{"id":15500,"date":"2026-03-04T09:25:46","date_gmt":"2026-03-04T07:25:46","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/2026\/03\/review-of-echr-decisions-for-04-03-2026\/"},"modified":"2026-03-04T09:25:46","modified_gmt":"2026-03-04T07:25:46","slug":"review-of-echr-decisions-for-04-03-2026","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/2026\/03\/review-of-echr-decisions-for-04-03-2026\/","title":{"rendered":"Review of ECHR decisions for 04\/03\/2026"},"content":{"rendered":"

<\/p>\n

CASE OF LANDIKA v. SLOVENIA<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

Here’s a breakdown of the Landika v. Slovenia ECHR decision:<\/p>\n

**1. Essence of the Decision:**<\/p>\n

The European Court of Human Rights ruled that Slovenia was not responsible for the inability of Bosnian applicants to recover “old” foreign-currency savings. These savings were initially deposited in the Sarajevo branch of Ljubljana Bank but were later converted into privatization certificates managed by authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The Court emphasized that the applicants’ situation differed significantly from the Ali\u0161i\u0107 case, as their claims had been transferred, and Slovenia’s repayment scheme, enacted after Ali\u0161i\u0107, specifically excluded such transferred claims. The domestic courts’ decisions in Slovenia were based on sound reasoning, leading the ECHR to find no violation of the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions.<\/p>\n

**2. Structure and Main Provisions:**<\/p>\n

* **Introduction:** The judgment starts by outlining the case’s subject matter: the applicants’ inability to recover “old” foreign-currency savings under Slovenian legislation enacted after the Ali\u0161i\u0107 and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina.
\n * **Facts:** This section details the factual background, including the historical context of the banking system in the former Yugoslavia, the dissolution of the SFRY, and the measures taken by Bosnia and Herzegovina and Slovenia regarding “old” foreign-currency savings. It also describes the specific circumstances of the applicants’ case, including the transfer of their predecessor’s savings to a privatization account.
\n * **Relevant Legal Framework and Practice:** This part summarizes the relevant legislation in Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the Ali\u0161i\u0107 Implementation Act in Slovenia and the Law on the Settlement of Claims in the Privatisation Process in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It also references relevant case law from domestic courts in both countries.
\n * **The Law:** This section presents the applicants’ complaint regarding a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (peaceful enjoyment of possessions). It includes an assessment of the admissibility of the application, addressing the government’s objections and the Court’s reasoning for declaring the application admissible.
\n * **Merits:** This section presents the submissions of the parties, including the applicants, the government, and third-party observations. It includes the Court’s assessment of whether the present case should be distinguished from Ali\u0161i\u0107 and Others and whether there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.
\n * **Conclusion:** The Court concludes that there has been no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and dismisses the government’s objection of incompatibility ratione materiae.<\/p>\n

**3. Main Provisions for Use:**<\/p>\n

* **Distinct Factual Circumstances:** The decision highlights the importance of distinguishing between cases where “old” foreign-currency savings claims were transferred to privatization accounts and those where they were not. This distinction is crucial for determining the responsibility of successor states in the former Yugoslavia.
\n * **Exclusion from Repayment Scheme:** The Slovenian repayment scheme, enacted after Ali\u0161i\u0107, specifically excluded the recovery of “old” foreign-currency savings subject to the transfer of claims. This exclusion was a key factor in the Court’s decision.
\n * **Soundness of Domestic Decisions:** The Court emphasized that the relevant domestic decisions in Slovenia were based on sound grounds, indicating that the domestic courts had thoroughly considered the applicants’ arguments and applied the relevant legal principles appropriately.
\n * **Limited Scope of Ali\u0161i\u0107:** The Court clarified that the Ali\u0161i\u0107 judgment did not address claims relating to savings transferred to privatization accounts, as none of the applicants in that case had such savings. This clarification is important for understanding the scope and limitations of the Ali\u0161i\u0107 judgment.
\n * **Responsibility for Privatization Scheme:** The Court noted that the regulation and operation of the privatization certificate scheme and the privatization process in Bosnia and Herzegovina fell within the domestic jurisdiction of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Slovenia could not be held responsible for any shortcomings in those processes.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

CASE OF SAARIVUOMA SAMI VILLAGE v. NORWAY<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

Here’s a breakdown of the European Court of Human Rights’ decision in the case of Saarivuoma Sami Village v. Norway:<\/p>\n

1. **Essence of the Decision:**
\n The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled that Norway did not violate the property rights of a Swedish Sami village by restricting their reindeer grazing rights in Norway for about 50 years. The Court found that while the restrictions constituted an interference with the Sami community’s property rights, it was “in accordance with the law,” served a public interest, and was proportionate. The Supreme Court’s decision not to award compensation to the Sami village was also deemed not to be disproportionate. The Court also rejected the claim of discrimination under Article 14 of the Convention.<\/p>\n

