{"id":17746,"date":"2026-06-24T10:33:04","date_gmt":"2026-06-24T07:33:04","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/2026\/06\/review-of-echr-decisions-for-24-06-2026\/"},"modified":"2026-06-24T10:33:04","modified_gmt":"2026-06-24T07:33:04","slug":"review-of-echr-decisions-for-24-06-2026","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/2026\/06\/review-of-echr-decisions-for-24-06-2026\/","title":{"rendered":"Review of ECHR decisions for 24\/06\/2026"},"content":{"rendered":"

<\/p>\n

CASE OF KARCHAVA v. GEORGIA<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

The judgment in *Karchava v. Georgia* (application no. 34790\/23) addresses the limits of state interference with solo protests. The applicant, a psychotherapist, was arrested and detained for 24 hours after attempting to set up a tent for a hunger strike near a public statue to protest the lack of school lunches. Despite the peaceful nature of his conduct, domestic authorities cited potential obstruction of a nearby court, the protection of a monument, and public safety concerns related to New Year\u2019s Eve celebrations as justifications for his removal. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found that these measures, including the arrest and detention, constituted an unjustified interference with the applicant\u2019s freedom of expression. The Court emphasized that the domestic authorities failed to provide relevant and sufficient reasons to justify the restriction, effectively penalizing a peaceful exercise of fundamental rights.<\/p>\n

### Structure and Provisions
\nThe decision follows the standard structure of an ECtHR judgment:
\n* **Introduction and Facts:** Details the applicant\u2019s attempt to protest, the police intervention, his subsequent arrest, and the domestic court proceedings.
\n* **Legal Framework:** Outlines relevant domestic laws (Assemblies and Demonstrations Act, Code of Administrative Offences) and international standards (Venice Commission\/OSCE guidelines).
\n* **The Law (Merits):** The Court clarifies that Article 10 (freedom of expression) is the *lex specialis* here, as the case concerns a solo protest, though it is interpreted in light of Article 11 (freedom of assembly).
\n* **Assessment:** The Court evaluates the “necessity” of the interference, focusing on whether the domestic courts relied on an “acceptable assessment of the relevant facts.”
\n* **Changes\/Developments:** The judgment reinforces the Court\u2019s recent jurisprudence regarding the “chilling effect” of administrative detention, even when the final judicial penalty (a verbal reprimand) is minor.<\/p>\n

### Key Provisions for Legal Use
\nThe following points are critical for practitioners and observers:
\n1. **Scope of Protection for Solo Protesters:** The Court reaffirms that a solo protester whose physical presence is an integral part of their expression is entitled to the same protection as an assembly.
\n2. **The “Chilling Effect” Doctrine:** The Court explicitly ruled that even if a final court penalty is “relatively insignificant” (such as a verbal reprimand), the preceding measures\u2014such as forcible removal, arrest, and 24-hour detention\u2014are sufficient to create a “chilling effect” on the exercise of democratic rights.
\n3. **Requirement for Evidence-Based Justification:** The Court rejected the government\u2019s reliance on “possible” or “potential” risks (e.g., the potential use of pyrotechnics). It established that authorities must substantiate such risks with concrete evidence, such as administrative maps or specific safety protocols, rather than speculative assumptions.
\n4. **Duty of Domestic Courts:** The judgment highlights that domestic courts must perform a substantive assessment of the facts. The failure of the Batumi City Court and the Kutaisi Court of Appeal to address the applicant\u2019s evidence (such as the topographic report proving he was not within the restricted 20-meter zone of the court) was a decisive factor in the finding of a violation.
\n5. **Tolerance of Peaceful Conduct:** The Court reiterated that where a demonstration does not involve violence, public authorities are expected to show a high degree of tolerance, even if the form of the protest (e.g., a tent) is inconvenient.<\/p>\n

***<\/p>\n

**:** This judgment is highly relevant for the Ukrainian legal context. Given the ongoing martial law in Ukraine, which imposes significant restrictions on public assemblies and demonstrations, this decision serves as a vital reminder that any interference with peaceful expression must still be based on a concrete, evidence-based necessity. It underscores that even under restrictive conditions, the state cannot rely on vague or speculative security justifications to suppress peaceful, non-violent protests that concern matters of public interest.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

CASE OF KIGURADZE v. GEORGIA<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

The judgment in *Kiguradze v. Georgia* (application no. 25784\/23) addresses the delicate balance between an individual\u2019s right to protect their reputation and the parliamentary immunity afforded to elected representatives. The applicant, a businessman, sought to sue a Member of Parliament (MP) for defamation after the MP publicly linked him to past espionage charges, despite the applicant having been subsequently acquitted. The domestic courts discontinued the proceedings, ruling that the MP\u2019s statements were protected by parliamentary immunity as they were made in the context of political debate and the exercise of official duties. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) was tasked with determining whether this procedural bar violated the applicant\u2019s right of access to a court under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. Ultimately, the Court found no violation, concluding that the immunity served a legitimate aim and that the domestic courts had properly verified the link between the MP\u2019s speech and their parliamentary functions.<\/p>\n

### Structure and Provisions
\nThe decision is structured around the classic proportionality test applied to Article 6 \u00a7 1. It begins by establishing that while the right of access to a court is a fundamental component of a fair trial, it is not absolute and may be subject to limitations. The Court confirms that parliamentary immunity is a widely accepted doctrine in Council of Europe member states, designed to protect the separation of powers and ensure that representatives can speak freely. <\/p>\n

Compared to previous jurisprudence, this judgment reinforces the Court\u2019s stance that it will not act as a court of appeal regarding the *substance* of a parliamentary statement. Instead, it focuses on the *procedural* legitimacy of the immunity. The Court highlights that the application of immunity in Georgia is not “automatic,” noting that domestic courts are required to verify the nexus between the statement and the MP\u2019s duties. This aligns with the Court\u2019s evolving approach to defer to national authorities when they provide a reasoned, case-specific analysis of why immunity applies.<\/p>\n

### Key Provisions for Legal Practice
\nFor legal practitioners, the following aspects of the judgment are particularly significant:<\/p>\n

