**Case No. 753\/16824\/18 dated 08\/10\/2025**<\/p>\n
1. The subject of the dispute is compensation for damage caused by the death of a breadwinner, and moral damage caused to a minor child as a result of a traffic accident involving a military vehicle.<\/p>\n
2. The court of cassation agreed with the conclusions of the courts of previous instances, which partially satisfied the claims. The court noted that moral damage caused by the death of an individual as a result of the operation of a source of increased danger is compensated by the person who owns this source on the appropriate legal basis, regardless of fault. The court took into account that the child is deprived of the opportunity to receive care and assistance from the father, which violates her normal life connections, and determined the amount of compensation for moral damage, based on the principles of reasonableness and fairness. The court also upheld the legality of the recovery of expenses for professional legal assistance, taking into account the complexity of the case and the amount of work performed by the attorney. Regarding the conclusion of the psychological examination, the court noted that it is not binding for determining the amount of moral damage, since this issue falls within the competence of the court. The court also took into account the payment of insurance compensation and reduced the amount of moral damage to be recovered from the defendant.<\/p>\n
3. The Supreme Court dismissed the cassation appeal, and the decisions of the courts of previous instances remained unchanged.<\/p>\n
**Case No. 463\/2671\/17 dated 22\/09\/2025**<\/p>\n
1. The subject of the dispute is the legality of the closure of criminal proceedings on charges against a person for embezzlement of company funds through abuse of office.<\/p>\n
2. The court of first instance closed the criminal proceedings, considering that the long-term non-appearance of the representative of the injured party in court is a rejection of the accusation in the case, which was considered in the form of private prosecution. The appellate court upheld this decision. The Supreme Court, overturning the decisions of previous instances, emphasized that the closure of proceedings on the basis of the injured party’s rejection of the accusation is possible only after the prosecutor refuses to support the state prosecution, which was not the case here. The court also noted that the courts of previous instances did not use all the possibilities provided for by the Criminal Procedure Code to ensure proper consideration of the case, in particular, they did not resolve the issue of the possibility of considering the case in the absence of the injured party or of imposing a monetary penalty on him. The Supreme Court emphasized that the courts should have ensured proper consideration of the criminal proceedings, and their conclusions about the correctness of closing the proceedings are premature.<\/p>\n
3. The Supreme Court overturned the ruling of the court of first instance and the ruling of the appellate court and ordered a new trial in the court of first instance.<\/p>\n
**Case No.**
\nva No. 153\/381\/24 dated 23\/09\/2025
\n1. The subject of the dispute is the legality of the appellate court’s ruling on the release of a person, convicted of evading conscription for military service during mobilization, from serving the sentence with probation.<\/p>\n
2. The appellate court, amending the judgment of the court of first instance, released the convicted person from serving the sentence with probation, motivating this by the fact that he has a number of diseases, requires treatment, is a participant in combat operations, and is raising a minor son on his own. The Supreme Court did not agree with this decision, noting that the appellate court did not provide sufficient reasons that would indicate the possibility of correcting the convicted person without actual imprisonment, considering that after the repeated failure to appear at the Regional Recruitment Center (RTCC), he did not realize the illegality of his behavior and did not take measures for voluntary appearance. The court also drew attention to the fact that the situation with raising the child on his own was created artificially, since at the time of evasion of mobilization, the child’s mother was in Ukraine. Considering these circumstances, the Supreme Court concluded that the appellate court incorrectly applied the provisions of Art. 75 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine regarding release from serving a sentence with probation.<\/p>\n
3. The Supreme Court overturned the ruling of the appellate court and ordered a new trial in the court of appellate instance.<\/p>\n
Case No. 243\/3619\/24 dated 01\/10\/2025<\/strong><\/a> 2. The court, granting the claim, proceeded from the fact that the plaintiff proved the fact of living as one family with the deceased daughter, their relations were of a family nature, they were connected by a common life, running a joint household, budget, and the existence of mutual rights and obligations. The court also noted that cases on establishing facts on which the emergence, change or termination of subjective rights of citizens depends are within the jurisdiction of the civil court. The court took into account that the current legislation does not provide for any other judicial procedure for confirming a fact that has legal significance other than the consideration of cases in the procedure of civil proceedings. The court took into account that the plaintiff was denied the appointment of an insurance payment due to the loss of a provider, since she does not belong to the circle of persons who are entitled to such payments. The court also took into account that the appellate court had previously overturned the decision of the court of first instance on establishing the fact of living as one family in a separate proceeding and clarified the right to apply to the court with a claim on general grounds.