules on the recusal of Constitutional Court judges in disciplinary proceedings is a significant deficiency that undermines the appearance of impartiality and public confidence in the judiciary.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

CASE OF BOTYANSZK\u00c1 AND OTHERS v. SLOVAKIA<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

The judgment in *Botyanszk\u00e1 and Others v. Slovakia* (application no. 56444\/22) concerns a protracted administrative restitution case that has been pending for over two decades. The applicants alleged that the excessive length of these proceedings violated their right to a fair trial within a reasonable time under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. Furthermore, they argued that the domestic legal system failed to provide an effective remedy for this delay, in violation of Article 13. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) rejected the Government\u2019s arguments regarding the complexity of the case and the conduct of the parties, finding no justification for the extreme duration of the proceedings. Consequently, the Court ruled unanimously that both Article 6 \u00a7 1 and Article 13 of the Convention had been breached. The judgment confirms the Court’s established stance that domestic remedies must allow for an assessment of the *overall* length of proceedings rather than segmenting them into parts.<\/p>\n

### Structure and Provisions
\nThe decision follows the standard structure of a Committee-level judgment:
\n* **Procedural History:** Outlines the timeline of the application and its connection to previous, related cases (*Balogh and Others v. Slovakia*).
\n* **The Facts:** Details the ongoing administrative proceedings before the Kom\u00e1rno Land Office and the unsuccessful attempt to seek redress via the Slovak Constitutional Court.
\n* **The Law:**
\n * **Article 6 \u00a7 1:** The Court applies the established *Frydlender* criteria (complexity, applicant conduct, authority conduct, and what is at stake) to determine that the “reasonable time” requirement was violated.
\n * **Article 13:** The Court finds a violation due to the lack of an effective domestic remedy, specifically criticizing the Constitutional Court\u2019s practice of refusing to examine the overall length of proceedings by segmenting them.
\n* **Article 41:** The Court awards non-pecuniary damages and costs, consistent with its previous findings in the *Balogh* line of cases.<\/p>\n

Compared to previous versions of this case, this judgment reinforces the Court\u2019s consistency, explicitly building upon the findings in the 2018 and 2021 *Balogh* judgments, effectively closing the door on the Government\u2019s attempts to justify the delay through procedural complexity.<\/p>\n

### Key Provisions for Legal Use
\nFor practitioners and legal observers, the most significant aspects of this decision are:<\/p>\n

1. **Rejection of “Excessive Formalism” in Exhaustion of Remedies:** The Court emphasizes that the rule on exhaustion of domestic remedies must be applied with flexibility. It explicitly rejects the Government\u2019s attempt to exclude specific periods of litigation from the assessment simply because the applicants did not specifically name every court in their constitutional complaint.
\n2. **The “Overall Length” Requirement:** The judgment serves as a strong precedent that a remedy for the length of proceedings is only “effective” if it allows the domestic court to examine the *entirety* of the proceedings. The Court rejects the practice of segmenting proceedings to avoid jurisdiction, a tactic often used by domestic authorities to evade responsibility for systemic delays.
\n3. **Standard of “Reasonable Time”:** The Court reiterates that even in complex cases involving numerous plaintiffs (in this case, 345), the state remains responsible for ensuring that administrative proceedings do not drag on for decades. The “complexity” argument is insufficient to justify a 21-year delay.<\/p>\n

This decision is a clear reminder to member states that administrative efficiency is a fundamental component of the right to a fair trial.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

CASE OF BULAKH v. UKRAINE<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

This judgment, **** for the context of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, addresses the procedural obligations of the State under Article 3 of the Convention. The case of *Bulakh v. Ukraine* (no. 1380\/25) concerns the failure of Ukrainian authorities to conduct an effective investigation into an incident of ill-treatment inflicted upon the applicant by a private party in 2022. Following the applicant\u2019s disappearance in action in June 2025, the Court permitted his wife to pursue the application, affirming her *locus standi*. The Court found that the domestic investigation was plagued by significant delays, procedural shortcomings, and a failure to secure the applicant\u2019s effective participation. Ultimately, the Court ruled that the State failed to meet the requirements of Article 3, as the investigation remained pending and ineffective for years. This decision serves as a reminder that even in cases of private violence, the State bears a positive obligation to act with diligence and promptness.<\/p>\n