* **The “Clear Link” Requirement:** The Court emphasizes that for parliamentary immunity to be compatible with Article 6, there must be a verifiable link between the impugned statement and the MP\u2019s parliamentary functions. The absence of such a link would likely lead to a finding of a violation.
\n* **Procedural Safeguards:** The judgment underscores that domestic courts must not apply immunity blindly. The fact that the Georgian courts held a hearing, allowed the parties to present arguments, and examined the context of the speech (distinguishing between factual allegations and value judgments) was crucial to the Court\u2019s finding of proportionality.
\n* **Wide Margin of Appreciation:** The Court reaffirms that States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in regulating parliamentary immunity. As long as the immunity is not used to shield an MP from liability for acts completely unrelated to their mandate, the Court is unlikely to intervene.
\n* **Distinction from Previous Cases:** The Court explicitly contrasts this case with earlier rulings (such as *Cordova v. Italy* or *Bakoyanni v. Greece*), where it found violations because the domestic courts had failed to properly examine whether the statements were actually connected to parliamentary duties. In *Kiguradze*, the domestic courts did their “homework,” which saved the state from a finding of a violation.<\/p>\n

This decision serves as a reminder that while parliamentary immunity is a powerful shield, its legitimacy in the eyes of the ECtHR depends entirely on the domestic judiciary\u2019s willingness to conduct a rigorous, fact-based assessment of whether the speech in question truly falls within the scope of an MP’s official duties.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

CASE OF MALACHINI AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

This judgment in the case of *Malachini and Others v. Russia* (Applications nos. 9184\/09 and 22580\/10) addresses the responsibility of the Russian Federation for the torture and killing of Georgian prisoners of war during and immediately following the 2008 armed conflict. The Court confirmed that the applicants, who were Georgian servicemen, fell under Russia\u2019s “spatial jurisdiction” because they were detained in Tskhinvali, an area where Russia exercised effective control. The Court found that the extreme violence inflicted upon these prisoners, including the extrajudicial execution of three individuals, constituted clear violations of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. Furthermore, the Court held that Russia failed to conduct any effective investigation into these grave abuses. This ruling reinforces the principle that a state cannot evade responsibility for the treatment of detainees by claiming the events occurred during an active phase of hostilities. The judgment concludes by awarding non-pecuniary damages to the victims and their families, while explicitly preventing double compensation for those already covered by previous inter-State rulings.<\/p>\n

### Structure and Provisions
\nThe decision follows the standard structure of a Chamber judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). It begins with the factual background of the 2008 conflict, followed by the specific circumstances of the applicants’ detention and ill-treatment. The legal analysis is divided into three main pillars:
\n1. **Jurisdiction (Article 1):** The Court clarifies that while “active hostilities” (bombing\/shelling) may preclude jurisdiction in certain contexts, the detention of prisoners of war is a distinct matter. It establishes that Russia\u2019s effective control over South Ossetia at the time of detention triggered its obligations under the Convention.
\n2. **Substantive and Procedural Violations (Articles 2 & 3):** The Court examines the right to life and the prohibition of torture. It finds that the state is responsible for the deaths and torture of the prisoners, regardless of whether the specific acts were committed by Russian forces or by South Ossetian forces under Russian influence.
\n3. **Just Satisfaction (Article 41):** The Court awards specific monetary sums for non-pecuniary damage, with a crucial proviso to avoid double-dipping regarding previous Grand Chamber awards.<\/p>\n

Compared to previous versions of the Court\u2019s jurisprudence (specifically *Georgia v. Russia (II)*), this decision refines the application of the “active phase of hostilities” doctrine. It clarifies that the exclusion of jurisdiction for “chaotic” military operations does not extend to the systematic detention and abuse of prisoners of war, even if those events occur during the same temporal window.<\/p>\n

### Key Provisions for Legal Use
\n* **Jurisdiction over Detainees:** The most significant aspect for practitioners is the Court\u2019s firm stance that the “chaos” of an international armed conflict does not absolve a state of its duty to protect prisoners of war. If a state exercises effective control over the territory where detainees are held, it is responsible for their treatment, regardless of the intensity of the surrounding conflict.
\n* **Attribution of Responsibility:** The Court reaffirms that where a state exercises effective control over a region (like South Ossetia), it is responsible for the actions of local subordinate forces. It is not necessary for an applicant to prove “detailed control” over every specific act of torture; the overarching control of the territory is sufficient to engage state responsibility.
\n* **Procedural Obligations:** The judgment emphasizes that the failure to investigate deaths in custody is a separate, autonomous violation of the Convention. This is a vital tool for lawyers seeking to hold states accountable for “disappearances” or deaths in conflict zones where the state claims it was not directly involved in the act itself.
\n* **Non-Pecuniary Damages:** The Court\u2019s approach to awarding damages while explicitly barring double compensation provides a clear roadmap for handling complex, multi-layered litigation involving both inter-State and individual applications.<\/p>\n

**:** This decision is highly relevant to the current situation in Ukraine. The Court\u2019s reasoning regarding the Russian Federation\u2019s “effective control” over occupied territories and its responsibility for the treatment of prisoners of war serves as a critical legal precedent for ongoing and future cases concerning the actions of Russian forces and their proxies in occupied Ukrainian territories.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

CASE OF TALESKI AND OTHERS v. NORTH MACEDONIA<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

This judgment in the case of *Taleski and Others v. North Macedonia* addresses the intersection of legislative intervention, the rule of law, and fair trial guarantees. The applicants, former high-ranking public officials, challenged the retrospective annulment of presidential pardons that had initially exempted them from criminal prosecution for corruption and electoral offenses. The Court examined whether this legislative intervention, which allowed for the continuation of their criminal proceedings, violated the principles of legal certainty and the rule of law. Additionally, the Court addressed complaints regarding judicial impartiality and the failure to serve prosecution submissions during appeal proceedings. Ultimately, the Court found that the legislative intervention was justified by compelling public interest, though it identified a procedural violation regarding the adversarial nature of the appeal process for two of the applicants.<\/p>\n