<\/p>\n 3. The court of cassation instance dismissed the cassation appeal and left the decisions of the previous instances unchanged.<\/p>\n Case No. 910\/2546\/22 dated 08\/10\/2025<\/strong><\/a> 3. The Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court granted the application of “Agro-Lan” LLC, justifying it by the fact that the incurred expenses for professional legal assistance are documented (contract, act of services rendered, payment documents) and are reasonable. The court rejected the arguments of “Herman-Agro” LLC regarding the disproportionality of expenses, since “Agro-Lan” LLC requested to recover this amount equally from both plaintiffs, and plaintiff-1 did not prove that this amount is an excessive burden for him. The court also disagreed with the arguments about the abuse of procedural rights by “Agro-Lan” LLC, since the determination of defendants is the right of the plaintiff. The court noted that the existence of other similar disputes between the parties does not deprive “Agro-Lan” LLC of the right to claim expenses for legal assistance in this case. The court indicated that mere references by “Herman-Agro” LLC to the disproportionality of expenses and disagreement with their amount are not grounds for refusing to grant the application.<\/p>\n 4. The court decided to grant the application of “Agro-Lan” LLC and recover from “Herman-Agro” LLC and “Ekoniva” LLC in favor of “Agro-Lan” LLC UAH 39,383.10 from each to compensate for expenses for professional legal assistance in the court of cassation instance.<\/p>\n **Case \u2116552\/4051\/23 dated 09\/10\/2025**<\/p>\n 1. The subject of the dispute is the recovery of debt under a loan agreement.<\/p>\n 2. The court of cassation instance upheld the ruling of the appellate court to suspend proceedings in the civil case on debt recovery, since there is a criminal case in which the plaintiff is accused of extorting the same debt, and the consideration of the civil case is impossible until the criminal case is resolved. The appellate court correctly took into account that there is a close connection between the civil and criminal cases, since the criminal case investigates the circumstances of obtaining the receipt, which is evidence of the existence of debt in the civil case. The court noted that providing a criminal-legal assessment of the parties’ actions is possible only within the framework of criminal proceedings, and not civil proceedings. Also, the court rejected the arguments of the cassation appeal regarding the non-consideration of the motion to postpone the hearing of the case, since the plaintiff was duly notified of the court session.<\/p>\n 3. The court of cassation instance dismissed the cassation appeal, and the ruling of the appellate court remained unchanged.<\/p>\n **Case \u2116904\/6704\/23 dated 06\/10\/2025**<\/p>\n 1. The subject of the dispute is the recovery from the lessee of arrears in rent, penalties, inflationary losses and 3% per annum under the real estate lease agreement.<\/p>\n 2. The court of cassation instance agreed with the decisions of the courts of previous instances, noting that the lessee did not properly fulfill the terms of the lease agreement regarding timelyof rent payments and reimbursement of property maintenance costs. The court rejected the tenant’s arguments that he should have been exempt from paying rent for the quarantine period, as his business of selling food products was not prohibited. The court also noted that the tenant had not proved that he was a small business entity engaged in production activities directly on the leased premises, which could have entitled him to benefits under the resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. In addition, the court rejected the tenant’s arguments regarding improper notification of the case hearing, as the court had sent the notification to the proper address, and non-receipt of correspondence is the risk of the party. The court also noted that the tenant had the opportunity to present all his objections during the appellate review.<\/p>\n 3. The Supreme Court dismissed the cassation appeal and upheld the decisions of the previous instances.<\/p>\n Case No. 395\/772\/22 dated 06\/10\/2025<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n 1. The subject of the dispute is the cancellation of the order for dismissal, reinstatement to the position and recovery of average earnings for the time of forced absence, as the plaintiff considered her dismissal illegal and discriminatory.<\/p>\n 2. The court of cassation agreed with the conclusions of the courts of previous instances, which refused to satisfy the claim for cancellation of the order of dismissal, reinstatement to the position and recovery of average earnings for the time of forced absence. The courts found that the plaintiff’s dismissal occurred in connection with the reduction of staff, and the employer complied with the requirements of the law by offering her available vacancies, which she refused. The court also noted that the plaintiff did not prove the facts of discrimination based on membership in a trade union, and the trade union’s refusal to consent to the dismissal did not contain sufficient legal justification. In addition, the court pointed out that in this case there was no liquidation or reorganization of the enterprise, but only a reduction in staff, therefore, the employer was not obliged to consult with the trade union regarding the dismissal of employees. The court of cassation also noted that it does not have the authority to establish the circumstances of the case or re-evaluate the evidence, and the arguments of the cassation appeal do not refute the conclusions of the courts of previous instances.