### Structure and Main Provisions
\nThe decision follows the standard structure of a Committee-level judgment of the European Court of Human Rights. It begins with the procedural history, followed by the Court\u2019s ruling on the *locus standi* of the applicant\u2019s wife, which is a crucial procedural step given the applicant’s status as missing in action. The core of the judgment is the analysis of the procedural limb of Article 3, where the Court evaluates the effectiveness of the domestic investigation. The judgment concludes with the application of Article 41, awarding non-pecuniary damages. Compared to previous versions of such judgments, this decision explicitly incorporates an appended table that details the specific shortcomings of the domestic investigation, aligning it with established case-law such as *Muta v. Ukraine*.<\/p>\n

### Main Provisions for Practical Use
\nFor legal practitioners and observers, the following aspects are of primary importance:
\n* **Procedural *Locus Standi*:** The Court\u2019s decision to allow the spouse of a missing-in-action soldier to continue the proceedings is a vital precedent. It confirms that the right to seek justice for human rights violations is not extinguished by the disappearance of the victim in life-threatening circumstances.
\n* **Positive Obligations under Article 3:** The judgment reinforces that the State\u2019s duty to investigate is not limited to acts committed by State agents. It explicitly states that authorities must conduct an effective investigation into ill-treatment by private individuals, requiring independence, impartiality, and public scrutiny.
\n* **Criteria for “Effectiveness”:** The Court highlights that the investigation must be prompt and thorough. It specifically identifies that the “overall protracted character” of proceedings and the “failure to secure the applicant\u2019s right to participate effectively” constitute clear breaches of the Convention.
\n* **Reliance on Precedents:** By citing *Muta v. Ukraine* and *Chernega and Others v. Ukraine*, the Court underscores that the failure to conduct timely investigative actions and the repeated termination of proceedings due to alleged lack of evidence\u2014despite the availability of witnesses\u2014are systemic issues that the State must address to maintain the rule of law.<\/p>\n

This judgment is **** as it underscores the continued necessity for the Ukrainian judicial and investigative systems to maintain high standards of procedural diligence, even under the extreme pressures of the current war, ensuring that victims of violence are not denied their right to an effective remedy.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

CASE OF KYSELYOV AND OTHERS v. UKRAINE<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

****<\/p>\n

This judgment, *Kyselyov and Others v. Ukraine*, delivered by the Fifth Section of the European Court of Human Rights on 25 June 2026, addresses a systemic issue regarding the treatment of detainees within the Ukrainian penitentiary system. The Court examined 14 joined applications concerning inadequate conditions of detention, including severe overcrowding, lack of hygiene, and poor sanitary facilities. In its ruling, the Court reaffirmed that such conditions, when persistent, constitute a violation of Article 3 of the Convention, which prohibits inhuman or degrading treatment. Furthermore, the Court found a violation of Article 13, noting that the applicants lacked any effective domestic remedy to challenge these conditions or obtain compensation. The judgment serves as a stern reminder of the state\u2019s obligation to provide humane conditions for all individuals deprived of their liberty. Consequently, the Court ordered the Ukrainian government to pay specific amounts in damages to the applicants, reflecting the gravity and duration of their suffering.<\/p>\n

The decision is structured as a standard Committee judgment, which is typically utilized for cases involving well-established case-law. It begins with the joinder of the applications due to their identical subject matter, followed by an assessment of the admissibility and merits of the complaints under Articles 3 and 13. The Court rejects the Government\u2019s objection regarding the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, clarifying that a compensatory remedy is only effective if the poor conditions have already ceased. The judgment concludes with an application of Article 41, awarding pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages. Compared to earlier rulings, this decision consolidates multiple individual claims into a single, streamlined judgment, reinforcing the Court\u2019s consistent stance on the “leading case” principle established in *Melnik v. Ukraine* and *Sukachov v. Ukraine*.<\/p>\n