2. **Structure and Main Provisions:**
\n * **Introduction:** Outlines the case’s subject matter: complaints regarding the restriction of reindeer herding rights.
\n * **Facts:** Details the historical background of Sami reindeer herding across the Sweden-Norway border, including treaties and conventions from 1751 onwards. It describes the domestic proceedings initiated by the Sami village against the Norwegian government and a state-owned enterprise, Statskog SF, concerning grazing rights in contested areas. It also covers the Supreme Court’s judgment, which acknowledged the Sami village’s private-law rights to herding in the contested areas but denied compensation.
\n * **Relevant Legal Framework:** Cites domestic laws, including the Cross-Border Reindeer Husbandry Act and the Reindeer Husbandry Act, as well as relevant case law.
\n * **Law:**
\n * **Article 1 of Protocol No. 1:** Addresses the alleged violation of property rights. The Court found that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was applicable, acknowledging the Sami village’s private-law rights as “possessions.” While there was an interference with these rights, it was considered a “control of the use” of property rather than a “deprivation.”
\n * **Article 14:** Addresses the alleged discrimination. The Court found no violation of Article 14, stating that the application did not reveal any differential treatment based on nationality or association with a national minority.
\n * **Decision:** Declares the complaint concerning Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 admissible but finds no violation. Rejects the remainder of the application as inadmissible.<\/p>\n

3. **Main Provisions for Use:**
\n * **Recognition of Sami Rights:** The Court acknowledged the importance of Sami reindeer herding as a cultural institution and that rights related to this activity enjoy special legal protection.
\n * **Control of Use vs. Deprivation:** The ruling clarifies the distinction between “control of the use” of property and “deprivation” of property in the context of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
\n * **Lawfulness, Legitimate Aim, and Proportionality:** The decision reinforces the importance of these three conditions for any interference with property rights to be compatible with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
\n * **Burden of Proof:** The Court emphasized that the applicant community failed to provide concrete evidence of the damages suffered due to the restrictions on grazing rights in the domestic proceedings.<\/p>\n

This judgment clarifies the scope of property rights under the Convention in the context of indigenous communities and the extent to which states can regulate the use of such rights.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

CASE OF TISHKINA v. BULGARIA<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

Here’s a breakdown of the European Court of Human Rights’ (ECHR) decision in the case of Tishkina v. Bulgaria:<\/p>\n

1. **Essence of the Decision:**
\n The ECHR found Bulgaria in violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property) due to the State’s failure to adequately protect the applicant’s house from irreparable damage caused by illegal coal mining activities. Despite the applicant and her mother repeatedly alerting authorities to the ongoing damage, the measures taken were insufficient and came too late to prevent the destruction of her home. The Court emphasized the lack of clarity among different state bodies regarding who was responsible for addressing the illegal mining, the fragmented information about the problem, and the inadequacy of the responses. The Court concluded that the authorities did not strike a fair balance between the general interest and the applicant’s individual rights to the peaceful enjoyment of her property.<\/p>\n

2. **Structure and Main Provisions:**
\n * **Introduction:** Sets out the case’s subject matter: the State’s failure to protect the applicant’s property from the illegal actions of third parties.
\n * **Facts:** Details the applicant’s situation, including the history of coal mining in Pernik, the illegal mining activities, the damage to her house, and the actions (or lack thereof) by the authorities.
\n * **Relevant Legal Framework:** Outlines the Bulgarian laws relevant to the case, including the Underground Resources Act and the Ordinance on Public Order on the Territory of the Municipality of Pernik.
\n * **Law:**
\n * **Alleged Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1:** Presents the applicant’s complaint and the relevant provision of the Convention.
\n * **Admissibility:** Examines the Government’s objections regarding the exhaustion of domestic remedies and the six-month time limit. The Court dismisses these objections, finding the application admissible.
\n * **Merits:** Assesses the parties’ submissions and the Court’s analysis of whether the authorities took adequate measures to protect the applicant’s property. The Court finds a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
\n * **Alleged Violations of Article 8 and Article 13 of the Convention:** The Court finds that there is no need to give a separate ruling on these additional complaints.
\n * **Application of Article 41 of the Convention:** Addresses the issue of just satisfaction, including damages and costs. The Court awards the applicant compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage but rejects the claim for costs and expenses.
\n * **Separate Opinion:** Includes the dissenting opinion of Judges N\u00ed Raifeartaigh, \u0110urovi\u0107 and Sancin.<\/p>\n