### Structure and Provisions
\nThe decision is structured into three primary legal assessments:
\n1. **Legislative Intervention:** The Court analyzed whether the 2016 Pardon Act, which enabled the annulment of the applicants’ pardons, breached Article 6 \u00a7 1. It concluded that the pardons were “void *ab initio*” because they were based on a repealed legal provision, thus creating a fundamental defect.
\n2. **Judicial Impartiality:** The Court assessed the participation of a Supreme Court judge who had previously made public statements regarding the pardons. It declared this complaint inadmissible due to the applicants’ failure to exhaust domestic remedies, specifically their failure to exercise “special diligence” in requesting the judge’s disqualification.
\n3. **Adversarial Proceedings:** The Court evaluated the failure to serve the higher prosecutor\u2019s submissions on the second and third applicants during their appeal. It found a violation of the right to an adversarial trial, following the precedent set in *Bosak and Others v. Croatia*.<\/p>\n

Compared to previous jurisprudence, this decision clarifies that while legislative interference with pending criminal cases is generally viewed with skepticism, it may be permissible if it serves a compelling general interest\u2014such as restoring the rule of law when public officials have been granted immunity through legally invalid acts.<\/p>\n

### Key Provisions for Legal Use
\n* **Justification for Retrospective Legislation:** The Court established that a departure from the principle of legal certainty is permissible when the underlying act (the pardon) is “tainted by a fundamental defect” and when the intervention aims to ensure the accountability of public officials. This provides a high threshold for states seeking to rectify systemic legal errors.
\n* **Duty of Diligence:** The judgment reinforces that in final-instance proceedings, parties must demonstrate “special diligence” in identifying and challenging potential judicial bias. Failure to proactively seek disqualification when the composition of the court is publicly accessible may render such complaints inadmissible.
\n* **Unconditional Right to Adversarial Proceedings:** The Court reaffirmed that the right to comment on prosecution submissions is unconditional. Even if an applicant is present at a hearing, the failure to provide written submissions in advance constitutes a violation, as it places a “disproportionate burden” on the defense. The Court explicitly noted that this violation is actionable even in the absence of proven prejudice to the outcome.<\/p>\n

***<\/p>\n

*Note: This decision is a significant development in European human rights law regarding the limits of executive clemency and the procedural requirements for adversarial criminal appeals.*<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

CASE OF ACAR v. T\u00dcRK\u0130YE<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

The case of *Acar v. T\u00fcrkiye* (application no. 20039\/22) concerns the indefinite retention of an individual\u2019s criminal conviction data in a police database, even after that conviction had been legally expunged from the official criminal record. The applicant argued that his personal data remained in the “GBT\/K\u0130HB\u0130” system, which is used by law enforcement during routine checks, despite his conviction being considered “spent” under domestic law. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) examined whether this continued storage violated the applicant’s right to respect for his private life under Article 8 of the Convention. The Court ultimately found that the legal framework governing this data retention lacked the necessary accessibility and foreseeability required by the Convention. Consequently, the Court ruled that the interference with the applicant\u2019s private life was not “in accordance with the law,” resulting in a finding of a violation of Article 8.<\/p>\n

### Structure and Provisions
\nThe judgment is structured into three primary segments:
\n1. **Admissibility:** The Court systematically rejected five preliminary objections raised by the Turkish Government, affirming that the mere storage of personal data constitutes a sufficient interference to grant the applicant “victim status,” and that the complaint was neither ill-founded nor an abuse of the right of application.
\n2. **Merits:** The Court analyzed the “lawfulness” of the data retention. It determined that while the database had a basis in a directive, that directive was not a statute, was not officially published, and lacked clear safeguards against arbitrariness.
\n3. **Just Satisfaction:** The Court awarded the applicant EUR 2,000 for non-pecuniary damage and EUR 500 for costs and expenses.<\/p>\n

Compared to previous jurisprudence, this decision reinforces the Court\u2019s established stance on the necessity of “quality of law” in digital surveillance and data storage, specifically emphasizing that internal administrative directives cannot override constitutional requirements for statutory clarity.<\/p>\n

### Key Provisions for Legal Application
\nFor practitioners and observers, the following points are the most critical:
\n* **The “In Accordance with the Law” Standard:** The Court reaffirmed that for data processing to be lawful, the domestic legal basis must be accessible and foreseeable. The fact that the K\u0130HB\u0130\/GBT Directive was “for official use only” and not publicly available was a decisive factor in the Court\u2019s finding of a violation.
\n* **Lack of Safeguards:** The Court highlighted that the primary legislation (Law No. 2559) failed to provide specific, concrete procedures for the retention and deletion of data, leaving too much discretion to executive authorities.
\n* **Data Protection as a Human Right:** The judgment serves as a strong precedent that the retention of “spent” conviction data in police databases, without a clear, public, and limited legal framework, constitutes a disproportionate interference with Article 8 rights.
\n* **Rejection of “Insignificant Disadvantage”:** The Court explicitly rejected the Government\u2019s argument that the storage of such data is a minor issue, confirming that the protection of personal data is of fundamental importance to the enjoyment of private life.<\/p>\n

This decision is a significant reminder to member states that internal police directives cannot serve as a substitute for transparent, parliamentary-sanctioned legislation when it comes to the long-term storage of sensitive personal information.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

CASE OF \u00c7ALI AND OTHERS v. T\u00dcRK\u0130YE<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

The judgment in *\u00c7al\u0131 and Others v. T\u00fcrkiye* (2026) addresses a massive group of 264 applications concerning the criminal conviction of individuals for membership in the \u201cFetullahist Terror Organisation\/Parallel State Structure\u201d (FET\u00d6\/PDY). The core of the legal dispute centers on the Turkish judiciary\u2019s reliance on the use of the encrypted messaging application \u201cByLock\u201d as the decisive, and often sole, evidence to secure convictions for membership in an armed terrorist organization. The Court found that the domestic courts\u2019 uniform approach\u2014treating the mere use of ByLock as conclusive proof of criminal intent and organizational hierarchy\u2014deprived the applicants of a fair trial. Consequently, the Court ruled that there has been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. This decision serves as a procedural extension of the landmark *Y\u00fcksel Yal\u00e7\u0131nkaya* judgment, confirming that the systemic shortcomings in these trials are not isolated incidents but a structural issue within the Turkish judicial process.<\/p>\n