For legal practitioners and observers, the most critical provisions of this decision are:<\/p>\n

* **The Rejection of the “Exhaustion of Remedies” Objection:** The Court explicitly ruled that the Government cannot claim a failure to exhaust domestic remedies if the applicant remains in the same inadequate conditions. This effectively lowers the barrier for detainees to seek justice directly from the Court while their detention continues.
\n* **The Evidentiary Standard:** The Court reiterated that once an applicant makes a *prima facie* case of ill-treatment, the burden of proof shifts to the State. The Government is required to provide primary evidence, such as cell floor plans, actual occupancy numbers, and specific records regarding hygiene, temperature, and lighting.
\n* **Systemic Violations:** By grouping these cases, the Court highlights the ongoing, systemic nature of these human rights violations in Ukraine. The inclusion of additional violations\u2014such as the excessive length of criminal proceedings (Article 6) and pre-trial detention (Article 5)\u2014in specific applications demonstrates that the Court is increasingly willing to address the broader procedural failures accompanying poor detention conditions.
\n* **Financial Redress:** The appended table provides a clear breakdown of the compensation awarded, which serves as a benchmark for future claims involving similar periods of detention and levels of overcrowding.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

CASE OF MACAVEIU AND OTHERS v. ROMANIA<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

In the case of *Macaveiu and Others v. Romania* (2026), the European Court of Human Rights addressed systemic issues regarding detention conditions in Romanian facilities. The Court examined four joined applications concerning individuals who had been held in prisons and police stations under conditions characterized by severe overcrowding, poor hygiene, and inadequate infrastructure. The judgment confirms that these conditions violated Article 3 of the Convention, which prohibits inhuman or degrading treatment. Notably, the Court allowed the heirs of a deceased applicant to continue the proceedings, affirming their standing to pursue the claim. While the Romanian government argued that domestic remedies were available, the Court found that these mechanisms were not effective during the specific periods of the applicants’ detention. Consequently, the Court ruled in favor of the applicants, awarding them compensation for non-pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n

The structure of the decision follows the standard format for a Committee-level judgment, beginning with the joinder of the applications due to their thematic similarity. It addresses the procedural issue of the standing of heirs, followed by the admissibility of the complaints, where the Court distinguishes between periods of detention covered by effective domestic remedies and those that were not. The judgment relies heavily on established precedents, such as *Rezmive\u0219 and Others v. Romania*, to assess the merits of the Article 3 claims. A significant change in this decision compared to earlier jurisprudence is the Court\u2019s explicit recognition of the effectiveness of specific domestic remedies (such as the complaint to the supervisory judge and actions in tort) that have only recently been deemed functional, thereby narrowing the window for future applications of this nature.<\/p>\n

The most important provisions for legal practitioners and observers are as follows:<\/p>\n

* **Standing of Heirs:** The Court reaffirmed that close family members have a legitimate interest in pursuing human rights complaints even after the death of the original applicant, provided the nature of the grievance justifies it.
\n* **Temporal Limitation of Admissibility:** The Court clarified that it will reject complaints for periods of detention where the state has already provided “adequate redress” through domestic legal mechanisms, such as Law no. 169\/2017.
\n* **Exhaustion of Remedies:** The judgment provides a clear timeline for the effectiveness of Romanian domestic remedies. It establishes that the “complaint to the supervisory judge” (Article 56 of Law no. 254\/2013) became an effective remedy as of 6 April 2023, and the “action in tort” became effective as of 13 January 2021.
\n* **Article 3 Thresholds:** The Court reiterated that a serious lack of personal space in a cell is a primary factor in determining “degrading” treatment, often sufficient on its own to constitute a violation when it falls below the minimum standards established in *Mur\u0161i\u0107 v. Croatia*.<\/p>\n

This decision serves as a definitive reminder that while states are increasingly successful in establishing effective domestic remedies to handle prison condition grievances, they remain liable for past systemic failures where such remedies were not yet available to the detainees.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

CASE OF MISHIN AND OTHERS v. UKRAINE<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