<\/p>\n 3. The court dismissed the cassation appeal, and the decisions of the courts of previous instances remained unchanged.<\/p>\n Case No. 947\/7879\/20 dated 06\/10\/2025<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n 1. The subject of the dispute is an appeal against the judgment of the court of appeal regarding the measure of punishment imposed on a person found guilty of violating traffic rules, which caused the death of the victim. 3. The Supreme Court dismissed the cassation appeal and upheld the judgment of the appellate court.<\/p>\n [https:\/\/reyestr.court.gov.ua\/Review\/130922964](https:\/\/reyestr.court.gov.ua\/Review\/130922964) **Case No. 490\/6246\/25 dated 10\/13\/2025**<\/p>\n 1. The subject of the dispute is the submission of the Mykolaiv Court of Appeal regarding the referral of case materials from one appellate court to another. [https:\/\/reyestr.court.gov.ua\/Review\/130922615](https:\/\/reyestr.court.gov.ua\/Review\/130922615) **Case No. 911\/640\/24 dated 10\/09\/2025**<\/p>\n 1. The subject of the dispute is the application of Procter & Gamble Ukraine LLC for the recovery from FC Diamant LLC of expenses for professional legal assistance incurred in the court of cassation in the case of debt collection under a factoring agreement. 3. The court partially granted the application of Procter & Gamble Ukraine LLC and ordered FC “Diamant” LLC to pay UAH 79,040 in professional legal assistance costs.<\/p>\n **Case No. 927\/1431\/23 dated 09\/30\/2025**<\/p>\n 1. The subject of the dispute in the case is the recovery of debt under an agreement for the provision of electric energy transmission services. **Case No. 236\/476\/21 dated 10\/08\/2025**<\/p>\n 1. The subject of the dispute is the application of Verdict Capital LLC for the issuance of a duplicate writ of execution and the renewal of the term for its presentation for execution of the court decision on the recovery of joint and several debt from PERSON_1 and PERSON_2 in favor of Rodovid Bank PJSC. 3. The court overturned the decisions of the lower courts regarding the issuance of a duplicate writ of execution concerning OSOBA_1 and remanded the case in this part for a new trial to the court of first instance, leaving the decision unchanged in the other part.<\/p>\n Case No. 689\/557\/20 dated 09\/10\/2025<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n 1. The subject of the dispute is an application for review based on newly discovered circumstances of a court decision regarding the cancellation of a decision on state registration of ownership.<\/p>\n 2. The court of cassation upheld the decision of the appellate court, which had dismissed the application for review based on newly discovered circumstances, as the plaintiff had missed the three-year period for filing such an application, established by Article 424 of the Civil Procedure Code of Ukraine, which is preclusive and not subject to renewal. The court noted that the applicant’s references to quarantine restrictions for renewing the term were unfounded, as the quarantine had already been lifted at the time of the appeal to the court, and the plaintiff did not file an application to renew the term due to the quarantine. Also, the court rejected the arguments about the suspension of the statute of limitations due to martial law, since in this case we are talking about missing the deadline for reviewing the decision based on newly discovered circumstances, and not about the statute of limitations. The court took into account the conclusions of the Supreme Court regarding the application of Article 424 of the Civil Procedure Code of Ukraine, set forth in other rulings.<\/p>\n 3. The court ruled: to dismiss the cassation appeal, and to uphold the decision of the appellate court.<\/p>\n Case No. 910\/10001\/24 dated 09\/10\/2025<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n 1. The subject of the dispute is the distribution of legal costs for professional legal assistance incurred by the defendant company in the court of cassation, in a case regarding the recovery of shares and determination of the size of participants’ shares in the authorized capital of companies, the claim in which was dismissed.<\/p>\n 2. The court of cassation, when considering the application for the distribution of court costs, was guided by the fact that in the event of dismissal of the claim, reimbursement of the defendant’s expenses is possible only if the unreasonableness of the plaintiff’s actions is established. The court recognized the plaintiff’s actions as unreasonable, since the latter, knowing about the existence of an arbitration clause, applied to the national court, and after losing in the courts of first instance and appeal, filed a cassation appeal with identical 3. The court partially satisfied the company’s application, recovering UAH 50,300 of court costs from the plaintiff in favor of the company, of which UAH 50,000 was for legal assistance and UAH 300 for postal expenses.