### Structure and Provisions
\nThe judgment is structured as a Committee-level decision, reflecting the Court’s strategy of handling repetitive applications by applying established case-law.
\n* **Joinder:** Given the identical nature of the complaints, the Court joined all 264 applications into a single proceeding.
\n* **Admissibility:** The Court declared the Article 6 \u00a7 1 complaints admissible, rejecting the Government\u2019s argument that these cases should be treated as unique or distinct from previous rulings.
\n* **Merits:** The Court applied the principles established in the Grand Chamber judgment *Y\u00fcksel Yal\u00e7\u0131nkaya v. T\u00fcrkiye* (2023) and the subsequent *Demirhan and Others v. T\u00fcrkiye* (2025). It explicitly noted that while some cases contained additional evidence (such as bank records or social media posts), the “global approach” of the domestic courts\u2014where ByLock use was the primary driver of conviction\u2014remained the defining, flawed feature of the trials.
\n* **Article 7:** The Court declined to examine the Article 7 (no punishment without law) complaints separately, as the finding of a violation under Article 6 \u00a7 1 provides the necessary basis for the applicants to seek a reopening of their domestic proceedings.<\/p>\n

### Key Provisions for Legal Application
\nFor practitioners and observers, the following points are the most critical:
\n1. **The “ByLock” Doctrine:** The Court maintains that the domestic courts\u2019 failure to provide adequate safeguards regarding the collection, decryption, and evaluation of ByLock data prevents defendants from effectively challenging the evidence against them.
\n2. **Procedural Redress:** The Court emphasizes that the most appropriate form of redress is the **reopening of domestic proceedings** under Article 311 \u00a7 1 (f) of the Turkish Code of Criminal Procedure. This is the primary mechanism for applicants to rectify the violation.
\n3. **Just Satisfaction:** The Court held that the finding of a violation constitutes sufficient just satisfaction in itself. It explicitly refused to award monetary compensation for non-pecuniary damage or costs, signaling that the remedy lies in the domestic judicial system rather than financial payouts from the Court.
\n4. **Uniformity of Violations:** The judgment reinforces that the violations are not “isolated incidents” but are inherent to the current judicial framework applied to FET\u00d6\/PDY-related cases, effectively lowering the threshold for future applicants to demonstrate that their trials suffered from the same systemic defects.<\/p>\n

***<\/p>\n

*Note: As this case concerns the interpretation of fair trial standards in the context of mass criminal proceedings following a coup attempt, it is highly relevant to the broader jurisprudence on the rule of law in the Council of Europe. While this specific judgment concerns T\u00fcrkiye, the principles regarding the use of digital evidence and the right to challenge it are of general importance to all member states, including those currently navigating complex post-conflict or post-crisis legal environments.*<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

CASE OF \u00c7ET\u0130N v. T\u00dcRK\u0130YE<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

The case of *\u00c7etin v. T\u00fcrkiye* (application no. 35454\/19) concerns the pre-trial detention of a 14-year-old minor who was held for over ten months on charges of armed robbery. The European Court of Human Rights examined whether the domestic courts provided “relevant and sufficient” reasons for this detention, as required by Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention. The Court found that the Turkish judicial authorities relied on formulaic, abstract, and stereotyped language, failing to conduct an individualized assessment of the applicant’s specific circumstances. Crucially, the domestic courts completely disregarded the applicant\u2019s status as a minor and failed to justify why alternative measures were insufficient. Consequently, the Court unanimously ruled that there had been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention.<\/p>\n

The decision is structured in a standard format for a Committee judgment, beginning with the subject matter and the procedural history of the application. It then addresses the Government\u2019s preliminary objections regarding the exhaustion of domestic remedies and the validity of the applicant\u2019s representation, both of which were dismissed. The core of the judgment is the assessment of the merits, where the Court reiterates its established case-law regarding the necessity of justifying pre-trial detention. The judgment does not introduce new legal principles but reinforces the existing, stringent requirements for the detention of minors, emphasizing that such measures must be a last resort.<\/p>\n

The most important provisions for the use of this decision are:
\n* **The Prohibition of Formulaic Reasoning:** The Court explicitly states that decisions relying on a “formulaic enumeration” of grounds\u2014such as the nature of the offence or the “catalogue” status of a crime\u2014without concrete, individualized facts, are insufficient to justify detention.
\n* **The “Last Resort” Principle for Minors:** The judgment underscores that an applicant\u2019s age is a critical factor. Domestic courts are under a heightened obligation to provide comprehensive reasoning when detaining a child, and they must demonstrate that they have actively considered and rejected less restrictive alternatives.
\n* **The Burden of Justification:** The Court clarifies that even where domestic law presumes certain risks (such as absconding or tampering with evidence), the judicial authorities must still provide concrete evidence to rebut the presumption of liberty.<\/p>\n

This judgment serves as a significant reminder that the procedural safeguards of the Convention apply with even greater rigor when the liberty of a child is at stake.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

CASE OF D\u00d6NMEZ AND OTHERS v. T\u00dcRK\u0130YE<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

The judgment in *D\u00f6nmez and Others v. T\u00fcrkiye* (2026) addresses a series of applications concerning convictions for membership in the \u201cFET\u00d6\/PDY\u201d organization following the 2016 coup attempt in T\u00fcrkiye. The core issue before the Court was the domestic judicial practice of relying decisively on the use of the encrypted messaging application \u201cByLock\u201d as sufficient, automatic proof of criminal membership in an armed terrorist organization. The Court found that this approach, which effectively imposed objective liability on users, violated the principle of legality under Article 7 of the Convention. By treating the mere use of the application as conclusive evidence of all constituent elements of the crime, the domestic courts failed to conduct an individualized assessment of the applicants’ specific criminal conduct. Consequently, the Court ruled that there has been a violation of Article 7, while finding it unnecessary to examine other complaints separately. This decision reinforces the precedent set in *Y\u00fcksel Yal\u00e7\u0131nkaya v. T\u00fcrkiye* and confirms that the systemic issues identified in that Grand Chamber ruling remain a point of contention in Turkish jurisprudence. ****<\/p>\n