****<\/p>\n

The judgment in *Mishin and Others v. Ukraine* (applications nos. 29381\/16 and 13 others) concerns a systemic issue regarding the administration of justice in Ukraine, specifically the excessive duration of criminal proceedings. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) examined 14 joined applications where the applicants argued that their cases had been pending for unreasonable periods, ranging from several years to over a decade. The Court concluded that the Ukrainian authorities failed to ensure that these criminal proceedings were conducted within a “reasonable time,” as required by Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. Furthermore, the Court found that the applicants lacked any effective domestic remedy to challenge these delays, constituting a violation of Article 13. Consequently, the Court ordered the Ukrainian government to pay varying amounts of compensation to the applicants for the non-pecuniary damage suffered due to these protracted legal processes.<\/p>\n

The structure of the decision follows the standard format for a Committee-level judgment of the Fifth Section of the ECHR. It begins with the procedural history and the joinder of the applications, which is a common practice when multiple cases share the same legal subject matter. The core of the decision is divided into the assessment of the alleged violations of Articles 6 and 13, followed by the application of Article 41 regarding just satisfaction. This judgment aligns with established case-law, notably referencing the leading case of *Nechay v. Ukraine* (2021), which serves as the precedent for the Court’s findings on the lack of effective domestic remedies for length-of-proceedings complaints in Ukraine. The decision is notable for its consolidated approach, addressing a diverse group of applicants in a single document to streamline the judicial process.<\/p>\n

The most important provisions for legal practitioners and observers are:<\/p>\n

* **The “Reasonable Time” Criterion:** The Court reaffirmed that the reasonableness of proceedings is assessed based on the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicants, and the conduct of the national authorities. The Court explicitly stated that it found no justification for the delays in the present cases, emphasizing that the burden of ensuring a timely trial rests with the State.
\n* **Systemic Lack of Remedy:** The Court\u2019s finding under Article 13 confirms that there remains no effective mechanism within the Ukrainian legal system for individuals to seek redress or accelerate proceedings that have become excessively long. This is a critical point for future litigation, as it underscores the necessity of applying to the ECHR when domestic avenues are exhausted or non-existent.
\n* **Just Satisfaction:** The Court awarded specific monetary compensation to each applicant, ranging from \u20ac500 to \u20ac4,800, depending on the specific duration and circumstances of their individual cases. These awards are payable within three months, with default interest provisions included to ensure compliance.
\n* **Precedential Weight:** By citing *Nechay v. Ukraine* and *Ganysh and Others v. Ukraine*, the Court reinforces a consistent line of jurisprudence, signaling that Ukraine remains under scrutiny for structural deficiencies in its criminal justice system regarding the speed of trials.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

CASE OF MOISE AND OTHERS v. ROMANIA<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

The judgment in *Moise and Others v. Romania* (applications nos. 61328\/19 and 10 others) concerns the systemic failure of the Romanian state to enforce final domestic court decisions regarding the restitution of property or compensation for assets confiscated during the communist regime. The Court found that the applicants, despite holding final judicial orders acknowledging their property rights or entitlements to compensation, were left in a state of legal uncertainty due to the authorities’ failure to execute these decisions. By joining these eleven applications, the Court addressed a recurring issue of ineffective domestic restitution mechanisms. It concluded that the state\u2019s inability to provide timely redress constitutes a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which protects the right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions. Consequently, the Court ordered the respondent State to ensure the enforcement of these judgments or, failing that, to pay specific amounts in pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages.<\/p>\n

### Structure and Provisions
\nThe decision follows the standard structure of a Committee-level judgment under the European Court of Human Rights:
\n* **Procedural History:** The Court notes the joinder of the applications due to their identical subject matter and addresses the *locus standi* of an heir following the death of an applicant.
\n* **Admissibility:** The Court dismisses the Government\u2019s objection regarding the “abuse of the right of individual application,” clarifying that the applicants provided accurate information regarding the status of their domestic claims.
\n* **Merits:** Relying on the leading case *V\u0103leanu and Others v. Romania*, the Court reaffirms that final court orders regarding restitution constitute “possessions” under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. It finds that the state failed to deploy necessary efforts to enforce these rights.
\n* **Just Satisfaction:** The Court applies the methodology established in *V\u0103leanu* for calculating pecuniary damages, explicitly rejecting the applicability of the new Emergency Ordinance no. 38\/2025 to these specific cases, as they were lodged prior to its entry into force. It also provides clear instructions on the deduction of any amounts already paid domestically to prevent “unjust enrichment.”<\/p>\n