3. **Main Provisions and Importance:**
\n * **Positive Obligations under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1:** The decision reinforces the principle that states have a positive obligation to take reasonable measures to protect individuals’ property rights, even from the actions of private individuals.
\n * **Assessment of State Response:** The Court’s analysis focuses on whether the authorities conducted a comprehensive assessment of the problem, took meaningful steps to mitigate risks, and implemented effective measures to combat the underlying conduct.
\n * **Causation and State Liability:** The Court clarifies that its role is not to re-examine the findings of national courts but to assess the State’s international liability, which encompasses the actions of different bodies at both state and municipal levels, as well as the adequacy of the applicable legal framework.
\n * **Just Satisfaction:** The Court’s approach to awarding damages reflects the principle that compensation should be linked to the nature of the violation and the causal connection between the damage claimed and the breach.<\/p>\n

The decision highlights the importance of states taking proactive and coordinated measures to address situations that threaten individuals’ property rights, even when those threats originate from non-state actors.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

CASE OF ST\u0102NOIU AND OTHERS v. ROMANIA<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

This judgment concerns several applications against Romania regarding the applicants’ inability to recover properties unlawfully nationalized during the communist regime and subsequently sold to third parties. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which protects the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions. The Court determined that the applicants’ inability to recover their properties or receive compensation, despite court decisions acknowledging their property rights, constituted a deprivation of possessions combined with a lack of compensation, imposing a disproportionate burden on them. The Court joined the applications due to their similar subject matter.<\/p>\n

The structure of the decision includes sections on the subject matter of the case, the Court’s assessment (joinder of applications, locus standi, alleged violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1), admissibility (failure to exhaust available remedies, compatibility ratione materiae and temporis), merits, remaining complaints, and the application of Article 41 of the Convention (pecuniary damage, non-pecuniary damage, costs and expenses, and default interest). The Court rejected the Government’s objections regarding the failure to exhaust domestic remedies and the inapplicability of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. It also addressed the issue of compatibility ratione temporis concerning compensation awarded to one of the applicants.<\/p>\n

The most important provisions of the decision are those concerning the violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and the application of Article 41. The Court ordered Romania to pay the applicants specific amounts for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, as well as costs and expenses, based on the methodology established in previous cases. The Court also clarified that any compensation already enforced in favor of the applicants by the date of the judgment should be deducted from the awarded amounts to prevent unjust enrichment.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

CASE OF STOICOVICI AND MATEEVICI v. ROMANIA<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

Here’s a breakdown of the Stoicovici and Mateevici v. Romania decision:<\/p>\n

1. **Essence:** The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) found Romania in violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which concerns the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions. The case involved applicants who were unable to fully enjoy their land due to a hotel being partially built on it and a superficies right being registered without proper legal basis or compensation. The Court determined that this situation placed a disproportionate burden on the applicants, infringing their property rights. While the Court acknowledged the applicants’ property rights based on previous domestic court decisions, the interference with these rights, combined with the lack of compensation, constituted a violation. The Court awarded the applicants compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage.<\/p>\n

2. **Structure and Main Provisions:**
\n * The judgment begins by outlining the facts of the case, including the applicants’ property ownership, the nationalization decree, and subsequent legal battles for recovery of possession.
\n * It references relevant domestic legal framework and practice concerning the right of superficies and real estate accession, citing previous ECHR cases for context.
\n * The Court addresses the issue of locus standi, confirming that the heirs of one of the applicants could continue the application after his death.
\n * The core of the judgment focuses on the alleged violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The Court first addresses the admissibility of the application, rejecting the Government’s objection regarding the exhaustion of domestic remedies.
\n * The Court then assesses the merits of the case, finding that the interference with the applicants’ property rights lacked a legal basis and imposed a disproportionate burden due to the absence of compensation.
\n * Finally, the judgment addresses the application of Article 41 of the Convention, concerning just satisfaction. It awards the applicants compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, calculated based on specific methodologies and legal provisions.<\/p>\n

3. **Main Provisions for Use:**
\n * The finding of a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 due to the unlawful establishment of a superficies right and the lack of compensation.
\n * The methodology established in V\u0103leanu and Others (just satisfaction), nos. 59012\/17 and 27 others, 7 January 2025, \u00a7\u00a7 114-18, and the legal provisions concerning the right to superficies (see paragraph 8 above).
\n * The Court’s emphasis on the importance of a legal basis for any interference with property rights.
\n * The principle that even if a legal basis exists, the interference must not impose a disproportionate and excessive burden on the property owner, including the right to compensation.
\n * The calculation of pecuniary damage based on notarial grids and correction coefficients, specifically referencing the 2025 notarial grids for Constan\u021ba.
\n * The deduction of any amounts already enforced in the applicants’ favor in domestic proceedings to prevent unjust enrichment.<\/p>\n