### Structure and Provisions
\nThe decision is structured as a Committee judgment, reflecting the Court\u2019s established practice for repetitive cases. It follows a standard format:
\n* **Subject Matter:** Outlines the legal context, specifically the reliance on ByLock and other circumstantial evidence (e.g., Bank Asya accounts, association memberships).
\n* **Assessment:** The Court joins the 34 applications due to their identical legal nature. It addresses the Article 7 complaint by reaffirming the principles established in *Y\u00fcksel Yal\u00e7\u0131nkaya* and *Demirhan and Others*.
\n* **Article 41 (Just Satisfaction):** The Court determines that the finding of a violation constitutes sufficient just satisfaction, emphasizing that the applicants have a domestic remedy available: the reopening of their criminal proceedings under Article 311 \u00a7 1 (f) of the Turkish Code of Criminal Procedure.
\n* **Changes:** Unlike earlier individual cases, this judgment serves as a consolidation of repetitive applications, confirming that the Court will not deviate from its established stance on the “ByLock” evidence issue, regardless of whether additional circumstantial evidence was present in specific files.<\/p>\n

### Key Provisions for Legal Use
\nFor legal practitioners and observers, the most critical aspects of this decision are:
\n1. **Reaffirmation of the “ByLock” Standard:** The Court explicitly states that it sees no reason to depart from its findings in *Y\u00fcksel Yal\u00e7\u0131nkaya*. It clarifies that while other evidence (e.g., witness statements, financial records) may exist, the domestic courts’ reliance on ByLock as *conclusive* proof of membership violates Article 7.
\n2. **Procedural Redress:** The judgment highlights that the primary remedy for these applicants is the reopening of their domestic trials. The Court explicitly links its finding of a violation to the applicants’ right to seek such a reopening, which is the most significant practical consequence of this ruling.
\n3. **Judicial Economy:** By finding a violation of Article 7, the Court exercises judicial economy, declining to examine Article 6 \u00a7 1 (fair trial) and other complaints separately. This signals that the Article 7 violation is the “main legal question” that effectively covers the core of the applicants’ grievances regarding their convictions.
\n4. **Individualization Requirement:** The judgment underscores that even if an applicant has an “organic link” to an organization, the domestic courts must still prove the “continuity, diversity, and intensity” of their activities rather than relying on a blanket presumption of guilt derived from the use of a specific communication tool.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

CASE OF ELEZI v. ALBANIA<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

The case of *Elezi v. Albania* (Application no. 17141\/21) concerns the dismissal of a career prosecutor following the extraordinary transitional vetting process implemented in Albania to reform the justice system. The applicant, who had served as a prosecutor since 1999, was removed from office by the Special Appeal Chamber (SAC) due to alleged discrepancies in his asset declarations. While the applicant was cleared regarding his professional competence and integrity, the vetting bodies identified minor financial shortfalls over a four-year period. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) examined whether this dismissal, which significantly impacted the applicant\u2019s private life, was proportionate to the legitimate aims of the vetting reform. Ultimately, the Court ruled that the dismissal was disproportionate, as the financial discrepancies were relatively insignificant and the calculation methods used by the domestic authorities were flawed.<\/p>\n

### Structure and Provisions
\nThe judgment is structured as a standard ECtHR Committee decision, focusing on the application of Article 8 (Right to respect for private life).
\n* **Background:** It details the vetting process, the applicant\u2019s professional history, and the specific financial analysis conducted by the Independent Qualification Commission (IQC) and the SAC.
\n* **Assessment:** The Court acknowledges that the Albanian vetting reform serves a “pressing social need” but emphasizes that individual dismissals must remain proportionate.
\n* **Findings:** The Court identifies that the SAC failed to justify a “spike” in estimated living costs for 2007 and failed to account for cumulative surpluses that offset the identified deficits.
\n* **Just Satisfaction:** The Court awards non-pecuniary damages and legal costs, and suggests the reopening of domestic proceedings as the appropriate remedy.<\/p>\n

Compared to earlier vetting cases (such as *Xhoxhaj* or *Sevdari*), this decision reinforces the Court\u2019s established jurisprudence that while the vetting process itself is legitimate, the domestic authorities must demonstrate a rigorous and balanced financial analysis before imposing the ultimate sanction of dismissal.<\/p>\n

### Key Provisions for Legal Application
\nFor practitioners and observers, the following points are the most critical aspects of this judgment:<\/p>\n

1. **Proportionality in Asset Assessment:** The Court established that where a public official has a positive record in integrity and professional competence, a dismissal based solely on asset discrepancies must be supported by a highly reliable financial analysis. Minor deficits (in this case, 1.5% to 3.2% of annual income) are insufficient to justify the “draconian” measure of dismissal.
\n2. **Requirement for Explanatory Rigor:** The Court explicitly criticized the SAC for failing to explain a massive, unexplained increase in estimated living costs for a specific year. This sets a precedent that domestic vetting bodies cannot rely on arbitrary statistical spikes without providing a reasoned explanation.
\n3. **Cumulative Financial Analysis:** The judgment confirms that vetting bodies must perform an “overall assessment.” They cannot ignore surpluses from other years that would effectively offset identified shortfalls, especially when those surpluses exceed the total deficit found.
\n4. **Remedial Guidance:** The Court reaffirmed that for cases involving disproportionate dismissal, the reopening of domestic proceedings is the appropriate path to ensure compliance with the Convention, providing a clear roadmap for applicants seeking reinstatement.<\/p>\n

*Note: While this case specifically concerns the Albanian judicial reform, the principles regarding the proportionality of sanctions in vetting processes are of high relevance to any jurisdiction undergoing similar systemic anti-corruption transitions.* ****<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

CASE OF \u0130PEK v. T\u00dcRK\u0130YE<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

The judgment in *\u0130pek v. T\u00fcrkiye* (application no. 71299\/16) concerns the pre-trial detention of a businessman, Mr. Cafer Tekin \u0130pek, who was held for over three years and eight months following allegations of financial irregularities and membership in the FET\u00d6\/PDY organization. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) examined whether the applicant\u2019s detention was based on a “reasonable suspicion” and whether the domestic courts provided sufficient, individualized reasons for his prolonged incarceration. While the Court found that the initial detention was supported by sufficient evidence of financial misconduct, it concluded that the subsequent extensions of his detention lacked the necessary justification. The judgment highlights a recurring issue in the Court\u2019s jurisprudence regarding the use of “catalogue offences” and formulaic reasoning by Turkish judicial authorities. Ultimately, the Court ruled that the failure to provide concrete, individualized reasons for the applicant’s continued detention constituted a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention.<\/p>\n