<\/p>\n Case No. 728\/382\/24 dated 08\/10\/2025<\/strong><\/a> 2. The court of cassation overturned the decision of the court of appeal, supporting the decision of the court of first instance, emphasizing that in order to exercise the pre-emptive right to purchase agricultural land, it is necessary to comply with the mandatory requirements of the law, in particular, the timely written notification of the land owner about the transfer of the pre-emptive right. The court of first instance reasonably took into account that the plaintiff did not acquire the pre-emptive right of the buyer, since there was no evidence of proper notification of the land owner about the transfer of the pre-emptive right to her, as provided for by Article 130-1 of the Land Code of Ukraine. The court of appeal erroneously overturned the decision of the court of first instance, failing to take into account the mandatory requirements regarding the notification of the land owner. The court of cassation emphasized that the lack of evidence of proper notification of the land owner about the transfer of the pre-emptive right is grounds for refusing to satisfy the claim for the transfer of the rights and obligations of the buyer. The court of cassation noted that the courts must carefully check compliance with all the requirements of the law when exercising the pre-emptive right to purchase land.<\/p>\n 3. The court of cassation overturned the ruling of the court of appeal and upheld the decision of the court of first instance, refusing to satisfy the claim for the transfer of the rights and obligations of the buyer.<\/p>\n Case No. 761\/26648\/22 dated 08\/10\/2025<\/strong><\/a> 2. The court of cassation did not agree with the conclusion of the court of appeal that there was no inaction on the part of the Authorized Person of the IDGF, since after the introduction of the bank liquidation procedure and the appointment of an authorized 3. The Supreme Court overturned the decision of the appellate court and upheld the decision of the court of first instance.<\/p>\n Case No. 1\/B-294 dated 01\/10\/2025<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n 1. The subject of the dispute is the appeal against the ruling of the court of first instance and the decision of the appellate court regarding the extension of the rehabilitation procedure and amendments to the rehabilitation plan of PJSC “Ternopil Association “Texterno” in the bankruptcy case.<\/p>\n 2. The court of cassation upheld the decisions of the previous instances, based on the fact that the courts of the previous instances acted within the limits of the Law “On Restoration of Debtor’s Solvency or Declaration of Bankruptcy” as amended until 19.01.2013, since the proceedings in the case were opened before that date. The court took into account that the creditors’ committee approved the amendments to the rehabilitation plan, which provide for the sale of the debtor’s property to attract additional funds and financial recovery of the enterprise. Also, the court took into account the positive dynamics in restoring the debtor’s solvency, the impossibility of timely implementation of the rehabilitation plan due to objective factors, in particular, the martial law in Ukraine. The court noted that the purpose of rehabilitation is to prevent the liquidation of the enterprise, financial recovery and full restoration of the debtor’s solvency, which is in the interests of creditors and the state. The court also emphasized the cooperation of creditors, the debtor, the rehabilitation manager and investors to achieve this goal.<\/p>\n 3. The Supreme Court dismissed the cassation appeal and upheld the ruling of the Commercial Court of Ternopil Region and the decision of the Western Commercial Court of Appeal.<\/p>\n Case No. 904\/3982\/24 dated 13\/10\/2025<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n 1. The subject of the dispute is the ruling of the appellate court refusing to open appellate proceedings on the complaint of a person who was not involved in the case regarding the decision of the court of first instance on the dismantling of an unauthorizedly constructed parking lot.<\/p>\n 2. The Supreme Court, overturning the ruling of the appellate court, noted that 3. The Court overturned the appellate court’s ruling and sent the case for continued consideration from the stage of resolving the issue of initiating appellate proceedings.<\/p>\n Case No. 917\/1130\/23 dated 10\/13\/2025<\/strong><\/a> 2. The court partially granted the private enforcement officer’s application, reasoning that the private enforcement officer is entitled to reimbursement of court costs at the stage of judicial control over the execution of court decisions. The court took into account the submitted evidence regarding the scope of services provided and their cost, but reduced the amount of reimbursement because it considered the claimed expenses disproportionate to the complexity of the case and the amount of work performed. The court also noted that the signing of the response to the cassation appeal not by the lawyer himself does not affect the fact of providing legal assistance. At the same time, the court took into account the objections of “Vector. LTD” LLC regarding the inflated cost of the lawyer’s services, taking into account the small amount of the prepared response to the cassation appeal. The court was guided by the criteria of reality, reasonableness, and proportionality of the incurred expenses, as well as the principles of dispositivity and adversarial proceedings.<\/p>\n 3. The court ordered the recovery from “Vector. LTD” LLC in favor of the private enforcement officer of UAH 2,000 for professional legal assistance expenses, denying the satisfaction of the remaining claims of the application.<\/p>\n Case No. 917\/939\/24 dated 10\/09\/2025<\/strong><\/a> 2. The court dismissed the claim because the plaintiff did not prove with proper evidence the existence of the defendant’s debt for the disputed period, taking into account numerous changes in the terms of the contract regarding the procedure for settlements, which were introduced by additional agreements, as well as the prejudicial significance of the decision in another case, which established 3. The court of cassation dismissed the cassation appeal and upheld the decisions of the courts of previous instances.