### Key Provisions for Legal Application
\nFor practitioners and stakeholders, the following points are of primary importance:
\n1. **Definition of “Possessions”:** The judgment reinforces that a final court order acknowledging a right to restitution or compensation is, in itself, a “possession” protected under the Convention.
\n2. **Enforcement Timeline:** The Court sets a strict twelve-month deadline for the state to enforce the outstanding judgments, failing which the pecuniary damages awarded in the appendix become immediately payable.
\n3. **Calculation Methodology:** The Court explicitly excludes the application of the recent Emergency Ordinance no. 38\/2025 to cases already pending before the Court, ensuring that the applicants\u2019 claims are assessed based on established, more favorable case-law criteria.
\n4. **Prevention of Double Recovery:** Paragraph 16 is crucial; it mandates that any compensation already received by the applicants through domestic administrative channels must be deducted from the Court\u2019s award to avoid unjust enrichment.
\n5. **Rejection of Speculative Claims:** The Court maintains a firm stance against awarding damages for “loss of profit” in restitution cases, labeling such claims as speculative and difficult to quantify, thereby limiting the scope of financial recovery to the value of the property and non-pecuniary harm.<\/p>\n

This judgment serves as a reminder of the state\u2019s ongoing obligation to provide effective remedies for historical property abuses, emphasizing that the passage of time does not absolve the state of its duty to execute final judicial decisions.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

CASE OF PU\u015eCA\u015e AND OTHERS v. ROMANIA<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

The case of *Pu\u015fca\u015f and Others v. Romania* concerns the systemic failure of the Romanian state to enforce domestic court decisions regarding the restitution of property confiscated during the communist regime. The applicants, or their heirs, held final judicial decisions from 2002 acknowledging their property rights, yet they remained unable to recover possession or obtain effective compensation for over two decades. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) found that this prolonged non-enforcement constituted a clear violation of the right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The Court rejected the Government\u2019s procedural objections, affirming that the heirs of the original claimants have the legal standing to pursue these claims. Ultimately, the Court ordered the state to enforce the original judgment or, failing that, to pay pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages to the estates of the deceased applicants.<\/p>\n

### Structure and Provisions
\nThe judgment follows the standard structure for a Committee-level decision under the European Convention on Human Rights. It begins with the procedural history, moves to the Court’s assessment of *locus standi* (the right of heirs to continue the case), addresses the merits of the property rights violation, and concludes with the application of Article 41 regarding just satisfaction. <\/p>\n

Compared to earlier jurisprudence, this decision reinforces the Court\u2019s established stance in the *V\u0103leanu and Others v. Romania* line of cases. It confirms that the Court will not tolerate the state\u2019s failure to implement restitution mechanisms, effectively treating the 2002 domestic judgment as a “possession” protected by the Convention. The decision is notable for its detailed handling of a complex chain of succession, ensuring that the rights of the original claimants are preserved for their descendants.<\/p>\n

### Key Provisions for Legal Application
\nFor practitioners and observers, the following elements are the most significant:<\/p>\n

* **Standing of Heirs:** The Court explicitly affirmed that in cases involving transferable pecuniary interests, heirs have the right to pursue proceedings in the stead of deceased applicants. This is crucial for long-standing restitution cases where the original claimants pass away during the lengthy litigation process.
\n* **Definition of “Possession”:** The Court reiterated that a final domestic decision acknowledging a right to restitution constitutes a “possession” under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. This provides a strong basis for arguing that the state\u2019s failure to execute such a decision is a direct violation of the Convention.
\n* **Prevention of Unjust Enrichment:** The Court included a specific safeguard (paragraph 20) requiring that any compensation already received through domestic administrative or judicial channels must be deducted from the ECHR award. This prevents double recovery while ensuring the state remains liable for the shortfall.
\n* **Strict Enforcement Timeline:** The judgment imposes a mandatory twelve-month deadline for the state to enforce the original 2002 judgment or pay the specified pecuniary damages, reinforcing the urgency of resolving these historical property disputes.<\/p>\n