### Structure and Provisions
\nThe decision is structured into three main parts: the factual background, the Court\u2019s assessment of the merits, and the application of Article 41 regarding just satisfaction.
\n1. **Admissibility:** The Court declared the complaint regarding the lack of “reasonable suspicion” (Article 5 \u00a7 1) inadmissible, finding that the initial reports from financial and investigative authorities provided a sufficient factual basis. However, it declared the complaints under Article 5 \u00a7 3 (the right to be brought to trial within a reasonable time or released pending trial) admissible.
\n2. **Merits:** The Court analyzed the detention orders, noting that the domestic courts relied heavily on the “catalogue offences” listed in the Turkish Code of Criminal Procedure.
\n3. **Just Satisfaction:** The Court awarded the applicant EUR 3,500 for non-pecuniary damage and EUR 500 for costs and expenses, rejecting his significantly higher claims.<\/p>\n

Compared to previous cases, this judgment reinforces the Court\u2019s established stance that a state\u2019s derogation under Article 15 of the Convention does not grant it carte blanche to ignore the requirement for individualized reasoning in detention proceedings, especially as the duration of detention increases.<\/p>\n

### Key Provisions for Legal Application
\nFor legal practitioners and observers, the following points are the most critical:
\n* **Requirement for Individualized Reasoning:** The Court explicitly states that relying on “catalogue offences” (statutory presumptions of flight risk or evidence tampering) is insufficient. Domestic courts must demonstrate, through concrete facts, why detention is necessary in the specific circumstances of the individual case.
\n* **The “Formulaic” Trap:** The judgment clarifies that the continued use of stereotyped or abstract language in court orders\u2014even if the initial detention was justified\u2014fails to meet the standards of Article 5 \u00a7 3, particularly in cases of prolonged pre-trial detention.
\n* **Persistence of Reasonable Suspicion:** While the Court accepted that a reasonable suspicion existed at the start, it emphasized that the *persistence* of such suspicion is a condition *sine qua non* for continued detention, but it is not a substitute for the requirement to provide specific, non-formulaic reasons for why that detention must continue over time.
\n* **Scope of Review:** The Court reaffirmed its practice of confining its assessment of “reasonable suspicion” to the evidence available to the domestic authorities *at the time* the detention was ordered, excluding evidence added to the file retrospectively.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

CASE OF KADANA v. ALBANIA<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

The case of *Kadana v. Albania* (application no. 50295\/20) concerns the dismissal of a judge, Mr. Izet Kadana, by the Albanian vetting institutions, specifically the Special Appeal Chamber (SAC). The applicant challenged his dismissal, arguing that the SAC panel that decided his case was not a “tribunal established by law” because one of its members, Judge L.D., had been appointed in violation of statutory eligibility criteria. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) examined whether the presence of this judge, who had previously been dismissed from office for disciplinary reasons, compromised the legitimacy of the judicial panel. The Court found that the applicant had exhausted domestic remedies by raising the issue of the judge’s eligibility during the vetting process. Ultimately, the Court ruled that the inclusion of Judge L.D. on the bench constituted a violation of the applicant’s right to a fair trial under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. Consequently, the Court held that the finding of a violation serves as sufficient just satisfaction, while noting that the applicant may request a reopening of his vetting proceedings.<\/p>\n

### Structure and Provisions
\nThe judgment follows the standard structure of an ECtHR committee decision:
\n* **Subject Matter:** Outlines the background of the applicant\u2019s dismissal under the Albanian Vetting Act and the specific challenge regarding the composition of the SAC.
\n* **Admissibility:** The Court addressed the Government\u2019s objection regarding the exhaustion of domestic remedies. It clarified that because the applicant had raised the eligibility of Judge L.D. during the proceedings, he was not required to seek further extraordinary reviews of the final judgment.
\n* **Merits:** The Court relied heavily on the precedent set in *Besnik Cani v. Albania*. It determined that there was a “manifest breach” of domestic law in the appointment of Judge L.D., which directly impacted the applicant’s right to a tribunal established by law.
\n* **Article 41 (Just Satisfaction):** The Court rejected the claim for pecuniary damages, stating it could not speculate on the outcome of the vetting had the violation not occurred. It deemed the finding of a violation sufficient for non-pecuniary damage and suggested the possibility of reopening the proceedings.<\/p>\n

### Key Provisions for Legal Application
\nFor legal practitioners and observers, the following points are critical:
\n1. **”Tribunal Established by Law”:** The judgment reinforces the principle that the appointment process of judges is not merely a domestic administrative matter but a core component of the right to a fair trial. A “manifest breach” of appointment rules can invalidate the entire judicial panel.
\n2. **Exhaustion of Remedies:** The Court clarified that if a party challenges the composition of a court during the proceedings (e.g., via a recusal request), they have sufficiently exhausted domestic remedies. They are not obligated to pursue subsequent, potentially ineffective, extraordinary review procedures to satisfy the requirements of Article 35.
\n3. **The *Besnik Cani* Precedent:** This decision confirms the Court\u2019s consistent stance on the systemic issues within the Albanian vetting process regarding the appointment of specific SAC judges. It serves as a binding reference for similar cases where the integrity of the vetting panel is questioned.
\n4. **Remedial Path:** The Court explicitly signaled that the appropriate remedy for such a violation is the reopening of the domestic proceedings, rather than financial compensation for the loss of office, as the latter would require the Court to assume the role of the national vetting authority.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

CASE OF KARASU AND OTHERS v. T\u00dcRK\u0130YE<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