<\/p>\n Case No. 357\/3851\/24 dated 09\/22\/2025<\/strong><\/a> 2. The court of cassation overturned the decision of the appellate court, which refused to recover the costs of legal assistance, citing the absence of a report on the scope of services provided and an act of acceptance and transfer of work. The Supreme Court did not agree with this conclusion, indicating that, according to the contract for the provision of legal assistance, the cost of services was set at a fixed amount, which does not depend on the scope of services provided or the time spent. The court emphasized that in such a case, the specific list of actions of the attorney does not matter for determining the amount of the fee, and the appellate court should have proceeded from the fixed amount established by the contract. Also, the Supreme Court noted that the absence of objections to the proportionality of the claimed expenses and documentary confirmation of their payment are the basis for granting the application for the recovery of expenses for legal assistance.<\/p>\n 3. The court of cassation overturned the decision of the appellate court and issued a new decision to recover from the plaintiff in favor of the defendant the costs of professional legal assistance in the amount of UAH 20,000.00.<\/p>\n Case No. 824\/131\/23 dated 09\/25\/2025<\/strong><\/a> 2. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of private enforcement officer Biletskyi and upheld the ruling of the Kyiv Court of Appeal. This means that the court agreed with the decision of the appellate court, which presumably recognized Makovetskyi’s actions regarding the removal as justified. The court presumably proceeded from the fact that the private enforcement officer has the right to recuse himself in cases provided for by law to ensure impartiality of the enforcement proceedings. 3. The court dismissed the appeal and upheld the decision of the appellate court.<\/p>\n Case No. 990\/54\/24 dated 09\/25\/2025<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n 1. The subject of the dispute is the appeal by a judge against the decisions of the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine (HQCJ) regarding amendments to the HQCJ Regulations, which, according to the plaintiff, were adopted with an excess of authority and led to the unlawful recognition of him as not meeting the position held.<\/p>\n 2. The court, in refusing to satisfy the claim, proceeded from the fact that at the time the plaintiff applied to the court, the challenged amendments to the Regulations had already lost their validity, and therefore, there was no violation of the plaintiff’s rights at the time of applying to the court. The court also noted that the method of protection chosen by the plaintiff (challenging the amendments to the Regulations) would not lead to the restoration of his rights and interests, since the main goal of the plaintiff is to challenge the HQCJ’s decision on non-compliance with the position held, and not the amendments to the Regulations themselves. The court emphasized that the right to judicial protection guaranteed by the Constitution of Ukraine provides for the possibility of applying to the court only in case of a real violation of the rights and interests of a person at the time of applying to the court. The court indicated that the cancellation of decisions on amendments to the Regulations would lead to the loss of its integrity and inconsistency in the regulation of public relations. The court also noted that normative legal acts do not have retroactive effect in time, therefore, there is no reason to challenge provisions that have already lost their validity.<\/p>\n 3. The court dismissed the appeals and upheld the decision of the court of first instance.<\/p>\n Case No. 726\/2740\/23 dated 10\/13\/2025<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n 1. The subject of the dispute is the recognition of the termination of a mortgage on a residential building, concluded between the bank and the previous owner, since the plaintiff, as the new owner, believes that the obligations under the mortgage agreement have been fulfilled.<\/p>\n 2. The court of appeal overturned the decision of the court of first instance to close the proceedings, motivating this by the fact that for the closure of proceedings on the basis of a previous court decision, complete identity of the parties, subject matter and grounds of the claim is necessary. In this case, the grounds for the claim differ from previous cases, since the new owner of the property (plaintiff) acquired the right to judicial protection of his rights, in particular, by recognizing the mortgage as terminated. Previous court decisions do not deprive the new owner of the right to protect his rights, since in one case the claim was dismissed due to the choice of an improper method of protection. In addition, the court took into account that the plaintiff is a party 3. The Supreme Court dismissed the cassation appeal, and the decision of the appellate court remained unchanged, confirming the possibility of continuing the consideration of the case in the court of first instance.