***<\/p>\n

*Note: While this specific case concerns Romania, the principles regarding the state’s obligation to enforce final judicial decisions and the protection of property rights are of universal relevance to the Council of Europe member states. Given the ongoing challenges regarding property restitution and the protection of private ownership in post-conflict or transitional justice contexts, the rigorous protection of these rights remains **** for the broader European legal landscape, including the context of post-war recovery and property rights protection in Ukraine.*<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

CASE OF VUKOVI\u0106 v. MONTENEGRO<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

The judgment in *Vukovi\u0107 v. Montenegro* (application no. 5522\/25) concerns a finding by the European Court of Human Rights regarding the excessive duration of constitutional proceedings in Montenegro. The applicant, Ivan Vukovi\u0107, challenged the length of time his case remained pending before the Constitutional Court, which spanned over seven years and five months. The Court assessed the reasonableness of this duration against established criteria, including the complexity of the case and the conduct of the national authorities. Ultimately, the Court concluded that the delay failed to meet the \u201creasonable time\u201d requirement mandated by Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. The judgment reaffirms the Court\u2019s consistent stance that domestic constitutional review must be conducted with due diligence to ensure effective judicial protection. Consequently, the Court found a violation of the applicant’s right to a fair trial and awarded him compensation for non-pecuniary damage and legal costs.<\/p>\n

The structure of the decision follows the standard format for a Committee-level judgment of the Court. It begins with the procedural history, noting the date of the application and the subsequent communication to the Government. The core of the decision is found in the “The Law” section, which outlines the legal framework under Article 6 \u00a7 1 and applies the established *Frydlender* criteria to the specific facts of the case. A notable feature of this decision is the Court\u2019s dismissal of the Government\u2019s objection regarding the “abuse of the right of petition,” which was raised because the applicant did not immediately notify the Court when the domestic proceedings concluded. By referencing established precedents such as *Staki\u0107 v. Montenegro* and *Sini\u0161taj v. Montenegro*, the Court maintains continuity in its jurisprudence, confirming that the systemic issue of lengthy constitutional proceedings in Montenegro remains a point of concern.<\/p>\n

The most important provisions for legal practitioners and observers are found in paragraphs 7 through 10. Paragraph 7 serves as a vital reminder of the four-fold test for “reasonable time”: the complexity of the case, the applicant’s conduct, the conduct of the authorities, and what was at stake for the applicant. Paragraph 9 is particularly significant as it clarifies that the conclusion of domestic proceedings after the communication of an application does not automatically render a complaint an abuse of process. This provides a clear procedural safeguard for applicants who may experience a resolution of their case while their application is pending before the Strasbourg Court. Furthermore, the decision serves as a firm directive to the Montenegrin authorities that the duration of constitutional review must be proportional to the nature of the dispute, reinforcing the principle that justice delayed is justice denied under the Convention.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

CASE OF SHEVCHUK v. UKRAINE This judgment, **** for the Ukrainian legal system, concerns the 2019 dismissal of Mr. Stanislav Shevchuk from his positions as a judge and President of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (CCU). The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found that the disciplinary proceedings against the applicant were fundamentally flawed, violating…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_bbp_topic_count":0,"_bbp_reply_count":0,"_bbp_total_topic_count":0,"_bbp_total_reply_count":0,"_bbp_voice_count":0,"_bbp_anonymous_reply_count":0,"_bbp_topic_count_hidden":0,"_bbp_reply_count_hidden":0,"_bbp_forum_subforum_count":0,"pmpro_default_level":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[129],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-17854","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-echr-decisions","pmpro-has-access"],"acf":{"patreon-level":0},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/17854","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=17854"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/17854\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=17854"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=17854"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=17854"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}