The judgment in *Karasu and Others v. T\u00fcrkiye* (applications nos. 12589\/18 and 42 others) concerns the pre-trial detention of 43 applicants\u2014primarily military and police officers\u2014following the attempted coup d’\u00e9tat of 15 July 2016. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) examined whether the domestic courts provided “relevant and sufficient” reasons for the applicants’ prolonged detention, which lasted between two and four and a half years. While the Court acknowledged the extraordinary context of the coup attempt and the legitimacy of initial detention, it found that the reasoning provided by Turkish authorities became insufficient as time passed. Specifically, the Court ruled that the domestic courts failed to conduct a fresh, individualised assessment of the necessity of detention after the state of emergency was lifted in July 2018. Consequently, the Court concluded that there was a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention regarding the right to liberty and security.<\/p>\n

**Structure and Provisions**
\nThe decision is structured as a standard Committee judgment, focusing on the procedural requirements of Article 5 \u00a7 3. It begins by establishing the factual background of the 2016 coup attempt and the subsequent state of emergency. The Court then addresses the Government\u2019s preliminary objections\u2014specifically regarding the exhaustion of domestic remedies and the status of the applicants\u2014and dismisses them, citing established case-law. The core of the judgment is the assessment of the “reasonableness” of the detention. The Court distinguishes between the initial period of detention, where it accepts the state\u2019s justifications due to the immediate security crisis, and the subsequent period, where it finds a failure to provide sufficiently tailored reasoning. The judgment concludes by awarding each applicant EUR 2,000 for non-pecuniary damage and costs, rejecting claims for pecuniary damages.<\/p>\n

**Key Provisions for Legal Application**
\nThe most critical aspect of this decision for legal practitioners is the Court’s clarification on the “temporal evolution” of detention justifications.
\n* **Diminishing Risks:** The Court emphasizes that as time passes, the risks (flight, collusion, reoffending) initially cited to justify detention inevitably diminish. Therefore, the burden on domestic courts to provide increasingly specific and individualised reasons grows over time.
\n* **Post-Emergency Obligations:** The judgment establishes that the lifting of a state of emergency serves as a critical threshold. Once the extraordinary legal regime ends, the justification for detention must be re-evaluated with greater scrutiny, and the failure to do so renders the continued detention a violation of the Convention.
\n* **Individualisation:** The Court explicitly rejects “formulaic” or “repetitive” reasoning. Even in cases involving serious crimes like terrorism or coup attempts, domestic courts must demonstrate that they have considered the specific circumstances of the individual and the possibility of applying less restrictive measures (such as judicial control or house arrest) rather than automatic, prolonged incarceration.<\/p>\n

This judgment serves as a vital precedent for challenging the length of pre-trial detention in cases where judicial authorities rely on generic, boilerplate justifications that ignore the passage of time and the changing security landscape.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

CASE OF KILI\u00c7 AND OTHERS v. T\u00dcRK\u0130YE<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

This judgment, *K\u0131l\u0131\u00e7 and Others v. T\u00fcrkiye* (2026), concerns the pre-trial detention of seventeen applicants in the aftermath of the 2016 coup attempt, specifically regarding their alleged membership in the FET\u00d6\/PDY organization. The Court examined whether the domestic authorities provided “relevant and sufficient” reasons for both the initial and, crucially, the continued detention of these individuals. While the Court acknowledged that the initial detention was justified by a concrete risk of absconding\u2014supported by evidence such as flight attempts or the use of false documents\u2014it found that the subsequent extensions of detention were based on formulaic and abstract reasoning. The domestic courts failed to conduct an individualized assessment of whether the risk of absconding persisted over time, relying instead on the nature of the “catalogue” offences. Consequently, the Court ruled that the prolonged detention without adequate justification violated Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention.<\/p>\n

The structure of the decision follows the standard format for a Committee-level judgment of the European Court of Human Rights. It begins with the procedural history and the joinder of the seventeen applications due to their similar subject matter. The core of the decision is divided into the assessment of admissibility and the merits under Article 5 (the right to liberty and security). The judgment reaffirms established jurisprudence regarding the necessity of “relevant and sufficient” reasons for detention, building upon previous cases such as *Ba\u015f v. Turkey* and *Turan and Others v. Turkey*. A significant change in this decision is the Court\u2019s increasingly stringent application of the “exigency” criterion; it explicitly notes that as the emergency situation following the 2016 coup has declined in intensity, the justification for prolonged detention must be scrutinized more rigorously, rejecting the Government\u2019s reliance on formulaic, repetitive justifications.<\/p>\n

The most important provisions for legal practitioners are as follows:<\/p>\n

* **Individualized Assessment:** The Court emphasizes that even for “catalogue” offences (serious crimes where detention is often presumed), the authorities must demonstrate concrete facts warranting detention. A mere reference to the nature of the offence or the severity of the potential sentence is insufficient to satisfy Article 5 \u00a7 3.
\n* **Temporal Diminution of Risk:** The judgment reinforces the principle that while a “risk of absconding” may justify initial detention, this ground loses its relevance over time. The burden on the state to provide “very compelling reasons” for continued detention increases as the period of incarceration lengthens.
\n* **Procedural Obligation:** The Court highlights that domestic courts are under a strict procedural obligation to consider alternative measures to detention. A formalistic statement that alternatives were considered, without substantive reasoning, constitutes a violation of the Convention.
\n* **Article 15 Limitations:** The Court clarifies that the derogation notified by T\u00fcrkiye under Article 15 does not grant a blanket exemption from the requirements of Article 5. The “exigency” of the situation must be evaluated against the duration of the detention, and the Court will not accept the state of emergency as a justification for indefinite or poorly reasoned detention.<\/p>\n

This judgment serves as a critical reminder that the passage of time in pre-trial detention requires a dynamic, rather than static, judicial review by national authorities.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

CASE OF KILI\u00c7ARSLAN AND OTHERS v. T\u00dcRK\u0130YE<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