<\/p>\n Case No. 916\/3517\/24 dated 08\/10\/2025<\/strong><\/a> 2. The court of cassation instance found that the courts of previous instances did not take into account the special rules governing relations related to compensation for damages from collisions of vessels, namely the provisions of Chapter 3 of the Merchant Shipping Code of Ukraine, which have priority over the general rules of civil and commercial legislation. The courts did not establish the circumstances of the maritime casualty, the guilt of the person, the causal connection between the event and the damage, and did not investigate the availability of documents of the investigation of the maritime casualty. Also, the courts did not clarify whether the defendant violated specific navigation rules, and did not evaluate the defendant’s arguments regarding the impossibility of mooring the vessel without the permission of authorized bodies. In addition, the courts did not take into account the circumstances of the previous mooring of vessels by the plaintiff and the possible impact of these circumstances on the occurrence of damage. The court emphasized the need to establish the presence or absence of the defendant’s guilt and the plaintiff’s illegal conduct, which led to the damage.<\/p>\n 3. The court of cassation instance overturned the decisions of the previous instance courts and sent the case for a new trial to the court of first instance.<\/p>\n Case No. 917\/2322\/24 dated 08\/10\/2025<\/strong><\/a> 2. The decision does not contain any arguments of the court.<\/p>\n 3. The Supreme Court partially satisfied the cassation appeal, overturned the decisions of the previous instance courts in the part of recognizing the additional agreement as concluded, and sent the case for a new trial to the court of first instance, and in the other part changed the decision, stating their reasoning parts in its wording, leaving the rest unchanged.<\/p>\n Case No. 910\/7335\/24 dated 09\/10\/2025<\/strong><\/a> 2. The court of cassation instance upheld the decisions of the previous instance courts, which refused to satin dismissing the claim for invalidation of contracts, based on the following: the plaintiff did not refute the presumption of legality of the transaction established by Article 204 of the Civil Code of Ukraine, regarding the pledge agreement, which, according to the courts, was concluded by an authorized person on behalf of SILVERILL TRADING LIMITED and is valid. The courts found that the pledge agreement was concluded in a simple written form, which complies with the requirements of the law, and signed by an authorized representative of the company based on a power of attorney. Since the pledge agreement is valid, the assignment of the right of claim under this agreement is also lawful, and therefore, there are no grounds for invalidating the subsequent contracts of purchase and sale of a share in the authorized capital. The court of cassation also noted that the arguments of the cassation appeal actually come down to the circumstances of violation of the extrajudicial procedure for foreclosing on the subject of the pledge, which were not defined as the basis of the claim and were not the subject of consideration by the courts of previous instances.<\/p>\n 3. The court dismissed the cassation appeal, and the decisions of the courts of previous instances remained unchanged.<\/p>\n Case No. 686\/7506\/25 dated 10\/10\/2025<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n 1. The subject of the dispute is the submission of the chairman of the Khmelnytskyi Court of Appeal to send the materials of the complaint of PERSON_6 against the ruling of the investigating judge from one court of appeal to another.<\/p>\n 2. The Supreme Court, when considering the submission of the chairman of the Khmelnytskyi Court of Appeal, was guided by the provisions of Part 2 of Article 376 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, which allows limiting itself to drawing up and announcing the operative part of the ruling if the preparation of the full text requires significant time. The court took into account the need for a prompt resolution of the issue of jurisdiction of the complaint of PERSON_6 against the ruling of the investigating judge. According to established practice, a change in the jurisdiction of criminal proceedings, in particular, at the stage of appeal, may be justified by circumstances that make it impossible for the relevant court to hear the case. In this case, the chairman of the Khmelnytskyi Court of Appeal probably provided sufficient arguments justifying the transfer of the case to another court of appeal. The transfer of the case to the Ternopil Court of Appeal should ensure an objective and impartial review of the complaint of PERSON_6. The Supreme Court agreed with the arguments of the submission, considering them reasonable and compliant with the requirements of criminal procedure law.<\/p>\n 3. The Supreme Court ruled to grant the submission of the chairman of the Khmelnytskyi Court of Appeal and send the criminal proceedings on the complaint of PERSON_6 to the Ternopil Court of Appeal.<\/p>\n Case No. 953\/694\/23 dated 07\/10\/2025<\/strong><\/a> The court granted the defense attorney’s cassation appeal and excluded the additional punishment in the form of confiscation of property from the court decisions.<\/p>\n
\n1. The subject of the dispute is the establishment of the fact of a mother and daughter living as one family for the purpose of receiving a one-time allowance in connection with the death of the daughter.<\/p>\n
\n1. P
\nThe subject of the dispute is the application of “Agro-Lan” LLC for the adoption of an additional decision regarding the recovery from the plaintiffs of legal costs for professional legal assistance in the court of cassation instance.<\/p>\n
\n2. The court of cassation upheld the judgment of the court of appeal, agreeing that the court of appeal reasonably overturned the decision of the court of first instance.