I hope this is helpful!<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

CASE OF T\u0130RYAK\u0130 v. T\u00dcRK\u0130YE<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered a judgment in the case of Tiryaki v. T\u00fcrkiye (application no. 16373\/18), finding a violation of Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3(d) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The case concerned the fairness of criminal proceedings against the applicant, who was convicted of aiding and abetting an armed terrorist organization (PKK). The core issue was the domestic courts’ failure to examine in person two witnesses whose initial statements formed the basis of the applicant’s conviction, even though these witnesses later retracted their statements during their own trial. The ECtHR concluded that this failure, without a valid reason, restricted the applicant’s ability to fairly challenge the reliability of the evidence against him, thus tainting the overall fairness of the proceedings. The Court also addressed the applicant’s complaint regarding the lack of sufficient reasoning by the domestic courts but found it unnecessary to examine it separately, as the main legal questions had already been addressed.<\/p>\n

The judgment is structured as follows: it begins with the procedural history and the facts of the case, followed by the applicant’s complaints under Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3(d) of the Convention. The Court then assesses the admissibility of the application, dismissing the Government’s objection that it was manifestly ill-founded. The merits of the case are examined by applying the three-pronged test established in previous case-law (Schatschaschwili v. Germany and Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. the United Kingdom) to determine whether the absence of the witnesses at trial was justified, whether their evidence was decisive, and whether there were sufficient counterbalancing factors. The Court finds that there was no good reason for the witnesses’ absence, their evidence was decisive, and there were insufficient counterbalancing factors. Finally, the judgment addresses the applicant’s claims for just satisfaction under Article 41 of the Convention, awarding compensation for non-pecuniary damage and costs and expenses.<\/p>\n

The most important provision of this decision is the reaffirmation of the principles concerning the examination of witnesses in criminal proceedings, particularly when their statements are critical to the conviction. The Court emphasizes the need for domestic courts to provide good reasons for not examining witnesses in person and to ensure that the defendant has an adequate opportunity to challenge and test the reliability of the evidence against them. This judgment underscores the importance of procedural safeguards in ensuring a fair trial, especially in cases involving serious charges such as aiding and abetting terrorism.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

CASE OF T\u00dcRKMEN v. T\u00dcRK\u0130YE<\/strong><\/h3>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) delivered a judgment in the case of T\u00fcrkmen v. T\u00fcrkiye, concerning the fairness of proceedings against the applicant, a liquor store owner, who was fined for selling alcohol outside permitted hours. The ECHR found a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention due to the lack of a public hearing in the proceedings reviewing the administrative fine. The Court emphasized that because the applicant contested the fine and challenged the factual basis, including the credibility of police statements, domestic courts should have held an oral hearing to properly assess the evidence. The Court dismissed the government’s argument that the applicant had not provided a concrete reason for requesting a hearing. Consequently, the ECHR decided it was unnecessary to examine further complaints regarding the applicant’s ability to challenge the fine effectively.<\/p>\n

The decision is structured as follows: it begins with the background of the case, outlining the applicant’s complaints and the government’s observations. It then assesses the admissibility of the application, focusing on whether Article 6 of the Convention applies to the proceedings. The Court refers to the “Engel criteria” to determine the applicability of the criminal limb of Article 6, ultimately concluding that it does apply. The judgment then addresses the merits of the case, examining whether the lack of a public hearing violated the applicant’s right to a fair trial. It cites previous case law to establish general principles regarding the right to an oral hearing. Applying these principles, the Court finds that a hearing was necessary to assess the credibility of the police officers’ observations. Finally, the decision addresses the application of Article 41 of the Convention regarding just satisfaction but finds no need to award compensation as the applicant did not submit any claims.<\/p>\n

The most important provision of this decision is the emphasis on the necessity of an oral hearing when the facts of the case, including the credibility of witnesses (in this case, police officers), are contested. The Court reiterated that while an oral hearing may not always be required, it is essential when the case hinges on the assessment of witness credibility and the applicant has actively disputed the factual basis of the charges. This clarifies the circumstances under which administrative offenses require a more rigorous judicial process to ensure fairness.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

CASE OF LANDIKA v. SLOVENIA Here’s a breakdown of the Landika v. Slovenia ECHR decision: **1. Essence of the Decision:** The European Court of Human Rights ruled that Slovenia was not responsible for the inability of Bosnian applicants to recover “old” foreign-currency savings. These savings were initially deposited in the Sarajevo branch of Ljubljana Bank…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_bbp_topic_count":0,"_bbp_reply_count":0,"_bbp_total_topic_count":0,"_bbp_total_reply_count":0,"_bbp_voice_count":0,"_bbp_anonymous_reply_count":0,"_bbp_topic_count_hidden":0,"_bbp_reply_count_hidden":0,"_bbp_forum_subforum_count":0,"pmpro_default_level":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[129],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-15500","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-echr-decisions","pmpro-has-access"],"acf":{"patreon-level":0},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15500","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=15500"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15500\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=15500"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=15500"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lexcovery.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=15500"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}