This judgment, *K\u0131l\u0131\u00e7arslan and Others v. T\u00fcrkiye* (2026), concerns 595 applications from individuals convicted of membership in the \u201cFET\u00d6\/PDY\u201d armed terrorist organization following the 2016 coup attempt in T\u00fcrkiye. The core issue is that these convictions were based primarily on the applicants\u2019 use of the encrypted messaging application \u201cByLock,\u201d which domestic courts treated as sufficient, conclusive proof of membership. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found that this approach effectively imposed objective liability, violating the principle of legality. The Court ruled that the domestic courts failed to provide adequate procedural safeguards to allow applicants to challenge the ByLock evidence effectively. Consequently, the Court held that there were violations of both Article 7 (no punishment without law) and Article 6 \u00a7 1 (right to a fair trial) of the Convention. The judgment confirms that the findings in the landmark *Y\u00fcksel Yal\u00e7\u0131nkaya* case are not isolated but represent a systemic issue in how these cases were handled.<\/p>\n

**Structure and Provisions**
\nThe decision is structured as a Committee judgment, reflecting the Court’s established jurisprudence on this specific category of cases. It begins by joining the 595 applications due to their identical subject matter. The Court then addresses the admissibility of the complaints, rejecting the Government\u2019s argument that these cases should be treated as distinct from *Y\u00fcksel Yal\u00e7\u0131nkaya*. The judgment is built upon the precedent set in *Yal\u00e7\u0131nkaya* and *Demirhan and Others*, maintaining that the uniform, global approach taken by Turkish courts toward ByLock evidence constitutes a breach of the Convention. Unlike previous iterations, this judgment serves as a mass confirmation of the Court\u2019s stance, applying the *Yal\u00e7\u0131nkaya* principles to a vast number of applicants simultaneously.<\/p>\n

**Key Provisions for Legal Use**
\nFor legal practitioners and observers, the most critical provisions are:
\n* **Article 7 Violation:** The Court reaffirms that using ByLock as the sole, conclusive basis for a conviction under Article 314 \u00a7 2 of the Turkish Criminal Code violates the principle of legality, as it imputes criminal liability without requiring proof of the specific constituent elements of the crime.
\n* **Article 6 \u00a7 1 Violation:** The Court identifies a failure in the procedural framework, specifically the lack of safeguards to challenge the integrity and content of the ByLock data, and the failure of domestic courts to provide sufficient reasoning for their decisions.
\n* **Redress:** The Court clarifies that the finding of a violation is sufficient just satisfaction. It explicitly points to Article 311 \u00a7 1 (f) of the Turkish Code of Criminal Procedure, noting that the most appropriate form of redress is the reopening of domestic proceedings in line with the “conclusions and spirit” of the judgment.
\n* **Scope of Evidence:** While the Court acknowledges that some applicants had other evidence against them (e.g., Bank Asya accounts, union membership), it maintains that the “global approach” of the domestic courts\u2014where ByLock was the decisive factor\u2014tainted the entire trial process, regardless of other supplementary evidence.<\/p>\n

**:** This decision is highly significant for the Ukrainian legal context, as it reinforces the standards for fair trial rights and the principle of legality in cases involving national security and mass prosecutions. It provides a clear roadmap for how international human rights standards must be applied when domestic authorities rely on mass-processed digital evidence to secure convictions for membership in organizations deemed terrorist or subversive.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

CASE OF OSMANI v. ALBANIA<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

The case of *Osmani v. Albania* (application no. 7780\/20) concerns the dismissal of a career prosecutor following a transitional vetting process aimed at purging the Albanian judiciary of corruption. While the applicant was initially confirmed in office by the Independent Qualification Commission, the Special Appeal Chamber (SAC) subsequently reversed this decision, citing a lack of lawful financial sources to justify family expenditures in two specific years. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found that the applicant\u2019s dismissal was based on a formalistic interpretation of asset declarations rather than evidence of illicit enrichment. Crucially, the Court noted that the applicant\u2019s wife, who shared the exact same financial circumstances, was retained in office, highlighting an arbitrary inconsistency in the treatment of the couple. Consequently, the Court ruled that the dismissal was disproportionate, violating the applicant\u2019s right to respect for his private life under Article 8 of the Convention.<\/p>\n

The decision is structured as a standard Chamber judgment, beginning with the factual background of the vetting process and the specific financial discrepancies identified by the SAC. It then moves to the Court\u2019s legal assessment, which focuses on the proportionality of the interference with the applicant’s Article 8 rights. Unlike previous vetting cases where the Court often upheld dismissals as necessary for systemic reform, this judgment emphasizes the requirement for individualised, non-arbitrary assessment. The main change here is the Court\u2019s explicit focus on the lack of consistency between the applicant\u2019s case and that of his spouse, which serves as a benchmark for assessing the “necessity” and “proportionality” of such severe disciplinary measures.<\/p>\n

The most important provisions for legal practitioners are found in the Court\u2019s assessment of proportionality (paragraphs 14\u201319). The Court establishes that:
\n* **Substance over Form:** A finding of a “negative balance” in asset declarations must be based on substantive evidence of illicit enrichment, not merely a formalistic or technical error in how savings were recorded in annual declarations.
\n* **Consistency Requirement:** When authorities evaluate family units or individuals with identical financial profiles, they must provide a convincing justification for any disparity in the outcomes of their vetting.
\n* **Remedial Action:** Under Article 46, the Court indicates that the reopening of domestic proceedings is the appropriate remedy for a violation of this nature, particularly when the dismissal is found to be disproportionate rather than inherently unlawful.<\/p>\n

This decision serves as a critical precedent for ensuring that anti-corruption vetting mechanisms do not devolve into arbitrary administrative exercises that disregard the specific context of an individual\u2019s financial history.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

CASE OF KARCHAVA v. GEORGIA The judgment in *Karchava v. Georgia* (application no. 34790\/23) addresses the limits of state interference with solo protests. The applicant, a psychotherapist, was arrested and detained for 24 hours after attempting to set up a tent for a hunger strike near a public statue to protest the lack of school…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_bbp_topic_count":0,"_bbp_reply_count":0,"_bbp_total_topic_count":0,"_bbp_total_reply_count":0,"_bbp_voice_count":0,"_bbp_anonymous_reply_count":0,"_bbp_topic_count_hidden":0,"_bbp_reply_count_hidden":0,"_bbp_forum_subforum_count":0,"pmpro_default_level":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[129],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-17746","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-echr-decisions","pmpro-has-access"],"acf":{"patreon-level":0},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/17746","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=17746"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/17746\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=17746"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=17746"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=17746"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}