\non regarding the release of a person from serving a sentence with probation. The court of cassation emphasized that the appellate court correctly considered the severity of the crime, the consequences that occurred, and the lack of sincere remorse in the convicted person, as he did not take sufficient measures to compensate for the damage caused. The Supreme Court emphasized that sincere remorse must be confirmed not only by admitting guilt but also by specific actions aimed at compensating for losses or eliminating the harm caused. The court also noted that the conclusion of the probation authority is advisory and not binding on the court. The Supreme Court indicated that the appellate court reasonably imposed a punishment in the form of actual imprisonment with deprivation of the right to drive vehicles, considering such punishment fair and necessary for the correction of the convicted person and the prevention of new crimes.<\/p>\n
\n2. The Supreme Court, when considering the submission of the Mykolaiv Court of Appeal, was guided by Articles 34 and 376 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine. The court took into account the need to ensure an objective and impartial consideration of the case, as well as compliance with the requirements of territorial jurisdiction. Considering the circumstances that could affect the objectivity of the case’s consideration in the Mykolaiv Court of Appeal, a decision was made to transfer the materials to the Odesa Court of Appeal. This decision is aimed at ensuring the applicant’s right to a fair trial. The court also noted that the full text of the ruling will be announced later, given the significant time required for its drafting.
\n3. The court ruled to grant the submission of the Mykolaiv Court of Appeal and to send the materials of the criminal proceedings to the Odesa Court of Appeal for consideration on the merits.<\/p>\n
\n2. The court of cassation, when considering the application for the distribution of court costs, was guided by the following. Firstly, Procter & Gamble Ukraine LLC submitted a preliminary (estimated) calculation of court costs in the response to the cassation appeal, as required by the Commercial Procedure Code of Ukraine. Secondly, the company declared its intention to submit evidence of incurred court costs within five days after the court’s decision, which also complies with the requirements of procedural law.
\nu. Thirdly, the court took into account that the amount of costs claimed for reimbursement (UAH 113,488.00) exceeds the amount specified in the preliminary calculation (UAH 79,040.00), and Procter & Gamble Ukraine LLC did not substantiate the increase in this amount, especially considering that the actual scope of legal assistance provided turned out to be less than planned. The court also emphasized that the recovery of professional legal assistance costs should not be a way for a party to become excessively enriched. Considering these circumstances, the court found it reasonable to recover legal assistance costs only in the amount specified in the preliminary calculation.<\/p>\n
\n2. The Supreme Court considered two main issues: whether Part 5 of Article 254 of the Civil Code of Ukraine applies to determining the term for fulfilling obligations if the agreement establishes a specific term, and whether increasing the claim amount for a new period is a simultaneous change of the subject matter and grounds of the claim. The court noted that Article 254 of the Civil Code of Ukraine regulates terms, not the deadline for fulfilling obligations, and if the agreement establishes a specific term, it must be fulfilled within this term. Also, the court indicated that increasing the claim amount under the same agreement is not a simultaneous change of the subject matter and grounds of the claim, but only an increase in the quantitative indicators of property claims. The court emphasized that liability for violation of a monetary obligation is established by Article 625 of the Civil Code of Ukraine, and the accrual of 3% per annum is a way to protect property rights and interests.
\n3. The Supreme Court overturned the decisions of the previous instances in the part of refusing to recover UAH 6,770.00 of 3% per annum and issued a new decision granting the claim in this part, and the defendant’s cassation appeal was dismissed.<\/p>\n
\n2. The Supreme Court partially granted the cassation appeal of PERSON_1, overturning the decisions of the courts of previous instances in the part of issuing a duplicate writ of execution against her, since the courts did not properly establish the fact of issuing the original writ of execution to the recovery claimant and its loss, which is a mandatory condition for issuing a duplicate. The court emphasized that a duplicate is issued only if the original writ of execution is actuallyexisted and was lost. The appellate court did not properly assess the arguments of OSOBA_1’s appeal regarding the absence of evidence of the writ of execution being issued to the claimant. At the same time, the Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the courts regarding the issuance of a duplicate writ of execution concerning OSOBA_2, as the latter did not appeal these decisions, and OSOBA_1 did not prove how this violated her rights. The court emphasized the principle of dispositiveness in civil proceedings, according to which each person independently decides whether to appeal a court decision.<\/p>\n
\narguments. At the same time, the court noted that the amount of expenses for professional legal assistance declared by the company is not commensurate with the complexity of the case and proportional to the subject of the dispute, since the dispute concerned only the issue of jurisdiction, and not the merits of the dispute, and the company’s position in the cassation instance was unchanged. The court also took into account that the company did not substantiate how exactly the amount of expenses for legal assistance was formed, and reduced its amount.<\/p>\n
\n1. The subject of the dispute is the transfer of the rights and obligations of the buyer under the contract of sale of a land plot, since the plaintiff believes that her pre-emptive right to purchase this plot was violated.<\/p>\n
\n1. The subject of the dispute is the recognition of the unlawful inaction of the Authorized Person of the Individuals’ Deposit Guarantee Fund (IDGF) regarding the failure to respond to an individual’s application to be recognized as a creditor and the obligation to perform certain actions.<\/p>\n
\nperson of the Fund, such person, acting on behalf of the bank and having the appropriate authority, was obliged to consider the application of an individual in the part of the requirements that do not relate to the recognition of such individual as a creditor, in accordance with the procedure provided for by the Law of Ukraine “On Citizens’ Appeals.” The court noted that the authorized person of the Fund acts on behalf of the bank within the powers of the Fund and has the right to sign any documents on behalf of the bank. Thus, the authorized person was obliged to consider the application or instruct the bank’s employees to consider it. The court also emphasized that the court of first instance correctly applied the norms of both the Law of Ukraine “On Citizens’ Appeals” and the Law of Ukraine “On the System of Guaranteeing Deposits of Individuals,” recognizing the inaction of the Authorized Person of the Fund as unlawful and obliging such person to consider the application in the proper part.<\/p>\n
\nthe right to a fair trial, guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, requires ensuring the possibility for a person to appeal court decisions. The Court emphasized that the appellate court should not exhibit excessive formalism when deciding on the issue of restoring the term for appeal, especially when the complaint is filed by a person who was not involved in the case and did not receive a copy of the decision of the court of first instance. It is important to consider the minor lapse of the term, the person’s genuine intention to appeal the decision, and the absence of abuse of procedural rights. The Court indicated that the appellate court should assess the circumstances of the lapse of the term for valid reasons, establish whether the term is significant, and whether restoring the term would interfere with the principle of legal certainty.<\/p>\n
\n1. The subject of the dispute is the private enforcement officer’s application for the recovery from “Vector. LTD” LLC of expenses for legal assistance incurred in connection with the consideration of the cassation appeal.<\/p>\n
\n1. The subject of the dispute is the recovery from the municipal enterprise in favor of the energy company of debt for electricity transmission services, as well as penalties.<\/p>\n
\nthe fact that the defendant paid for services for the previous period; the court also took into account that the defendant made payment for services for December 2023, and the plaintiff did not substantiate the legal nature of the charges for each separate period, taking into account the terms of the contract, which were amended by additional agreements. The court of cassation agreed with the conclusions of the courts of previous instances, noting that the plaintiff did not provide proper evidence of the defendant’s delay in fulfilling monetary obligations, and also did not substantiate the legal nature of the charges for each separate period, taking into account the terms of the contract, which were amended by additional agreements. The court of cassation rejected the arguments of the cassation appeal that the courts of previous instances did not take into account the legal conclusions of the Supreme Court, set forth in other cases, since the circumstances of these cases are not similar to the circumstances of this case.<\/p>\n
\n1. The subject of the dispute is the recovery of expenses for professional legal assistance.<\/p>\n
\n1. The subject of the dispute is the appeal against the actions of private enforcement officer Makovetskyi regarding the issuance of a decision on removal.<\/p>\n
\nproceedings. It is possible that Biletskyi appealed the legitimacy of the grounds for the removal of Makovetskyi, but the court found no grounds to grant his complaint. The final court decision was based on an analysis of the circumstances of the case and the application of the provisions of the law on enforcement proceedings.<\/p>\n
\nregarding relations under a subsequent mortgage. The Supreme Court agreed with these conclusions, noting that the non-identity of at least one of the elements of the claim or the rejection of the claim due to an improper method of protection does not prevent a repeated appeal to the court.<\/p>\n
\n1. The subject of the dispute is the recovery of material damages caused by damage to the vessel from a private enterprise in favor of a state enterprise.<\/p>\n
\n1. The subject of the dispute is the appeal against the decision of the village council and the recognition of an additional agreement concluded between the farm enterprise and the village council.<\/p>\n
\n1. The subject of the dispute is the recognition of invalidity of contracts for the assignment of the right of claim and the sale and purchase of a share in the authorized capital of the company.<\/p>\n
\nThe subject of the dispute in the case is the legality of applying an additional penalty in the form of confiscation of property to a person convicted of collaboration.
\nthe commission of new crimes. The court also took into account that the crime committed by the convicted person falls under criminal offenses, and there are no circumstances that aggravate the punishment. Considering established judicial practice, the court concluded that it was necessary to exclude the additional punishment in the form of confiscation of property.<\/p>\n